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The references use a modified Oxford format with the full citation being 
given on the first occasion in a chapter and subsequent citations in that chapter 
giving a recognisable shortened form of the title. The references for each chapter 
are treated separately, so that if a source has been cited in a previous chapter the 
full citation is still provided for the first reference to it in a new chapter. In 
references for the first two, theoretical chapters, titles of key Soviet journals are 
not abbreviated, but in the last three, empirical chapters they are, as follows:
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The Library of Congress transliteration of Russian is used for all reference titles, 
but not for proper names, since some Soviet scholars prefer otherwise (e.g. 
Simoniya) and an alternative version of other names is common (e.g. Trotsky, 
Levkovsky). Within reason, I have sought a blend of simplicity and consistency. 
A scholar's first name or initial is given at the first reference in the text, but 
subsequent references use only the surname. Two Vasil'ev s are referred to in the 
text, Vladimir F. in chapter three and Leonid S. in chapter five; otherwise, only 
one scholar with the same surname is discussed in the text. Apart from common 
abbreviations like CPSU, two specific acronyms are used throughout the thesis:
IMEMO = Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 
IVAN = Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk
(The Institute of World Economy and International Relations is also part of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, but this usage is common in Moscow.) Throughout 
the thesis, original emphasis is designated by italics and my emphasis by 
underlining.
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A bstract
This thesis investigates three layers of Soviet debate since the mid 1960s about 
problems of development. A protracted debate about the importance of 'socialist 
orientation' in the third world is considered principally as a dispute between 
conservative officials and liberal critics about the significance for Soviet foreign 
policy of dependent allies in a global struggle with imperialism. A parallel debate 
about the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the third world is evaluated 
mainly as the first phase of a substantial discussion amongst leading scholars 
searching for an adequate theory of the developing world. A subterranean debate 
about the nature of modem Soviet society is presented as an example of the 
profound criticism of Brezhnev's regime which some leading scholars were able 
to make in print during the 'years of stagnation'. These empirical interpretations 
are based on two theoretical arguments, which establish the main historical 
contexts of Soviet development debates and the position of an outside reader as 
someone necessarily concerned with the same questions as the participants in the 
debates. The thesis demonstrates the intellectual achievements of a group of 
committed Soviet scholars, whose thought was not constrained by a dogmatic 
system of censorship. By showing the openness of Soviet discussions to a foreign 
interpreter, it questions the view that 'Marxism-Leninism' has constituted the 
language of recent development debates in the USSR.
one sees by experience in our times that the princes who have done great 
things are those who have taken little account of faith and have known how 
to get around men's brains with their astuteness; and in the end they have 
overcome those who have founded themselves on loyalty. ... But it is 
necessary to know well how to colour this nature, and to be a great 
pretender and dissembler, and men are so simple and so obedient to 
present necessities that he who deceives will always find someone who 
will let himself be deceived. ... For the vulgar are taken in by the 
appearance and outcome of a thing, and in the world there is no one 
but the vulgar,
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr., 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, pp. 69-71.
all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the 
essence of things directly coincided.
Karl Maix, Capital, volume III, Progress, Moscow, 1959, p. 817.
The error often committed in historico-political analyses consists in 
having been unable to find the correct relationship between what is 
organic and what is occasional: thus one succeeds either in expounding as 
directly operative causes which instead operate indirectly, or in asserting 
that diiect causes are the only effective causes; in the one case there is an 
excess of 'economism' or pedantic doctrinairism, in the other an excess of 
'ideologism'; in the one case an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the 
other an exaltation of the voluntarist and individual element. The distinction 
between 'organic' movements and events and 'incidental' or occasional 
movements and events must be applied to all types of situations, not only to 
those where one sees a reactionary development or an acute crisis, but to 
those where one sees a progressive or prosperous development and to those 
where one sees a stagnation of the productive forces. The dialectical nexus 
between the two kinds of movement, and, therefore, of research, is difficult 
to establish; and if the error is serious in historiography, it is still more 
serious in the art of politics, where we are dealing not with reconstructing 
past history but with building present and future history; one's own inferior 
and immediate desires and passions are the causes of error, insofar as they 
are substituted for objective and impartial analysis, and this happens not as 
a conscious 'means' to stimulate action but as self-deceit Here also, the 
snake bites the charlatan, or rather the demagogue is the first victim of 
his demagogy.
Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince, International Publishers, New York, 
1957, pp. 166-7.
1Introduction
The word, if it is not an acknowledged falsehood, is bottomless.
(Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 127.)
This thesis began within a comer of one of the two basic language-games for 
writing about the USSR, but has finished toward the centre of the other game. 
The first game is called Sovietology, and involves reading Soviet sources in order 
to disclose the Soviet state's policy in various domains. The second game might 
be called 'anti-Stalinism', and involves a dialogue with an "intellectual opposition" 
in the USSR.* Both games can be played in parallel, since they share a concern 
for "what is manifest in the text" of Soviet political discourse, and have basically 
"the same method: measurement of the deviation of a current statement from the 
traditional c l i c h e . What initially distinguishes these games is the texts they 
consider worth reading. Sovietologists value documents which either express or 
might influence the behaviour of the Kremlin, while 'anti-Stalinists' value 
documents which expose the inadequacies of Soviet society. Glasnost' has brought 
these games closer together but by no means merged them into one. Some of the 
interpretations presented herein belong to the first game, while others belong to 
the second. Since the leading Soviet scholars discussing problems of development 
have played both games from 'inside the whale', I have followed suit.^
The main originality of this thesis is in demonstrating that some key documents 
can be read in terms of both these language-games. What is manifest in the key 
texts of Soviet development debates is not one meaning but several 
complementary meanings, which exist at different 'levels' of analysis or 
conceptual 'depth'.^ Three broad layers of Soviet debate about development were 
revealed in a process of empirical discovery which roughly corresponded to the 
argument presented in a recent article entitled "Once More About the Problem of 
Socialist Orientation".^ First, the official view of the third world from the early 
1960s until the early 1980s, which declared 'non-capitalist development' to be a 
widespread alternative to peripheral capitalism, was considered as the object of a
2critique by some leading scholars who were dissatisfied with quoting Marx and 
Lenin out of context in order to affirm a simplistic account of social change in the 
developing countries.^ This critique was investigated as the most significant part 
of a broad debate about Soviet policy toward the third world, the key question of 
which was gradually discerned as the importance or marginality of dependent 
allies. Second, behind this critical response to the ruling dogma of 'socialist 
orientation' there lay a more complex and intellectually substantial debate about 
the prospects for capitalist development in post-colonial societies. This discussion 
was viewed as part of a broad settling of accounts with the official slogan of 
capitalism's 'general crisis', which many Soviet scholars seem to have engaged in 
since at least the early 1960s. While some of the ideas expressed in this debate 
reinforced the orthodox view of 'socialist orientation' and most supported the 
emerging critique of it, the scope of the questions at issue clearly transcended the 
immediate priorities of Soviet foreign policy, involving a consideration of the 
objective force of capitalism and the limitations of possible alternatives to it in 
backward countries without the necessary prerequisites for a transition to 
socialism.^ Third, beneath this consideration the most critical scholars were 
found using the logical power of comparative analysis in order to reflect upon 
key historical situations in which the basic structures of Soviet society had been 
forged. At this level, problems of development oriented toward socialism were 
being earnestly reconsidered in the profound context of twentieth century world 
history, rather than treated sophistically in terms of the subjective requirements
o
of "ideological struggle in the international arena".
These three broad layers of Soviet debate about development are distinguished 
by the participants involved and the resonance of the ideas discussed, as well as by 
the scope of the questions at issue. At the top layer, debate about the significance 
of states of ’socialist orientation' for Soviet foreign policy tended during the 
1970s and early 1980s to involve a growing number of prominent liberal critics 
attacking a conservative orthodoxy which was affirmed by senior officials and 
supported by a decreasing band of lesser scholars. The influence on Soviet policy 
of the liberal critique of dependent allies was limited during the Brezhnev period
3precisely by the fact that the main objects of criticism were key officials like 
Rostislav Ul'ianovsky. By the same token, the influence of this critique under 
Gorbachev has been greatly extended as a result of the rejuvenation of the Soviet 
foreign policy apparatus.^ At the middle layer, debate about the prospects for 
peripheral capitalism developed in the 1970s and 1980s mainly through arguments 
amongst leading Soviet scholars themselves, rather than between prominent 
scholars and current officials. The resonance of this debate amongst specialists 
has grown gradually in accordance with the increasing sophistication of the 
arguments elaborated, not sharply as a result of a change in the political climate, 
although the new atmosphere of open discussion has allowed the arguments to be 
taken further and encouraged more participants to join in debating a complex 
topic. At the bottom layer, esoteric debate about the nature of Soviet society had 
from the late 1960s until recently involved only a relatively small group of the 
leading scholars, whose implicit meanings would have been largely restricted, by 
small publication runs and the apparently foreign subject matter, to themselves 
and any fortunate and perceptive onlookers. Here the effect of glasnost' has been 
quite dramatic, opening up the most critical level of Soviet development debates 
to a wider audience. Ideas elaborated in a cramped code have been allowed to 
breath the fresh air of rhetorical suasion, and this together with the topicality of 
debate about the nature of Stalinism will have increased significantly the influence 
of that criticism which accurately named its referent.
Fortuitously, the top and bottom layers of Soviet development debates have 
just finished in the form that they have taken since the late 1960s, while the 
middle layer has reached a new peak of all-round discussion, from which 
previous arguments can be evaluated with the benefit of hindsight. The debate 
about dependent allies finally ended last year with a complete victory for the 
critics, both on the specific question of foreign policy priorities involved and on 
the general issue of the legitimacy of relatively independent scholarly input into 
policy-making. The attempt by old officials to restrict scientific discussion 
largely to an endorsement of the official line failed slowly but surely, and a new 
period of quite open proposals for improving Soviet third world policy has
4clearly begun. A more interdependent division of labour between scholars and 
policy-makers is reflected also in the effervescence of debate about the prospects 
for capitalism in the third world. While the empirical difference between 
remaining states of ’socialist orientation' and various types of peripheral capitalist 
development is still recognised, automatic consideration of the former as more 
reliable partners for the USSR has been dropped. Consequently, the distinction 
between the top and middle layers of debate has recently become less marked, 
since while a new liberal orthodoxy has emerged, it has the support of most 
leading scholars, and criticism of this orthodoxy is predominantly a continuation 
of arguments between specialists, not scepticism toward the new line. The 
opening up of the bottom layer of esoteric debate about Soviet society has also 
reduced its distinctiveness as a separate discussion, and in some cases enabled 
straightforward confirmation of inferences about meanings which might hitherto 
have seemed incongruous to an informed sceptic.
This thesis focuses on debates amongst leading Soviet scholars not on actual 
policies conducted by the Soviet state, but it assumes that the arguments of the 
former shed some light on the actions of the latter. Ideas or 'perceptions' are an 
inalienable part of any action, so Soviet policies cannot be understood by ignoring 
the dominant beliefs of decision-makers and interpreting only the use of hard and 
fast capabilities.^ And since the beliefs of those responsible for policy do not 
exist in a social vacuum, the evidence available for illuminating these beliefs is not 
limited to statements by decision-makers themselves. In broad terms, the tenor of 
Soviet scholarly debate about third world development was considered as a 
response to the prevailing concerns of the Soviet leadership. Many different 
particular responses were analysed in terms of a hierarchy of basic policy 
objectives, derived from a directive speech to Soviet orientalists by a leading 
foreign policy official of the Brezhnev regime and an interpretation of Soviet 
actions in the third world. The general tone of the response from leading 
scholars to official concerns changed from increasing criticism in the late 
Brezhnev years to enthusiastic support after the proclamation of 'new political 
thinking', which suggests a basic change in the dominant beliefs of the new Soviet
5leadership compared to the world view of their predecessors in the Politburo. 
From this perspective, the process of conceptual change or learning in Soviet 
foreign policy has been more like a 'spiral' creeping up a bureaucratic pyramid 
than a 'curve' expressing the depressed expectations of incumbent officials. Since 
the topic of the thesis is limited to scholarly debates, statements of the new 
leadership have not been studied in order to work out the new hierarchy of basic 
Soviet policy objectives toward the third world, but some broad hypotheses about 
the extent of conceptual change are suggested in the conclusions. At the bottom 
layer of debate about the nature of Soviet society, the contrast between scholarly 
arguments and official concerns is considerably starker, and the lag of policy 
behind theory much more evident. Although Gorbachev complained at the 
January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that the "moving forces 
and contradictions" of Soviet society had "not become the object of profound 
scientific investigations", it is clear that this statement was not entirely accurate.^ 
Whereas most of the critical liberal arguments about understanding the third 
world advanced by Soviet scholars in the 'years of stagnation' have readily been 
accepted as part of the re-evaluation of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, 
many of the radical criticisms of Stalinism made in the esoteric debate about the 
nature of Soviet society disputed the existence of a 'socialist order' in the USSR, 
and so cannot be embraced without a more substantial revision of dogmas than has 
yet occurred.
A principal concern of the theoretical section of this thesis is to elucidate the 
nature of 'Marxism-Leninism' as the milieu of Soviet development debates. Since 
the empirical research was informed by a sceptical attitude toward the view that 
'Marxism-Leninism' constitutes the conceptual framework of Soviet discussion, it 
seemed necessary to substantiate this through an alternative explanation of 'Soviet 
ideology'. Rather than a coherent and believable theory, official Soviet dogma 
was interpreted as an idiom of censorship, the 'revisions' of which in the 
post-Stalin era were adjustments to accommodate social pressures for reform, not 
concessions to the unrealisability of a liberating utopia. This materialist approach 
to the dominant form of Soviet political discourse was initially supported largely
8with accounts by emigres and dissidents of life within the Soviet intelligentsia
during the Brezhnev years, then confirmed by an interpretation of the one text in
the esoteric debate about Soviet society which analysed the problem of 'mass 
1 9consciousness’, and buttressed with some recent statements by liberal Soviet 
intellectuals published as a result of glasnost'. Viewing 'Marxism-Leninism' as a 
loyalty test rather than a belief system did not mean discounting the role of Marx 
and Lenin as sources of ideas for some leading participants in Soviet development 
debates. On the contrary, this approach highlighted cases in which these 
theoretical sources were used in order to explain features of third world 
development or Stalinism, particularly where competing arguments were 
presented by scholars relying on different views expressed by Marx and Lenin, 
without discounting the presence in Soviet debates of a variety of ideas deriving 
from other sources.
The basic problem in interpreting the political meaning of Soviet development 
debates was not to find the key to a hidden ’operational code’, but simply to find 
some questions with which to pass through an open door by means of an "actual 
dialogue in the field". ^  The sign ’Marxism-Leninism' did not mark a threshold 
of debate, but rather a mirror of narcissism, whose "pretentious" claim to a 
monopoly of self-truths effectively precluded the "mutual outsideness" 
presupposed by all dialogue.^ By denying the contingency of its own context, 
this sign obscured the questions which participants in Soviet development debates 
were trying to answer. Finding these questions involved assuming that some key 
problems were perceived in broadly the same terms by these participants and the 
outside reader. The basic task was to find the most interesting common problems, 
as opposed to either viewing Soviet problems as a reason for Western 
self-satisfaction or focusing on unproblematic commonalities. In this sense, "the 
person who understands inevitably becomes a third party in the dialogue", a 
'superaddressee' "whose absolutely just responsive understanding" mediates 
between the author and the immediate audience from outside and after the fac t.^  
The position of this third party is not objective but interested, so that justice in 
interpreting a debate is achieved not by adopting a neutral, uncritical attitude but
7by exhausting one question after another. Finding meaning in a text requires not 
only reading it, but asking what it sought to do for whom. Such understanding 
responds to the text by incorporating it into a new language-game in which the 
dialogue between author and audience is re-awakened. The polysemy inherent in 
the key texts of Soviet development debates shows that the different outside 
perspectives represented by Sovietology and 'anti-Stalinism' are founded upon 
different questions rather than different documents.
My research is presented in two short theoretical chapters and three long 
empirical ones. The first chapter endeavours to resolve some fundamental 
methodological and epistemological problems involved in understanding the broad 
practice of 'esoteric communication' in the Soviet context. The main features of 
policy debates amongst the Soviet intelligentsia are characterised through a review 
of previous Western studies, then the process of interpreting Soviet political 
discourse is shown to depend upon the outside reader making a bridging 
assumption of some common meanings. The second chapter establishes such 
meanings through an investigation of the three general contexts of Soviet 
development debates. The first context is a broad 'loosening' of ideological 
censorship in the post-Stalin era, while the second is the renewal of serious 
comparative research which occurred in the theoretical field of Soviet oriental 
studies gradually from 1956 onwards, reaching a 'critical mass' by the late 1960s.* 
The third context is the hierarchy of basic Soviet policy objectives toward the 
third world during the Brezhnev years, which forms the main period covered by 
the empirical research. The third chapter presents an analysis of the most 
significant arguments in the long-running Soviet debate about 'socialist 
orientation', known initially as 'non-capitalist development'. The main theme of 
this debate is revealed as the declining significance of dependent allies for Soviet 
foreign policy in the opinion of an increasing number of leading scholars. The 
fourth chapter presents an account of the first twenty years of Soviet debate about 
the prospects for capitalism in the third world, which began in earnest in the late 
1960s. The main theme of this debate is revealed as a change from initial 
scepticism about such prospects to more recent optimism, although it is shown
8that some key issues have not been resolved and substantial dispute is likely to 
continue amongst the leading scholars for some time to come. The fifth chapter 
presents a reading of a subterranean debate in which a select group of scholars 
critically reconsidered the nature of Soviet society while ostensibly only 
discussing the 'third world'. This reading reveals the existence within the Soviet 
intelligentsia of a diversity of radical and liberal responses to the legacy of 
Stalinism, at a time when this wounded heart of Soviet history was apparently 
forgotten. The conclusions highlight the key points of the thesis concerning 
Soviet politics in general and Soviet views of development in particular.
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Chapter 1: Interpreting the Political Meaning of Soviet Debates
The central task of the interpreter is to find the question to which a text presents 
the answer, to understand a text is to understand the question [it addresses].
(Josef Bleicher, The Hermeneutical Imagination, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1982, p.75) 1
Many students of Soviet foreign policy toward the third world have implicitly 
assumed that the political meaning of Soviet sources is self-evident.^ This 
assumption may be questioned theoretically by attempting to formulate some 
guidelines for interpretation that elaborate the old adage, 'read between the lines'. 
An elaborate theoretical approach is in itself no guarantee of producing 
significant empirical results. Archie Brown has warned about the "danger ... of 
merely presenting familiar knowledge in a less familiar framework. Even this 
may not be entirely devoid of interest, but the change of approach can be really 
justified only if its different conceptual framework leads the researcher into 
somewhat less familiar territory, the exploration of which produces new 
knowledge and a refinement of our understanding of Soviet political life.'0  The 
task of theoretical questioning is to establish where a new area of research exists, 
and to suggest how it is best investigated. In this sense, theoretical and empirical 
work are complementary not opposed; they are simply different aspects of a 
process of asking the most pertinent questions. As C. Wright Mills succinctly 
said: "'Method' has to do, first of all, with how to ask and answer questions with 
some assurance that the answers are more or less durable. 'Theory' has to do, 
above all, with paying close attention to the words one is using, especially their 
degree of generality and their logical relations. The primary purpose of both is 
clarity of conception and economy of procedure." ^
Identifying Political Perceptions
The topic of policy debates amongst the Soviet elite about various foreign and 
domestic problems has emerged during the past two decades as a significant area
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of research. Many detailed studies have been undertaken, but the methodological 
difficulties of this research have not always received sufficient attention. These 
difficulties exist principally because of the strict censorship which has existed in 
the USSR over what could be said publicly to selected audiences, and increasingly 
also because of "the vastly greater organisational complexity of the Soviet polity 
and policy-making process."^ Central control over information and public 
expression together with more diverse inputs into policy formation mean that it is 
difficult to determine at first glance what is politically significant in Soviet 
sources. Yet, as Mary McAuley said in a recent debate about Soviet political 
culture, "if we are to analyse political perceptions and to try to explain them, we 
must first be able to identify them."^ Any such identification must proceed by a 
method of inference from Soviet sources, so the problem of correctly identifying 
political perceptions amongst the Soviet elite is essentially one of avoiding errors 
of inference when interpreting Soviet sources. Elaborating an adequate method 
of inference from Soviet sources is difficult, as shown by the fact that such 
methods have usually been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly argued for. 
Explicit inferences may not be intrinsically superior to implicit ones, but it is 
important to specify the assumptions upon which certain expressions in Soviet 
discourse are considered more significant than others as indicators of political 
belief.^ At least, as Erik Hoffmann suggested in 1966, "a rudimentary but 
important piece of advice would be to infer carefully the m eaning  of 
communications, and not to take the stated meaning or contents literally.
The carefulness of inference from Soviet sources depends fundamentally on a 
preliminary assumption about the existence of political argument within the Soviet 
elite. If it is assumed that no significant political differences exist, whether 
because of the supposed "unifying dynamic of common ideology" or because of 
strict censorship, then careful inference is not necessary, since every source will 
equally be "an index of real perceptions".^ But "censorship is introduced by 
those who fear public opinion, [so] the very existence of censorship is a sign that 
oppositional thought is alive and cannot be eradicated."^ Significant political 
differences have been shown to exist even at the topmost level of the Soviet elite, 
so the need for careful inference should not be avoided by simply assuming the
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uniformity of all opinions expressed (this would logically negate the purpose of 
any detailed and sophisticated investigation of Soviet sources, since if two 
different Soviet "schools of thought” are found, the only conclusion consistent 
with the initial assumption is that there is no effective political difference between 
them).** Once the existence of political argument is recognised, a number of 
interpretative difficulties must be resolved. The first problem is understanding 
the forms or methods of public debate within the Soviet e lite .^  Without this 
understanding it is impossible to avoid making false inferences about the policy 
implications of particular Soviet statements. A consideration of the forms in 
which policy debate occurs is also the best way of approaching perennial 
problems of interpretation, like distinguishing between genuine perceptions and 
propagandists affirmation, and identifying the link between scholarly debates and 
the making of foreign policy decisions.
Public debate within the Soviet elite has been restricted by three different 
forms of censorship. Specifically, the central censoring body Glavlit "checks to 
ensure that numerous types of concrete information, primarily military or 
economic, are not included in the manuscript."^ Banning of particular subjects 
prohibits direct mention of sensitive political issues which might offend foreign 
governments, but mainly affects the provision of information rather than the 
extent of debate allow ed .^  Generally, the main political and ideological 
restrictions on debate are instituted principally by editorial boards of newspapers, 
journals and publishing houses, who control the expression of political arguments 
in print. ^  This institutional form of censorship sets the tone of discussion in 
particular fields, defining the extent of self-censorship which scholars must use if 
they wish to present their views publicly. Both central and institutional forms of 
censorship can shift in scope, markedly as a result of new policies and 
appointments made from above, and marginally as a result of persistent struggles 
by authors and editors to open a crevice for thought. Socially, these two directly 
political forms of censorship have been reinforced by a third: the "influence on 
culture as a whole" of Soviet ideology, which, as Andrei Sinyavsky pointed out, 
"forbids silence. A  degree of silence is necessary for clear thinking, so an 
'ideology' which makes people listen to and participate in a monologue of noisy
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lies can best be understood as part of a comprehensive system of censorship.
The result of these forms of censorship, as Jerry Hough pointed out several 
years ago, has been that in the USSR ’’foreign policy is almost impossible to 
discuss [openly] in any sophisticated manner.”^  This limitation has affected 
different types of Soviet sources in quite different ways, so that distinguishing 
between the kinds of discussion possible in Soviet sources is an important 
requirement for any careful method of inference. As Ronald Hill has suggested, 
there are
three basic types of political literature in the Soviet Union: first, the 'official' 
literature ... including the speeches and writings of politicians, together with 
official handbooks and commentaries; second, 'propagandistic' literature, 
written in a popular style, for home or foreign consumption, and designed 
to present the accepted view, revealing no secrets, no serious problems; and, 
third, 'heavy' political science, published by academic or provincial presses 
or in specialist journals, often by scholars whose work also appears in more 
popular format or in the periodical press. This literature tends to be more 
revealing, more realistic in its assessment... more willing to discuss problems 
in a serious manner. It relies much less on pure assertion, more on the results 
of detailed study, backed up with argumentation and judgement. There is also 
a concern for methodology that immediately raises such work to a level of 
respectability that few would accord the unsophisticated accounts.^
Soviet sources in the ’official’ category are the most difficult to characterise, since 
their nature depends on the position of the official(s) whose views they represent, 
as well as on the subject matter discussed and the context of the audience 
addressed. The distinction between academic and propagandistic literature was 
confirmed by a leading Soviet foreign policy official, Boris Ponomarev, who, in a 
speech to the Institute of Oriental Studies (hereinafter IVAN), informed Soviet 
scholars that they were required to undertake "scientific-research and 
popularising work”. ^  The meaning of this distinction is essentially that serious 
discussion with implications for policy occurs only in the scientific-research work 
performed by Soviet scholars, not in their propagandistic work, which simply 
endorses official policy. But the demands of the latter for a long time restricted 
the influence of the former, leading a prominent reformist scholar to claim in 
July, 1987, that it was "necessary to establish a clear line between scientific
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publications and publications reflecting the official position”, so that scholars can 
work out answers to current problems and not waste time defending old 
policies.^
Most errors of inference from Soviet sources result from attempts to deduce 
political perceptions from propagandistic statements, thus confusing the two most 
different types of Soviet sources. While central and institutional censorship 
ensures that all Soviet sources avoid direct discussion of sensitive issues, 
propagandistic material must in addition provide a lot of noise affirming the 
"postulate” that the USSR ”may conduct only such a foreign policy which, by 
definition, is from the beginning correct, free from mistakes and answering the 
interests of all progressive f o r c e s . * Because of this, most direct comment in 
the USSR on Soviet foreign policy is mere polemical affirmation, the purpose of 
which is not to discuss problems or suggest changes, but simply to persuade all 
that this policy is being conducted in the best possible way. Moscow Radio 
foreign language broadcasts are crucial for a study of Soviet propaganda, but of 
little or no interest for investigating Soviet perceptions. Even articles in New  
Times and International Affairs, while more nuanced and informative than most 
radio broadcasts, consisted until recently almost entirely of statements trumpeting 
Soviet p o l i c y . T h e s e  "obligatory polemical banalities", as Neil Malcolm has 
aptly termed them, also exist in Soviet academic discourse, but there they are 
usually ritual emendations from which "the author's real meaning has to be 
carefully disentangled".^ The dividing line between these two types of Soviet 
discourse is rarely clear-cut — the same article can include both types of discourse
— but it nevertheless exists. If any article by a Soviet foreign policy official is 
simply read as a literal expression of the beliefs impelling complex Soviet actions, 
then an error of inference is the most likely result.^
While the danger of confusing propagandistic affirmation with genuine 
perceptions affecting Soviet foreign policy formation can be minimised by 
considering the contexts of particular statements, this assumes that Soviet 
specialists themselves manage to keep their affirmatory and explanatory activities 
separate. Ronald Pope has argued that the optimistic character of much Soviet
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academic discourse might make many analysts in Moscow "the victims of their 
own propaganda."^ Such an effect should not be ruled out as impossible, but it 
is necessary to specify the type of situation in which it could occur. This is where 
a specialist or official has no access to information that casts doubt on the 
accuracy of a purely affirmatory view of events, and also will not seek such 
information because the responsibility for making ill-advised decisions does not 
rest with them. These conditions are definitive at most only of John Steinbruner's 
category of ’grooved’ thinkers, who, as Robert Cutler has suggested, in the Soviet 
context "are the low-level functionaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Situating Steinbruner's two other categories institutionally, Cutler comments that: 
"The 'uncommitted' policy-makers are the chief political decision-makers in the 
country: the Politburo and the Secretariat, and to some degree the Central 
Committee Departments. The 'theoretical' policy-makers are the institute-based 
advisors and ministerial consultants."^ Both these groups would be very 
unlikely to mistake propagandists justification for actual perception (the accuracy 
of their perceptions is another matter). The former receive much classified 
information at odds with a purely affirmatory view, including special summaries 
of foreign political commentary; they are also responsible for the general 
supervision of political propaganda, a task which requires the ability to 
distinguish justification from perception, or words from deeds. The latter 
have access to fairly diverse sources of public information, and are able to 
discriminate readily between the requirements of policy affirmation and the 
opportunités for genuine articulation of opinions since, as Franklyn Griffiths has 
pointed out, they have regularly "said different things to different audiences at 
about the same time."29 When unorthodox scholars put forward conventional 
arguments at certain times, they are consciously making concessions to tradition 
in some areas in order to advance other opinions of a more controversial 
n a tu re .^  Rather than an effect of propaganda, this is simply one of many 
techniques which Soviet specialists regularly use in order to get around the 
restrictions on open discussion.
Several other techniques regularly appear in Soviet academic literature as 
forms of esoteric communication and debate, using Aesopian language that does
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not infringe what Hough has called the two basic "rules of the gam e".^ These 
rules are: 1) that Soviet policy itself cannot be discussed directly in any critical 
manner; and 2) that certain postulates, like the consistently peace-loving nature of 
Soviet policy, the ultimate irreconcilability of the two social systems and the 
absence of a third way between them, must be accepted without question. The 
consequence of the first rule is that, instead of an open debate about policy options 
for the USSR, "published discussion of foreign policy takes place within the 
framework of a discussion of the 'objective situation' in the outside world." And 
since, in accordance with the second rule, "any change in Soviet policy, when 
acknowledged at all, is described as the natural response of a perfectly consistent 
program to differences in conditions", the focus of public debate must always be 
on the nature and implications of those conditions.^^ The techniques of 
conducting such debate vary, depending on the scope and sensitivity of the matter 
at issue. Relatively open discussions became more regular after the fall of 
Khrushchev, when "the collective leadership adopted a comparatively detached 
approach in which specialists were evidently given greater freedom to resolve 
their own differences and to carry out research and a n a l y s i s . T h e s e  open 
discussions usually focus on broad questions, rather than on what is occurring in a 
particular country, but, as Hough has pointed out, "the more abstract the debate, 
the more sensitive the real issue is likely to b e ."^  While broad questions may be 
debated with some openness, this is not possible for particular sensitive issues, on 
which "a controversial position is presented in a straightforward manner, without 
any indication that it is controversial or that another position is being attacked."^ 
Sometimes points of criticism are made esoterically through commentaries on 
historical or foreign surrogates, or by means of a "false denial", when a new 
interpretation is raised and apparently rejected, simply in order to circulate it.
An important example showing the context of esoteric criticism is cited by 
Malcolm, who notes that "when the head of the USA Institute's Department of 
Internal Politics delivered the opinion in 1981 that American officials ignore 
valuable analyses submitted by foreign policy brains' trusts because of their own 
narrow-minded and blinkered attitudes, their 'bureaucratic inflexibility' and their 
attachment to 'stereotyped habits of thought established during the Cold War', it
' i n
was surely clear to his readers that he had in mind targets closer to home". '
1 6
An important methodological implication of such esoteric forms of debate is 
that an accurate and sophisticated understanding of the political meaning of 
statements by Soviet specialists requires much more than a translated exposition 
or content analysis of the arguments put forward. Such an exposition, used by 
Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, effectively obscures from view significant 
differences amongst Soviet specialists by focusing on general, self-serving 
statements which have few implications for policy. The brief account which 
Hoffmann and Laird provide of Soviet writing about the third world does not 
mention any controversial points at all, while their conclusion only discusses 
different Soviet statements in terms of the general categories of "conservatives 
and modernisers".-^ There are fundamental differences between conservatives 
and modernisers, but this is only the most immediate level of debate. If the 
conservatives lose ground, then differences amongst modernisers become more 
significant, and understanding these differences requires a detailed interpretation 
of the issues at stake. Significantly, Hoffmann and Laird rely more on popular 
Soviet publications than on academic works, and when they do refer to the latter 
material it is not in a sufficiently thorough way to extract the main explanatory, 
not affirmatory, frameworks of interpretation used by Soviet scholars. y Their 
superficial form of content analysis lumps together a lot of apparently similar 
statements without considering whether, in view of the specific terms used and the 
audience addressed, similar meanings were being communicated. In short, the 
method of translated exposition, by not defining the basic categories of Soviet 
debates, fails to recognise that "it is not the significance of repetition that is 
important but rather the repetition of significance."^
The problem of interpreting the significance of Soviet debates is not limited to 
defining the political meaning of key words, although that is very important and 
also difficult because often "it is the variation in the definition or in the emphasis 
that constitutes an important part of the debate, not just which word to choose."^* 
An equally important and difficult task is to specify the place of specialist debates 
in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. The significance of a particular debate 
will depend both on its intrinsic meaning and on its resonance within the Soviet 
elite. This does not mean that both these qualities must be fulfilled to a certain
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arbitrary limit before a debate should be considered worth investigating. After 
all, a discussion carried on in rather crude terms may be important if the 
participants have some political influence, and a debate which is known only to a 
select group of scholars may be significant if its terms are politically insightful. 
What is required theoretically is an adequate conceptualisation of both these 
aspects of significance. Since the question of how to define and investigate the 
political meaning of a debate raises fundamental philosophical problems of 
interpretation, it will be considered after discussing the task of understanding how 
academic debates within the Soviet elite connect with the policy-making 
hierarchy.
Political Debate is Transactional
In the first section the character of political debate within the Soviet elite was
specified largely in negative terms, noting a number of difficulties which must be
overcome in making careful inferences from Soviet sources. This section attempts
to characterise such debate positively, in terms of the concept of "transactional
perceptions" originally developed and effectively used by Franklyn Griffiths in
4.9his study of changing Soviet images of the United States. This concept focuses 
on the significance of publicly articulated political arguments between informal 
groups in the Soviet elite concerned with foreign affairs. It does not deny the 
importance of the largely hidden views of particular Politburo members for the 
taking of major policy decisions, but emphasises that, even in such an extremely 
centralised political hierarchy as exists in the USSR, these leaders do not exist in a 
social vacuum, forever unaffected by the arguments occurring between less 
celebrated mortals of the Soviet elite beneath them.
Dimitri Simes has pointed out that it is "a mistake to assume that debates 
among academics and experts necessarily mirror disagreements at the to p ."^  
While existing policy or previous decisions may be subjected to esoteric criticism, 
a major, open debate amongst specialists usually indicates that policy-makers have 
yet to decide, or have decided only provisionally and are unsure about the
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implications. Scholarly arguments may delineate the range of policy options
which might be under consideration, but they do not normally show whether
some group of Politburo members supports one position rather than another (and
the positions of opposed specialists are likely to be further apart than those of
divergent l e a d e r s ) . W h e t h e r  certain Politburo members are ’’sponsoring''
particular specialist views is usually an almost impossible question to answer.^
It is not the most important question, because the leadership and academic
specialists operate at quite different levels of analysis and action, having vastly
different limits of responsibility. The latter spend most of their time researching
and writing, publicly and in classified reports, about the implications of particular
foreign issues, from an academic and policy point of view. The former,
excepting the Foreign Minister, the Secretary of the Central Committee's
International Department and to some degree the General-Secretary, devote
relatively little time to international affairs, only ever spend a relatively short
amount of time on any one foreign issue, and when so engaged as individuals are
principally concerned with policy implementation (negotiating and signing
agreements). The mediation between these different levels is undertaken by
institute directors and senior Central Committee or Foreign Ministry officials, not
by regular foreign policy bureaucrats, who operate at the level of day-to-day
policy. Although some channels for direct scholarly input exist (such as informal
personal contacts, classified reports and ad hoc committees), these are usually
restricted to senior specialists and constitute a supplementary rather than an
essential part of the policy-making p r o c e s s . G e o r g y  Arbatov defined the role
of academic institutes in the making of government policy as "to study long-term
problems and trends, and to develop fundamental research that can contribute to
understanding more deeply and reliably the countries we study. As Hough has
stressed, the major contribution of specialist debates lies in affecting gradually the
assumptions current within the Soviet foreign policy establishment about how
aq
various foreign issues should be interpreted. °
This primarily indirect and long-term nature of scholarly influence on foreign 
policy formation within the Soviet elite needs to be conceptualised as a political 
process. Such conceptualisation is absent from the method of inference used by
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Richard Remnek, who tried to "extract policy-relevant analyses and concrete 
recommendations from Soviet scholarly literature and determine whether they 
were later reflected in Soviet policy".^ Remnek's conclusion "that scholarly 
influence is limited mainly to areas where the requirements of expertise are 
high", such as economic aid and trade, is based on a very narrow definition of 
direct influence which makes it difficult for anything but purely technical advice 
to q u a l i f y . T h i s  limited conclusion results from reading the influence of 
academic specialists back to front, i.e. considering the implementation of policy 
before analysing scholarly debates, and downplays the more interesting and 
substantial results of Remnek's analysis, such as the finding that debates among 
Soviet experts on India in the late 1950s and early 1960s generally undermined 
some assumptions on which Khrushchev's aid programme was based, although the 
focus of Soviet policy did not change toward trade rather than aid until after 
Khrushchev was ousted .^  This example suggests that a major function of 
scholarly debates amongst Soviet specialists is to get new issues or new 
interpretations of old issues onto the agenda of senior bureaucrats and 
policy-makers, to initiate new policy options as well as discuss the appropriateness 
of current policy. To understand this feature of Soviet policy formation, 
empirical research must be undertaken from the perspective of a moving picture 
rather than a snapshot.^ This perspective is necessary because of the long-term 
nature of specialist debates themselves. As Hough has pointed out, not only does 
the meaning and importance of particular terms change over time, but the 
"implications of concepts are often much more evident as they are first explained 
and criticised than when they come to be taken for granted". Therefore, "reading 
the debates cannot be limited to a brief period", but must be undertaken 
extensively and with "a clear perception of the historical background against 
which the changes occur.
It is primarily as a means of conceptualising the long-term influence of 
scholarly debates upon Soviet foreign policy that Griffiths' concept of 
"transactional perceptions" is useful.^ The key contribution of this concept is to 
elucidate the nature of a topical scholarly debate in the USSR as "a foreign policy 
discussion in disguise", in which "stated perceptions ... derive not so much from
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cognition as from political considerations."^ Some of the features which 
Griffiths emphasises are basic to political argument in all societies, especially 
those with large state bureaucracies, but have special importance in the USSR 
because of the severe restrictions on debate noted above. Griffiths’ most general 
point is that Soviet foreign policy formation should be conceptualised dynamically 
as a process of "social learning", not statically as the isolated application of certain 
doctrinal postulates by individual leaders in particular international situations.^ 
Although this contrast may seem artificial, it is remarkable how many accounts of 
Soviet intentions assume that they exist in an immutable form in the ideological 
silverware, or 'operational code’, of the Politburo.^ Important principles of 
Soviet policy certainly exist, most clearly in the military sphere, but the key 
question, as Hough and Seweryn Bialer have both emphasised, is to investigate 
how these principles change.^  Such principles are perhaps best seen as 
definitions or images of an objective situation, which imply a certain Soviet 
response. Griffiths' study shows that the dominant Soviet image of the United 
States changed significantly in the 1960s toward a more positive evaluation of the 
American state's independence from monopoly control, and that during the same 
period the USSR developed a more collaborative arms control policy toward the 
United States. He provides much evidence showing that these changes in the terms 
of debate and policy were interconnected in a mutually reinforcing way (the 
former increased the advisability of the latter, which in turn increased the 
credibility of the new definition), and concludes that those responsible for Soviet 
policy learnt to apply new and improved principles in relation to the USSR's main 
international a d v e r s a r y . ^
The one type of evidence conspicuously absent from Griffiths' study is the 
Kremlinological sort, which attempts to divine the individual subjective views of 
Politburo members by means of isolated analysis of their few public comments 
about a particular subject.^ Griffiths' conceptualisation of Soviet foreign policy 
formation suggests that Kremlinology has been looking in the wrong place for 
substantial debate about the basic images or principles informing Soviet policy. 
The top officials who ultimately take decisions lack the time and specialist 
expertise required for evaluating, through a detailed consideration of particular
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problems, the adequacy of their definition of an objective situation. Usually, they 
will simply assume such adequacy, but in so doing they will rely on information 
processed and discussed at lower levels of the hierarchy. In other words, while 
policy debate is resolved at the top, it is not concentrated there.1^  Some 
disagreements are no doubt expressed at the top, but as the complex result of what 
Griffiths terms a broad "politics of perception and learning” involving many 
subordinate officials and specialists, not as a simple effect of the different ways in 
which Politburo members subjectively perceive an objective s i t u a t i o n . ^  
Griffiths suggests that "individual cognition" on the part of those ultimately 
responsible for Soviet foreign policy is actually "of relatively little importance in 
the making of policy", except in crisis s i t u a t i o n s . E v e n  then, when the very 
short-term nature of decision making would limit influence on policy from lower 
echelons of the hierarchy, key officials would rely heavily on their personal 
advisors, who would be aware of different views amongst the Soviet foreign 
policy establishment.^^ These advisors might choose to ignore unorthodox views 
rather than pass them on for consideration, leaving an agenda with only different 
versions of one option rather than different options. But in this case, as academic 
bosses Evgeny Primakov and Leonid Abalkin argued at the recent CPSU 
Conference, mistakes would have resulted not just because of the ignorance of 
leaders, but because of a "process of preparing decisions" which relied on a 
conservative apparatus instead of a variety of think-tanks.^^
Griffiths takes as given the strict hierarchical control subordinating 
bureaucratic policy organisations like academic institutes, the Foreign Ministry 
and the Central Committee’s International Department to the top bosses of the 
Politburo, and looks at how this affects the type of political debate possible within 
the Soviet e lite .^  While top officials cannot decide everything, and thus depend 
upon discussion of policy principles and implications occurring beneath them, 
they can ensure that such discussion does not undermine their authority as 
stewards of the state. In practice, as George Breslauer has shown, this authority 
must be strenuously built up and carefully reinforced in relations with 
subordinates.^^ One important means for this is the control which top officials 
exert over the relative openness of official Soviet language, a power deriving not
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only from the restrictions of central and institutional censorship, but also from 
the homogenised character of official Soviet discourse itself. This remains an 
unusually impersonal language, repressing subjectivity beneath layer upon layer 
of what Alexander Yanov has termed "reinforced-concrete p h ra se o lo g y " .^  The 
statements of leaders themselves in this discourse are characteristically given 
objective force as repositories of truth rather than subjective force as expressions 
of opinion. This ritualised character of official Soviet language provides top 
officials with a position of assured semantic superiority over their subordinates. 
They can safely elaborate and justify their policies publicly in order to maintain 
legitimacy amongst the elite as a whole, while the various opinion groups which 
comprise the latter can openly express only views about the adequacy of existing 
policy that do not call into question the tenure of current leaders. Top officials 
concern themselves with being authoritative leaders, but their subordinates are not 
entitled to assess publicly anything beyond the appropriateness of certain 
policies.1^
One consequence of this structure of official Soviet discourse is that discussion
amongst subordinates about the images or principles guiding Soviet policy occurs
through what Griffiths terms "a struggle to arrange the official perceptual
screen"7® Contributors to a debate do not just express their own views using the
various techniques of esoteric discussion noted above; they express their views in
ways which will seem the most credible in official circles. The term transactional
perceptions refers essentially to the articulation of policy-relevant images "in a
context where participants in a controlled debate seek not so much to express their
own perceptions as to alter the cognitive and instrumental orientations of others"
71involved in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. ' Griffiths has stressed that 
political debate within the Soviet elite is not conducted simply over the question of 
what is true about an objective situation, but rather over what can legitimately be 
said to be true about it in terms of the basic principles of Soviet policy, which can 
be somewhat differently d e f i n e d . I n  this sense, the elaboration of different 
images of an objective situation is "accomplished by screening out or letting 
through certain kinds of information and evaluations on which arguments for 
policy could properly be based. This dominance within the Soviet elite of an
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idiom of official rather than subjective perception is expressed in the rarity in 
Soviet publications of the qualification, usual in most bureaucratic environments, 
that the views expressed are merely those of a work’s authors, not the institution 
they work in. Even books which openly acknowledge the controversial nature of 
their ideas are written in an idiom which seeks to show that the views put forward 
are perfectly legitim ate.^ The meaning of this idiom is not that only official 
views are allowed to exist, since in a modem, complex and very contradictory 
society like the USSR it is quite impossible to subdue critical attitudes even with 
totalitarian control over means of communication.^^ Rather, this idiom signifies 
that here political debate takes a more extremely transactional form than in other 
bureaucratic hierarchies. In a society where it is good advice to "think what you 
want, but keep your tongue behind your teeth",^  people are unlikely to state 
their private views openly, and in print they will usually take care to see that 
challenging interpretations criticising current policy are "buried in otherwise 
routine professions of orthodoxy."^
Thus the language of public debate within the Soviet elite has been politicised 
in a restricted, paradoxical way. Affirmatory parts of official Soviet discourse 
constitute ritual chaff in the guise of political commentary, while definitions of 
the outside world represent a "subtext" of conflicting political arguments
70
formulated by different opinion groups in the Soviet elite.70 The difference
between propaganda and genuinely political debate corresponds to an important
distinction, highlighted by Maria Markus, between "overt and covert modes of
7 Qlegitimation" in Soviet-type societies after Stal in. '7 The language of 
'Marxism-Leninism' "has been restricted to definite public occasions alone", 
where, in the words of Eugene Varga's 'Political Testament', "it is confined to the 
pronouncement of dogmatic, abstract slogans which do not succeed in making a 
profound impression on a n y o n e . M a r k u s  suggests that, having proven quite 
inadequate as a mode of legitimation, this overt ideology was transformed "into a 
kind of verbal ritual, serving ... the merely repressive function of monopolisation 
of 'public speech"', i.e. the "depoliticisation of the masses’’.^ * While the 
ritualisation of overt ideology has been widely noted, she argues that it has been 
"accompanied by the ever-growing weight of 'covert' legitimating practices",
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including the practice of tolerating a limited heterogeneity of political opinion 
within the elite, in order to legitimate policies "which otherwise could not be 
stated c l e a r l y . T h i s  js not a voluntary 'de-ideologisation but rather a 
necessary 're-ideologisation', in which new, covert rhetorical arguments have 
been quietly incorporated into official Soviet discourse, because, unlike the 
dogmas of 'Marxism-Leninism', they help top officials justify their rule to the 
elite as a w hole.^ While not reducing the depoliticisation of the masses, this 
extension of official vocabularies has increased the linguistic scope for debate 
within the Soviet elite, facilitating a greater variety of views and the gradual 
emergence of a competitive specialist environment.^ This environment did not 
blossom until the Gorbachev era, but it was growing before then, and many of the 
new policy initiatives introduced under Gorbachev would have been inconceivable 
without the concepts elaborated in previous discussion at lower levels of the 
policy-making hierarchy.
Griffiths suggests that key participants in Soviet debates form "highly informal 
coalitions of officials and specialists," who "struggle to influence party policy by 
securing support for a definition" of the objective situation which implies that 
their preferred policy is the b e s t .^  Such coalitions include interpersonal 
relations based upon friendship and shared experiences, but are not limited to 
these; given the highly atomised nature of Soviet society, two scholars may be 
informal members of the same opinion group while meeting only rarely if at 
a ll .^  What links these like-minded "individuals from a variety of institutions and 
different political levels into informal groups" is simply their common support 
for particular perspectives, since such groups can only consult indirectly, through 
the aggregation of their public statements.*^ Regular foreign policy bureaucrats 
may decide minor matters, but they would not usually be members of what 
Brown has termed the key "issue networks — made up of people who can expect 
to get a hearing on a particular issue or policy area because of their relevant 
k n o w l e d g e . T h e  concentration of long-term debate in academic institutes is 
indicated by political directives from top officials in the post-Stalin era, and by 
the failure of an attempt in the mid 1960s to establish a "special Directorate for 
Foreign Policy Planning" within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, incorporating
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prominent s c h o l a r s . T h e  most famous directive was a statement at the 20th 
CPSU Congress in 1956 by Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan, who, in 
reference to the operational inactivity of IVAN, said that: "If the entire East has 
awakened during our time, then this institute still dozes until the present day.”^  
Brezhnev’s instruction at the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 that ”it is necessary to 
put an end to the notion, current among part of our cadres, that the social sciences 
have a merely propagandists significance,"^ reflected the growing importance 
of academic institutes, although their expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was not accompanied by a lightening of the dead weight of propaganda. Institute 
directors have been particularly important in coordinating policy-relevant 
research, but during the 'years of stagnation’ some of them were inclined to 
impose views of "an instructive-directive character", which, as Anatoly Butenko 
noted in 1983, "contradict the very nature of scientific research".^ In late 1988, 
the first deputy director of IVAN admitted that science had been "reduced to the 
task of a propagandists service defending the latest turn-around of the political 
course", adding that "in order to benefit the international activity of the state, ... 
orientalist politology must be 'autonomous' from practical authorities in posing 
research tasks and in determining its conclusions."^ Yet, in the 1970s leading 
Soviet orientalists had 'leapt ahead' with their own work, despite not being 
encouraged at the time.
As well as conceptualising political perceptions and debate within the Soviet 
elite as transactional rather than subjective, Griffiths suggests two reading 
techniques for interpreting empirical material. First, he argues that the lack of a 
clear doctrinal framework encompassing contrasting specialist views "suggests 
that a more specific designation of the various images should await an 
examination of the policy objectives involved."^ Conceptualising such objectives 
is notoriously difficult, because actual policy is usually determined by trade-offs 
between conflicting goals, but it is still crucial. Griffiths himself discusses the 
objectives and general conduct of Soviet policy after considering in detail the 
images constructed in specialist debates, endeavouring to demonstrate a "broad 
correspondence between the diverse tendencies in Soviet policy toward the United 
States and the diverse arguments expressed in inner-party debate on the nature of
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the a dve r s a r y" . Hi s  account of Soviet policy tendencies is very general and not 
closely tied with his previous analysis of policy-relevant images, which suggests 
that basic Soviet policy objectives should be considered briefly before an analysis 
of specialist debates, and reviewed later in the light of the particular views 
discovered.^ Second, he suggests "the desirability of sacrificing some empirical 
material in order to bring out the theoretical and incipient policy dimensions of 
contrasting Soviet images", but qualifies this later by saying that: "A wider sample 
of the available literature, particularly if it emphasised quality and included press 
and radio reports, might yield somewhat different images, and would certainly be 
far richer in empirical references than is true of the constructs to be discussed 
h e re ."^  This remark fails to distinguish theoretically between a practice of 
’sacrificing’ empirical material, which if it included quality sources rather than 
the chaff of policy affirmation would be a mistake, and the absolutely necessary 
process of abstracting certain material in order to focus on the most important 
connections, before considering the rest of the relevant material altogether again, 
though "this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of 
many determinations and r e l a t i o n s " . I f  Griffiths had included press and radio 
reports in his analysis, then the result would have been not empirically richer but 
poorer, because of the inherent nature of such material. The key problem of 
interpretation is to determine precisely which parts of a discourse are the richest, 
and to know what they mean. This problem raises fundamental philosophical 
questions, which must now be discussed.
The Interpretation of Political Meaning
The preceding two sections have considered the forms and character of 
foreign policy debate within the Soviet elite, but not the most important 
theoretical problem of analysis, which is how one can gain accurate knowledge of 
the content of such debate. Practically, this problem is solved by extensive, 
well-informed reading, but the theoretical question remains: what is a 
well-informed reading? What methodological assumptions are necessary in 
order to know that one interpretation is more accurate than another? This
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question must be faced, since even intuition and guesswork are based on prior 
knowledge and assumptions. Philosophically, this question concerns 
epistemology, or the practice of knowing Soviet debates, whereas the issues 
discussed in the two previous sections were largely matters of ontology, or the 
existential characteristics of these debates. These two aspects of knowledge are 
interdependent but distinct. While the relevance of this distinction may not be 
immediately apparent, it is arguable that many errors of inference from Soviet 
sources have partly resulted from insufficient attention to epistemology leading to 
overly general ontological assum ptions.^ The point of a philosophical 
discussion is to clarify conceptual puzzles, so that empirical work can proceed in a 
clearer and more fruitful manner. Such discussion is not an end in itself, merely 
a means of making implicit assumptions explicit, and hence more clearly effective 
and open to greater scrutiny. As Hanna Pitkin has summarised Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s advice to political scientists: ’’You already are using philosophy, 
but in blind, fragmented, distorted forms of which you are only dimly aware. 
These forms control your thought more than you know, impose themselves on 
you, and prevent rather than promote the accurate perception of reality.”
This injunction to philosophise about problems of interpretation forms part of 
a critique of the key assumption of a positivist or empiricist methodology, which 
is that the facts speak for themselves. ^  In Western studies of Soviet foreign 
policy, this assumption has often obscured the provisionality of fundamental, 
bridging assumptions about the semantic content of 'Soviet ideology'. Many 
analysts, when faced with a lot of dense doctrinal rhetoric which appears 
unrelated to either the empirical parts of Soviet writing or the general trends of 
Soviet policy, have seen such material as simply legitimating Soviet 'national 
interests', which are calculated within the time-honoured framework of 
Machiavellian realism. The problem with this essentially pragmatic view is not 
that the lack of importance which it accords to Soviet doctrinal discourse is 
necessarily wrong, but that no clear methodological arguments are given for 
considering this an appropriate approach to interpreting Soviet sources. This 
empiricism is accompanied by one revealing assumption highlighted by Vendulka 
Kubalkova, who notes that unargued dismissals of Soviet doctrinal discourse
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"imply that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is no more than a fig leaf that conceals a 
quite ordinary Realpolitik that denies to the Soviet mind any separate existence 
and, by implication, leads us at one and the same time to believe that the Western 
mind and modes of thought might boast of an essentially universal nature."*^ 
The pragmatic view, which assumes that Soviet writing only makes sense in 
Western terms, was most evident in 'convergence theory', which saw the 
separation of Soviet economic and poliiical analysis as a positive step because such 
separation is prevalent in the W e s t .^  a  ciear indication of the methodological 
disorientation of this view is its continued use of the terms 'left' and 'right' to 
denote different political positions within the Soviet elite. If these terms are 
meant to signify fundamental differences about the nature and objectives of the 
Soviet state, then they have not been clearly applicable to the USSR since the Left 
Opposition was purged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When they are applied, 
it is revealing that their analytical usage in pragmatic Western discourse about 
Soviet perceptions is actually the reverse of their political usage within the USSR. 
In the former, 'left' persons in the USSR are considered orthodox and dogmatic, 
i.e. neo-Stalinist, but within the Soviet elite itself, as Alexander Zinoviev has 
reported, someone who articulated clear criticism of Stalin and a toleration of 
Yugoslav and Chinese views was thought to have gone "so far to the left that I 
constantly had to restrain him." ^ 4
Against the pragmatic assumption of a dialogue in Western terms, many 
analysts have maintained that, in the doctrinal parts of Soviet discourse, the 
USSR's hostile foreign policy "intentions are actually laid bare before us" through 
the framework of Marxism-Leninism. ^  The main problem with this essentially 
idealist view is simply that it never answers its own basic question: what is 
Marxism-Leninism? This view considers Marxism-Leninism as an 
'operational code' which motivates Soviet actions, but all attempts to specify this 
postulated doctrinal code have used terms so banal and general that they apply to 
most other states as well as to the USSR.*^ The reason for this vagueness has 
been highlighted by Rachel Walker, who argues that Western interpretations of 
Marxism-Leninism have been based on erroneous assumptions about its nature. 
She points out that "in Soviet terms Marxism-Leninism effectively means
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everything and nothing" — from whatever the CPSU has ever said, to specific 
doctrines like 'histmat' and 'diamat', to traits of desirable Soviet citizens such as 
'ideological dedication’ and a 'spirit of collectivism’. The implication of this 
variety of usages is that Marxism-Leninism is not an ontologically independent 
body of ideas, but "an inclusionary/exclusionary device" signifying what in a 
particular context is politically permissible b e h a v i o u r .  ^ 8  As Yuri Afanas’ev 
recently said:
The basic features of [Marxism-Leninism] remain till now in the same form 
in which they crystallised in the 1930s. Precisely then Marxism-Leninism 
hardened in the capacity of a dogmatic scholastic ideology, and became an 
obstacle to, not an aid for, understanding the contemporary world.
Since then, the words 'Marx' and 'Lenin' in most Soviet discourse have not been 
references to real people whose ideas provide a guide for action, but symbols of 
authority which have been used to legitimate any point of v iew .^^  In this light, 
the substantial amount of doctrinal rhetoric present in Soviet sources is evidence 
not of a common framework of analysis, but of the presence of underlying debate 
which has to be kept within strict limits. As Malcolm has aptly pointed out, "the 
coin of central party control and ideological uniformity has two sides to it. To put 
it crudely, the forces of order are arrayed so impressively only because the forces 
of anarchy confronting them require it.”  ^^   ^ The bridging assumption of the 
idealist view, that Soviet perceptions and policy are directly observable in highly 
ritualised official Soviet discourse, contains a double omission. Not only is the 
supposed conceptual framework of Soviet ideology left undefined, but the 
doctrinal passages which this view highlights as of great conceptual importance 
are in fact indications of something else, which most versions of the idealist view 
discount: serious public discussion within the Soviet elite about different policy 
perspectives.
Both these traditional Western responses to the problem of doctrinal rhetoric 
in Soviet sources have led to conceptual confusion because they have not engaged 
dialogically with the depth and complexity of political meaning implicit in these 
sources, in spite of strict censorship. Methodologically, each view has emphasised 
one type of Soviet discourse while disregarding another, thus assuming that one
aspect alone of this discourse contains the full meaning of the whole. Yet, it is
fundamental to the practice of interpretation that parts and wholes should be read
together, not separately. In order to understand the parts of a discourse they must
be read in the context of the whole, while the whole itself can only be read
through interpreting its parts. As Charles Taylor has expressed this
interconnectedness of readings, known as 'the hermeneutical circle': "we are
trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings
of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with
making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the
readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the 
11?whole. This circle cannot be broken, only recognised and moved within in a 
process of "continual checking and r e - c h e c k i n g  Taylor points out that an
interpretation can never be grounded in 1)11116 data' which are themselves beyond 
question, unable to be read in another way. The criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of conflicting interpretations of the political meaning of a particular 
statement always involve other, generally-agreed meanings, not pure facts which 
exist in a pre-meaningful state. Hermeneutics, as the art of interpretation, is 
essentially concerned with clarifying unclear meanings by reference to meanings 
which are relatively clear. As Taylor notes, the aim of interpretation is "to bring 
to light an underlying coherence or sense" in meaningful material "which in some 
way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory — in one way or 
another, u n c l e a r . " W h i l e  this aim is present wherever the art of interpretation 
is used, understanding another conceptual world requires that several 
methodological points be recognised, so that the gap between the interpreter and 
the foreign material can be bridged in a clarifying rather than a confusing way.
The basic problem facing any analyst who begins reading foreign material is 
to be able "to tell an interesting fact from a bad translation ."^  As Martin Hollis 
has helpfully pointed out, this abstraction of significant material from 
commonplace statements must be made initially on the basis of an a priori 
assumption that the discourse containing this material is rationally constructed. ^  ^  
Without such an assumption there would be no common referent from which an 
interpretation could begin. In order to understand foreign statements, the analyst
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must not only consider the relations between terms in them, but also establish 
"definitive interpretations of enough terms to restrict possible renderings of 
others," by assuming to begin with that, where some terms refer to situations 
known also to the analyst, then the author of the foreign statements "perceives 
very much what [the analyst] perceives and says about it very much what [the 
analyst] would say ."* ^  in other words, the analyst must assume that the 
statements in question were made by someone with a similar capacity for 
perceiving rationally the logic of an objective situation. This a priori 
"bridgehead" of common rationality is necessary in order to identify the operative 
rules of communication with which the discourse was constructed, since "even at 
the empirical stage irrational utterances are to be interpreted by knowing when it 
would be rational to utter them.’’^ ^
While this initial bridgehead is not an empirical but an a priori assumption,
i.e. a belief which is logically necessary in order to interpret evidence, not simply
a belief about particular evidence, it needs supplementing by beliefs of the latter
type. Where the analyst is unsure of the meaning of terms used, an a priori
assumption of some common meanings has to provide a basis for interpreting the
consistency of a discourse, and hence its coherent meaning as a whole. Hollis
points out that when we are familiar with the stock of terms used, "we ask the
meaning of a token before asking whether it was rationally uttered. But, where
the stock is in doubt, the relation is the other way. If the utterance seems
outrageous, there is an automatic case for finding it another m e a n i n g " . W h i l e
some common meanings are needed a priori, which meanings, and how extensive
they are, is a matter for empirical clarification. In other words, a bridging
assumption is unavoidable, but it must take the form of an empirical specification
or delimitation of the meaning of key terms, achieved "by identifying certain
fundamental issues which must be addressed in any language and imputing
* *i 1 90rationality ... in the treatment of those issues by the 'Other Mind’."lz,u Once a 
bridgehead’s common meanings have been established a priori, the empirical 
hypotheses coming from it must be revised in the light of the evidence discovered. 
This revision may extend retrospectively to aspects of the bridgehead itself, ’"but 
there are wholly crucial limits' to the extent of such changes tolerable without the
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effective abandonment of the decoding proposal defined by that particular 
. tt 1 91bridgehead. A bridgehead works by setting ”a priori limits to the possible 
interpretations of facts”, so that the process of establishing the actual rules of 
communication that govern a particular discourse can be consistent. *22 j^ is  is a 
limited but essential function, enabling an analysis of the political meaning of 
Soviet statements to be more than simply a descriptive or speculative translated 
exposition. As Hollis has written, Mthe point ... is not that the same plain facts 
stare everyone in the face, but that the Enquirer has to assume an overlap, since, 
where everything is a hypothesis, nothing could count as evidence.” *23
Since rationality is socially and historically variable as well as logically 
uniform, empirical investigations of a bridgehead's hypotheses can proceed "only 
after the Enquirer has imputed the right degree of the right sort of 
rationality.” As Colin Sumner has argued in commenting on the decoding 
assumption proposed by Hollis, "to assume rationality a priori is vacuous unless it 
has empirical viability”, because "to discover the rationality of a statement in a 
particular social context one would need to know the details of the social context, 
broadly defined.”^25 This implies that the rationality of a foreign discourse 
"should not be located solely within the practictioner's mind” as a series of 
"normative or ideological codes", but considered as the "internal logic of a social 
practice", through which the meaning of the discourse is expressed.126 This 
point follows also from a recognition of the social rather than personal nature of 
meaning itself, and the fact that the meaning of terms is not fixed in relation to 
definite objects but rather consists in their referential use. Both these points were 
clarified by Wittgenstein, who stressed that "nothing is more wrong-headed than 
calling meaning a mental activity! ”127 A particular meaning is not a private 
mental experience, but an element of social communication, which can only be 
understood in the circumstances of its expression ("the meaning of a word is not 
the experience one has in hearing or saying it"). 128 Wittgenstein used the term 
'language-game' to emphasise that meaning is active and practical, not reflective 
and contemplative. "Just as the significance of a piece of chess is determined by 
its role in the game, so too the meaning of an expression is dependent upon its use 
in the language-game wherein it occurs.”*29 Language-games cannot be
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understood apart from the forms of life in which they exist, so the meaning of 
words cannot be separated from how they are used. The upshot of this has been 
stated by Mihailo Markovic as one of the rules or conditions of effective 
communication: "In order to be adequate, an interpretation should take account of 
the context as a w h o le .  " ^ 0
The importance of considering the context of a text when interpreting it has
been a major theme in the methodological writing of a leading historian of ideas,
Quentin Skinner, who argues that the meaning which an author conveys cannot be
adequately inferred by simply reading a text over and over again, without relating
it to the "context of prevailing conventions and assumptions" through which the
meaning was e x p r e s s e d . He claims that understanding an author's intentions in
writing something is crucial, because the point or immanent meaning of a text is
essentially characterised by what an author tried to do in communicating the ideas
expressed in a text. ^  ^ 2 xhjs conception of writing as an activity makes it possible
to understand an author’s intended meaning, since the latter is seen as something
made public in a text itself, not as a private aim which is inaccessible to 
i ^
others. Skinner suggests that "the idea of studying what a writer is doing is a 
crucially and I think a fruitfully ambiguous one — ambiguous as between the 
study of what the writer has done intentionally and what we may correctly say he 
has achieved, whether or not all the effects were intentionally brought off."^ 4  
Sometimes a text may be expressed poorly, so that its meaning is less than the 
author intended. Alternatively, Skinner notes that an author's text may sometimes 
achieve
far more than he can possibly have intended or may be disposed to say he 
meant. We may wish to argue, in the case of avowed intentions, that he seems 
uninterested or incompetent in giving a full or accurate characterisation of 
what he has done. Or we may wish to invoke the well-known fact that, in the 
case of any complex action, an alert and dispassionate observer may often be 
in a better position than the agent himself to discern the subtlest patterns of 
meaning underlying what has been d o n e .^
In cases where an author intends more than he can admit to mean, Skinner agrees 
with Hollis that a characterisation of the author's intentions requires also an 
account of the author's motives, both for intending something other than is
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apparent and for covering this with certain professed principles, which, as 
Skinner points out, will constrain what can possibly be meant. Particularly 
where writers are forced to use "oblique strategies" in order to get their message 
across, an investigation of a text's social context is essential for deciding which 
interpretation best captures "what conventionally recognisable meanings, in a 
society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have 
intended to communicate." Skinner rejects the simplistic view that the 
contents of any text can be deduced from its social context, but insists that, where 
there is doubt about the meaning of a text, "the context itself can be used as a sort 
of court of appeal for assessing the relative plausibility of incompatible 
ascriptions of intentionality."^^ If this court is not summoned, there is what 
A.P. Simonds has termed the "great danger" of isolated textual analysis becoming 
"a license for parochial interpretation", in which "the interpreter slips easily into 
the assumption that the text mandates whatever meaning he (the reader) finds
familiar. " ^ 9
Given Wittgenstein’s conception of the acquisition of language-games as "an 
eminently practical process ('the mastering of a technique'), guaranteed only by 
participation in the appropriate form of life", knowledge of the context of a text 
appears possible only from inside that context itself, not by means of theoretical 
clarification by an outside interpreter. Assuming the inaccessibility of a form 
of life to non-participants leads to a relativist regress, in which the world can only 
be made up of isolated language-games which have meaning only for their players 
and are untranslatable for foreigners. ^  Wittgenstein never bothered to define 
the limits of a form of life, because there are no strict limits; forms of life
1 4 0
interact and hence are commensurable to some degree, not isolated. As Roy 
Bhaskar has argued, every genuine communicative act or episode requires some 
overlap in context for it to be possible, and some diversity in beliefs and practical 
interests for it to be necessary; therefore, a language-game is by definition open 
to outside interpretation, including critique, since views held by participants in a 
form of life can be w r o n g . T h i s  implies that an interpreter cannot be a 
"detached observer", but must be a sort of semi-participant, in order to 
understand the context for interpretation. As Taylor has suggested, "you
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understand the key terms to the extent that you have some grasp of what would be 
the appropriate thing for a participant to do in certain situations. ... Some degree 
of participant's know-how, some ability to 'call' the right responses, even if for a 
host of other reasons, including insufficient command of the language, you could 
not actually wade in there and participate, is an essential part of 
understanding.'’ 144
Such understanding is achieved through a mediation of language-games, which 
Hans-Georg Gadamer has described as a "fusion of horizons" between interpreter 
and i n t e r p r e t e d .  145 The presence of "two ’minds'" in an interpretation was 
stressed by Bakhtin, who argued that "any true understanding is dialogic in 
nature."l^^ Yet the problem with written texts, as Paul Ricoeur has emphasised, 
is that they are not simply dialogic means of communication, since writing 
establishes a separation in time and space between the author and reader. Ricoeur 
terms this separation a "distanciation", in which "the work decontextualises itself, 
from the sociological as well as the psychological point of view, and is able to 
recontextualise itself differently in the act of reading." In contrast to speech, a 
written text is open to all sorts of readings. He argues that "distanciation is not 
the product of methodology and hence something superfluous and parasitical; 
rather, it is constitutive of the phenomenon of the text as writing", so that it 
conditions any interpretation, and constitutes "what understanding must 
overcome". In other words, the text does have its own questions, but they are not 
referred to, as in speech; indeed, "the task of reading, qua interpretation, will be 
precisely to fulfill the reference", i.e. to spell out the questions to which a text 
presents its answers, saying why they are important for the reader as well. 
Ricoeur insists that this appropriation of a text's frame of reference must be 
achieved not by imagining what the author wanted to say, but by understanding 
the "objective meaning" or "proposed world" evident in "the kind of things the 
text is about." He suggests that, in appropriating the meaning of a text, "what we 
want to understand is not something hidden behind the text, but something 
disclosed in front of it." Here, the hermeneutical circle operates not between the 
reader and author as two subjects, nor as the projection of the subjectivity of the 
reader into the reading, but rather between the reader’s horizon of understanding
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and the kind of world opened up by the text i t s e l f .  147
While this suggestion is useful, its sense needs to be specified, because Ricoeur 
is ambiguous about whether a text has any intrinsic meaning, connected with the 
context in which it was written, or whether its meaning is determined, not merely 
discovered, by its reader. The latter view leads to a relativist regress, in which 
different readings cannot be judged as more or less adequate fulfilments of what 
Ricoeur terms "the injunction of the text", but merely considered, tautologically, 
as ’different'. 1^^ As Bhaskar argues, it is necessary to consider the object of 
interpretation as meaningful in itself, for otherwise there would literally be 
nothing to understand apart from oneself. Priority must be given to the meaning 
of a text for a particular audience, usually the original audience for whom the text 
was written, and "to this extent it is salutary to remember the old hermeneutic 
dictum that meaning must be read out of, not into, a tex t."* ^  what the 
interpreter reads out of the text is the particular world, or horizon of concerns, 
projected to its audience by the author. As Bhaskar notes, the author's intentions 
in writing the text must be referred to — they are after all the reason for the text
— but they are not the object of interpretation by themselves; rather, this object 
comprises the questions of practical life which the author addresses in the text, 
and by means of which the text finds its r e a d e r s . T h e  world of texts is not 
made up only of the history of ideas, as Skinner and Collingwood claim. ^  The 
clash of ideas which texts constitute should be investigated not on a rarefied plane, 
but "in the light of knowledge of material circumstances to which the contested 
ideas r e l a t e " .  An author's public views about such circumstances constitute 
the 'objective meaning' which is 'in front of the text. And by understanding such 
circumstances, as well as an author, the interpreter best advances knowledge of 
the society in question. In this sense, an open, 'dialogical materialist' framework 
can accommodate Ricoeur's definition of the art of textual interpretation as "the 
sort of inquiry concerned with the power of a work to project a world of its own 
and to set in motion the hermeneutical circle, which encompasses in its spiral both 
the apprehension of projected worlds and the advance of self-understanding in the 
presence of these new worlds."
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The most important general consideration for assessing the adequacy of 
different interpretations of political meaning is that understanding a text is 
complemented, not contradicted, by explaining how it came to be written, i.e. 
identifying the basic questions or practical issues which occasioned i t . - ^  Since, 
as Bhaskar argues,
judgements about beliefs cannot be separated from judgements about activity, 
judgements about meaning — again presupposing a two-way resolution (in the 
shape of a dialogical fusion of horizons) — are inseparable from judgements 
about explanatory adequacy. Thus the so-called 'problem of the indeterminacy 
of translation' ... can only be resolved in practice by selecting that translation 
which is explanatorily most adequate (whether or not it is most charitable) in 
the context of what is already known about the organisation of the particular 
society in question (and of societies in general) — a context which may well of 
course be modified by the explanatory choice. The most adequate explanation 
will save the maximum of significant phenomena in the subject-matter at issue, 
showing in that subject-matter precisely the degree and type of irrationality 
that does so. ... Some social practices are vague, others are ambiguous and 
they should be described accordingly. ...The only general rules to follow are: 
(i) engage dialogically with one's subject; (ii) maximise total explanatory 
power, and (iii) make one's analysis as precise, but only as precise, as 
'the nature of the subject permits'. ^
These general rules of interpretation express what Michael Slote has termed the 
"Principle of Unlimited Inquiry", which is the most basic procedure of scientific 
inference. According to this principle, it is unreasonable for an interpreter to put 
forward an "inquiry limiting hypothesis", which rules out the possibility of 
further warranted explanations of the subject-matter at issue. When reading a 
text, it is unreasonable to assume that all the words are being used to mean exactly 
what they should literally mean, or even that the significance of a topic is just 
what it appears to be and nothing more, unless it can be shown that it would be 
irrational for anyone to play other, oblique language-games, because this would 
so disrupt the stock of terms as to make communication itself impossible. Of 
course, what games are actually being played is an empirical question to be 
determined by reading the material in question, and there are no special 
procedures for generating plausible readings. As Eric Hirsch has written, "the act 
of understanding is at first a genial (or a mistaken) guess and there are no 
methods for making guesses, no rules for generating i n s i g h t s " . a r t  0 f
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textual interpretation must rely on what Sumner has called our five ordinary ways 
of reading: "Repetition, assumption, inconsistency, neglect and substance are all 
read routinely as significant discursive phenomena." These everyday forms of 
insight are powerful, but naturally they cannot guarantee the adequacy of an 
interpretation. For, as Bhaskar reminds us, it is characteristic of the practice of 
interpreting meaning that it is ”a skilled, and only contingently successful (if and 
when, indeed, it is) achievement”. ^
The difficulty of this achievement in Soviet studies has resulted partly from 
the dominance of monological rather than dialogical views in Soviet society itself, 
and partly from an interpretative shallowness which has seen the ideological 
■braking mechanism’ of Marxism-Leninism as a ready-made set of answers rather 
than an obscure set of questions. The cacophony of noise which constitutes Soviet 
ideology has either been seen as something peripheral to understanding Soviet 
debates, or as something which explains the insignificance of such debates, when it 
is precisely this noise itself which needs to be explained, so that the specific 
features and content of discussion within the Soviet elite can be better understood. 
Whereas, according to the careful methodological advice of Hollis, "the Other 
Mind ... is to be made rational where possible, irrational, where necessary, and 
never non-rational at all”, in much Western discourse about Soviet foreign policy 
the non-rational category has slipped in through the back door in the form of an 
implicit 'too hard’ b a s k e t .  ^ 0  Manifest absurdities in Soviet discourse have been 
passed over, rather than taken as indications of the social complexity shrouding 
public political argument within the Soviet elite. When an interpreter has noticed 
significant absurdities, the analysis has usually stopped half-way instead of being 
taken to its logical conclusion. Morton Schwartz, having documented the 
increasing pessimism of Soviet commentary about the third world in the early 
1970s, remarked perspicaciously that ”it is difficult to take Moscow's theoretical 
pronouncements regarding the 'non-capitalist path of development' seriously”, 
and added that, given the economic backwardness of developing countries, Soviet 
"talk of the transition to socialism becomes patent nonsense.” Yet, while of the 
opinion that "Soviet attitudes and policies regarding leftist regimes in the third 
world are solely a function of raison d'etat", he did not ask what the implications
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of such an assessment are for the political meaning of key terms in official Soviet 
discourse, such as 'socialism', 'non-capitalist development' and the like. His 
pragmatic interpretation of Soviet ideology had found a new stock of terms, but 
he appeared not to appreciate the need to revise the empirical content of his 
b r id g e h e a d . 1 6 1  The lesson of this is that a bridgehead should be carefully and 
firmly established in the first place, so that the interpreter can be fairly sure of 
which question an author is attempting to answer, and for what audience. As 
Hollis has written:
The pass mark must be high enough to help us decide whether he believes 
what he seems to say or means what he seems to believe. The more secure the 
bridgehead, the lower is the score which has to be imputed. Interpretative 
charity is a virtue in moderation, a vice in excess. ^ 2
Moderation in imputing rationality depends on knowing the questions of practical 
life which particular Soviet authors writing about development are likely to have 
been interested in answering. The next chapter considers the historical contexts 
of Soviet development debates, in order to establish these questions at a general 
level, before investigating in detail the various answers which different scholars 
have given.
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p. 18. Hill's descriptive term "'heavy' political science" would perhaps be better as "'heavy' social 
science", since the discipline of political science has yet to be formally accorded independent 
institutional status in the USSR, and serious scholarly work there is by no means limited to the type 
of research which would be considered political science in Britain or the USA. The case for an 
"institute of political theory" was recently re-stated by the President of the Soviet Political Sciences 
Association, Georgy Shakhnazarov, "Nauka o Politike", Pravda, 26/9/88, p. 6.
19. "Rech kandidata v chleny politburo TsK KPSS, Sekretaria TsK KPSS, Akademika B.N. 
Ponomareva pri vruchenii ordena trudovogo krasnogo znameni institutu vostokovedeniia AN 
SSSR 10 Oktiabria 1980 g.", Narody Azii i A friki, 1981, no. 1, p. 7. For a similar statement by 
a senior Soviet expert on Iran in a review article see N.A. Kuznetsova, "Leninskoe nasledie v 
trudakh sovetskikh iranistov", Narody Azii i A friki, 1980, no. 3, p. 20.
20. V.L. Sheinis, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany i novoe politicheskoe myshlenie", Rabochii Klass i 
Sovremennyi Mir, 1987, no. 4, p. 90.
21. G.B. Ardaev, in "Perestroika: faktory neobratimosti i mekhanizm tormozheniia ('Kruglyi stol', 
okonchanie)", Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir, 1988, no. 3, p. 43.
22. According to Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow, Knopf, New York, 1985, p. 73, 
International Affairs "is the semi-official organ of the Foreign Ministry; Andrei Gromyko was ... 
its chief editor." According to Dimitri Simes (cited in Ronald Russell Pope, Soviet Foreign Affairs 
Specialists: an evaluation o f their direct and indirect impact on Soviet foreign policy 
decision-making based on their analysis o f Cuba 1958-1961 and Chile 1969-1973, Ph.D 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975, p. 21) this journal was not read seriously by Soviet 
specialists in Moscow.
23. Neil Malcolm, Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics, Macmillan, London, 1984, 
p. 17. The number of copies printed (tirazh ) may be used as a general guide-of-thumb concerning 
whether a particular source is predominantly academic or popular. As Jerry Hough ('The Soviet 
Union and Social Science Theory , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, 
p. 200) has noted, there "tends to be a strong relationship between the number of copies printed of 
a book or journal and the conventionality of the ideas published in it" — of those Soviet works 
published between 1965 and 1969 which presented a new view of the American political system, 
67% appeared in editions of less than 5,000 copies, and none in editions of more than 10,000.
24. A clear example of such an error is the assertion of R. Judson Mitchell (Ideology of a 
Superpower, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1982, p. 85) that the following statement in late 
1979 by long-time International Department Secretary Boris Ponomarev was an extension of a 
doctrine of "revolutionary violence" to "areas where Soviet power has not yet been established", 
"particularly in countries around the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf'. Ponomarev said: "Soviet 
people are not indifferent to the socio-political orientations reflected in the various trends within the 
developing world. The devotees of scientific socialism have no intention of denying their spiritual 
closeness to the progressive forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Sympathy with fighters for 
true freedom is natural for Marxist-Leninists and internationalists. Where such fighters exist and are 
struggling, they have the right to depend on our solidarity and support" ("Neodolimost' 
osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia", Kommunist, 1980, no. 1, p. 23). Although taken from an article in 
the CPSU's main ideological journal just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there is nothing 
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Chapter 2: The Historical Contexts of Soviet Development Debates
the key point - is to take up substantive problems on the historical level of reality; 
to state these problems in terms appropriate to them; and then, no matter how high the 
flight of theory, no matter how painstaking the crawl among detail, in the end of each 
completed act of study, to state the solution in the macroscopic terms of the problem.
(C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1960, 
pp. 142-3.)
The contexts of Soviet development debates are threefold. First, there is the 
social and historical context of serious public debate as a new phenomenon in the 
USSR in the post-Stalin era. It is an important historical fact that widespread 
public discussion about complex topical questions began to re-emerge into Soviet 
life to a significant extent only after the death of Stalin in the first instance, and 
together with the first de-Stalinisation campaign launched by Khrushchev at the 
20th CPSU Congress in 1956 in the second. * Since most leading participants in 
Soviet development debates wrote their first articles and books when Khrushchev 
was trying to reform the Stalinist system, it is important to read their work in the 
light of how the expectations which they then formed were depressed during the 
more conservative and prolonged Brezhnev regime which followed. The first 
section of this chapter reviews changes in ideological censorship in the USSR 
since Stalin, to outline the basic problems of everyday work which such members 
of the Soviet "party intelligentsia" have faced. ^
Second, a more specific context of Soviet development debates is given by the 
political significance for Soviet scholars of studying comparative social progress. 
Although the Soviet system has, at least until recently, been excluded as a subject 
for serious comparative discussion, the comparative method itself cannot be 
artificially limited, especially for scholars working under a harsh state presenting 
itself as the leading force of humanity in the contemporary world. The second 
section of this chapter considers the renewal of comparative scholarship in the 
USSR since 1956 in the field of oriental studies, which, because of its relative 
distance from ideological supervision, proved a fruitful haven for substantive 
debate about basic issues of comparative social development in the modem world. 
Finally, the most apparent context of Soviet development debates for Western
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observers is the foreign policy context, defined by the basic objectives of the 
Soviet state in its relations with the developing countries of the third world. The 
third section of this chapter presents an assessment of these objectives, since their 
relative priority forms the key political issue of the Soviet debates about third 
world development which are analysed in the subsequent two chapters.
Ideological Censorship in the USSR
An interpretation of Soviet debates which restricts the fundamental issues in 
question to mere differences within a hegemonic belief system derived from Marx 
and Lenin underestimates the diverse usages to which apparently similar words 
can be put. This limitation is evident in the assumptions of James Scanlan’s book 
on modem Soviet philosophy, notwithstanding his initial recognition that Min 
practice people will invest whatever words they have with the meanings they find 
necessary in order to make sense of their experience. First, Scanlan argues that 
just "because Marxist-Leninist philosophy is so inconsistent with reality" as 
perceived by outsiders, we should not assume that Soviet leaders and philosophers 
do not believe in "faiths that defy rational explanation." He suggests that 
statements by Brezhnev and his subordinates affirming the unified, 
non-antagonistic nature of Soviet society in contrast to capitalism should be taken 
at face value as substantive beliefs, rather than viewed with suspicion as 
propaganda exercises. Second, Scanlan claims that "if there is any bad faith in the 
leaders' relation to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, it consists not in the failure of those 
leaders to mean what they say, but in their failure to recognise the extent to which 
their ideological pronouncements simply establish by stipulation what they 
purport to describe." Thus Soviet officials are credited with the ability to think 
irrationally, but not with the capacity to realise that all their public thoughts take 
the form of "stipulative truth making" within an idiom of censorship. In fact, 
Scanlan's assumptions are plausible when reversed, and placed carefully in 
relation to the historical development of Soviet society. The one thing we can be 
sure of is that Soviet officials have consciously used Marxism-Leninism to
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stipulate acceptable beliefs, since views not couched in this idiom have been 
systematically repressed. The extent to which officially-sanctioned statements are 
believed by Soviet officials and the population at large is a very complex question, 
which should be approached with a recognition that the answer, even for the same 
statement, may vary substantially across time as well as between people. 
However this empirical matter is investigated, it is unwise to adopt a theoretical 
stance which pre-judges the answer as always affirmative, since then 
interpretation ceases to be a critical search for meaning and becomes instead a 
hostage to various nonsensical views which, although their appearance is 
rationally explicable, are not actually held by the subjects in question.^
The importance of a critical concept of ideology has been stressed in general 
terms by John Thompson, who argues ’’that to study ideology is to study the ways 
in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations o f domination", by 
legitimating, concealing the nature of, or reifying ahistorically the transience of a 
particular regime.^ To understand the historical specificity of this nexus between 
ideology and power in the USSR, one can follow Martin Heidegger's 
hermeneutical injunction, according to which "what is decisive is not to get out of 
the circle but to come into it the right way".^ The circle of interpretation here is 
centred around a paradoxical 'unity of opposites' at the heart of modem Soviet 
ideology: ambiguity and exclusiveness.^ Many interpreters have tried to annul 
this paradox on the rarefied plane of isolated ideas, without considering whether 
its origins lie deeper, in the very contradictory nature of Soviet society since the 
rise of Stalin. Precisely because "Marxism-Leninism is, after all, the official 
'language game' of the Soviet system", it should not be viewed apart from the 
extremely hierarchical structure of power in the USSR, as a separate and 
incorrigible set of principles upon which the latter either rests or was 
established.il Marxism-Leninism is not so much an ideology in power as an 
ideology of power, or the ideological garb of a peculiar concentration of power 
which is both enormous and insufficient, both apparently unchallenged and 
intrinsically unstable.^  The discursive content of this ideology is significant, but 
it should be investigated together with the social relations characteristic of Soviet
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society during and after its codification, not deduced in the first instance from an 
altogether different subject, the history of ideas. ^
While 'Marxo-Leninism' was coined by Comintern chief Grigory Zinoviev in 
1925, the enforced domination of Marxism-Leninism as the framework of public 
belief in the USSR dates from 1930, when, as Scanlan notes, philosophers of the 
view that ’’dialectical materialism is a crying absurdity” were deprived of an 
audience by the nationalisation of all publishing activ ity .^ Two crucial historical 
facts about this establishment of a unique system of ideological censorship at the 
time of Stalin's emerging autocracy should be recognised. First, as Michal 
Reiman has emphasised, "the key consideration in any attempt to understand 
Stalinism ... is that it was not a product of positive social development or the 
positive development of a social doctrine or conception, but the result of a deep 
and all-embracing crisis; it evolved as a special kind of instrument or means of 
finding a way out of this crisis ."^  Stalin's solution comprised callous policies 
imposed from above without discussion, necessitating the total elimination of 
public criticism, through direct repression, propaganda against 'deviants', and a 
loss of individuality as all authors become 'writers in uniform' parroting 
'Agitprop P i d g i n ' .  16 As Boris Kagarlitsky has pointed out, Stalin's power stifled 
free thought so much that he did not need an elaborate system of censorship. 1 ^  
Fear and devotion worked wonders for 'the chief, who increased his authority by 
overseeing "a contradiction between word and deed, and the appearance of a 
special political language when it is necessary to 'read between the lines', 
according to indirect signs having an almost ritual significance, in order to 
understand the real sense of that which is spoken and done".^  Second, Stalin's 
codification of Marxism-Leninism and elevation of his name to "a synonym for 
the party, the revolution and socialism" constituted an attack upon the ideological 
heritage of the Bolshevik Party. ^  This, in a materialist framework, is the 
meaning of Markovic's notion "that Stalin advanced through gaps in Marx's 
argument"; it is folly to suppose that better arguments by Marx and Lenin could 
alone have prevented Stalin's advance, but important to note that his rise signified 
the degradation of their id eas .^  As a young member of the new Soviet elite in
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the early 1930s answered a question about how Stalin’s policy of forced 
collectivisation stood in relation to Marx's critical analysis, in Das Kapital, of the 
expropriation of the peasantry: "You don't expect me to study Karl Marx or to 
understand his true meaning. You old Bolsheviks are studying Karl Marx and 
Lenin without Stalin; that is why you will never get a clear idea about 
anything."^!
In a recent analysis of the Stalinist system published in ¡Communist, four 
liberal Soviet sociologists stressed the patently instrumental nature of 
Marxism-Leninism, arguing that "the bureaucratic system is only in appearance 
ideocratic ... the mode of its spiritual existence is the transformation of any living 
thought into a dead formula for the conjuring away of reality, not for an 
orientation within it". They interpreted acceptance by subordinates of top 
officials' "monopoly of truth" as "a demonstration of complete loyalty", adding 
that "the system of vertical loyalty was supported by a system of universal 
uncertainty and d r e a d . " 2 2  a  similar view was expressed in the 1970s by Lev 
Kopolev, who suggested that "the actual ideology of the Stalinists ... is an ideology 
of authoritarian bureaucratic party discipline, of superstate chauvinism, of 
unprincipled pragmatism in the interpretation of history, the contemporary world 
and economic or ethical q u e s t i o n s . " ^  The pure form of Soviet ideology was not 
doctrine or mere dogma, but an idiom of censorship marked by an "inferiority 
complex in respect to culture as s u c h . " 2 4  As Alexander Zinoviev pointed out, the 
position of Soviet ideology in relation to diverse spheres of knowledge was always 
"familiar — a position of control, supervision, tutelage, censorship". This 
policing function, which "serves as a kind of military uniform distinguishing the 
in-group from the outsiders", necessarily became more complex in the post-Stalin 
e r a . Zinoviev remarked that, whereas "during the Stalin epoch ideological 
communism attained a level of striking clarity, which threatened to strip bare its 
essence and reveal it to the broad masses of the population", "criticism of the 
Stalinist 'vulgarisation' of Marxism-Leninism had the practical aim of returning it 
to its former (pre-Stalin) confused state which was more in accord with the nature 
of the ideology", and "achieved such significant success that now no trace remains
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of the former (classic) Stalinist c l a r i t y . " ^  This process was seen by many 
subordinate CPSU members as a ’return to Leninist norms’, but for top officials 
much more than a revision of Stalin’s ’Leninism’ was at s ta k e d  To absorb the 
’rejection energy’ of dissatisfied Soviet citizens, new dead formulas had to be 
found, and to stifle the fresh air of criticism from below, a new corps of 
professional censors had to be created.29 The upshot of this was that the ’’divorce 
between private conviction and public utterance”, which had emerged under 
Stalin, widened considerably in the post-Stalin era, embedding ’dualist thinking’ in 
a combination of private cynicism and public conform ism .^
The best broad analysis of the metamorphosis of Marxism-Leninism remains a 
1969 article in Voprosy filosofii by Vladimir Lukin, who presented "some 
isolated notes” about the role of ideology in the social transformation of a 
backward but independent ’’society of an anti-colonial, peasant-statocratic type.”^  
Initially, ’’the role of ideology is exceptionally large, maybe larger than in many 
other social structures”, because in an unstable situation the "state and ruling 
party” must rely on a "unified and ’strict’ ideological system of ties", in order "to 
orient the masses in the chaos and confusion of the first post-revolutionary years 
... to install in them a feeling of pride and optimism in conditions when an 
objective and unprejudiced view of things might give rise to an atmosphere of 
disappointment, decomposition and growing dissatisfaction." An ’ideology of 
development’ in which "adherence to principle is manifested in the form of 
personal devotion to the chief, the leader", helps "rescue the disintegrating 
system." Since "the central point of ideological conceptions ... has become a 
tendency toward the legitimation of state power ... the confirmation of a halo 
around its sanctity, its highest and unquestionable integrity in comparison with 
any other form of loyalty", Lukin suggested that the message of this ideology was 
as old as the "Confucian-Buddist socio-ethical dogmas" according to which "man 
is essentially good, but has many bad aspects" that the authorities must correct, as 
parents instruct children; the "ideal government is a government of wise and 
saintly people, the pious life of whom is an obligatory example for the whole 
society and each of its members." Quoting Clifford Geertz’s view of ideology as
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bridging the "emotional gap between things as they are in reality and as they 
ought to be", he focused on the role of metaphor as the "cement, fastening 
separate elements into" a dogmatic "new system of cultural symbols", facilitating 
"firm spiritual solidity, purposefulness and disciplined behaviour." Since the 
short term efficacy of a political symbol "does not depend upon ... how adequate 
it is to the real position of things, ... the ruling elite frequently cannot resist the 
temptation to use the prestige of a scientific world-view, taking advantage of its 
external features and transforming them into a metaphorical, optimistic scheme, 
with the purpose being to legitimise the existing power and offer the masses 
’radiant horizons', frequently by means of an open break with the ’uncomfortable' 
objective reality." Lukin concluded that:
Only in the very long term, in the process of long and painful experience are 
the masses all the more exposed to the non-correspondence between their 
everyday collective and individual practice and the systems of metaphorical 
symbols implanted in their consciousness. There begins a process of the 
loosening of such a type of ideology, which is accompanied by a gradual 
lowering of its intensity and effectiveness. Bit by bit the formerly mighty 
factor of social orientation is turned into an obligatory, although very tedious 
ritual, the use of which indicates the observance by the society's members 
of an already old tradition of the 'rules of the game', not established by them, 
rather than any identification of their internal aspirations with an obsolete 
dogma. But, just as the erosion of a pre-scientific ideology may not be 
accompanied by qualitative changes in the cultural level of society and 
correspondingly deep shifts in the basic mechanisms of mass consciousness, 
so this matter is frequently confined to the replacement of one metaphorical 
system by another — sometimes an 'anti-system', but more often a 'repaired' 
variant of the preceding one. With this, the building material and the 
mechanism do not undergo any essential changes.
The paradox of exclusive ambiguity marks a language-game where the words 
have been warped through misuse, so that they no longer bridge the gap over 
which their sense was stretched. In terms of the metaphorical persuasiveness of 
the apologetic ideology, there has been a great change, almost 'from infinity to 
zero', to borrow a phrase of Z i n o v i e v ' s . B u t  the 'eroded' ideology remains on 
stage like a mummy, since its function as a 'mechanism' of social exclusion is still 
required by the elite. And there is no essential change in the content of this 
ideological carcase, since Lukin points out that its "overwhelming trend" was
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always composed of ’’different kinds of nationalist conceptions", comprising 
"sufficiently wide, diffuse stereotypes that could render admissible any concrete 
programme if only it was embodied in a dynamic, strong and distinct leader 
unambiguously indicating the 'only correct path’." What remains is a tragically 
ironic autonomy of words in a society where "any aspiration toward collective or 
individual autonomy is considered as sabotage of the sta te".^
This loosening of what Stephen Cohen has called "the terroristic ideology of 
the Stalin years" formed the main historical context for Soviet development 
d e b a t e s . T h e  extent of liberalisation from above was an issue in the struggle 
for power within the post-Stalin leadership, which had to address the demands of 
society at large, in particular the impossibility of managing the economy through 
political coercion, and the general discontent of the intelligentsia, the social layer 
which, next to the elite itself, had benefited most from Stalinist 
industrialisation.^ a  gradual de-Stalinisation was under way before Khrushchev 
took the bull by the horns at the 20th CPSU Congress, consolidating his authority 
within the elite by deflecting criticism away from the basic structures of power, 
toward the villain who had been a deity only three years before. For those below, 
this exposure rocked the system of ideological censorship centred around Stalin. 
Claude Lefort noted in 1956 that "the monopoly of truth built up by Stalinism has 
been broken, whatever the new leaders do to restore it", while Yuri Karyakin 
recently stressed the suddenness with which "a whole world-view was smashed in 
one moment", contrasting this shock with the gradual evolution of world-views 
"from theism to deism and further" that took centuries in Europe. Khrushchev 
endeavoured to cover this breach in the fortress of censorship, by fostering his 
own cult while restraining the intelligenstia's enthusiasm, so that the 'flood' of 
criticism did not burst its banks and drown responsible officials on high 
g r o u n d . B u t  his populist attempt to 'repair' the ideological stability of Soviet 
society while trying to reform its administrative structure alienated the powerful 
'moderate-conservative' faction of the Soviet elite and the reformist part of the 
intelligentsia simultaneously.^
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The most important aspect of Khrushchev's liberalisation was criticism of the 
terror, which lessened the atomised 'inertia of fear' characteristic of Stalinism, 
and led to "a partial but important re-politicisation ... amongst the 
intelligentsia."40 Already in the late 1940s and 1950s, as Andrei Amalrik has 
pointed out, "a lively ideological movement began to make itself felt ... 
somewhere on the borderline between the de-ideologised masses and the ritual 
ideology of the elite, in the shape of underground Marxist groups aiming to 
re-invest Marxism in Russia with its old, revolutionary (instead of its present, 
conservative) character."41 This trend was predominant in the youth movement 
that emerged after the 20th CPSU Congress, some of whose "theoreticians" later 
became leading Soviet writers on third world developm ent.^  With the 
repression of their organisations, and a broadening of cultural contacts between 
the USSR and the West in the early 1960s, this radical trend was outstripped by 
the growth of a liberal reformist opposition amongst the party intelligentsia.^ 
Practical comparisons with the West showed even privileged Soviet intellectuals 
that they were poorer in material terms than their counterparts in advanced 
capitalist countries, who also had more independent conditions of work, relative 
freedom of speech and better careers for their children.44 Together with the 
optimism which resulted from a brief but significant opening of the archives 
following the 22nd CPSU Congress, such comparisons raised the expectations of 
some Soviet intellectuals about possible improvements in their position through 
political and economic reform. This liberal trend was publicly expressed in the 
prominent literary journal Novy Mir, and became so influential that "the liberal 
epoch", as Zinoviev terms it, did not end with Khrushchev's fall, but lasted 
broadly for another four years, and in some respects for longer.45
During the 1960s Marxism-Leninism became stretched, in order to cover up 
a differentiation of genuine political belief within the elite, extending from social 
democratic reformism on the liberal left to Slavophile nationalism on the extreme 
right.^^ Zinoviev has highlighted the cynicism with which many senior officials 
regarded Marxism as their private property, and Victor Zaslavsky has pointed to 
the "counterpropaganda organisations that emerged ... in the mid 1960s" in order
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to distort Marxism as an ideology of social change, blocking "the potential role of 
Marxism as a doctrine capable of generating some kind of workers' 
m o v e m e n t " .^  But that "mass of ambiguity" which made the official 
language-game more elastic also made it easier for critics to communicate their 
thoughts in public, so long as they took sufficient care to dress them up in ritual 
uniform. The art of outwitting the censorship was developed most skilfully by 
the liberal reformists, whose basic attitude of changing the system gradually from 
within suited esoteric rather than outspoken criticism. Zinoviev, a well-known 
member of this milieu, reports that:
They talked in such a way that no-one could fail to read between the lines. 
There was never a word about the Ism. All it got was winks and nudges and 
little sly grins. Some young genius from somewhere or other would stand up 
and start sounding off without pause for breath. ...The main thing was to say 
as much as possible, as vaguely as possible, using dozens of incomprehensible 
terms, and references to dozens of Western names. The best to choose were 
those who had just published one small article. This was the latest word in 
science. Just two or three words to say that nothing in this was a contradiction 
of the Ism, just to keep the authorities happy. So everyone knew what was 
going on. That was essential.^^
Many varieties of 'liberal Marxism' were developed by those who, on the basis of 
"social democratic principles", considered the USSR to be in "a transitional phase 
developing from the dictatorial (totalitarian) pseudo-socialism of Stalin's type, 
toward a more democratic and just society with a real respect for human rights 
and universal moral v a l u e s . Kagarlitsky has shown the increasingly radical 
analysis of Stalinism to which these believers in 'true Communism' turned during 
the 1960s, while continuing to struggle in legal rather than underground form s.^ 
Perhaps, it was just this combination of potentially systemic criticism and an 
unpunishable form of agitation which frightened the conservative party of order 
into a new reaction.
In the early Brezhnev years, the prospect of reform still hung in the air as the 
new leadership moved to incorporate specialists in the formation of government 
p o l i c y . Amalrik observed of this time that: "The regime is not on the attack 
but on the defence. Its motto is: 'Don't touch us and we won't touch you. J But
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the liberal critics wanted to change rather than stabilise the Stalinist system. 
Demands for fundamental reform were subject to mounting conservative criticism 
within the Soviet elite following the 23rd CPSU Congress, culminating in August 
1968 with the 'decisive rebuff signalled by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.^ 
This event was a shock to 'true Communism’, for clearly it now "was not a matter 
of 'the excesses of Stalinism' but of the system itse lf ."^  When Aleksandr 
Tvardovsky was forced to resign in January 1970 from the chief editorship of 
Novy M ir, the 'liberal epoch' in the USSR, a time when it was occasionally 
possible for intelligent critics "to publish a small booklet on a subject which it was 
still too early to write about and which afterwards became too late", ended 
without satisfying any of the basic demands of the reformist i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . ^  As 
Igor Kon foresaw, a historically temporary "process of disintegration" e n s u e d . ^  
Many liberals changed their spots in order to remain upwardly mobile during the 
'years of stagnation'.^ The best reformist scholars maintained their own views, 
but it was more difficult for them to encourage students to think in the same way. 
The Highest Qualification Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education was 
given more red tape in 1971, when "it became obligatory to reconsider all 
degrees and titles, independently of their 'level', and confirmation of the most 
common Candidate degree stopped being r o u t i n e . N e w  regulations about 
research degrees and scientific titles were introduced in 1975, specifying that 
successful applicants had to follow "in all actions the principles of Communist 
m o r a l i t y . " 6 0  Such "vigilance at the gates of paradise" led to a decline in the 
general standard of Soviet social science, as those whose "education is a matter of 
cultivated ignorance" came to the fore.^l In contrast to the Stalin era, "the cream 
of the intelligentsia" was not eliminated, just left "in complete isolation even 
within their own s p h e r e . " 6 2  The best description of this phase of ideological 
censorship was given in 1982 by Boris Slavnyi, who borrowed Collingwood's 
phrase "the corruption of consciousness" to refer implicitly to the changed 
orientation of most Soviet theory, which had passed "from demanding radical 
reform (both outside of and within the national economy) to a defense of the 
status-quo."6^
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Many observers have fetishised Marxism-Leninism as a body of ideas, thus 
"paying far too much honour to a dogmatism that borders on idiocy", at the cost 
of ignoring what Moshe Lewin once highlighted as "a subterranean political 
reality, presenting in potentia, and even at the present time, a large spectrum of 
o p i n i o n .  During the post-Stalin era, this subterranean culture has grown 
stronger as the gulf between "official and popular Russia" has widened, with 
official discourse vainly stretching itself so as to hem in alternative beliefs, and 
succeeding only in providing more space for such beliefs to be expressed and 
engendering more cynicism from which they may be bom.65 Kagarlitsky has 
stressed that implicit debates within censored Soviet publications have often 
mirrored open disputes in samizdat, with the difference that the arguments of the 
former tend to be better while their nominal conclusions seem worse, from a 
reformist v i e w p o i n t . 6 6  Ferenc Feher's judgement that, after "oppositional 
Marxism missed its great historical moment" in 1968, it succumbed to a 'negative 
dialectic’ and was reduced "to impotence and humiliation", is exaggerated, at least 
if 'Marxist' is taken liberally.1^  Not all thoughts that were golden glistered, and 
not all those who wondered were lost. Because Brezhnev's culture of censorship 
could only check for external obedience, not internal belief, ° more than a few 
scholars were able to respond to their "general scientific context" consisting 
"precisely of the 'accursed' questions of our time, the most acute and painful 
social problems," knowing that they had only to present their opinions in general 
terms, since life itself provided the backdrop for c o m m u n i c a t i o n . ^  As Efim 
Etkind has said, "Soviet people know how to read and they know how to 
l i s t e n . " 7 0  Zinoviev presents a dialogue between a cynical but relatively orthodox 
Soviet sociologist and the sculptor Neizvestniy, about a general analysis of a 
society characterised by tendencies of decay:
When he had read this extract from Schizophrenic's manuscript, Sociologist
said to Dauber that Schizophrenic would get into really hot water for it.
'Whatever for?' asked Dauber in surprise. 'What do you mean, what for?'
replied Sociologist, no less surprised. 'This is all about us and our society.'
'TTiere isn’t a word here that says it's all about us,' observed Dauber.
'Our bosses are no fools,' said Sociologist. 'Hypocrisy, oppression,
disinformation, waste and so on - a babe in arms would recognise
71who all that's about. 1
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But Soviet society is so complex that critical analysis is not so easy to produce, 
especially if it endeavours to explain what is going on, not just redescribe the 
familiar in scientific language. Such analysis requires abstract thought, and so 
would tend to occur most fruitfully in an area of study based on historical 
comparison, like Soviet theoretical work on third world development.
The Political Significance of Comparative Development
As Nodari Simoniya has stressed, comparative analysis is vacuous if done 
without a dynamic, historical frame work.^2 To study comparative development 
is essentially to investigate how societies change in relation to one another. And, 
as Scott Meikle has recently argued, a coherent historical framework must 
distinguish between changes which are necessary, in the sense of being 
developments of the essential nature of something, and changes which are 
accidental to that nature.73 Determining the inherent nature of social entities by 
abstract comparison is part and parcel of an adequate historical method. And 
such comparison cannot be amoral, because, as Aron Gurevich has emphasised, 
cultural 'mentalities’ are an inalienable part of history, including the researcher's 
historical present. History is made and understood through dialogues between 
people, which may be openly progressive or narrowly closed, and recognising the 
specific quandary of others may serve as a basis for criticising one's own 
civilisation, just as much as vice v e rsa .^  These basic methodological principles 
have often been ignored in liberal societies, but in the USSR under Stalin they 
suffered an explicit, demagogic attack. It is not an accident that, as Lion 
Chernyak states, "Marxism-Leninism suffers from total amnesia when it comes to 
history."7^ Any apology for the present must abolish the past.
The classic Stalinist apology was quite dissembling, providing the appearance 
of history on a grand scale, while asserting that no more changes would follow, 
since the last of five 'stages' (primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, 
capitalism and socialism) had already arrived in the USSR, the execution of many
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tens of thousands of committed socialists n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . ^  As Lewin notes, the 
Stalinist regime "controlled Marxism ... by adopting, nationalising and freezing it 
into a boring and ineffectual c a t e c h i s m . Bukharin warned about this in 
Aesopian language, saying that "Marxism ... has nothing in common with its 
pitiful social-fascist caricature which goes back ideologically to Lasalle, growing 
with all its shoots into the ideology of the fascist 'National', 'caste' and 
'corporative' state, with the proletariat completely enslaved to capital and its 
terroristic dictatorship, offered up under the pseudonym of the 'nation' and the
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'whole'."' 0 Stalin was aware of the significance of analogies, having banned 
Marx’s concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' in 1931 because of its critical 
implications for understanding the Soviet present.^^ Discussion of the historical 
blind-alley of the 'Asiatic mode' was subversive because it showed the difficulty 
and contingency of any transition from one structure of society to another. By 
implication, the Russian Revolution need not lead straight on to socialism; it could 
lead rather to a period of resurgent absolutism and economic stagnation, and 
perhaps eventually a return to capitalism. Obscuring this required the ending of 
sophisticated analyses of all transition periods, not just the Soviet case, since the
o n
concepts used for the former could also be applied to the latter. The patent 
instrumentalism of Stalin's 'piatichlenka was recently pointed out by Marat 
Cheshkov, who revised the "five-step formational 'ladder”' in Europe to have the 
'asiatic' mode as its beginning and capitalism as its "peak", implying that such a 
scheme could equally be used to justify the immortality of the bourgeoisie.^ * His 
view of world history is based on Marx's broad concept of a bifurcated "second 
m acro-form ation", covering organic class societies in the West and 
"unarticulated" class societies in the Orient, with the modem USSR a special case
of the latter.
Conceptual dissonance caused by "strict ideological control" has weighed very 
heavily on Soviet social science.*^ Confusing conjurations like 'non-antagonistic 
contradictions' muddled those Marxist categories which had not been appropriated 
as slogans, and, given the limited access to alternative theories, impelled most 
conscientious scholars toward pedestrian research on "more peaceful" subjects
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unaffected by imposing interests of s t a t e . ' T h e  result was recently characterised 
by Viktor Il'in and Aleksandr Razumov as a double loss in the form of 
"ideologised scholastics and positivist empiricism under the flag of the same 
scholastics."*^ As Eero Loone suggests, the loss of historical theory caused by 
Stalin's reduction of scholars to fact-finders supporting his grand slogans was 
exacerbated by a farcical craze for 'topicality' imposed under Brezhnev, when, as 
Gurevich pointedly remarks, many historians vigilantly proceeded "to re-write 
history not on the basis of new knowledge, but according to conjunctural 
communiques, in the spirit of an Orwellian 'ministry of t r u t h ' " . j n  areas which 
did not involve comparative study and had obvious sensitivity, like Soviet history, 
the "stormy discussions of the 1960s" were aborted amidst "conditions of a 
lowering of the general tone of creative thought, and increasing showiness and 
w o r d m o n g e r i n g " . 8 7  Stalinist historiography has been called a 
"contemptuosly-cynical eclectic ... naturalisation of historical knowledge", 
according to which social development was governed by 'iron laws' determined 
from on high in a voluntarist way by those "'big' people 'having the right to take 
d e c i s i o n s ' . A s  Mikhail Gefter has stressed, Stalinism effectively abolished the 
concept of historical choice, which is a central condition of 20th century life. 
But such nihilism could not destroy the critical 'feedback' of comparative 
research, even where "scientific development proceeds not according to the laws 
of science itself, but with the aid of an administrative-political m echanism ."^ As 
N.S. Zlobin has put it, the "splash of philosophical thought" with which some 
Soviet scholars responded to Khrushchev's 'thaw' continued to trickle through the 
years of 'stagnation', with serious scholars "considering the same problems on 
more neutral material. 1 L.V. Danilova claims that even the theory of 
socio-economic formations has been relieved in recent years of some of its 
"distortions" as a result of historical research "in such an area as oriental 
s t u d i e s " . One leading liberal historian of Russia, Pavel Volobuev, ventured 
into oriental studies in the early 1980s to discuss "the problem of the choice of 
paths of social development", and recently restated the view that the Soviet state 
under Stalin degenerated into a dictatorship similar to "medieval oriental
despotism ".^
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In oriental studies, the need for historical comparison was recognised earlier 
and more fully than in most areas of Soviet social science, but even here this did 
not occur until the mid 1960s and thereafter affected only the leading scholars. 
After 1956, Stalin’s "mistaken views on the role of the national bourgeoisie in the 
liberation movements of the Orient" were revised, but editorials in the Orientalist 
journal Narody Azii i Afriki in the early Brezhnev years criticised "time-serving, 
incompatible with real science", and urged an end to "such negative phenomena, 
still often appearing in our research, as timidity and indecisiveness in the posing 
of sharp problems of contemporary development". Overall, Soviet oriental 
studies remained pedestrian until 1979, when IVAN began "restructuring" its 
work into "new scientific directions"; even this did little to develop research of an 
"interdisciplinary character", because "strengthening specialisation" and an 
"absence amongst orientalists of a taste for methodological questions" meant that 
the discipline's leading scholars largely shouldered the weight of "enlarging its 
theoretical baggage" t h e m s e l v e s . 9 5  But the qualitative work of these scholars 
proved fruitful, particularly in developing the implications of Lenin’s idea that 
Russia in 1917 "stood on the border between Europe and Asia, West and E a s t " . 9 6  
This "thesis of Russia as a model of the world at the beginning of the 20th 
century" provided an opening for feeding the insights of comparative historical 
research about the third world back into an understanding of Soviet h i s t o r y . 9 ^  
Simoniya quoted this idea of Lenin’s in order to justify devoting "great attention 
to the problem of the transitional period in the conditions of Russia" in a book 
entitled Strany VostokaP^ Aleksei Levkovsky, whose discussion of third world 
’multistructurality’ paralleled applications of this concept to pre-revolutionary 
Russia, argued in a 1976 discussion of this book that Simoniya had demonstrated 
"the objective necessity of using the experience of Russia and Western Europe in 
resolving the problems of the ’third world'", so that "the isolated study of the 
Orient has now gone into the p a s t . " 9 9  This point is crucial for establishing a 
bridging assumption which accommodates all the political meanings that Soviet 
theorists of development can communicate. If the third world cannot be 
understood in isolation, then neither can the USSR, and serious debates about the 
former must have implications for understanding the latter.
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When Gefter announced at a symposium in early 1964 that 'universality is the 
edict of the times", he implicitly called for an end to the forced isolation of Soviet 
society from world developments, in culture as well as in t e c h n o l o g y .  100 w h i l e  
the course of the next twenty years tempered Gefter’s optimism, neither he nor 
other serious Soviet scholars discarded their "concern to obtain scientific truth 
and serve the cause of p r o g r e s s " . ! 01 v.M . Mezhuev recently argued that a 
philosophy of history based on a humanist concept of development is not only 
theoretically necessary to make sense of the past, but also practically necessary to 
orient oneself in the present, as a way of understanding that history "has still not 
f i n i s h e d " .  102 pr0gress is only humanly possible, not naturally inevitable, since 
social contradictions may be controlled positively or negatively, the latter leading
1 A -3
as Marx said to "the common ruin of the contending classes". J Therefore, any 
account of progress or development is value-dependent, as Viktor Sheinis 
observed:
In the concept of progress there are clearly or implicitly contained ideas about 
values, since the value orientation of the researcher need not coincide with the 
values accepted (or even dominant) in one society or another. It is important 
in this matter to avoid the extremes of a normative-teleological approach, in 
which the researcher too simply correlates the facts of a contradictory reality 
with his own ideas about what is 'necessary' and 'better', and a relativist 
approach, which either denies the concept of progress in general, or defends a 
thesis about the incomparability of progress in different societies, 
accomplished as if according to different criteria. ... 'In Marxism', wrote 
V.I.Lenin, 'there is nothing in common with 'sectarianism' in the sense of a 
closed, ossified teaching, arising apart from  the highway of the development 
of world civilisation.' The values of Marxism are a development, a 
socio-historical specification and realisation of the values advanced and 'tested' 
on the long historical path of world civilisation. The aetiology of Marxism is 
inseparably connected with a scientific analysis of the development of those 
societies which are situated in the centre of its attention, the circle of 
which has continually broadened. *04
This perspective implies that serious comparative research into problems of social 
development cannot but ask critical questions about relative progress in all 
societies of significance, particularly where a state, using Marxist phraseology, 
asserts itself superior to the outside world without daring to take the test of an 
open dialogue. While Gorbachev and his supporters in the Soviet elite are now
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endeavouring to reintegrate the USSR into a modem world civilisation, it is clear 
that many leading Soviet intellectuals have been concerned for most of their 
working lives to end what Afanas'ev recently called the "intellectual 
self-isolation" of Soviet s o c i e t y .  105
The conditions of life in the USSR during the liberal epoch and after suggest 
that, at least for critical Marxist scholars researching comparative development, 
the topical issues requiring public discussion must have included the state of 
Soviet society itself. Serious comparative research began to return to Soviet 
social science under Khrushchev, both in response to official recognition of the 
complexity of the modem world, and in the context of the Soviet intelligentsia’s 
demand for reforms to bring their livelihood closer to Western standards. 
During the 1970s the official recognition of complexity remained, while the 
intelligentsia’s dissatisfaction with Soviet life grew yet found less opportunity for 
expression. Gurevich recently observed that "periods of economic progress and 
political ascent or regress are not directly connected with periods of cultural 
prosperity or d e c a y . "  106 ^  1976, as the 'years of stagnation' set in, Lev Reisner 
wrote: "One could say that the marginal state of an economic system, its greatest 
degree of approaching entropy, is precisely what serves in certain conditions as a 
stimulus for maximal theoretical a c t i v i t y " .  107 if  a harsh environment 
concentrates the mind, one specific reason given by Georgy Mirsky for the 
relative prosperity of Soviet oriental studies is that during the 1970s the third 
world changed so much that "a mass of aphoristic, indisputable truths from above 
was not successfully collected", so here "the space for independent scientific 
thought was incomparably greater than, say, in the study of the problems of 
contemporary c a p i t a l i s m . "  108 Soviet debates about the third world have 
concerned real problems, not scholastic jousts. As Yuri Ostrovitianov suggested 
in 1968, after noting the need to explain 'barracks communism': "The point of the 
theoretical compass all the more insistently points at the former colonial 
periphery as a ferment exciting scientific thought, as a source for new conclusions 
and g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . "  109 Another reason was that the field of oriental studies 
found itself "miles away from ideology", subject to less direct political control
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than other areas of Soviet social science. When the Central Committee’s 
wardens of censorship claimed in 1976 at a major discussion of Strany Vostoka 
that comparative analysis was unnecessary for understanding the third world, they 
were met with a united response from leading scholars in the field who asserted 
the contrary.^ 1 * Thus two key pre-requisites for sophisticated esoteric discussion 
of the USSR, a comparative historical approach to development and relatively 
little ideological interference from above, formed in the theoretical field of 
oriental studies when the basic imperative for such discussion, the decline of 
Soviet society in comparison with the West, became more pressing.
It is an important social and linguistic fact that any comparison can be read 
back to front, so that comments made by Soviet scholars ostensibly only about the 
third world can be understood as applicable also to the USSR, provided that the 
particular discussion makes sense in terms of that referent. By taking seriously 
the view that the USSR is still in many respects a ’developing country', it is 
possible to read Soviet theoretical debates about third world development at a 
subterranean level, as analysis of Soviet society written through the mirror of 
analysis of general trends in the 'developing countries' or the 'Orient'. The 
interesting thing is that here the same words can be used to communicate 
meanings about two different subjects, one apparent and the other submerged but 
at least as significant for the authors concerned. It is clear theoretically that 
interpreting political meaning depends upon recognising the questions at issue, not 
on defining the significance of key terms in isolation, since the same terms can 
have different meanings when viewed with different questions of practical life in 
mind. Leading Soviet theorists about development have had to write seriously at 
two levels in order to participate fully in an unrestricted debate. Both levels of 
analysis are intrinsically important, since the subterranean level of political 
meaning could not exist in a sophisticated form by itself, if not supported by 
officially required analysis of third world development. As Arlen Meliksetov, a 
professor at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Relations, said in the 
published discussion of Strany Vostoka, "Soviet oriental studies is a science 
closely connected with practice ... and it is this connection with practice which
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compels orientalists to turn to questions of general t h e o r y . j t ¿s now 
necessary to provide an assessment of the foreign policy issues which have given 
Soviet theorists of development an enhanced political position, and hence more 
opportunities to use their knowledge to communicate esoterically the political 
meanings which they have deemed most significant.
Basic Objectives of Soviet Policy Toward the Third World
To the extent that Soviet debates about third world development concern issues 
of Soviet foreign policy, they reflect different political responses within the 
Soviet elite to the dilemmas of working out a hierarchy of policy objectives 
guiding Soviet relations with the many developing countries. Policy makers need 
some principles to order their information and experience, even if all they wish to 
do is muddle through. The contingency of such 'guides to action' in the outside 
world creates space for political debate about the relative importance of different 
objectives, but scholars questioning the accuracy of particular foreign policy 
assumptions must have the 'national interests’ of the Soviet state at heart, albeit in 
an improved form. Significantly, members of the Soviet party intelligentsia tend 
to be less critical when evaluating the character of Soviet foreign policy than 
when assessing the plight of Soviet society, and identify much more with 
expanding the Soviet state's influence abroad than they do with the same thing 
domestically. Reasons for this difference, which is far from peculiarly Soviet, 
range from the more realistic nature of the Soviet elite’s propaganda about its 
performance abroad than its 'leading role' at home, to the indirect advisory role 
in foreign policy formation of leading Soviet scholars, which incorporates them 
politically in a way distinct from domestic affairs, where they are inclined to 
more cynical attitudes concerning officialdom. Another factor is certainly Soviet 
state nationalism, which in a pragmatic form is a staple ideology of the Soviet 
elite, although, as Yanov has stressed, this is different from the messianic Russian 
nationalism of those who would return all to the dark ages in order to save the 
Soviet state from the ills of c i v i l i s a t i on . Accep t ance  of the need for a Soviet 
'power centre' does not make most Soviet scholars support rash adventures which
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waste scarce domestic resources on aid of doubtful political utility, but it does 
mean that their first concern is often not the interests of the oppressed majority of 
poverty-stricken people in the third world.
Since censorship and the norms of diplomacy preclude direct discussion of the
basic objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world, any attempt to identify
them must be somewhat speculative. Two different types of evidence are
available for interpretation in order to work out the general aims of Soviet policy
toward the developing countries. First, there are statements by Soviet officials, a
key example of which is an important directive speech made by Boris Ponomarev,
candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary of the International Department
of the CPSU Central Committee for over thirty years until early 1986, to IVAN
on October 10, 1980, outlining the major "topical problems” requiring
clarification from sch o lars .!^  This speech surveys the basic issues which the
institute is required to research, and constitutes the nearest thing in Soviet sources
to an official account, relatively unmuddied by propaganda, of the basic concerns
of Soviet policy makers regarding the third world. Second, this source can be
read in the light of the historical record of Soviet actions concerning the
developing countries. This record is open to different interpretations, but it is
remarkable how rarely the question of Soviet objectives is explicitly discussed at
length in Western writing about Soviet foreign policy. As Craig Nation has noted
with reference to Soviet Middle East policy, most Western accounts have been
”pre-occupied with the tactical dimensions of Soviet conduct”, rather than
considering the fundamental reasons for Soviet involvement with countries of the
third w o rld .!^  Yet interpreting the historical record in order to assess the basic
objectives of Soviet foreign policy is not as difficult a task as it might first appear.
Richard Herrmann has pointed out that, while some scholars claim the practice of
attributing aims to Soviet foreign policy to be too speculative or difficult to
attempt, in fact ”the task is not impossible; it is done all the time”, because it is a
117necessary part of making any interpretative sense of Soviet policy at all.11 ' Most 
Western literature on Soviet third world policy has relied on a generalisation that 
the USSR, like other states, exploits opportunities to expand its influence where
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feasible. This generalisation begs the question of Soviet policy objectives, by not 
defining what situation constitutes an opportunity for what goals, and by failing to 
investigate how Soviet leaders actually perceive the context of influence-building 
in the third world. As Simes has said, saying that Soviet leaders "exploit 
opportunities as these arise ... is irrelevant if you fail to establish how they
1 1 Q
actually define opportunities and then proceed to exploit them."110
The first item on Ponomarev’s research agenda concerned the problems posed 
for the USSR by the economic, political and military power of the major Western 
states. He said that "a very important direction of the research work of 
orientalists has been and remains the all-sided study of the strategies and tactics of 
imperialism in the countries of the Orient, and also the active opposition to it." 
Noting the power of multinational corporations, he expressed concern about the 
"new approaches" imperialism was using to force the liberated countries into a 
military alliance under the pretence of a 'Soviet threat'. And, given that the 
United States had just declared itself to have 'vital interests' far from North 
America but close to Soviet borders, he raised the ever-present danger of 
confrontation escalating to major war by adding: "here hotbeds of conflict and 
local wars are being i n f l a m e d " . The two principal Soviet policy objectives 
toward the third world implicit in these comments are to remove a Western 
military presence from as many countries as possible, and avoid any risk that 
Soviet involvement could escalate to a war with other major powers.
These goals derive from what Michael MccGwire has called the "first-order 
objectives" of the Soviet state: "retain independence of action", "avoid world war" 
and "retain power by Communist P a r t y " . H e  argues that "the primary tension 
among the three first order objectives lies between 'avoiding world war' and 
'preserving the capacity for independent action', since the latter could itself lead 
to war. World war is, therefore, a continuing possibility and should it be 
inescapable then the objective must be 'not to lose'". This objective of not losing 
a major war is a second order national objective, which supports the higher 
objectives of retaining power by the CPSU and retaining independent action in 
international r e la t io n s .^  Preserving a capacity for independent action is
78
enhanced by removing threatening Western military capabilities, as is the 
imperative of not losing a major war. But the destruction of any such war would 
be so great that avoiding it must take precedence, so the objective of removing 
Western military forces is limited by an equally important objective of avoiding 
any risk of a conflict escalating to the level of a major war. The historical record 
shows that removing a Western presence has consistently been the most basic 
positive incentive of Soviet policy toward the third world, and that avoiding 
escalation has consistently been the most basic negative factor constraining Soviet 
involvement. Since its formation the Soviet state has pursued a policy of 
"strategic denial" toward nearby developing countries, encouraging them through 
pressure and inducements to restrict their military ties with the West. ^ 2  While 
unsuccessful at the start of the Cold War, because of Stalin’s heavy-handedness 
and the economic and military weakness of the Soviet state, in the mid 1950s this 
basic policy succeeded toward extensive areas of the third world, such as the main 
Arab countries and India, though not toward Turkey and Iran. ^ 3  During the 
Brezhnev period, the objective of removing, and consolidating the removal of, a 
Western military presence remained predominant, but in all cases when there was 
even a remote danger of conflict escalating to a major war (Egypt in 1973, 
Somalia in 1977-78 and Iran in 1978-80) the USSR was careful to avoid this at all 
costs, even acquiescing to the return of a US military presence in states that had 
formerly been ’staunch’ Soviet allies.
One consequence of the tension in Soviet policy between the positive objective 
of removing a Western military presence and the constraining objective of 
avoiding escalation has been that the USSR has devoted substantial attention to 
assessing the domestic evolution of third world states, checking the prospects in 
particular cases for attaining the former objective without prejudicing the latter. 
After commenting on particularly recent or worrying matters, like the political 
role of contemporary Islamic ideology and the emergence of an "open union of 
Peking with imperialism" (leading toward a "military partnership with the United 
States" which would have drastically outflanked the main positive objective of 
Soviet policy toward the third world), the second broad issue addressed by
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Ponomarev in his speech was the need for a clear defmition of Soviet allies and 
their problems. He said "the significance of a scientific elaboration of the 
problems inherent in the countries of socialist orientation should be especially 
emphasised", and noted that these countries have to "resolve very complex 
problems connected with a shortage of resources and qualified specialists, the 
opposition of internal counterrevolution, and uninterrupted pressure from the 
forces of imperialism, who often proceed right up to open intervention." While 
regarding the 'Soviet model’ as "in essence, universal", he stressed that "the 
conditions in each of these countries ... distinguish them from situations which 
occurred earlier in other regions and countries of the world, and are very 
heterogeneous in themselves in our t i m e . "125 As well as focusing on close allies, 
Ponomarev informed Soviet scholars that "the movement of non-aligned states 
deserves special and continuing attention. An analysis of its development, and the 
struggles of progressive anti-imperialist forces in it against those who would have 
it clash with positive positions, these are questions of big political importance." 
In contrast to the directive about studying the problems of 'socialist orientation', 
which concerned the internal stability of Soviet allies, this research task focused 
on understanding "the important mobilisation of the foreign policy activity of 
those countries participating in the non-aligned movement," their "struggle 
against the arms race, against military threats and against all the aggressive 
policies of i m p e r i a l i s m . "  126 Such comments suggest that the main tactical 
objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world in 1980 were to encourage both 
radical and moderate forms of 'anti-imperialism', as manifested in dependent 
Soviet allies (states of 'socialist orientation') and independent non-aligned 
countries, but that the first tactic was still considered superior to the second.
The objective of defending Soviet allies where feasible is important not just to 
strengthen the removal of a Western presence, and but also to facilitate a military 
objective of securing future war-related requirements. MccGwire has pointed out 
that "acquiring and exploiting base rights will usually consume influence rather 
than preserve it", so having substantial influence with dependent allies is a crucial 
part of preparing not to lose a major w a r .  127 g ut the objective of defending
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Soviet allies is constrained by the higher objective of avoiding escalation, since the 
loss of an ally is less threatening to the well-being of the Soviet state than the 
consequences of an avoidable, major war. The less demanding objective of 
supporting non-alignment may reinforce the removal of a Western presence, 
particularly if attained through the instrument of arms sales, but it conflicts with 
securing war-related requirements. The historical record shows that the USSR 
has been careful to use military power only to defend a non-contiguous third 
world state, not to force a change in regime. MccGwire claims that
through 1984 (with one minor exception), the Soviet Union had not used 
actual or latent military force to coerce a state outside its national security 
zone. The Soviets exercised restraint even when base rights were at stake, and 
they had significant forces on the ground and control of air terminals in that 
country. Similarly, when the Soviets have applied supportive military force, 
either directly or through proxies, it has been defensive and not punitive, 
since it is counterproductive to generate unnecessary hostility. *
This policy of defending but not creating or forcibly holding on to allies, and not 
unusually punishing enemies, is sensible in view of the higher objective which it 
serves, since one consequence of a substantial use of Soviet forces in the third 
world would be to encourage threatened regimes to invite a Western military 
presence in r e s p o n s e . B u t  such a policy places a premium on defining just 
which third world countries are reliable Soviet allies, and this is the context of the 
USSR's evident interest in signing formal 'Treaties of Friendship and 
Cooperation' with anti-Western third world states. Given that the first such 
treaty, signed with Egypt in May, 1971, proved not worth the paper on which it 
was written, a key question for Soviet policy toward the third world during the 
1970s must have been whether there was a nationalist limit beyond which any 
developing country would not 'strengthen' its relations with the U SSR .^0
The final research directive in Ponomarev's speech concerned the need to find 
ways of expanding trade and other bilateral arrangements between the USSR and 
particular third world countries. He said "serious demands are put before Soviet 
oriental science regarding the prospects for political, economic and cultural 
cooperation of the Soviet Union with the countries of the Orient. Here there is a
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need for profound summaries of past experience, and an elaboration of 
scientifically based conclusions and suggestions which may assist the search for 
optimal solutions in the mutual interests of the parties concerned, and which 
contribute overall to the joint struggle against imperialism and the threat of 
war . "AJA This directive clearly reflected a basic Soviet policy objective of 
trading with any state which is interested, and a supplementary aim of 
endeavouring to use such bilaterial cooperation where possible to further the 
more important political objectives of Soviet third world policy which 
Ponomarev had outlined. During the post-Stalin era the USSR has endeavoured to 
improve economic relations with all third world states, even those with which it 
has substantial political differences. The main connection between trade and 
other, higher priority political objectives of Soviet policy toward the third world 
has been that matters of trade have tended to become more important bilaterally 
when the more demanding objectives are clearly unattainable, as has often been 
the case in Soviet relations with Iran, since the USSR has been concerned to 
prevent the West from completely dominating any area of the third world. But 
during the Brezhnev period Soviet economic involvement with the third world 
became increasingly commercial, and focused mainly on neighbouring countries, 
with whom trade was geographically more f e a s i b l e .  ^ 2
Ponomarev's speech and the historical record suggest that, in rough order of 
importance, the six basic objectives guiding Soviet policy toward the third world 
have been: remove Western influence, particularly a Western military presence, 
while minimising the risk of involvement in the third world escalating to a 
situation of confrontation which could portend war; defend reliable allies where 
feasible; support moves of non-aligned third world countries to become more 
independent of the West; trade with anyone who can pay; and secure war-related 
requirements in order not to lose a major w a r .  3 These objectives are limited, 
yet sufficiently complex to create big problems for Soviet policy makers. The 
temptation to use a simple category, like the 'non-capitalist path’, to differentiate 
reliable Soviet allies is perhaps understandable from the viewpoint of a seasoned 
conservative decision maker, though hardly effective in terms of expanding Soviet
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influence. Ponomarev concluded his address by stating that: "The Party and the 
Soviet people expect from orientalist scholars fundamental works, summarising 
new phenomena and tendencies in the struggle of the peoples of the Orient, and 
also prompt analysis of current events." While he complained that "the timeliness 
and exactness of analyses is not always secured", observing that "it would be an 
exaggeration to affirm that the analysis of socio-economic development and 
political processes in the countries of the Orient is now fully satisfactory", the 
more distinguished members of his audience no doubt thought that 'exactness' in 
the conduct of current Soviet policy was even more lacking.
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Chapter 3: The Decline of Dependent Allies
Summing up the results of the discussion, Doctor of Economic Science S.I. TiuTpanov 
(Leningrad State University) drew some conclusions. We all depart, he noted, from the 
position formulated in the theses of E.M. Primakov, that the developing countries are a 
part of the world capitalist economy, that the world capitalist economy includes not only 
countries going along the path of capitalism, but also countries of so-called socialist 
orientation.... Speaking about the non-capitalist path of development, Professor 
TiuTpanov noted that today this is not that path which we imagined to ourselves 
20-25 years ago. This does not mean, however, that the pre-requisites for such 
development do not ripen in cuiTent times. Therefore, besides a general typology, 
a particular-country approach is very important.
("Problemy i tendentsii razvitiia osvobodivshikhsia stran", Rabochii Klass i 
Sovremennyi Mir, 1979, no. 4, pp. 159-60.)
During the first postwar decade the USSR, because of its internal weakness 
and shortage of foreign policy personnel, remained almost completely isolated 
from the vast areas of the globe which were of no direct concern to Soviet 
security. Despite Molotov's claim, in February 1946, that "important problems 
of international relations cannot nowadays be settled without the participation of 
the Soviet Union or without heeding the voice of the country", it was not until the 
second postwar decade that the USSR emerged to participate fully in world 
affairs.^ This was symbolised at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when 
Khrushchev publicly replaced Zhdanov's 'two-camp' view of the world with a 
more relaxed and optimistic perspective, in which the USSR could reduce 
Western pressure through a policy of 'peaceful co-existence', and put pressure on 
the main capitalist states in turn by supporting anti-imperialist states and 
liberation movements in the third world.^ These latter were important because 
the USSR's traditional instrument for pressurising the West, loyal Communist 
Parties, had been marginalised by the Cold War system.^ As John Fitzpatrick has 
pointed out, this "sea-change" of Soviet policy in the mid 1950s was largely a 
response to new objective circumstances, not a product of foresight on the part of 
Stalin's successors.^ Nevertheless, the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy 
toward support for non-aligned states in the third world involved a substantial 
reformulation of Soviet doctrine. Whereas under Stalin the national bourgeoisie 
in the developing countries, especially its reformist elements, had been
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"denounced as lackeys of imperialism", now this class was considered to have 
essentially anti-Western interests, even if only for a certain period of time.^
Given Khrushchev's inexperience in foreign affairs, it is not surprising that 
his policy toward the new sovereign states was erratic. He often made decisions 
on the run, with little concern for evaluating broader implications, using a 
method of trial and error which in due time produced more failures than 
successes.^ While some of Khrushchev's achievements in the third world, such as 
greater Soviet influence with India, reflected good policy, others, such as greater 
Soviet influence in several Arab states and particularly in Cuba, were more the 
result of good luck. While it lasted this luck led to the belief, later acknowledged 
by a leading Soviet expert on the third world as an "illusion", that "within the 
briefest period of time the overwhelming majority of former colonies would 
allegedly take, if not the socialist, then at least the non-capitalist, path of 
development".^ The strength of this illusion reflected the backwardness of most 
Soviet writing on the developing countries under Khrushchev, which 
simplistically transformed Lenin's suggestion about the possibility in special 
circumstances of 'non-capitalist development' "into a hypothesis about the 
inevitable break with capitalism of the majority of liberated countries during the 
course of a national-democratic revolution".^ Thus, during the second postwar 
decade, changes in objective conditions established some basic parameters of 
Soviet third world policy, but the Soviet leadership in general and Khrushchev in 
particular were not well-informed enough to know where and when to stop.
Several Western observers have noted that Soviet disillusionment with the 
prospects of the 'non-capitalist path' began soon after the fall of Khrushchev, 
when in 1965 and 1966 some self-styled 'progressive' regimes were overthrown.^ 
Yet the "sobering effect" of setbacks in Indonesia, Mali, and Ghana did not 
produce a return to the dogmatic 'two-camp' view, since the situation in the third 
world was still evidently in flux and by no means hopeless from the Soviet 
viewpoint. Rather, as Richard Remnek has noted, "the immediate impact was to 
broaden the discussion of the national liberation movement for the expression of
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widely divergent views." 10 Soviet interest in improving relations with third 
world countries remained high, but policy formation began to occur in a more 
considered way. As a Soviet article reviewing the history of CPSU statements 
about the third world later pointed out, "the resolutions of the XXIII Congress 
were the first ones in the practice of Party congresses in which recommendations 
for further strengthening the USSR's foreign policy links with developing 
countries were specifically expressed."! 1 Some top officials responsible for 
Soviet third world policy started to listen a little more carefully to the opinions of 
academic specialists, who in turn devoted more attention to topical problems. An 
article on the "tasks of Soviet orientalists" at the end of the third post war decade 
claimed that: "In recent years an important qualitative change has occurred in 
Soviet oriental studies. There has been implemented a reorientation of research 
activity toward the primary study of contemporary problems", such as "disclosing 
the laws and basic tendencies of development of the countries of the Orient" .^  
But, particularly during the fourth postwar decade, any disclosures which upset 
the assumptions of existing policy were not welcomed by those in power, who 
preferred the stability of steady decline to the uncertainties of changing course. 
Concerned scholars had to wait till the beginning of the fifth postwar decade 
before "the arrival of a new generation of leaders, in the consciousness and 
personal experience of whom traditions and the imperatives of today are related 
otherwise than for their predecessors," provided the prospect of a genuine 
"division and cooperation of labour" between "researchers and politicians".^
The significance of countries on the 'non-capitalist path', renamed from 1968 
onwards as 'states of socialist orientation', was a key topic of Soviet debate about 
third world development during the Brezhnev years, but the view which gained 
increasing acceptance amongst scholars in the 1970s had little influence on Soviet 
policy until some old officials were replaced by Gorbachev to make way for 'new 
political thinking'. 14 This debate may be broadly divided into four periods. 
Initially, in the mid and late 1960s, many Soviet scholars offered general 
definitions of the difference between a 'state of national democracy', proceeding 
gradually on the 'non-capitalist path', and 'actually existing' but still backward
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’socialist' states like North Korea. ^  While most thought the difference 
substantial, some almost identified the two, reflecting widespread optimism about 
the "first generation" of developing countries to take the 'non-capitalist path'. ^  
The second period, in the early and mid 1970s, involved more detailed and 
critical analysis of some problems with these 'states of socialist orientation', such 
as the nationalist basis of their anti-imperialism, the instability of their political 
leadership, and the constraints imposed on them by their economic backwardness 
and marginal position in the world capitalist economy. By 1975, 'socialist 
orientation' was categorised by a few leading Soviet scholars as socially 
contradictory and historically limited, not as a wave of the future. Together with 
the emergence of such "negative phenomena" as "regressions in the 
socio-economic development of Egypt, Somalia and some other countries",^ this 
deeper analysis led to the third period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when 
many scholars who had been optimistic about the ’non-capitalist path' 
reconsidered their views. The change of mood was so marked by 1982 that 
Georgy Kim, the senior deputy director of IVAN, concluded an academic 
conference by criticising the manifestation "in some speeches of pessimism in 
evaluating the development of the national liberation movement after 1975."*° 
Although the "second generation" of countries which took the 'non-capitalist path' 
in the mid and late 1970s were ideologically more reliable than the "first 
generation" of the 1960s, many participants in this debate in the early 1980s 
openly questioned whether these more dependent allies were worth paying for. 
The fourth and last period of Soviet debate about 'socialist orientation' occurred 
after the 27th CPSU Congress, when a relaxation of censorship enabled many 
critics of former officials to set the record straight, justifying the superiority of 
doubt over dogma.
The Historical Character of National Liberation Revolutions
The issue of the character of contemporary national liberation revolutions is 
an appropriate place to begin an examination of Soviet development debates, since
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it provides the broader context for a number of specific controversies and gives 
an indication of the general trend of debate over time. All Soviet scholars work 
within a general conceptual background different from standard Western 
concerns about securing investment, preventing instability and providing aid in 
order to make the third world safe for capitalism. The major difference is that 
the colonial period is viewed as an important historical factor rather than as 
something best forgotten. A related difference is that the years after the Second 
World War are seen as a period when the colonised peoples transformed 
themselves from objects of oppression into subjects of history through a national 
liberation struggle. It has been a standard assumption of Soviet analysis that the 
beneficiaries of decolonisation were the leading actors in the achievement of 
political independence, not the metropolitan powers, who were forced to give up 
their colonial possessions, and who even now continue their efforts to re-establish 
control over areas of the third world with a neocolonialist policy. The attainment 
of economic development, overcoming the backwardness produced by 
colonialism, has generally been seen as the central issue of developing countries' 
continuing struggle with imperialism, but Soviet scholars have expressed 
substantially different views about the historical nature of this struggle for 
economic independence and full national liberation. While most assumed that this 
nationalist struggle has an inherent tendency to develop in an anti-capitalist 
direction, from the mid 1960s this key assumption began to be rejected by some 
who viewed contemporary national liberation revolutions as essentially similar to 
the bourgeois democratic revolutions which consolidated capitalism in Europe 
before the industrial revolution.
This debate opened in late 1966 with a highly polemical and erudite article by 
Simoniya, then a promising young scholar at IVAN. Simoniya explicitly attacked 
the idea, propounded among others by Viktor Tiagunenko, the leading specialist 
on the third world at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
[hereinafter IMEMO], that the distinguishing characteristic of contemporary 
national liberation revolutions was their tendency to "grow over" [pererastat'] 
from a "general-democratic" to a "socialist" phase. ^  Tiagunenko claimed that:
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"In the contemporary epoch there is occurring not only a further growing 
together but also an intertwining of the tasks of national liberation and national 
democratic revolutions with the tasks of socialist r e v o l u t i o n s . "^0 Criticising this 
proposition, Simoniya advanced three basic arguments. First, he denied any basic 
historical difference between European bourgeois democratic revolutions and 
contemporary national liberation revolutions, since the latter were directed 
against colonialism in much the same way as the former had been directed against 
absolutism. Indeed, he argued that there was an essential similarity between these 
types of revolutions, since the latter, which were directed not against 
"imperialism in general but only one of its features", usually had the effect of 
fostering the development of national "capitalist tendencies" in countries liberated 
from foreign oppression.^! It was therefore incorrect to claim, as Tiagunenko 
did, that contemporary national liberation revolutions were generally of a "new 
type" because of the "special significance" of the "very favourable international 
conditions" in which they were occurring (by this Tiagunenko meant the USSR's 
support for third world national liberation movements). Instead, Simoniya 
argued that all that could be said generally was that these conditions "made 
possible a choice between capitalism and socialism", the outcome of which 
depended on the internal struggle within a particular country.
Second, in addressing the factors determining this internal struggle, Simoniya 
questioned the primary role which Tiagunenko had accorded to economic reforms 
before political changes. While it was correct to argue that objective economic 
demands for development might lead to significant political changes, Simoniya 
asserted that a policy of economic reforms as such could only follow the latter. 
This was especially true of countries proceeding on the 'non-capitalist path', to 
which Tiagunenko was r e f e r r i n g . in other words, the decisive factor in 
determining whether a particular national liberation revolution turns into a 
socialist one is not the general task of economic development standing before it, 
but rather whether or not "revolutionary class changes in the political position of 
the government" occur, making the im plem entation of progressive 
socio-economic reforms p o s s i b l e . 2 4  Simoniya argued that without such changes,
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the tasks of national liberation revolutions and socialist revolutions were separate, 
with the former limited to the attainment of political i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^
Third, Simoniya pointed out that actually, of the 28 Asian countries which had 
attained independence in the twentieth century, only 4 had 'grown-over' from a 
national liberation revolution into a 'socialist' one, and only 2 others had taken the 
'non-capitalist path of development'. He stated frankly that: 'Tn all the 
remaining countries of Asia right up to the present there occurs — in some cases 
quickly, in others slowly ~  an evolution along the capitalist p a th ."^  In other 
words, the tendency of 'growing-over' existed only in a few cases. In 
commenting on the historical limitation of this tendency, Simoniya pointed to "the 
fact that national liberation revolutions can be completed before the emergence of 
a situation in which a growing-over would be possible." In this case, "we already 
have to speak simply about the maturing (possibly, very prolonged) of a socialist 
revolution, and not about the growing-over of a democratic national liberation 
revolution into a socialist o n e . " 2 8  To emphasise the limitations of the 
growing-over perspective, Simoniya concluded his article by discussing some 
countries where the bourgeoisie had come to power as a result of national 
liberation revolutions. In such places as India and Turkey, the only kind of 
popular revolution possible now was a separate, anti-capitalist one. The idea of 
an "uncompleted" national liberation revolution waiting to 'grow-over' into a 
socialist one "does not consider the fact that the transition to the second stage of a 
national movement for economic liberation far from always signifies, and, to be 
precise, in a majority of cases does not signify, a transition to the second stage of 
a [national liberation] r e v o l u t i o n . " ^  Hence, the "very favourable international 
conditions", which Tiagunenko thought contributed substantially to the process of 
"growing-over", could also contribute to its opposite, since "the representatives of 
the bourgeoisie of a series of countries have very successfully used these 
conditions for strengthening the political sovereignty and economic independence
of their countries.
The political meaning of this debate for the priorities of Soviet policy toward
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the third world was quite clear. The general implications of Simoniya's position 
were more cautious than those of Tiagunenko's. Whereas Tiagunenko explicitiy 
referred to national democratic revolutions as constituting "a component part of 
the world socialist revolution”, Simoniya cited Lenin to affirm his view that these 
revolutions were just "an independent moving force of the world revolutionary 
process, which in their anti-imperialist tendency will assist the world socialist 
r e v o l u t i o n . 1 Tiagunenko was saying quite clearly that contemporary national 
liberation revolutions should lead to the emergence of a host of reliable Soviet 
allies worth defending, while Simoniya was saying that the number of such 
countries was small and would remain so for a long time to come. After quoting 
Lenin to the effect that the countries of the Orient were generally developing in 
the European, capitalist pattern, Simoniya conceded this did not mean that they 
had to pass "through the full cycle of capitalist development." He then wrote 
boldly: "Following on from K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin regularly 
indicated the possibility of these peoples by-passing capitalism after the victory of 
socialism in the advanced countries of the West."^^ Since it was received opinion 
amongst the Soviet elite that, to use Brezhnev's words, "the Communist movement 
in Western Europe ... won’t amount to anything for fifty years", Sim oniya 
actually conceded n o t h i n g . ^  As the conclusion of his article clearly indicates, he 
was saying that the USSR should devote more attention to its relations with 
substantial capitalist states in the third world, since they were more numerous and 
were already benefiting indirectly from Soviet support. Since reliable allies 
would be few and far between, it was important to do everything posible to 
support the independence from the West of non-aligned capitalist countries, even 
if there was no likelihood of their 'growing-over' to a 'socialist revolution'.
Despite the quality of Simoniya's arguments, it took a long time before his 
view about the character of national liberation revolutions gained wide 
acceptance. This was because he was challenging the dominant orthodoxy on the 
most important theoretical issue of third world development. In an 
understatement at the start of his article, he noted that Tiagunenko’s view was 
"one of the most widespread".*^ In fact, the idea that contemporary national
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liberation revolutions were in some sense of a 'new type' was supported by almost 
all Soviet scholars and officials in the late 1960s. Thus Karen Brutents, a deputy 
head of the International Department who was one of the first to note publicly the 
difficulties of the 'non-capitalist path', asserted in 1966 that "the historical mission 
of contemporary national liberation revolutions consists not in that they clear the 
ground for the consolidation of capitalist relations, but in that during the course 
of the liquidation of the political and economic supremacy of imperialism they 
make a path toward the struggle for a socialist reconstruction of society." He 
stressed the "enormous significance of the international factor for the 
non-capitalist path of development", whereas Simoniya had previously stated that 
the "internal factor" had an "unusually growing role" in the third world.^^ 
Brutents saw capitalist development in the former colonies as regressive, 
constituting "not only a movement from feudal and pre-feudal orders, but also a 
falling back from the non-capitalist and socialist perspectives, which are real 
already t o d a y . a  similar view had been expressed in 1965 by Sergei 
Tiul'panov, who suggested that "at a definite stage of development the developing 
countries, participating in the international division of labour and being, as such, 
part of the world economy, may take up their own kind of intermediate position 
between the capitalist and socialist systems, and so form a particular sector of the
' i n
world economy — still not socialist, but already no longer capitalist."^7 These 
views were essentially reformulations of the 1961 CPSU Program, which had 
confidently asserted that capitalism could not solve the basic problems of the 
underdeveloped world, so that "in the contemporary epoch the objective course of 
events is such that it is impossible to go forward without going toward socialism", 
i.e. the USSR.38
The main significance of Simoniya's criticism of Tiagunenko was that, for the 
first time, a scholar had openly challenged the direction of Soviet third world 
policy in the broadest possible terms. When support for Indian non-alignment 
had been voiced in the late 1950s, it was by scholars such as Rostislav 
Ul'ianovsky, appointed in July 1958 as a deputy director of IVAN, who generally
on
supported existing Soviet policy from a conservative perspective. As Brutents'
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opposite number in the International Department, Ul'ianovsky became the chief 
proponent of the ’non-capitalist path’ when it was subjected to criticism from 
leading Soviet scholars during the 1970s. Before 1966, innovative scholars like 
Mirsky had questioned the application of traditional Stalinist categories to the 
third world, emphasising the importance of new subjective factors like the 
anti-Western political attitudes of influential parts of the military and 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . ^  But Simoniya’s criticism focused on the objective character of 
social change in the developing countries, and so was much more sweeping. His 
concern was that the concept of ’growing-over’, notwithstanding its Comintern 
pedigree and the institutional authority of its propounder, involved a basic 
misreading of contemporary history in the third world. The point of his 
arguments, which were republished in a booklet in 1968, was to take advantage of 
the new space for within-system criticism to alert the Soviet foreign policy 
establishment to the inaccuracy of a key assumption — the possibility of 
consolidating a significant group of dependent and hence reliable allies in the 
form of ’non-capitalist’ developing countries.^
The course of the debate about the character of national liberation revolutions
in the late 1960s and early 1970s shows that Simoniya’s view was too novel to be
accepted in official circles then, partly because it was based on a serious rather
than sophistic understanding of Lenin's writings about the issue of 
49'growing-over'. Although Simoniya was seconded to the editorial board of 
Narody Azii i Afriki shortly before his critical article appeared, the conceptual 
inertia which he attacked was still politically influential. Conservative dogmatists 
even implicitly accused him of having "petty-bourgeois-populist views on 
non-capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t " . ^  Tiagunenko's authority was such that, in the 
second edition of his book on contemporary national liberation revolutions 
published in 1969, he saw no need to refer explicitly to any of Simoniya’s 
criticisms. He reprinted the parts of his book concerning ’growing-over’ almost 
entirely unchanged, merely inserting a few cautious statements in recognition of 
the fact that the ’non-capitalist path’ was not without "temporary setbacks".
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Apart from the power of authority, Tiagunenko's view remained dominant for 
some time because it was vague enough about basic issues to appeal to all scholars 
who generally favoured a perspective of historical optimism about Soviet allies. 
The practical flexibility of Tiagunenko’s eclectic view is evident in his definition 
of the 'non-capitalist path’ as ”a series of intermediate steps" through which a 
national liberation revolution ’grows-over' into a 'socialist' o n e .^  Combining 
optimism about the anti-capitalist outcome of national liberation revolutions with 
the usual criticism of Stalin for excluding the national bourgeoisie from 
participation in a national front strategy, he admitted that Western investment was 
needed for third world economic development, and noted that agrarian reforms 
would facilitate the development of capitalism. He asserted that the pressure of 
foreign capital was forcing the national bourgeoisie to join the struggle for 
economic independence, and that this struggle was taking the form of a "further 
development of the anti-imperialist, national democratic revolution to new 
stages", which were contradictory views, since the Soviet concept of a 'national 
democratic revolution' referred to emerging anti-capitalist tendencies, and the 
further these develop the more they must impinge on the interests of the national 
b o u r g e o i s i e . Such contradictions were not peculiar to Tiagunenko, but rather 
inherent in the loose definitions of 'non-capitalist development' prevalent amongst 
Soviet scholars and officials at this time. Tiul'panov, in his textbook on the 
developing countries published in 1969, referred to contemporary national 
liberation revolutions as both the "starting point" for 'non-capitalist development' 
in the third world and as opening up two possible paths of development there, the 
other path being capitalist; he left the reader to puzzle out how the "special" 
character of successful national liberation revolutions could lead in two divergent 
directions at o n c e .^  The most ludicrous contradiction of the time occurred in 
the speeches to the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, when "patriotic minded 
representatives of national capital" were included amongst forces supporting the 
'non-capitalist path of d e v e l o p m e n t ' T h i s  was testimony indeed to the fact that 
ideas may be perpetuated long after they have been shown inadequate, provided 
they have sufficient social support. The authority of the support in this case was 
made clear during Brezhnev's report to that Congress, which included an explicit
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endorsement of Tiagunenko's key concept of 'growing-over': "The main thing 
consists in the fact that the struggle for national liberation in many countries has 
practically grown-over into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal
and capitalist. "49
This official endorsement of the 'growing-over' perspective was undoubtedly 
a setback for Simoniya, whose clear criticisms had apparently been ignored. The 
debate seemed to have been resolved squarely in favour of Tiagunenko, 
particularly since the next major book on the subject, by Brutents, quoted 
Brezhnev’s statement in its introduction and responded to Simoniya's criticisms. 
Brutents maintained the view that contemporary national liberation revolutions 
differed historically from bourgeois democratic revolutions during the rise of 
capitalism in Europe, highlighting the phrase "Democratic Revolutions of a New 
Type" as the title of the first part of his b o o k .^  But, although Brutents 
reaffirmed his difference with Simoniya about the importance of the international 
factor, his actual contribution was a subtle one, which, rather than ending the 
debate in Tiagunenko's favour, helped focus attention on the specific problems of 
'states of socialist orientation'.^ *
The key section of Brutents' book for this debate was chapter five, which 
carried an almost identical title to Simoniya's article, and consisted largely of an 
implicit response to his criticisms. Brutents' main criticism of Simoniya's 
argument was that he had falsely identified revolutions which were occurring in 
two different epochs as similar. He argued that, although most of the formerly 
colonised world remained capitalist, "more than a quarter" of it had "acquired an 
anti-capitalist tendency" as a result of national liberation revolutions, and this 
constituted a major historical difference with the epoch of bourgeois democratic 
revolutions in Western E u r o p e . The possibility of 'growing-over' did then 
definitely exist, and in view of the policy advantages of having reliable allies it 
could not simply be "ignored" because it concerned only a minority of countries. 
But with regard to the crucial question of 'growing-over', Brutents raised a 
"serious qualification". He said that, while there were close links between the
106
'national democratic' and 'socialist' revolutions, "the border between them — 
though sometimes very thin at the point of transition or growing-over — has a 
fundamental significance, and it is incorrect and dangerous to ignore i t . " ^  
Moreover, he stressed that even a 'national democratic revolution' was not the 
inevitable result of every national liberation revolution. It existed "only as a 
possibility", as one of the "two antagonistic tendencies of social development" 
(capitalist and anti-capitalist) which were struggling with each other in the course 
of a national liberation revolution.^ While attempting to set the record straight 
about the character of contemporary national liberation revolutions, Brutents 
added some new questions to old problems. In addition to repeating his former 
statements that "capitalism possesses definite internal reserves" and that the 
victory of the anti-capitalist tendency "is not predetermined", he concluded by 
noting the existence of "enormous obstacles for the development and especially 
the practical realisation of anti-capitalist tendencies" in the third w orld .^
Brutents' arguments changed the focus of Soviet debate from the historical 
character of national liberation revolutions to the dominant orientation of social 
developments in the third world. The former issue was not resolved or 
considered less important, but all leading participants in the debate recognised that 
it could not be discussed adequately in isolation from other questions upon which 
the answer to it depended. Tiagunenko, in the introduction to his posthumously 
published book on the international division of labour, said that while the 
character of national liberation revolutions was "the central question of the 
socio-economic development of the 'third world'", the answer to it depended 
crucially on the prospects for capitalism overcoming the gap between developing 
countries and developed countries in the world capitalist economy. He claimed 
that only if this gap was closed would those who viewed contemporary national 
liberation revolutions as bourgeois democratic be proven c o r r e c t . ^  While this 
particular argument would have been seen by Simoniya as an attempt on 
Tiagunenko's part to shore up his increasingly tired arguments about 
'growing-over' by changing the terms of the question, in a general sense this 
change was widespread and transcended definitional differences. ' Although
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Brutents differed from Simoniya in extending the concept of national liberation 
revolutions to cover the struggle for economic as well as political independence, 
this became secondary once he clearly identified the main feature of this struggle 
as being ’’above all around the question of the path of social development” which a 
particular country was to fo llow .^
Significantly, in a discussion in November 1976 of Simoniya's book Strany 
Vostoka, the only point of agreement between an ideologist from the Central 
Committee’s Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in this case V.N. Egorov, and 
Simoniya concerned the latter’s criticism of Tiul'panov's attempt to deny the 
bourgeois democratic nature of contemporary national liberation r e v o l u t i o n s . ^  
Apart from pointing out the inconsistency of Tiul’panov's position, Simoniya 
questioned his assertion that internal conditions, such as the extent of class 
formation, new tendencies in the evolution of petty-bourgeois democracy and the 
growing role of the subjective factor, were more advanced in the contemporary 
third world than they had been in Western Europe during the era of the 
consolidation of capitalism. He claimed that:
although this point of view is still very widespread, until now we have not met 
one adequately based and empirically confirmed argument in its favour. The 
matter is usually limited to simple declarations of the special character of 
these revolutions, references to the really different character of international 
conditions and the fact of borrowing definite ideas from outside, without 
any serious analysis of internal socio-economic conditions.
This judgement reflected Simoniya's dissatisfaction with the slow progress of a 
debate about the dimensions and prospects of the 'non-capitalist path' which had 
begun after the 23rd CPSU Congress, but some arch conservatives thought new 
ideas were already out of control. Reviewing Brutents' book, Ul'ianovsky's right 
hand man, Arkadi Kaufman, objected strongly to what he labelled as "extreme” 
views expressed "in recent times”, which tried "to nullify or ignore the big 
political and practical significance of the processes occurring in the countries of 
socialist orientation.”61 The object of this attack was Simoniya, who had 
emerged by the mid 1970s as the leading critic of the illusions of consolidating
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dependent allies on the so-called 'non-capitalist path of development'.
The Dimensions of 'Non-Capitalist Development'
Soviet debate about the significance of 'non-capitalist development' has been 
hamstrung by the crudely normative nature of official Soviet discourse, based on 
"the coalescence of the Stalinist regime ... with a general idea of the organisation 
of socialist s o c i e t y . Stalin's principle that "an internationalist is one who is 
ready to defend the USSR ... unconditionally" was not rejected or forgotten by his 
s u c c e s s o r s . 6 3  The lopsided language necessitated by this premise instrumentally 
tied debate about 'non-capitalist development' to the strategic imperatives of 
Soviet policy, ruling out by definition any analysis reflecting the independent 
interests of 'non-capitalist' movements themselves, apart from or opposed to the 
interests of the USSR. In the early 1960s, two dramatic changes made 
'non-capitalist development' topical from the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership. 
On the one hand, Fidel Castro aligned Cuba with the USSR in spite of not being a 
loyal communist, while, on the other, the widening Sino-Soviet split confirmed 
Stalin’s principle that a powerful but independent communist movement could 
hinder rather than help the USSR. The political function of the term 
’non-capitalist development' was to work out whether other developing countries 
might, like Cuba, become reliable Soviet allies, whose 'communism' would be 
secondary to their dependence on the USSR, rather than vice versa, as with 
C h i n a . 6 4  This focus on dependent allies has been reflected in the only officially 
acceptable discourse which Soviet officials have had for criticising 'states of 
socialist orientation', namely, arrogant and hypocritical statements that their 
leaders have only an 'unscientific' knowledge of s o c i a l i s m . 6 5  in 1969, Lukin 
thought it was "obvious, that the causes of the 'unscientific nature' of one or other 
'national socialism' ... are rooted not so much in the mistakes or illusions of its 
authors, or in an inadequate analysis of reality and the prospects of class 
contradictions in the society, but in the very peculiarities of social relations and 
social psychology in the social system c o n c e r n e d . " 6 6  A peculiar feature of Soviet
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debate about 'non-capitalist development' has been the prolonged resistance of 
state voluntarism to widespread scholarly criticism. As Slavnyi recently 
suggested, this debate has been conducted through a language in which "ought has 
priority over is" apologetically, reducing "objectively conditioned characteristics 
of a process of development" to "synonyms for a special capacity to reform 
socio-economic reality, peculiar to some figures by virtue of their social position 
and the progressiveness of their world-view". Despite increasing criticism, the 
conservatives, whose words were "an echo of those 'absolutely correct' positions" 
of past policy, held the semantic high ground.^^
The first period of debate concerned not the viability of the 'non-capitalist 
path', but the question of how precisely to define it, and hence implicitly how 
much support the USSR should give to states adjudged to be on it. Before the 
23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, almost all Soviet scholars were optimistic about the 
growing dimensions of 'non-capitalist development' in the third world. The 
leading optimist was Mirsky, who predicted at a conference in early 1964 that the 
'non-capitalist path' "will be manifested all the stronger" in the years ahead. He 
thought that, because of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in most 
developing countries, socially independent nationalist leaders like Nasser would 
come to power, and try to overcome backwardness with economic reforms that 
increased the role of the state and prevented the formation of a national capitalist
¿TO
class. Mirsky was not dissuaded by colleagues at IMEMO who thought he had 
exaggerated reforms introduced in Egypt since 1961, or by criticism at this 
conference from another colleague for a tendency "to substitute what we wish 
were the case for what really exists".1^  Mirsky suggested that, as a result of the 
USSR's "colossal influence on the course of events" in the third world, there was 
"opening in front of the young states an exit from the world capitalist economic 
s y s t e m " . ^  He was more outspoken than others in support of 'non-capitalist 
development', but this suggestion was quite widespread (both its aspects were 
supported by Tiagunenko and Tiul'panov, while the predicate at least was 
affirmed by Brutents).^ Scepticism about the 'non-capitalist path' was expressed 
by those who favoured relying on loyal communists to take power, but Mirsky
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dismissed this position by identifying it with the Chinese leadership, who had an 
"old scheme" of a "quick socialist revolution in the liberated countries" through 
"armed struggle in any conditions."^ Even after the removal of Khrushchev, 
scholars cautious about ’non-capitalist development' because they doubted the 
significance of the ’international factor’, i.e. Soviet aid, still expressed their view 
q u i e t l y . S o m e  "difficulties" of the ’non-capitalist path’ were noted in early 
1966 by Brutents and others, but they were simply being careful about the 
complexity of the situation, not recommending an alternative strategy to support 
for states like Algeria, Burma and Egypt in the hope that they would become 
reliable allies of the U SSR .^ The dominant view remained that expressed in mid 
1964 by Ostrovitianov, who asserted that the ’non-capitalist path’ had emerged as 
"the main tendency of our time" amongst the "kaleidoscope of events" occurring 
in the third w o rld .^  This optimistic opinion about the new trend in the 
developing countries was expressed in a resolution of the 23rd CPSU Congress, 
which referred to the "improving conditions of life with the non-capitalist path of
development. "^6
After the 23rd CPSU Congress, Soviet scholars were informed that defining 
the limits of ’non-capitalist development’ was "an extraordinarily important task", 
and were allowed to express some "serious disagreements" about i t . ^  Three 
different views about the dimensions of 'non-capitalist development’ were 
expressed in the pages of Narody Azii i Afriki during the second half of 1966. 
The key questions distinguishing these views were: whether the 'non-capitalist 
path’ for contemporary developing countries was essentially similar to that taken 
by Soviet Central Asia, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam; and when the 
’non-capitalist path’ should be considered decisively undertaken. The issue 
underlying the first question was how much aid the USSR should provide, and 
that underlying the second was when such resources should be committed. One 
A.K. Bochagov, whose chief claim to fame was having helped storm the heights 
of victory in the steppes of Kazakhstan during collectivisation, argued stridentiy 
that the answer to the first question was clearly yes and the answer to the second 
clearly now. At a time when the Soviet leadership was considering a
rehabilitation of Stalin, he implied that the main difference between 
collectivisation in Kazakhstan and contemporary Egypt was the latter’s lack of 
strong fatherly direction from the USSR. Explicitly criticising some 
officially-connected Soviet scholars, like A.I. Sobolev and Tiagunenko, for 
suggesting that the ’non-capitalist path’ was merely an ’’intermediate stage", 
during which developing countries formed the "prerequisites" for 
"growing-over" to "socialist construction", he asserted that countries like Burma 
and Algeria were "already moving along the path of socialism. While his 
view seemed akin to Mirsky’s opinion that reforms in Egypt had already acquired 
a "socialist character", it was more adventurist, notwithstanding common 
assertions about the "enormous influence of the Soviet Union" amongst countries 
on the ’non-capitalist path’?  ^ Whereas Mirsky focused on the fluid class 
structure of most developing countries, Bochagov simply generalised from what 
had previously happened elsewhere. But his voluntarist view, that states 
proclaiming themselves ’socialist’ would readily become dependent Soviet allies if 
only they were given adequate directive support, was of marginal political 
significance. Anyone reduced to lecturing Tiagunenko that "the very possibility 
of non-capitalist development ... appears as a result of the growing over of a 
democratic revolution into a socialist one" clearly did not contribute much
A second view, put forward by Kim and three colleagues, also answered the 
first question with a clear yes, but argued that certain strict criteria had to be met 
before it was worth making a commitment to any state professing the aim of 
’socialist construction’. These authors thought that the first view was correct in 
principle but too simplistic in practice. They nominally agreed with Tiagunenko 
that "a series of transitional steps" were necessary, but thought these steps had to 
be successfully completed before a ’non-capitalist path’ similar to that undertaken 
by North Korea could be embarked upon. The key step in their view was the 
transformation of nationalist, petty bourgeois leaderships "into parties expressing 
the ideology of scientific socialism", i.e. loyal to the USSR. These authors argued 
that the current situation in all the countries concerned, irrespective of their level 
of socio-economic development, was one of continuing political struggle which
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could result in a choice of either the capitalist or 'non-capitalist' path. They 
emphasised the importance of "all-sided" Soviet aid in ensuring that a particular 
"revolutionary-democratic regime" took the right path, but also made a prophetic 
warning about not mistaking "the development of state-capitalist tendencies, 
accompanied by a limitation of private capitalist activity, for the non-capitalist 
path". Their basic point was that third world allies would be reliable only once 
they had become politically dependent upon the USSR, and no longer occupied an 
"intermediate" position internationally. They were optimistic about the political 
consolidation which had occurred in North Vietnam and Cuba, but downplayed 
the inconclusive reforms introduced in Egypt and Burma. The sharp criticism 
which Kim and company made of the third view, in which 'non-capitalist 
development' was seen as an "intermediate stage" from whence a country may 
even "return back to capitalism", suggests that they were reacting against the 
'non-party' orientation about political change in the third world, which was 
prevalent under Khrushchev and remained influential through the writings of 
Mirsky and Tiagunenko.^ * While Simoniya was about to expose the 
contradictions of the dominant 'growing-over' perspective itself, these authors 
merely thought the "international links" between the USSR and carefully selected 
allies in the third world required a perfectly traditional " s t r e n g t h e n i n g " . ^
The third view was advanced in an article entitled "Once More About the 
Non-Capitalist Path of Development" by Robert Landa, whose answers to the key 
questions were the reverse of Kim's. Landa, like Kim, was a senior scholar at 
IVAN and a member of the editorial board of Narody Azii i Afriki, but, unlike 
Kim, he was a specialist on one of the new states on the 'non-capitalist path' 
(Algeria), not one of those consolidated in Stalin's time (North Korea). 
Criticising the "schematic definitions" of the two previously expressed views, 
Landa differentiated his own opinion somewhat from the optimism inherent in the 
'growing-over' perspective. His basic point was that "the practice of recent 
years" had shown several cases of "non-capitalist reforms" being implemented in 
countries which did not initially have "close ties" with the USSR. Therefore, 
rather than use an "a priori definition of the non-capitalist path" which simply
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equated it with previous cases that occurred in different conditions, it was better 
to define 'non-capitalist development' as an "approach" toward the path of 
'socialist development', which proceeded "gradually through a series of 
intermediate stages", and during which the possibility of changes back toward 
capitalism remained as a result of economic backwardness. Because of this 
possibility, Landa suggested that more attention be given to the general level of 
socio-economic and cultural-political development of states on the 'non-capitalist 
path'. He also noted some real reasons why leaders of such states "adhere to their 
own kind of middle position", and pointed out that they were not about to "break 
off all ties with the states of developed capitalism". Then, having emphasised the 
diverse difficulties facing such countries, he wrote in response to Kim:
Obviously, a definition of the non-capitalist path of development must be 
more flexible and all-sided, enlarging not narrowing the opportunities 
to understand all the complexities, peculiarities, specific forms and stages 
of this social process.
Landa viewed 'non-capitalist development' as a fortuitous "continuation" of some 
national liberation revolutions, which if supported carefully could lead to the 
consolidation some time in the future of new third world allies that presently 
could be nothing but unstable. The point of his article was to defend the dominant 
eclectic approach to 'non-capitalist development' from Kim's dogmatic criticism, 
and simultaneously to add a voice of caution to this perspective in order to correct 
the exaggerated optimism of its more prominent supporters.
The debate about the dimensions of 'non-capitalist development' which began 
in earnest so quickly after the 23rd CPSU Congress did not lead to the working 
out of an adequate answer to the question of the reliability of new third world 
allies. Instead, it merely confirmed the authority of the most politically 
convenient definition, which, as Hough has pointed out, was that which considered 
the 'non-capitalist path’ as "transitional", without specifying either the precise 
nature of the transition being undertaken or its likely duration. The 
'transitional' view was expressed at conferences by both Brutents and 
Ul'ianovsky, although the latter implied in one article that if states on the
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'non-capitalist path' continued to develop successfully for another 10-15 years 
then their orientation toward the USSR would have become "irreversible".^ 
Both these officials stressed the importance of loyal communists "rallying" 
together with radical nationalists such as Nasser, a view supported by Mirsky and 
also by Sim oniya.^ This tactical consensus about "not discrediting a progressive 
regime, but offering constructive criticism of its mistakes" in addition to general 
support, made for a reasonable strategy while events were going well, 
particularly in the Arab world, but it still begged the question of the reliability of 
radical nationalist leaders in the third world. ^  The problem was that answering 
this question convincingly required more theoretical clarification than the 
dominant eclectic view of 'non-capitalist development' could provide. The need 
for a more serious theoretical approach had been recognised by some participants 
in a discussion about the 'non-capitalist path' held in May-June, 1966, but this was 
easier said than done, particularly since the existing level of work on the subject 
was so low.
The theoretical weakness of the dominant view was evident in the third volume 
of IMEMO's first collective work on the developing countries, published in 1968. 
It presented 'non-capitalist development' generally as a "necessity which is 
dictated by the failure of attempts to attain quick and effective results within the 
limits of capitalism", but then suggested that the main basis of this 'necessity' was 
the "enormous" importance of personalities. The possibility that in some 
countries "revolutionary democratic", i.e. 'non-capitalist', reforms "may only 
clear the path for capitalism", was noted but not examined, because of an 
assumption that "revolutionary democrats" as such were "not the bearers of
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capitalism. On the contrary, they strive to restrain capitalist elements" . 7 As a 
description of Nasser at the time this may have seemed adequate, but it was not a 
convincing theoretical analysis. Unsurprisingly, Simoniya's review of this 
volume was almost entirely critical. Regarding the 'non-capitalist path', he 
disclosed several contradictions and ambiguities in this book's analysis. While 
'non-capitalist development' was said theoretically to be "in the final analysis 
incompatible with the ruling position of the petty bourgeoisie", the actual analysis
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of Syria stated: "facts have shown" that the Ba'th party, while "remaining petty 
bourgeois nationalist, has the capacity to implement serious socio-economic 
reforms, objectively leading the country onto the non-capitalist path of 
d e v e l o p m e n t " Simoniya thought this idea that a bourgeoisie could take the 
'non-capitalist path’ was incredible. He criticised the volume for avoiding the 
crucial question of 'transitional to what?', adding it was no help to be told that the 
political regime of a country on the 'non-capitalist path' was a 'state of national 
democracy', since this created "only one more conditional symbol, also 
demanding to be deciphered." When varieties of 'non-capitalist development' 
were said to include backward regions of the USSR, he commented that "it is not 
difficult for this to present itself as a final confusion for the unskilled reader."^
Ironically, the issue of Narody Azii i Afriki prior to the one carrying 
Simoniya's review included a selection of "materials received by the editor", in 
which some provincial scholars presented more "a priori definitions of the 
non-capitalist path", without any consideration of actual cases in the third 
world. These pieces largely supported Kim's view that the model for any 
'non-capitalist path’ was Soviet Central Asia or North Korea, but politically they 
were of little more than curiosity value. Ul'ianovsky had already stated that 
contemporary countries on the 'non-capitalist path' "still may not completely 
break away from the system of the world capitalist economy", adding that "this 
circumstance defines the essential, specific peculiarity of their development, 
which was not definitive of either the Soviet republics of Central Asia or 
M o n g o l i a . "93 This point was emphasised by Gleb Starushenko in his contribution 
to a review conference on the aforementioned IMEMO volume. Noting that the 
problem of the 'non-capitalist path' demanded "further research", he pointed out 
that securing 'non-capitalist development' in the contemporary third world was 
"more difficult" than it had previously been in the Far East, and hence required 
"different methods" if it was to succeed in the new conditions. He specifically 
said that while Soviet aid to 'non-capitalist' countries in the third world could be 
of some importance, it could never be anywhere near as significant as it had been 
in Mongolia. He added that the problem was even more serious because
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contemporary "countries of socialist orientation", as he termed them, had an 
advancing superstructure but a still backward base. He stressed the need both to 
"strengthen the national-democratic state" by "creating a stable vanguard party", 
and pursuing both "a realistic economic policy" and "a flexible national policy". 
Since Starushenko noted that such measures had received "little attention" in the 
IMEMO volume, which was undoubtedly the leading Soviet work of its time, it is 
clear that by the late 1960s not much had been achieved by Soviet debate about the 
dimensions of ’non-capitalist development'.^
The first period of debate about the ’non-capitalist path’ ended in mid 1972, 
with the publication of a book by Ul'ianovsky which affirmed the dominant 
eclectic view by asserting that objective conditions had "brought to life a 
transitional epoch of non-capitalist development, when a wide and contradictory 
bloc of social forces is rendered capable of implementing some preparatory steps 
toward socialism." The two main themes of Ul'ianovsky’s analysis were the 
peculiarities of contemporary 'non-capitalist development' compared to previous 
cases of this path, and the crucial need for a "prolonged union" between loyal 
communists and 'national democrats' like Nasser, in order for 'non-capitalist 
development' to succeed. In Ul'ianovsky's view, a 'non-party orientation' toward 
potential allies in the third world was the only sensible approach, since in the 
developing countries "the prospects for socialism [i.e. the USSR] depend on the 
correlation of forces within the limits of national democracy." His rejection of 
the approach of Kim and Bochagov was summarised by a sympathetic reviewer:
R.A. Ul'ianovsky emphasises that the non-capitalist path for ’third world' 
countries is not that path which was taken by Mongolia and Soviet Central 
Asian republics, and also not a growing-over of a bourgeois democratic 
revolution into a socialist one, but a transitional period for preparatory 
steps toward socialism in countries where there are not sufficient objective 
pre-requisites for its direct implementation. In the book are analysed the 
economic, political, social and ideological contradictions which, in the 
opinion of the author, form the basis of non-capitalist development as a 
transitional epoch.^^
The significance of this definition was not just in asserting that it would take a
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long time (an "epoch") before the USSR's allies in the third world could become 
integrated into the Soviet bloc, or that, as an article elaborating Ul’ianovsky's 
position subsequently put it, "it would be profoundly wrong to present the 
non-capitalist path as a universal, to canonise it, and turn it into an ossifying 
dogma that itself blocks the further creative elaboration of the paths of 
revolutionary development in the 'third world'. "96 Ul'ianovsky’s definition also 
explicitly acknowledged the "contradictions" inherent in the 'non-capitalist path of 
development'. These contradictions were such a feature of reality by the early 
1970s that, as Mirsky pointed out in a review, Ul'ianovsky's book contained some 
"terminological cloudiness" regarding the boundary between a 'national 
liberation' revolution and a 'national democratic' one.97 Ul'ianovsky's intention 
in noting the presence of contradictions in the development of states of 'socialist 
orientation' was definitely not to downplay the importance for the USSR of 
developing countries following the 'non-capitalist path'.98 He was merely 
recognising their complexity, partly so that the politically dominant but 
theoretically weak eclectic view would still appear to most Soviet observers to be 
in tune with events. But by opening the way ideologically for "a special analysis" 
of the obstacles to the consolidation of the USSR's new allies, Ul'ianovsky 
unwittingly made it easier for leading Soviet scholars to question the dominant 
view from a new angle, although when they did so he was the first to complain.99
Nationalism and the Foundations of 'Socialist Orientation'
The second period of Soviet debate about 'socialist orientation', which, as 
Ul'ianovsky pointed out, was now to be used as a "synonym" for the 
’non-capitalist path’, involved more substantial and fruitful debates, which 
effectively exposed the weakness of the established view. Whereas, except 
for Simoniya's critique of Tiagunenko, criticism had previously come from 
reactionaries like Kim, now it came from open-minded 'liberal Marxists' such as 
Levkovsky, Mirsky and particularly Simoniya himself, while Ul'ianovsky became 
the "representative of the rearguard".^! And, whereas the early debate had been
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confounded by dogmatic, a priori assertions, during the mid 1970s some crucial 
empirical problems of third world development began to be discussed in a more 
serious, scholarly way. This second period of discussion witnessed an important 
widening and deepening of debate in both academic and political terms, so that 
leading scholars in the field of oriental studies were no longer mere suppliants 
expressing ideas for consideration by the almighty apparat. Their knowledge 
gained them some independence within the bounds of Soviet officialdom, so that 
their standing within the party intelligentsia increased and they were able to 
determine more fully the character of their fields of study. It is very significant 
that, whereas in the first period Simoniya criticised a leading scholar at the rival 
institute and effectively lost the argument in terms of political influence amongst 
his colleagues at that time, during the second period both Simoniya and 
Levkovsky engaged openly in polemical debates with a senior official, 
Ul'ianovsky, and achieved in the first instance a draw, which, with the subsequent 
pruning of the apparat under Gorbachev, was effectively recognised as a victory. 
Since the major discussions of the mid 1970s constituted a turning-point in the 
trend of Soviet evaluations of the significance of dependent third world allies, it is 
necessary to analyse them in some detail. This section focuses on Simoniya's 
contribution to the emerging critique of the dominant view, while the next section 
will consider Levkovsky's different but politically complementary arguments.
The political background to Simoniya’s work in the mid 1970s was formed by 
two related factors. First, it was now widely recognised that ’non-capitalist 
development' in the third world faced serious difficulties. As Yuri Krasin, a 
minder of the 'world revolutionary process' attached to the Central Committee, 
wrote in an authoritative book in late 1972:
The non-capitalist path, the possibility of which has been made clear in 
documents of the international communist movement, is not a path of 
automatic development, but a historical tendency, which strengthens with 
the strengthening of the world socialist system. Yet it confronts economic 
backwardness, social underdevelopment, and political instability. It is not 
surprising that on this ground strong counteracting tendencies arise, often 
opening real chances for the occurrence of derelictions (in an extreme 
degree for a temporary period) by virtue of the weakness of the subjective
factor of the revolutionary process. ... All this does not signify that the 
possibility of non-capitalist development is unreal or too narrow. It is 
entirely real and prospective. ... We speak only about the fact that the 
realisation of this possibility is accompanied by many more difficulties 
than could have been thought earlier, by processes of the regrouping and 
struggle of social forces in different d i r e c t i o n s .  102
Second, these difficulties created more space than before for a serious theoretical 
approach to the prospects of 'socialist orientation'. Krasin made some pertinent 
comments about the need to develop theory through debate, which Simoniya 
would cite to legitimate his own more critical book published three years later. 
Krasin quoted Lenin to point out that those who attempt to solve partial questions 
without considering the general issues at stake will inevitably confront the general 
problems at every step "blindly, and in each particular case this means they doom 
their policy to the worst vacillation and lack of principle." 103 He claimed that 
the only sensible way to achieve a resolution of general questions was "precisely 
through the counterposition of views, and discussions, in the course of which 
onesidedness is overcome, imprecision is eliminated, and the full scope of the 
dialectics of living reality inherent in Marxism-Leninism is attained." 104 No 
doubt other members of the Soviet elite had a less liberal interpretation of the 
limits of censorship, but it is significant that a relative bigwig amongst the 
intelligentsia like Krasin was still able to legitimate scholarly debate in the early 
1970s. 105 The difficulties which had arisen on the 'non-capitalist path' provided 
leading Soviet orientalists with an opportunity to use this twilight of liberalism to 
the fullest effect.
The increasing vulnerability to criticism of the dominant Soviet view of 
'socialist orientation' in the mid 1970s is apparent from an article published in 
early 1974 by Ruben Andreasian, then a leading expert on the Arab world at 
IMEMO (he later moved to IVAN). 106 Andreasian supported Ul'ianovsky's 
view, but emphasised the "peculiarities and contradictions" which characterised 
the "complex and quickly changing reality of the 'third world'". After stressing 
the difference between contemporary 'socialist orientation' and cases like 
Mongolia, he downplayed the importance of the 'international factor':
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Despite the big influence of the correlation of forces in the world on the 
genesis and development of non-proletarian revolutionary regimes, it 
should be especially emphasised that they have directly arisen from 
internal contradictions, carry the imprints of their level of development, 
and present their own objective reality. Their originality is in a certain 
sense a 'surprise of history'.
This was an important concession to Simoniya’s view, first advanced in 1965, but 
rejected then even by cautious writers like Brutents and Tiul’panov, that "the 
non-capitalist path is characterised by a fundamentally different, unusually 
growing role of the internal f a c t o r " .  ^ 7  Andreasian said that, while countries of 
'socialist orientation' generally developed closer ties with the USSR, this process, 
like their domestic evolution, was marked by many peculiarities. He classified the 
social base of such regimes as "not purely petty bourgeois", but added that, 
because of the weakness of loyal communists, the main political force was the 
petty bourgeoisie, which was "nationalist in its very nature". In analysing the 
nationalism which was the main motivation of 'non-capitalist development', 
Andreasian used the traditional distinction between its "patriotic" and 
"reactionary" aspects, but emphasised the latter rather than the former. He 
focused on nationalist "aspirations to isolate the popular movement in the 
liberated countries from the world revolutionary process", observing that "the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community is 
considered in some non-capitalist countries in no small degree from the position 
of petty bourgeois nationalism — they support the struggle against imperialism 
and at the same time fear a strengthening of the might of the socialist camp." 
This was a frank admission that some states of 'socialist orientation' "pursue on 
the world arena a policy of non-alignment", rather than a policy oriented 
principally toward the U SSR .*^
Andreasian's sober evaluation of the prospects of 'non-capitalist development' 
clearly reflected an appreciation of the changes occurring in the most important 
state of 'socialist orientation' at that time, Egypt. He noted that "it is impossible 
to consider, as any particular formal indicator of a non-capitalist country, the 
declarations of its leaders about an intention to construct socialism. It is known
[■
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that the leaders of many countries in the 'third world' speak about this.” Instead, 
he said it was necessary to work out a "system of criteria" for assessing 'socialist 
orientation’, although "this is difficult to do, since non-capitalist development as a 
phenomenon is transitional in its social essence." Citing Ul’ianovsky, Andreasian 
defined "the first and most fundamental criterion as the type and character of 
political power." Evidently responding to scholars who had suggested a different 
primary criterion, like level of socio-economic development, Andreasian wrote:
Regarding the non-capitalist type of development, the character of political 
power is of really fundamental significance In order to understand this, 
it is sufficient to compare the level of socio-economic development of 
countries which have begun on the non-capitalist path and states where the 
socialist revolution has been completed. May one really affirm that between 
such countries as Algeria and North Vietnam, Syria and North Korea, on the 
eve of their entrance onto the progressive historical path, there existed any 
substantial difference relating to the level of development of the productive 
forces or the character of relations of production? I think not. But meanwhile 
these countries have passed toward social progress on different paths. ^ 9
This was an important statement clarifying the nature of ’socialist orientation', 
which Ul'ianovsky would soon reinforce in his polemic with Levkovsky. 
However, the character of the economic base still had to be considered, and on 
this matter Andreasian was both more hesitant and somewhat pessimistic. He 
affirmed the IMEMO view that "in countries of non-capitalist development the 
state sector plays the decisive economic role, ... [and] does not have a 
state-capitalist character, since it does not serve as a support for the big national 
b o u r g e o i s i e " . *  yet, despite suggesting that "the base, as itself a part of 
non-capitalist development, has a transitional character", he recognised the 
"non-correspondence between the base and superstructure of a non-capitalist 
society" as a "significant criterion" of 'socialist orientation'. This recognition 
implied that the base was more problematic than the character of political power, 
an impression which Andreasian's analysis of particular economic problems 
confirmed. He noted that "the presence of the private sector at a given stage of 
non-capitalist development is objectively necessary, and this sector fulfills a 
definite positive role". "But", he continued, "private-ownership elements possess,
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as is known, the capacity to engender capitalism, to infect revolutionary cadres 
and make them degenerate, to promote the manifestation and growth of a new 
bourgeoisie." He also pointed out that a "national democratic regime" which 
rested on the petty bourgeoisie could not avoid the growth of kulaks in the 
countryside and some "corruption of state officials". This implied that the 
’non-correspondence’ between base and superstructure would, eventually, take the 
form of a social contradiction which could be resolved only by a change in the 
character of one or the other, not a compromise.^ * *
In this respect, Andreasian was rather pessimistic about the objective prospects 
for ’non-capitalist development’, saying that "revolutionary democrats, especially 
in the Arab countries, who acknowledge and encourage small private property, do 
not have any real means available to withstand the growth of private-ownership 
elements." He added that they do not want to give private enterprise "full space" 
in which to move, but implied that the reason for this was mainly negative — "it 
may seize them, eliminate them from power and transfer the rudder of 
administration to openly pro-capitalist elements." In spite of the strong tendency 
of such authorities to monopolise political power, he suggested that "the presence 
of a growing private sector — in the town or countryside — will sooner or later 
inevitably lead to the creation of an independent centre of political a c t i v i t y . "
This analysis, implying that if the superstructure determined which path a country 
took, developments in the base determined how far this path went before meeting 
with insurmountable obstacles, had been applied to Egypt in 1973 by Mirsky. He 
observed "two tendencies of the development of national-democratic regimes, 
which one may relatively call radical and conservative", distinguished by whether 
the threat of embourgeoisement is repressed or succeeds in creating a system 
based on "state capitalist elements." Andreasian likewise concluded that a 
"differentiation of national democracy" was already occurring, with some forces 
moving closer to the USSR and others "toward a bourgeois-bureaucratic rebirth". 
But he maintained faith in the 'growing-over' perspective, refusing to limit the 
possibility of the 'non-capitalist path' to the more backward developing countries. 
This, together with his admission that everything depended on whether there
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existed favourable or unfavourable conditions, showed that the dominant eclectic 
perspective was not easily r e v i s e d .
With one significant exception, Andreasian's analysis of the 'non-capitalist 
path’ corresponded almost exactly with the analysis published at the same time in 
chapter sixteen of IMEMO's collective work on the developing countries, written, 
or at least edited, by Mirsky. The exception, Andreasian's unusually negative 
evaluation of petty bourgeois nationalism in states of ’socialist orientation', was 
significant for two reasons. First, the IMEMO book presented "anti-imperialist 
nationalism" as the "primary impulse" motivating some third world leaders' 
"aspirations to overcome dependence and backwardness" by choosing the 
'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky had no illusions that such leaders would align 
themselves with the USSR for ideological reasons, but he thought the "pragmatism 
of their policies" would push them in that direction when faced with Western 
pressure. It was in these terms that he drew a parallel between Cuba and Egypt, 
though he noted that contemporary "countries on the non-capitalist path have still 
not broken the thousands of threads which tie them with the world supremacy of 
private property." Suggesting that "subjective factors of development play a 
much bigger role at all stages of the non-capitalist path, than with development 
along the capitalist path", he added that "this to a significant degree determines the 
insufficient political stability of regimes of non-capitalist development, and 
facilitates attempts at counter-revolutionary restoration." But, while noting a 
tendency toward bourgeois rebirth domestically, he did not refer to what Brutents 
had recently called the "nationalist manoeuvrings" of 'revolutionary democrats' in 
international r e la t io n s .^  Mirsky explained the poor economic performance of 
most states on the 'non-capitalist path' as resulting largely from the costs of 
protecting themselves from imperialist aggression, which suggested that they 
could be sounder and more reliable allies if the USSR gave them more 
s u p p o r t .  H  ^  w hile Andreasian did not explicitly reject this perspective, his 
evaluation of anti-imperialist nationalism in states of 'socialist orientation' was 
more critical, and suggested implicitly that too much support might backfire, 
since third world nationalists were inherently suspicious of all outside powers.
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The second reason why this more pessimistic evaluation was significant is that 
it offered a new perspective on a debate about the positive and negative aspects of 
third world nationalism recently published in the IMEMO journal. It began in 
early 1972 with two articles by Simoniya, who suggested that, after the 
acquisition of political sovereignty, third world nationalism tended to lose its 
anti-imperialist character and exacerbate conflicts between different domestic 
forces struggling to determine the nature of ’’national-state construction”. He 
argued that the positive aspect of third world nationalism was counterbalanced not 
merely by conflicts engendered from irrational boundaries imposed by colonial, 
powers, but also by "new waves of nationalism and inter-ethnic frictions and 
conflicts, both within given state-territorial conglomerates and between different 
African and Asian c o u n t r i e s . ”  Simoniya ended his second article with a call 
for new research, but the response of most Soviet scholars was to criticise his 
reformulation of the 'national question'. The leading critic was G.S. Akopian, 
who had recently claimed that "a negative attitude to all kinds of nationalism of 
the oppressed and developing nations may lead only to a loss by the proletariat 
[i.e. the USSR] of possible allies in the liberation and anti-imperialist 
struggle.”H ^  \  firm adherent of the 'growing-over' perspective, he thought 
Simoniya's approach "underestimates the chances and significance of nationalism 
in the period of struggle against neocolonialism", and hence "places under doubt 
the possib ility  of the participation  of national-dem ocratic  and 
revolutionary-nationalist movements in a united anti-imperialist front." After 
dismissing the "separatist movements of national minorities", he affirmed the 
"enormous significance" of such fronts of "progressive and patriotic forces" in 
Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Chile, saying they were indications of a 
"sharp turning-point" in the political rapprochement of "progressive nationalists" 
and loyal communists. *^0
In view of Akopian’s strident defence of the orthodox view about third world 
nationalism, it is not surprising that other scholars did not support Simoniya, 
especially since ardent nationalists like the Ba'th in Iraq seemed at the time to be 
as anti-Western as ever. The leading Soviet expert on national movements, M.S.
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Lazarev, considered that bourgeois nationalist movements still possessed some 
’’progressive significance”, while Mirsky repeated the traditional formula that ”it 
is impossible to consider the anti-imperialist potential [of nationalism] to be 
completely exhausted." 121 Simoniya conceded this in an article the following 
year, but still emphasised that a "new type of nation” had not been formed in 
states of 'socialist orientation', which had yet to solve the essentially "bourgeois 
democratic” task of attaining national-state integration, and could not solve it in 
"’one stroke', by means of forced state-administrative measures".122 Simoniya's 
main message was that, in terms of the growing negative side of third world 
nationalism, there was no general difference between states of ’socialist 
orientation' and states on the capitalist path, the implication being that, in terms of 
domestic political-ethnic stability, the former would be no more reliable as allies 
than the latter. This view was rejected in a subsequent article by Aleksei Kiva, a 
colleague of Simoniya's at IVAN. He agreed with Simoniya against Akopian that 
the internal aspect of third world nationalism required more study, but presented 
a quite positive evaluation of the situation in states of 'socialist orientation', even 
citing Somalia as a case where "the struggle with nationalist ideology, in 
particular with tribalism," was proving successful. 123 The actual course of 
events in the Horn of Africa in the next few years would have led many Soviet 
scholars to a belated acceptance of Simoniya's warning, but it is significant that 
already in 1974 Andreasian, a specialist from the rival institute, had expressed a 
complementary, although less sweeping, note of caution about the reliability of 
apparently pro-Soviet nationalists. This shows the heterogeneity of Soviet debate 
in the mid 1970s about the significance of the 'non-capitalist path', even though at 
precisely this time the two major institutes had polarised over the question of the
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type of capitalist development possible in the third world.LjL
Simoniya's book Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiia, published in 1975, has been 
recognised by several Western writers as the key text in the internal Soviet 
critique of the 'non-capitalist p a t h ' .  125 jt was ajso one 0f the few erudite books 
published in the USSR for nearly half a century which used Marxist theory to 
explain important developments in the outside world, and even certain aspects of
Soviet history. In his introduction Simoniya criticised the "pragmatic approach” 
of many colleagues, who avoided serious thinking since they knew "one may find 
in the classics any 'needed1 citation for any case.” He lamented the "inertia” of 
scholars content with old positions, and quoted a December 1962 speech by 
Ponomarev calling on Soviet historians to overcome the "legacy of the cult of 
p e r s o n a l i t y " .  126 [s no SUIprise that at a discussion of the book in November 
1976 several senior Party demagogues expressed strong objections to its contents, 
and Bobodjan Gafurov, the ageing director of IVAN, which had recommended 
the book for publication, concluded by noting "with disappointment that a similar 
airing of views [sotrudnichestvo , which literally means "collaboration" or 
"cooperation", was the word used, but it was evidently ironic, if not euphemistic] 
did not take place at a much earlier stage in the period of preparing the 
manuscript for p u b l i c a t i o n . "  127 g ut if some disciplinarians were concerned that 
the censorship system had slipped up, many more real scholars must have given 
serious consideration to the comprehensive critical evaluation which Simoniya 
presented about the prospects for states of 'socialist orientation' becoming reliable 
Soviet allies.
In a previous article Simoniya had defined the specific feature of 'non-capitalist 
development' as being "an original 'revolution from above'," led by "a narrow 
layer of revolutionary leaders at the top who are compelled to rest on a stratum 
of the old bureaucratic state apparatus, in order to implement their reforms in the 
interests of the lower strata". He noted that in such a situation the problem arises 
of unavoidable "corrections, adapting a superstructure to the real base", and 
concluded that while 'socialist orientation' could begin easily and in different 
forms, it could only succeed through the "ideological and political consolidation 
of the supporters of the non-capitalist path of development" into a "vanguard 
party", a process facing "gigantic d i f f i c u l t i e s " . ! 28 in his book, Simoniya 
developed this by considering 'socialist orientation' in terms of a theoretical 
clarification of the categories of 'social' and 'political' revolution, 'base' and 
'superstructure', and a historical analysis of the legacy of colonialism for 
countries of the Orient. His general point was that third world countries were
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still in the era of a modified bourgeois social revolution, in which their economic 
structures comprised a colonial synthesis of traditional and capitalist relations. In 
this situation, which differed from the "weak link" of imperialism characteristic 
of Russia in 1917, the accomplishment of a socialist political revolution through a 
process of ’growing-over’ was impossible, although "leaps forward" toward it 
would be made. The success of such leaps ultimately depended upon the creation 
of a new economic base, which Simoniya specifically characterised as "a real 
economic socialisation of production (i.e. a transformation of productive 
relations), not a juridical statocratisation, that is nationalisation (changes in the 
relations of property)." Until such a transformation was accomplished, the 
danger of a political "recoil" backwards remained, although this could be reduced 
by two factors: internally, by carefully uniting social and private property 
interests, so that the latter, which could not be eliminated because of the 
incomplete nature of the bourgeois revolution, served the former; and externally, 
by using Soviet support and learning from Soviet experience. Within this 
framework, Simoniya briefly suggested a materialist explanation of Maoism's 
"military-bureaucratic superstructure", and openly re-stated the fact that Lenin 
thought the victory of socialism in one country impossible, but his critical analysis 
of the limitations of 'socialist orientation' included five main arguments.^ 9
First, he doubted the view of Ul'ianovsky and scholars at IMEMO that the 
'non-capitalist path' remained open for countries such as India, Turkey, the 
Philippines and the major Latin American states, where capitalist social relations 
had been forming for some time, during the colonial period as well as after the 
victory of a bourgeois democratic national liberation movement. Simoniya 
asserted that, in these countries:
the thesis about a non-capitalist path of development is turned into a 
multifarious tactical slogan about a united national (or national democratic) 
front. Then doubt arises concerning the advisability of using the term 
'non-capitalist path of development'.
This point followed directly from his general argument that capitalism had
already established itself as a leading socio-economic structure in most of the 
third world, a view which Ul'ianovsky supported without drawing the same 
conclusion about its possible political consequences. Simoniya's difference with 
Ul’ianovsky concerned the implications of the colonial implantation of capitalist 
relations in the third world. Whereas Ul’ianovsky saw the national bourgeoisie as 
a weak opponent of imperialism and hence a potential, albeit short-sighted, 
participant in a 'national democratic front', Simoniya did not. His emphasis on 
the 'internal factor' in third world development focused on the national 
bourgeoisie's class nature as the basis of its anti-imperialist potential. He 
explicitly criticised Ul'ianovsky for suggesting that the national bourgeoisie could 
form part of the "social base" of a country embarking on the 'non-capitalist path'. 
He emphasised that this question of political support was quite different from the 
existence of the national bourgeoisie as part of the objective "economic basis of a 
revolutionary superstructure in a transitional period", adding that to admit "a 
thesis about the multi-class essence of a state of socialist orientation" because of 
the presence in its apparatus of bourgeois specialists would mean implying the 
same thing about the USSR in the 1 9 2 0 s .^  Hence, because of the strong 
position of the national bourgeoisie in more developed third world countries, the 
geographical extent of 'socialist orientation' was limited to countries too 
backward to have developed along the capitalist path.
Second, Simoniya argued that the problems facing ’socialist orientation' in 
these backward countries were immense precisely because capitalist social 
relations had hardly developed there. Having noted that in post-revolutionary 
Russia there was, as a result of the "multistructural" nature of economic life, a 
"pre-determined necessity for a more or less prolonged, special historical period 
of transition to socialism", "through a particular type of state capitalism", 
Simoniya pointed out that such a period for less developed third world countries 
would have to encompass "an even greater quantity of transitional s t e p s . "
This meant that the possibility of a "recoil" to the capitalist path would remain in 
these countries for a very long time. Simoniya pointed to the "concentration of 
the specifics of the non-capitalist path in the superstructural region" not the
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economic base of states of ’socialist orientation'. He added that this "explains the 
relative ease with which a start on it can be made (it is sufficient, for example, to 
have a military coup at the top and a proclamation of socialist orientation), and 
also the quickness with which a ’de-railing’ from this path occurs (as a result of a 
counter-revolutionary coup or simply a change of persons in the leadership of a 
c o u n t r y ) . " I n  short, where ’socialist orientation’ was feasible because of the 
slow development of capitalism and the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, it 
was also unstable and reversible because of the prolonged period of state capitalist 
economic development necessary to make up for this backwardness.
Third, Simoniya divided the states of ’socialist orientation’ into two groups, 
according to how they had taken this path. For one group, ’socialist orientation’ 
had been chosen as the result of an "ascending" revolutionary movement which 
went beyond the limits of a bourgeois democratic liberation struggle. Simoniya 
viewed Algeria as the main example in this category, but also listed Syria and, to 
a limited extent, Iraq. The second group of countries had started on the 
’non-capitalist path’ "as a consequence of ’revolution from above"’ in the form of 
a "military coup". Simoniya listed Burma and Egypt as the main examples of this 
variant, characterised by the "absence of a social base" and an attraction of 
foreign models to the civilian intelligentsia, which formed the main administrative 
a p p a r a t u s . S i m o n i y a ’s characterisation of the latter group of states as 
generally less reliable stalwarts of ’socialist orientation’ than the former would 
prove inaccurate in particular cases (Burma remained on the ’non-capitalist path’ 
slightly longer than either Iraq or Syria). However, his main point was that even 
the first variant lacked enough mass support to maintain course on a stable path of 
’socialist orientation’ for a long time, and he quoted Lenin to point out that this 
resulted from an "insufficient development of capitalism" in such c o u n t r i e s .  ^ 5
Fourth, Simoniya argued that, as a result of this underdevelopment, popular 
protests against capitalism in states of ’socialist orientation’ tended to be directed 
"only against the negative aspects" of it, not against it as a system of commodity 
p r o d u c t i o n .  Consequently, movement toward a different system along the
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'non-capitalist path' depended almost entirely on the character of the political 
authorities in charge of the state apparatus. On this point of the crucial 
importance of political power, Simoniya was in agreement with Ul'ianovsky, most 
of the IMEMO scholars except Vladimir Krylov, and indeed almost all Soviet 
scholars apart from those who supported Levkovsky’s optimistic interpretation of 
state capitalism. 1^7 But Simoniya's evaluation of 'revolutionary democratic' 
leaderships of states of ’socialist orientation' showed that he thought this a cause 
for pessimism rather than optimism. Indeed, he thought the prospects so bleak 
that he wrote: ’’the problem of recoil has itself become a stumbling-block, on 
account of which sharper contradictions are now already breaking out amongst 
revolutionary dem ocrats."138 ^  ]^s vjew> the ’differentiation’ occurring 
amongst ’revolutionary democrats' derived not from the question of whether to 
move closer to the USSR, but rather from whether such leaderships should take 
the objective possibility of returning to a capitalist orientation when a new 
bourgeoisie was emerging. Whereas the dominant eclectic view implied an 
outcome of this 'differentiation' in which the USSR would consolidate some allies 
while losing others, Simoniya suggested that none of the countries on the 
'non-capitalist path' could become reliable Soviet allies.
After stressing negative features of leadership in states of 'socialist orientation', 
such as the "charismatic magnification" of the top-most leader in the manner of 
Mao Zedong, Simoniya distinguished two types of leadership in such states, 
reflecting "two predominant types of social s t r u c t u r e . " T h e  first was 
characterised by "authoritarian forms of administration" and existed in countries 
where capitalism had developed to an early stage. Here ’revolutionary
j
democratic' leaderships focused on "state capitalist measures which, if consistently 
put into practice, will enable" both quick economic construction and a 
disappearance of petty-bourgeois illusions. Simoniya was careful to phrase this in 
the future tense as a possibility, and pointed out that, because of the more 
developed social structure of such countries, there was "a big possibility of the 
strengthening of rightist tendencies (a most evident example of this is the social 
development of Egypt in recent years)." 1^0 The second type existed in countries
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with "an overwhelmingly traditional or neotraditional structure", where 
'revolutionary democrats' tended toward utopian conceptions of advancing 
quickly to socialism "without an adequate development of the modem productive 
forces corresponding to it." Here the main concern was not so much tendencies 
back towards capitalism, but "sharp problems of overcoming stagnant tendencies 
in the e c o n o m y . "  141 Simoniya's point was not that either type was somewhat 
better in one minor respect, but that both were problematic as archetypal stable 
allies for the USSR. He stressed the "weaknesses and nationalistic vacillations" 
characteristic of the former type, and the "utopianism in outlooks" characteristic 
of the latter. While remarking that "the only guarantee of real, and not 
imaginary, socialist orientation" was an appropriate synthesis of national 
characteristics and "borrowings from the attainments of the progressive world" (a 
euphemism for Soviet aid), he was careful not to identify any existing state of 
'socialist orientation' which had managed to achieve such a synthesis.*42 j^ is  
comprehensive critical analysis of 'revolutionary democrats' was very significant, 
since when Soviet scholars, including Simoniya himself, had previously offered 
cautious warnings about 'revolutionary democrats', they had always singled out 
some positive features to balance their critical remarks. In Simoniya's analysis 
such features were conspicuously absent. 1^
Simoniya's fifth argument concerned the importance of loyal communists for 
ensuring that a state of 'socialist orientation' stayed on course throughout its 
prolonged transition period into full membership of the Soviet bloc. This may 
seem strange for someone considered a 'moderate' by Western commentators, but 
in fact it followed logically from his previous points and supported his overall 
argument about the "historically limited" character of "the phenomenon of 
socialist o r i e n t a t i o n . "144 Given the long time required to consolidate a 
proclaimed 'socialist orientation', and the objectively determined negative features 
of 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships, it was natural for Simoniya to conclude 
that "any dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie [i.e. a 'revolutionary democratic 
regime' without loyal communist support] can only be a step toward the complete 
authority of the b o u r g e o i s i e . "145 Unless 'revolutionary democratic' leaderships
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began to evolve, under the influence of loyal communists, toward unwavering 
support for the USSR, then they would sooner or later "begin to express a 
tendency of not socialist, but bureaucratic-capitalist orientation, covered by 
pseudo-socialist p h r a s e s . " T h e point of this argument was not that more 
efforts should be devoted to bolstering the position of loyal communists in states 
of ’socialist orientation'. Simoniya had been the first Soviet scholar to assert the 
"unusually growing role" of the "internal factor" in deciding the social 
development of a particular country, and his extensive criticisms of Maoism 
showed that he retained that opinion without reservation. Rather, in 
concluding that "the success of progressive development and the possibility of 
socialist orientation depends on the union of revolutionary democrats and 
communists", he was pointing out the objective limits of a policy of seeking allies 
only amongst states blessed with such a union, since every responsible member of 
the Soviet elite knew that the situation of loyal communists in the third world, as 
elsewhere, was one of steady decline.
Having shown the foundations of 'socialist orientation' to be shaky even in the 
best of circumstances, Simoniya was quite explicit in his conclusion about the 
"historically limited" nature of this phenomenon in the contemporary third world. 
He stated that: "as a result of changes that have taken place in the socio-economic 
development of the majority of countries of the Orient, they have passed beyond 
that historical border after which socialist orientation (the non-capitalist path) has 
already no chance of attaining s u c c e s s . " T h e  main political message of his 
book was the same as that of his early article, to point out to the Soviet diplomatic 
establishment that most countries of the third world, including all the largest and 
most developed ones, were well and truly on the capitalist path, or bound sooner 
or later to return to it, so that a policy which did not seek to develop stable 
relations with them would fail the test of increasing Soviet influence in the 
developing world. He now reinforced this point by stressing the inherent 
problems of 'states of socialist orientation', the message being that supporting 
them could cost more than it was worth. He was even bold enough to assert that 
his analysis "leads logically to the fact that the international prospects of socialist
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orientation will, obviously, be considered in the future above all not so much in 
the plane of a further world-wide broadening of its geographical zones, but rather 
in the plane of a deepening of social processes and a strengthening of the 
effectiveness of economic development in the already existing group of 
c o u n t r i e s . "150 ^  respect, he quoted the Director of the Institute of Africa, 
V.G. Solodovnikov, saying that economic growth in ’socialist oriented' countries 
of that continent (which, because of its greater backwardness, contained most such 
countries) was "much slower" than in capitalist oriented ones. 151 Generally, as 
Hough has pointed out, a major implication of Simoniya's book was to draw 
attention to the fact that the Russian Revolution, and especially its subsequent 
denouement, was a specific historical development which could not be easily 
repeated in other areas of the globe. 152 Since Simoniya argued that the "wave of 
popular-democratic revolutions" after World War II was limited to parts of East 
Asia, and the attempts to take the 'non-capitalist path' from the early 1960s had 
proven very limited in their achievements, the overall policy implication was that 
capitalism as a system was still strong, so it would be foolish to cherish 'utopian' 
or 'petty bourgeois' illusions about the extent to which the USSR could challenge 
this system from a position of weakness, without suffering a diplomatic
rebuff. 153
The Implications of ’Multistructurality’ and Backwardness
The reception which Simoniya's arguments received in various quarters of 
the Soviet foreign policy establishment provides a good insight into the complex 
course which discussion about 'socialist orientation' took during the late Brezhnev 
period. Broadly speaking, three different responses may be delineated. The first 
response came from authoritarian spokesmen for the Central Committee, such as 
Ul'ianovsky and some demagogues from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, who 
asserted that Simoniya's views were heretical. When the 'loss' of Egypt had 
demonstrated the practical deficiency of the orthodox eclectic view, Ul'ianovsky 
was in no mood for an objective, scholarly debate about the implications for the
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future of the 'non-capitalist path'. He recognised that Simoniya's approach was an 
attack upon the Stalinist tradition of voluntarism in matters of state, as well as a 
rejection of the priority of 'socialist orientation', and replied by attempting to 
dismiss his critic as an apologist for capitalism:
We have already written about the fact that N.A. Simoniya, sharply protesting 
against voluntarism, looks at growing-over as an act of will. It might be added 
that, if we follow his logic, the peoples of the developing countries now must 
not and cannot consider a way out on the non-capitalist path — under the 
leadership of revolutionary-democratic forces — as a real possibility at once 
for two reasons: because of the immaturity of capitalist relations, and because 
of how far capitalist development has proceeded (and this relates, in essence, 
to any one of the majority of liberated countries). N.A. Simoniya's point of 
view amounts to this: the developing countries have only one path - a path of 
capitalist development, with the farthest prospect of a socialist revolution. 
Consequently, the negation of socialist orientation, of the non-capitalist path 
of development as some voluntarist variant, leads to the view that the only 
path of transition of the liberated countries to socialism lies through a full 
development of capitalism itself, concluded with the very remote prospect
of a socialist r e v o l u t i o n .  154
Ul'ianovsky did not bother to discuss the development of capitalism in the third 
world, because, as his simultaneous polemic with Levkovsky showed, he thought 
Simoniya's evaluation of that was substantially correct. Instead, he directly 
attacked the legitimacy of Simoniya's theoretical presuppositions, adding a few 
superficial attempts, such as the counterposition of the ’two reasons' above, to 
dismiss his critic's argument as contradictory.!55 Politically, Ul'ianovsky 
endeavoured to rule Simoniya's criticism out of court as unconstitutional, 
according to the current conventions of debate within the Soviet elite.
Ul'ianovsky's reaction did not convince the leading Soviet orientalists who 
participated in the published discussion of Simoniya's book soon after 
Ul'ianovsky's review had appeared. The second response to Simoniya's 
arguments consisted of their gradual endorsement by many leading colleagues, 
including some like Mirsky who had previously been optimistic about the 
prospects of the 'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky considered that "while some of the 
solutions offered by N.A. Simoniya are very debatable, they are still interesting
and will be thought a b o u t . "  156 Semion Agaev, who subsequently wrote a 
theoretical book on Iran with Simoniya as responsible editor and a journalistic 
book on Iran with Ul'ianovsky in that role, agreed with Simoniya about the 
specific historical prerequisites of 'growing-over', merely adding that "the author 
has been unnecessarily categorical in speaking about the geographical limitedness 
of the non-capitalist p a t h . "157 jh is  qualification was not considered justified by 
two senior specialists on India, Aleksandr Chicherov and Glery Shirokov, who 
fully endorsed Simoniya's limitation of ’socialist orientation' to the least 
developed third world countries. Chicherov suggested that Simoniya had not 
devoted enough attention to countries on the capitalist path, while Shirokov (who 
was a responsible editor for Simoniya's book) pointed out that "in Asia there are 
countries where it is already impossible to by-pass capitalism, and we may speak 
only about what can interrupt its development." 158 The limited applicability of 
the 'non-capitalist path' was the first element of Simoniya's critique to undermine 
the dominant eclectic view. An article published in October 1976 by Kiva, who 
supported the idea of 'growing-over' for more backward countries, asserted that 
"the conception of socialist orientation presupposes either an absence or a weak 
development of capitalism."159
The third response, taken by many Soviet authors writing about 'socialist 
orientation' in the late Brezhnev period, was simply to repeat the orthodox view 
as if nobody had ever challenged it. This was done partly in deference to the 
greater political clout of the first response, and partly because the appearance in 
the late 1970s of a 'second generation' of 'socialist orientation' seemed to belie 
Simoniya's critique of the basic assumption that the most reliable Soviet allies in 
the third world are states whose domestic situation and external orientation make 
them dependent upon the USSR for support. This response was essentially an 
apology for existing policy, in the form of "books with no independent positions, 
brochures without a thought, and articles without ideas", which allowed top 
oficiáis to ignore the expression by leading Soviet orientalists from 1975 onwards 
of "a sceptical attitude to the very idea of non-capitalist development". 1^0 When 
the plight of new 'revolutionary democratic regimes' like Angola, Mozambique,
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Ethiopia and Afghanistan worsened, writers adopting this response became 
defensive. They avoided rather than clarified the difficulties besetting existing 
policy, and were unable to reply seriously to new criticism in the early 1980s 
which focused on the costs of attempting to retain states of ’socialist orientation’ 
(by the mid 1980s, the main defenders in Moscow of these states were 'left 
radicals' like Kiva Maidanik whose internationalism did not defer to Stalin). The 
theoretical abstinence of those endorsing the orthodox view ultimately facilitated 
the relatively quick emergence of a new consensus about the limits of the 
'non-capitalist path', once the officials who had preserved the authority of the old 
view were finally freed from their duties. Since, with hindsight, the second 
response to Simoniya's arguments was the most important, this discussion will 
focus on it, after considering Ul'ianovsky's attack on Levkovsky.
The sensitivity of the foreign policy issues at stake in the polemic about the 
significance of "multistructural" economic relations in the third world, which 
occurred in the journal Rabochii Klass i Sovremennyi Mir from late 1974 until 
early 1977, is evident from Ul'ianovsky's decision to present his key arguments 
under a pseudonym. The source of his concern was the possibility that 
Levkovsky's concept of "multistructurality" (mnogoukladnost') might become an 
influential generalisation of the idea, sponsored by Ul'ianovsky, about a 
'transitional epoch of non-capitalist development'. In other words, Levkovsky's 
analysis, which appeared in the key first section of IVAN’s major collective work 
on the third world published in early 1974, might change the meaning of this 
newly recognised 'epoch' by specifying an alternative definition of the 
all-important word 'transitional'. When expounding his theory in 1969, 
Levkovsky had described 'multistructurality' as "the concrete content of the 
concept of 'transitionality"', adding that it was "a transitional period that
1 zT 1
encompasses the time of change from one social formation to another."101 This 
view, which accorded with the logical meaning of the word 'epoch', was endorsed 
by Yuri Rozaliev in a major article in 1974 reviewing Soviet ideas of state 
capitalism in the developing countries, but it had some implications for Soviet 
foreign policy which Ul'ianovsky could not accept. ^
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Apart from dropping the dogma that history was made up of only five definite 
'stages', Levkovsky’s concept of 'multistructurality' was controversial because it 
challenged the two key premises of most Soviet writing about the third world. 
First, he argued that now the main obstacle to economic development in the third 
world was not the continuing opposition of imperialism, but rather the complex, 
multistructural nature of economic relations ~  particularly the absence of a 
dominant structure of production relations ~  which had resulted from the period 
of colonial oppression. This point implied that anti-imperialist nationalism would 
not by itself be a sufficient generator of economic and social development in the 
third world, and hence of reliable allies.163 Second, Levkovsky downplayed the 
independent political role of the state in third world countries, saying that it was 
more "eclectic" than elsewhere, since it was determined by an economic base 
comprising several contradictory structures of production. 164 j^ is  implied that 
economic changes determined political prospects not vice versa, a view consonant 
with Marx and Lenin but not with most Soviet scholarship since the 1930s. 165 
Whereas the orthodox view of 'non-capitalist development’ assumed that political 
power was the crucial factor determining the direction of social developments in 
the third world, Levkovsky and his supporters argued that it was the 
multistructural nature of economic relations which provided the very possibility 
of more than one capitalist direction in the first place. 166 Levkovsky repeatedly 
stressed that third world multistructurality was qualitatively different from the 
multistructurality which existed in previous periods of transition between 
formations, because there were now more different economic structures 
interacting, and two alternative formations (not one, as previously) to which a 
transition could lead. 167 The implication of defining 'transitionality* in economic 
rather than political terms was that it would be a long time before any third world 
country could approximate the Soviet formation domestically, and hence become 
a stable ally of the USSR.
Levkovsky’s view supported Simoniya’s scepticism about backward states of 
’socialist orientation’, despite his quite different evaluation of the extent of 
capitalist development which had occurred in the third world. Levkovsky’s main
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message politically was to stress the importance of the USSR's allies in the third 
world having a sound domestic economy, implicitly questioning the significance 
of backward allies such as Laos, which had just "passed into the world socialist 
system" as a result of the 'primacy of politics’ but which hardly possessed a 
homogenous economic base. 168 Yet, as Hough has noted, in defining most of the 
third world as still multistructural rather than capitalist, Levkovsky was 
optimistic about the long-term prospects for the USSR to consolidate substantial 
'non-capitalist' allies, especially since he emphasised the deepening crisis of 
capitalism as a reason why imperialism was now less of an obstacle to economic 
d e v e l o p m e n t .  169 T h e  main focus of Levkovsky's long-term optimism was the 
tendency he discerned in multistructural societies for a necessary expansion of the 
state capitalist economic structure, which, he suggested, could function as an 
"incubator" of the material and social prerequisites for constructing an 
economically viable s o c i a l i s m . W h i l e  maintaining faith in the future, 
Levkovsky did not ignore the political difficulties which in the short-term could 
complicate the manifestation of this "immanent" trend in multistructural societies 
toward 'non-capitalist development'. Indeed, he stressed the fluidity of political 
struggles by claiming that "different groups of the bourgeoisie are often found on 
different sides of the barricades", and arguing that the large role of the petty 
bourgeoisie in multistructural societies made class coalitions and national fronts 
an objective necessity. 171 A similar point about the need for a 'non-party 
orientation’ had been made by Ul'ianovsky in 1964, but whereas he viewed this as 
a step toward the political consolidation of reliable allies, Levkovsky simply saw 
no significant alternative in the short-term to unstable relations with independent 
nationalist regimes. 172 The cautious foreign policy implications of Levkovsky’s 
view are clear from his main concern, which, as he stated in a rejoinder to 
Ul'ianovsky, was to see that "the false problem of the 'export of revolution' for 
the purpose of creating the internal conditions for a movement toward socialism 
does not arise". 173
Ul’ianovsky’s two articles explicitly attacking Levkovsky’s interpretation of 
multistructurality were separated chronologically by Levkovsky's rejoinder, by
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an attack on this from one of Ul'ianovsky's staunchest supporters, I.L. Andreev, 
and by a contribution from one "E.P. Konoplev", who generally supported 
Levkovsky while trying to resolve the debate from an intermediate standpoint.
The latter's effort at compromise was squashed by Ul'ianovsky's second article, 
which rebuked Levkovsky even more sternly than his first. Ul'ianovsky 
disagreed with Levkovsky about three key issues, arguing strongly for opposite 
political implications. First, he criticised Levkovsky for ignoring the continuing 
importance of the international aspect of economic development in the third 
world, especially East-West competition. Ul’ianovsky asserted that ’’the struggle 
of the two world systems has enveloped the third world,” and optimistically 
claimed that a "stabilisation of an anti-imperialist social structure" was apparent in 
the developing countries. Asserting that "direct aid from the USSR" was a key 
factor assisting progressive developments in the third world, he stressed that the 
other key factors likewise "lie in general and as a whole outside, beyond the 
bounds of the influence of a multistructural economy and any ’immanent' 
inclination toward socialist development existing in i t . " H i s  view implied that 
Soviet aid could be crucial in determining the historical evolution of a particular 
third world country, and thus raised to an issue of practical importance the 'false 
problem' which in Levkovsky's opinion should not arise.
Second, both Ul'ianovsky and Andreev directly attacked Levkovsky's ideas 
that multistructurality was the distinguishing characteristic of developing 
countries, and that it rather than political power determined the possibilities for 
'socialist development' in the third world. Andreev accused Levkovsky of "a 
hyperbolisation and even some mystification of the role of multistructurality in 
the development of the liberated countries", and concluded by claiming that: "the 
conception of multistructurality, while evidently useful at the country and even 
regional level of analysis of specific-historical situations forming in the sphere of 
socio-economic relations of the liberated countries, may not pretend — as to an 
extreme degree in its current form — to the role of a conceptual scheme 
disclosing a fundamentally new vision of the specifics of development of the 
liberated c o u n t r i e s . " U l ' i a n o v s k y  criticised Levkovsky's thesis about
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multistructurality as a general transition period or ’’chronological space" between 
formations characterising all developing countries, arguing that, if countries did 
not take the 'non-capitalist path', then they had to be on a capitalist one and not 
somewhere in between. This implied that politics not economics was crucial in 
determining social developments in the third world, a point which Ul'ianovsky 
and Andreev stressed repeatedly. Andreev claimed that Levkovsky's "absolutising 
of the role of multistructurality" had led to his "underestimation" of the influence 
of the political-ideological superstructure and his "incorrect overestimation of the 
place and role of the petty bourgeoisie", which anyway exists "only in those 
confines in which the laws of capitalism o p e r a t e . " Ul ' i a n o v s k y  claimed that 
"everything depends on the class nature of the political authorities," and said it 
was the "very large role of the state superstructure, which everyone recognises," 
not the nature of economic relations, which determines the path that a particular 
third world country takes. His view was that there were definitely two 
possible directions of social evolution for third world countries, but that if 
political power was not taken by those interested in 'socialist orientation', then 
economic forces would make an evolution along the capitalist path inevitable.
Third, Ul'ianovsky strongly criticised Levkovsky's idea that the presence of a 
state capitalist structure in the heart of a multistructural economy constituted the 
main objective foundation of 'socialist orientation' in the third world. Their 
difference of opinion was expressed most clearly in a paragraph in Ul'ianovsky's 
second article:
Obviously, if the possibility of socialist orientation exists, then it has a 
definite objective foundation. The whole question is what comprises this 
foundation: the economic base of a transitional society, as A.I. Levkovsky 
suggests, or socio-political conditions lying outside it, although, of course, 
conditioned by it to a greater or lesser degree. Here is the subject of the 
debate. ... does the economic structure of multistructurality in itself contain 
socialist potential, or must a socialist orientation rest on prerequisites outside 
the base and advance on its way in spite of the spontaneously acting laws of 
a multistructural economy? 1
Ul'ianovsky's answer to this question was clear and unequivocal. In his first
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article he had argued that "multistructurality in itself ... is capable of giving rise 
only to capitalism and nothing else." He restated this emphatically in his second 
article: "multistructurality has never before created, and in any case does not now 
create the material foundations of socialism, but it still gives rise every day and 
every hour to small owners, petty bourgeois, and capitalists. In truth it is difficult 
to know how it is that a multistructural base immanently has an inherent socialist
i on
potential. "lou According to Ul'ianovsky, the effect of the state sector on social 
development in third world countries depended entirely on the nature of the 
political authorities controlling it. In multistructural countries on the capitalist 
path, the state sector could not be an 'incubator' of 'socialist orientation', since it 
would develop in the same way as it had in developed capitalist countries, where it 
"not only does not lead to socialism, but opposes it and strengthens capitalism". 
In Ul'ianovsky's view, the opportunity to avoid or short-cut capitalist 
development resulted not from any special combination of economic structures, 
but only from "the competition of the two world systems and the growing 
influence of the socialist community of nations on the whole course of social 
progress in the young s ta te s ." ^  This meant that developing countries would not 
proceed toward 'socialist orientation' as a result of their own nature; they had to 
be attracted to such a position, and once attracted they had to be retained or 
consolidated so that they would not lose this orientation.
Ul'ianovsky rejected the idea of "multistructurality or a transition period in 
general" applying to all developing countries, because he thought that "the 
overwhelming tendency in the majority of liberated countries is still 
c a p i t a l i s t . "182 He argued that the concept of multistructurality was not applicable 
to third world countries "where the capitalist tendency already dominates and the 
capitalist formation is fully determined (the countries of Latin America, many 
countries of South and South-East Asia, and some countries of the Arab Orient)." 
Moreover, he added that in most places "where there is no dominant capitalist 
structure, it is the leading structure, and it determines most strongly the
1 O ' )
socio-economic and political tendencies which are forming."LOJ With this 
assessment Ul'ianovsky effectively conceded Simoniya's first point, that only those
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countries which had not advanced far on the capitalist path could readily be 
candidates for 'socialist orientation'. Now his overriding concern was with the 
fact that the number of such prospective close allies was small and unlikely to 
increase substantially. But since Ul'ianovsky, unlike Simoniya, thought the 
quality of these allies was less of a problem for the USSR than their quantity, his 
view implied a definite willingness to consolidate the support of any potential, 
albeit economically dependent, Soviet ally in the third world, because of the 
expectation that generally such close allies would be few for the foreseeable 
future. Ul'ianovsky indicated the political significance of this debate at the end of 
his second article by saying that it was unfortunate that Levkovsky has discussed 
important issues in his rejoinder "largely for rehabilitating the basic positions of 
the fatalistic 'theory of m u l t i s t r u c t u r a l i t y ’ . "  184 Ul'ianovsky thought Levkovsky's 
view was 'fatalistic' because it might prevent the attempted consolidation by the 
USSR of the only close allies in the third world which it was likely to have for a 
long time. In other words, the USSR could not afford to wait for better allies to 
develop in the future, since that was most unlikely. At a time when a lull in the 
usual belligerence of imperialism allowed the USSR more room to intervene 
without risking a confrontation, Ul'ianovsky asserted that anyone who suggested a 
more relaxed perspective about developments in the third world should be treated 
with contempt.
While Ul'ianovsky used his position of power to have the last word in the open 
polemic, most leading Soviet scholars supported Levkovsky about the implications 
of multistructurality and backwardness for a critical understanding of 'socialist 
orientation'. In his keynote address to a January 1975 conference, Sobolev, the 
editor of Rabochii Klass, said clearly that:
Above all the question consists in whether it is possible at the current stage to 
overcome multistructurality? Does there exist in the liberated countries the 
material basis and economic mechanism for overcoming multistructurality?
It is clear to anyone that the answer is no. ... Multistructurality will remain 
for a long time the real condition in which social development occurs, even 
for those countries where the state sector plays a very big r o l e .  185
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It is possible that Sobolev wrote the article by "Konoplev", which expressed this 
view clearly, noting that "in contemporary conditions even the most progressive 
superstructure in countries of socialist orientation cannot abolish the operation of 
structures connected with private enterprise, since such an economic form still 
exists as an economic n e c e ss ity ."^  any casej this article firmly defended the 
concept of multistructurality, criticising Andreev for ignoring the "priority" of 
economic relations in determining a country’s social evolution, and for having 
"absolutised the importance of the external factor of development". 187 while 
Ul’ianovsky's main support came from Krylov, who linked the priority of 
economic relations precisely with the paramount importance of external relations, 
references to the domestic importance of multistructurality in the third world 
were made by leading scholars outside IVAN, such as Tiul'panov and Mirsky. In 
a review article published in mid 1975, Tiul’panov and his Leningrad colleagues 
directly responded to Ul'ianovsky's attack on Levkovsky, claiming that, 
"precisely" in order to understand "the class structure of the developing 
countries", "the very study of a complex multistructural structure, which is by no 
means static and exists in a dynamic, transitional state, is very important". 
Meanwhile Mirsky, who like Tiul'panov had recognised multistructurality as a 
feature of developing countries in the 1960s, continually repeated a passage which 
described the third world as "distinguished by multistructurality", evidently 
unim pressed by U l'ianovsky's high-handed attem pt to belittle this 
p h e n o m e n o n .  188 Levkovsky repeated his view essentially unchanged in a major 
book published in 1978, although a supportive reviewer noted that the "political 
aspects of multistructurality" were now given a "more significant r o l e " . 189 
Discussing this book in late 1979, Ul'ianovsky repeated his criticism of 
Levkovsky for exaggerating the third world's uniqueness, but with less certainty 
about the rise of a "mighty tendency of socialist o r i e n t a t i o n " .  190
The debate about multistructurality highlighted the limits and problems of the 
'non-capitalist path' if it was open only, as Ul'ianovsky now implicitly admitted, 
for countries with backward economic structures. Only two supporters of 
Levkovsky, Vladimir Yashkin and A.I. Medovoi, still argued for the existence of
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"an objective tendency toward non-capitalist development", based on the growing 
role of the state structure "in a wide sense, for a significant part of the ’third 
world’, independently of the degree of maturity there of capitalist relations." 
Considering capitalism incapable of transforming the "prolonged crisis of 
multistructural structures" in the third world, Yashkin and Medovoi agreed with 
Krylov that "one should not identify the non-capitalist path only with the coming 
to power of revolutionary democrats, since its economic basis may be formed 
with an old political superstructure that is at the stage of national-democratic 
r e f o r m s . "  191 This view was rejected by "the overwhelming majority of 
conference participants" at a symposium in February 1979, but Yashkin was no 
more optimistic in the short-term than T i u l ' p a n o v . 1 9 2  ^  ^ e  conclusion to his 
Doctor's thesis in 1981, he argued that the "prerequisites" for 'socialist 
orientation’ would still grow because of the sharp contradictions of most 
multistructural societies, adding that this did not always bode well for the USSR:
But with definite conditions (the weakness of the socialist alternative), a 
deepening of the crisis of capitalism in these countries and the growing 
variety of forms rejecting it may lead to the manifestation of non-capitalist 
forms of a conservative or even reactionary type, which, maintaining their 
anti-capitalist direction, do not make a move toward socialism, or, more 
than that, if extremist forces are found in power, succeed themselves in1 QO
checking social progress. D
Such pessimism accorded with Simoniya’s critical evaluation of anti-imperialist 
nationalism, although Yashkin disputed his view of capitalism’s steady growth in 
the third world. The most sophisticated economic analysis of ’socialist orientation’ 
was presented by Shirokov, in a 1979 article about three variants of the 
transformation or deepening of multistructurality. He argued that in very 
backward countries with traditional elites multistructurality tended to broaden, 
while in countries like India where capitalist relations had developed significantly 
during the colonial period it was transformed by a relatively strong national 
bourgeoisie into a "dual" structure of a dominant capitalist sector and a 
subordinate traditional one. Where capitalism had developed to some degree but 
the national bourgeoisie was weak, a "growing disintegration" of the economy 
resulted, giving rise to an "unusually important role of the state in the
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reproduction process". The consequence of this ’socialist orientation’ was "to 
obstruct the transformation of private-enterprise capitalism into a ruling, 
system-forming structure", so that "the state-capitalist structure becomes the 
leading one". Shirokov argued that, while multistructurality had already been 
transformed in countries of the second variant, so that they were moving "toward 
the group of states of a medium level of capitalist development", in countries of 
'socialist orientation' only "with a further transformation of the social structure 
there can arise pre-requisites for a final overcoming of multistructurality."
His analysis, which combined the insights of Simoniya and Levkovsky, clearly 
implied that 'socialist orientation' was primarily a by-product of economic 
backwardness, not a progressive short-cut, as the orthodox eclectic view had 
repeatedly asserted.
The Cost of Dependent Allies
A common implication of the arguments of Simoniya and Levkovsky was that 
dependent allies would cause more problems than they were worth. This view 
was not readily acceptable to those responsible for Soviet foreign policy, whose 
political experience predisposed them to accept the orthodox perspective about 
third world development, based on a crucial distinction between states with which 
the USSR had some common interests and states which simply could not exist 
without Soviet support. The optimism of this view had derived from an 
expectation that some of the former would in due time 'grow-over' into the latter, 
thus raising not only the quantity but more importantly the quality of Soviet allies 
in the third world. The course of events in the late Brezhnev period showed this 
perspective to be inadequate, particularly in the Afghan case where a wilful 
'growing-over' did occur. The orthodox view remained authoritative due to the 
inertia characterising Soviet policy formation at this time, but, even before the 
official discovery of 'new political thinking', its spokesmen became noticeably 
defensive in asserting the importance of the 'non-capitalist path'. An article in 
1979 by Ul'ianovsky mentioning the difficulties of 'socialist orientation' was cited
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by his critics to stress the limitations of the orthodox view, while an article by 
Primakov clarifying the status of 'socialist orientation' after the 26th CPSU 
Congress devoted substantial attention to the dangers of voluntarism, now evident 
in A f g h a n i s t a n .  195 Primakov criticised some scholars for suggesting that the 
reproduction and broadening of capitalist relations signified a "departure" from 
'socialist orientation', but his reliance on the simple rhetorical device of mediating 
two "extremes" to assert that economic difficulties would not force states of 
'socialist orientation' toward capitalism showed the defensiveness of the dominant 
eclectic v i e w .  196 ^ e  pessimistic 'extreme' was expressed by Tiul'panov, who, 
referring to "countries of so-called socialist orientation", suggested that "in the 
final analysis, objectively all these very backward countries need to complete that 
which has not yet been made by capitalism, and for this they have to create the 
most satisfactory forms for capitalist development in the future." 197
The broadest reason for increasing pessimism was the widespread recognition 
by Soviet scholars of an important negative factor not emphasised in Simoniya's 
book, though implicit in his definition of the third world as experiencing an 
unfinished bourgeois social revolution. This factor was the continuing dependent 
position of states of 'socialist orientation' within the world capitalist economy. 
Significantly, the scholar who expressed this point most strongly was Mirsky, who 
had predicted in 1964 a possible 'way out' for such states from the world 
capitalist economy in the near future. Mirsky was not a dogmatist, so his 
reconsideration of this issue is not surprising. His change of mind was so total 
that, at a conference in January 1975, he referred to the dependence of states of 
'socialist orientation' on the world capitalist economy as a "serious external 
contradiction of the non-capitalist path of development", labelling it as the 
"number one contradiction", which "predetermines the special sharpness and the 
difficulties of the tasks standing in front of the countries of socialist 
o r i e n t a t i o n . "  1 9 8  This general point had been noted in 1967 by Ul'ianovsky, but 
Mirsky was the first to spell out clearly the implications of limited Soviet aid for 
the crucial internal political struggle occurring within countries on the 
'non-capitalist path'. He said clearly: "But we now see that this aid, in terms of its
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physical volume, is much less than the current amount which is provided by
world capitalism, and it would be naive to suppose that this amount will render
only an economic influence on the development of the countries of Asia and
Africa." Referring to states of 'socialist orientation', he remarked pessimistically
that "it cannot be excluded that the dependence of some of these countries on
world capitalism will not be reduced, but rather will grow in accordance with the
establishment in them of modem economies", and concluded that, while Soviet aid
can "weaken capitalist influence, it cannot paralyse it so long as" this objective
dependence lasts.*99 Although the logic of this situation was not discussed as
directly by other Soviet scholars, it soon became widely accepted as something
which "negatively affects the tempo and stability of economic and social progress
in the states of socialist o r i e n t a t i o n .  "200 Even scholars who were still optimistic
about the 'non-capitalist path' began to stress the objective necessity for countries
on this path to attract Western investment, in order to avert "big economic
difficulties which could lead to unfavourable political and social 
901consequences."lLyjL A broad consensus about this point is evident from Kim's 
statement in 1982 that "many revolutionary-democratic regimes are compelled 
not only to support, but also to broaden their foreign economic links with the 
capitalist world."^02
The most important aspect of Simoniya's analysis of 'socialist orientation' 
which was gradually endorsed by other leading scholars in the late Brezhnev 
period was his pessimistic evaluation of 'revolutionary democrats'. Again, 
Mirsky was the first leading optimist to reconsider the situation, although it was 
some time before he fully accepted Simoniya's view. In 1975, Mirsky said that 
the domestic problems of states of 'socialist orientation' "may be summarised as 
manifestations of the main internal contradiction of non-capitalist development, 
which is precisely between objective tendencies toward the restructuring of 
society on socialist principles, and the character of the subjective factors, i.e. the 
non-proletarian character of the leading political forces." He added that "this 
contradiction is natural, for we speak here about an attempted transition onto the 
path leading toward socialism, with the absence of a dictatorship of the
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p r o l e t a r i a t " . 203 y^is re-evaluation was significant for two reasons. First,
whereas the initial basis for Mirsky's optimism in the 1960s had been the
progressive potential of the subjective factor, and precisely its ’non-proletarian’,
i.e. nationalist not loyal communist character, now he thought this potential was
intrinsically limited. Second, Mirsky's very cautious terminology ('an attempted
transition onto the path leading toward...') was a noticeable change from the
previous decade, when he had been criticised for ascribing a 'socialist character'
to Nasser’s reforms in Egypt. Pessimism about resolving the internal
contradictions of ’socialist orientation’ became widespread amongst supporters of
the orthodox view in the late Brezhnev period. An article reviewing conservative
Soviet books about ’socialist orientation’ in early 1979 noted the presence of
"subjective errors" as one of the "characteristics of non-capitalist development",
and said that all scholars recognised that this path, while "objectively leading
toward socialism, contains within itself serious contradictions, so that in
unfavourable conditions it may be interrupted.»204 recognition was
reflected in Kim’s subsequent "few words about the causes of a departure from
the course of socialist orientation" in Ghana, Mali, Egypt and Somalia, which
listed "subjectivism", a "strengthening of neo-bourgeois strata" and a "sharp
strengthening of nationalist tendencies" as respectively the key internal factors
90Sleading to the "defeat of a national-democratic revolution". J
In the context of this growing pessimism about the reliability of ’revolutionary 
democrats', one important feature of Soviet discussion about 'socialist orientation' 
in the late 1970s was a recognition of Mirsky's distinction between two different 
subgroups of states on the 'non-capitalist path'. This distinction was made most 
clearly by Kiva, who in a 1978 book discussed "countries of socialist orientation 
in the wide and narrow (or strict) sense of the word." He claimed that "it is 
impossible not to see an essential difference in official ideology, policy and 
practice between such countries as South Yemen and Syria, Congo and Tanzania, 
Angola and Burma." Kiva also distinguished three stages of 'socialist orientation': 
its beginning, its stabilisation, and its concluding stage, "about which until now 
one may speak only in the theoretical plane". He suggested that the first subgroup
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had reached the second stage, "marked by the growing-over of a 
national-democratic revolution into a popular revolution", of a kind similar to 
Vietnam and Laos.^06 j_fjs optimism about the political evolution of "countries of 
socialist orientation in the narrow sense of the word", which "largely have a low 
initial level of economic and socio-class development", was qualified by a remark 
that even at this stage of stabilisation there is still a "great reversibility of socialist 
orientation". Meanwhile, states in the economically more developed subgroup 
were unlikely to consolidate their orientation toward the USSR, since they had 
been on the 'non-capitalist path' twice as long as their backward fellow-travellers 
but were still at the beginning of a prolonged transition period.^O^ Thjs 
implication was made clearly by Mirsky in a discussion with Kiva and Simoniya, 
when he argued that "if we 'subtract' from the liberated countries on the one side 
regimes of the 'Angolan-Mozambiquean type', and on the other side those states 
which really have the chance to create an independent, strong capitalism, then we 
see that the remaining developing countries have greater similarities than 
differences." Noting that the term 'state of national democracy' was now "little 
used", he transfered his remaining optimism about the third world to the 'second 
generation' of countries attempting the 'non-capitalist path', since they appeared 
to possess the "key p o in t... an all-round strengthening of the leading force of the 
regime — a vanguard party."^^^
The need for a 'vanguard party' to guarantee success on the 'non-capitalist 
path' had been noted by Brutents as early as 1966, but it did not become 
prominent in Soviet writing until the late 1970s. Some Western commentators 
have interpreted this as part of an optimistic 'forward policy' toward the third 
world in the late Brezhnev period, but such a reading ignores its context in Soviet 
discussion, which had increasingly focused on the unreliability of 'revolutionary 
democrats', given the continuing dependent position of states of 'socialist 
orientation' within the world capitalist economy.^^^ Galia Golan has pointed out 
that encouraging dependent allies to build-up a 'vanguard party' was a tactic 
rather than a strategy of Soviet policy, which was applied only where a pro-Soviet 
regime was evidently unstable or threatened with intervention from outside
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(Ethiopia, Angola and M ozambique).^^ Given the distinction between genuine 
and passing states of 'socialist orientation’ introduced by Mirsky and Kiva, such 
stress on the importance of a 'vanguard party' may also be seen as part of an 
attempt to apply the lessons of the 'first generation' of countries on the 
'non-capitalist path' to the more backward regimes of the 'second generation', 
before they succumb to pressure and recoil toward capitalism. In other words, 
the fact that, "in recent years, the viewpoint about the necessity of creating a 
vanguard party has become all the more confirmed", indicates not optimism on 
the part of Soviet proponents of the 'non-capitalist path', but rather a reversion to 
'administrative measures' in order to resolve the social contradictions which life 
itself so incessantly provides.^!* This much is clear from a paragraph in a 
review by Agaev of Brutents' 1979 book on the liberated countries:
Interpreting the factors which are complicating the realisation of anti-capitalist 
tendencies in the liberated countries, K.N. Brutents writes in particular: 
"Socialist orientation, with all the significance of the already conducted social 
reforms, is at the current stage above all determined by 'political will'.It is this 
which affects the economic base, which here, especially in the rural economy 
(and its role in the developing countries is enormous), continues to be marked 
by processes of spontaneous development leading to the growth of private 
ownership, capitalist relations, and which in many of its features remains 
similar to the base in countries on the capitalist path." In as much as "the 
choice of socialist orientation still does not guarantee the victory of socialism 
and does not exclude movements backward, returning onto capitalist rails", 
then there is an urgent necessity for making come to pass the creation of a 
vanguard party and for strengthening the collaboration of communists
and revolutionary d e m o c r a t s . ^ ^
Agaev's agreement with Brutents showed that Ul'ianovsky's sharp criticism of 
Simoniya a few years before, for viewing 'growing-over’ as 'an act of will', had 
not convinced scholars capable of thinking for themselves.
After twenty years of recruiting around the 'non-capitalist path', the USSR 
had succeeded by the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 in gathering a host of 
seventeen or so allies, many of whom were small, poor and backward, and less 
than half a dozen of whom could be considered reliable in anything more than a 
very short-term and extremely relative sense of that word. It is not surprising
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therefore that Brezhnev's report to that gathering was less optimistic than his
speech of five years b e f o r e . ^  3 Supporters of the orthodox view could trumpet
the emergence after 1975 of a few radically pro-Soviet regimes in places of some
strategic importance, but the instability of these dependent allies raised the
question of the costs of stopping a backward country from eventually following
the capitalist path. Against the background of Soviet losses in Afghanistan, some
admirably impatient scholars started in the last months of Brezhnev's existence
openly to question the whole idea that dependent allies were worth the price.
Yuri Novopashin pointed out quite frankly that, since the USSR was experiencing
the "growing difficulties of a transition toward an intensive type of development",
it was in no position to assist selflessly a whole group of states of 'socialist
orientation' whose total population, approximately 220 million people, was almost
as much as its own. He criticised the tendency in such states "to force progressive
social-political and socio-economic reforms", and suggested that, given "the
presence of a food problem in a series of countries" of the Soviet bloc, it was
sensible for the USSR and its European allies to trade agricultural machinery in
exchange for rural produce from states of 'socialist orientation' on an
economically beneficial basis.^14 gm  far from all these states had a surplus of
food. Butenko, a colleague of Novopashin's at the institute studying the Soviet
bloc, recommended the experience of NEP to the governments of Vietnam and
Laos, and hence to more backward regimes of the 'Angolan-Mozambiquean type',
pointing out that such countries had to focus precisely on "the formation of their
own factors of economic growth", particularly satisfying the "needs of the rural
economy", since "without the presence of a food fund one may hardly speak in
91 5general about a real socialist policy.
By the mid 1980s, the 'first generation' of countries on the 'non-capitalist 
path' had clearly been de-railed by the combined pressures of the world capitalist 
economy and a maturing national bourgeoisie. Landa quaintly observed: 
"Regimes of socialist orientation are not insured from military-bureaucratic 
tendencies of a bourgeois k i n d . 16 Reviewing the destiny of 'national 
democratic revolutions', Mirsky clearly spelled out the implication, that such
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states would inevitably remain unreliable allies for the foreseeable future: "The 
state of national democracy ... has either crashed down or degenerated. In 
Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Burma and Tanzania, where so-called revolutionary 
democratic forces came to power, this power is being consolidated, but it displays 
no tendencies toward a transition to the ideological positions of scientific 
socialism". Vladimir Khoros responded by saying that in countries like South 
Yemen and Ethiopia "one may speak about features of ’growing-over’, the 
transition from a national-democratic revolution to a popular democratic one. ... 
But I agree that the concept of ’growing-over’ here does not signify any cardinal 
movement, just quick changes of a subjective order — in the views of leaders, in 
the organisational principles of party construction, e t c . "217 This assessment was 
far from the ’revolutions of a new type’ perspective which Brutents had supported 
a decade or so earlier. After the ascension of Gorbachev, former officials like 
Ul’ianovsky, and latecoming supporters of military expansion like Zakeriia 
Gafurov, rose to "defend the attainments" of dependent Soviet allies, but even 
Ul’ianovsky now acknowledged the problem of "voluntarist mistakes", and 
cautioned against making any form of ’growing-over’ general and universal at a 
time when, in his view, the only reliable strategy remained a "broad national
front of a left orientation".^ 8
The only substantial response to Simoniya’s critique of ’socialist orientation’ 
was offered in a 1986 book by Maidanik, who paid "a debt to the anti-dogmatic 
pathos" of Strany Vostoka, saying that he shared "many of the author's positions 
(especially concerning the posing of the problem), [but could] not agree, however, 
with a number of his c o n c l u s i o n s . "219 Stressing the "inverted development" of 
social revolutions in the Orient, which Lenin had noted in 1921, Maidanik argued 
that the backwardness and dependence of post-colonial societies made a "socialist 
choice" easy to take, but hard to fulfill without the prerequisites which capitalism 
had developed in Europe. He thought Simoniya’s view about "the prospect of a 
'natural' maturation of a socialist revolution" through Oriental capitalist 
development was "significantly more utopian, than the course 'from 
anti-imperialism to socialism'", since a "dependent-capitalist modernisation" of
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third world countries could only "block*' and "deform" revolutionary aspirations, 
not create objective prerequisites for socialism .^2 0  pje ciaimed that "the 
national-liberation processes of the 20th century, considered together, cannot be 
ascribed to an epoch of bourgeois social revolution", because their key task, 
"overcoming the structure of dependence and historical backwardness", was quite 
new and required a struggle against capitalism "as a world s y s t e m " . Maidanik 
defined the present stage of liberation in Asia and Africa, where the capitalist 
mode of production was not yet dominant, as "national-democratic", but he could 
not find one "national-democratic revolution" that had been anti-capitalist, rather 
than "anti-neocolonial" (Egypt, Syria and Iran), "anti-colonial" (Algeria) or 
"anti-feudal" (Yemen).^22 j^ is  gap t>eiieci hjs strategic claim that the space for 
"intermediate variants" of national capitalist development was "gradually 
narrowing", and his tactical advice that "a single anti-imperialist front" uniting 
reformist as well as revolutionary forces was outdated, at least as advice for 
Soviet d i p l o m a c y . 2 2 3  Maidanik's defence of "the independence of left forces" in 
the form of a plurality of 'left radicals', as against the "mistakes" of Stalin's 
"traditional vanguard" approach and the "illusory nature" of the subsequent 
'non-party orientation', suggests that he may have been concerned principally 
about the fate of socialists in the third world themselves, rather than the "foreign 
policy considerations" of '"one of the blocs'".^24 However, his pessimistic 
conclusion that a new revolutionary wave is "improbable" before the end of this 
century, together with Mirsky's conclusions that the prospect of new states of 
'socialist orientation' arising is "now very limited", and that "the positive features 
of popular-democratic regimes still do not guarantee their political stability" or 
prevent "instability in the foreign orientation of some of them", just 
complemented Simoniya's a n a l y s i s . ^ 2 5
After the 27th CPSU Congress endorsed a new Party Program downplaying 
the significance of the 'non-capitalist path', discussion about the lessons, problems 
and prospects of 'socialist orientation' continued, becoming more frank and 
widespread than before. In an article published in mid 1986, the respected liberal 
Soviet historian Pavel Volobuev noted some large obstacles facing peripheral
154
capitalist development, then made a clear and unequivocal evaluation of the past 
twenty years: "As experience shows, non-capitalist development, in creating a 
modem economic base and an advanced political superstructure, has come up 
against even bigger difficulties of an external and internal order than development 
along the capitalist p a t h .  "226 Such an opinion is not now limited to leading 
scholars. In an article in late 1986 reviewing the well-known contradictions of 
the 'non-capitalist path', the senior Soviet specialist on Burma, Vladimir Vasil'ev, 
noted that, due to their economic backwardness, states of 'socialist orientation' 
"do not have sufficient internal natural-historical impulses in order to determine a 
movement in the direction of socialism." He said such impulses must "come from 
the global historical process", but admitted that the USSR had not demonstrated its 
economic superiority on this scale, and concluded that "the primary responsibility 
for progressive development along this path must lie with the very peoples and
leadership of these c o u n t r i e s . "227
The extent of Soviet support for states of 'socialist orientation' was the first 
empirical issue debated by Mirsky and Vladimir Li in a discussion published in 
August 1987, opening a flurry of articles on the subject in Aziia i Afrika 
Segodnia. Mirsky claimed that the concept of 'non-capitalist development' 
worked out under Khrushchev was a "substitute" for, not an extension of, Lenin's 
nominally similar idea, which had referred to backward, pre-capitalist areas, not 
countries where capitalism had begun to develop, like Egypt and Syria. He noted 
that economically such countries "largely depend until now on world capitalist 
'centres"', adding that the Soviet bloc, "because of its economic and technical 
difficulties ... cannot fully give 'mighty support' to" ’socialist orientation', "except 
in the military-political sphere, which is important in the most critical points of 
struggle with imperialism but far from decisive at the stage of construction." Li 
thought this was "still more debatable" than the suggestion of a theoretical decline 
since Lenin, but Mirsky pointed out that, following Li's logic, the difficulties of 
'socialist orientation' must derive "precisely from unfavourable tendencies in the 
development of the external factor", rather than from internal causes. While Li 
defended "a 'revolution from above' in countries of non-capitalist development",
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merely stressing the low level of mass political culture which the authorities had 
to cope with, Mirsky argued that domestic problems in state capitalist regimes 
with socialist pretensions were more serious, including an inefficient state sector, 
"bureaucratism, nepotism, corruption ... social apathy, and distrust in the 
leadership." When Li repeated, without acknowledgement, Simoniya's criticism 
of the equally "ruinous'1 mistakes of ’revolutionary democrats’ (fostering market 
forces in less backward countries and "ignoring the laws of commodity-money 
relations” in more backward ones), Mirsky responded that ’’the basic causes of the 
difficulties of socialist orientation" would not be disclosed by "a special accent on 
the errors" of leaders, since the "downfall or overthrow" of the ’first generation' 
of these countries had been "entirely natural". Li claimed that "the degeneration 
of national-democratic revolutions is not so much a regularity as an anomaly," but 
Mirsky suggested that, despite some "pluses", the 'second generation' of states of 
'socialist orientation' were clearly "not far behind" the 'first generation' in terms 
of bureaucratism and a need for Western investment, with which "a local private 
sector will grow, and a parasitical, neocomprador layer will appear." He 
concluded that, while the odd state of 'socialist orientation' might yet arise, for 
almost all developing countries "the prospect of a break with capitalism (which 
will already be not a 'non-capitalist path', but a socialist revolution) is still
c o m p l e t e l y  u n c l e a r . " 2 2 8
Mirsky's suggestion that 'socialist orientation' will at best encompass less than 
10% of the third world was criticised as too pessimistic in an important article in 
the IMEMO journal by his department head, Rachik Avakov, who was scathing 
about supporters of the eclectic view like Li, claiming that, due to their 
"schematicism and triviality", work on 'socialist orientation' constituted "the 
weakest part of third world studies". As well as making some unprecedented 
remarks about obvious matters, such as the fact that "the quantity of publications 
on the problems of socialist orientation is in obverse proportion to the level and 
quality of the research", Avakov stated that: "nothing may justify the fact that 
there are no open objective researches and no profound scientific publications on, 
for example, the Afghan question. Policy may hardly calculate on an effective
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decision on this or that problem if science does not participate in the explanation 
to the public of its essence and complexities, and in the creation of public opinion 
itself around this problem, based on deep and all-sided research.” Noting that 
"the matter consists not only in the existence of ’restricted zones' and not only in 
the fact that here is found a far from optimum character of relations between 
science and policy", he added:
It is necessary to emphasize another, no less important aspect — the 
theoretical-methodological. Socialist orientation is not only an object of 
research in third world studies, but also part of the scientific tendency 
occupied with an analysis of the problems of world socialism. This would 
seem obvious. However, judging by the works of Soviet authors, socialist 
orientation is studied only in the bounds of research on the developing world.
... And if to this is added the fact that, in their turn, a series of socialist 
countries, which have grown from national-liberation revolutions — China, 
Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea and Laos ~  have been excluded from third world 
studies, then both the methodological confusion and the fragmentation of 
research on the problem of socialist orientation becomes clear.^29
This nod toward Marx, who in his Critique of the Gotha Programme scorned that 
"kind of democratism which keeps within the limits of what is permitted by the 
police and not permitted by logic", was significant in legitimating a new angle for 
criticism of Soviet 'socialism', but Avakov’s call for an open discussion of foreign 
policy issues was more readily heard and accepted.230 in an article entitled "The 
Developing Countries and New Political Thinking" in July, 1987, Sheinis had 
called for a revision of the old, 1961 view that the third world contains "two 
equivalent directions of socio-economic development", and questioned the 
"significant burden" which the USSR has to shoulder in order to retain states of 
'socialist orientation' in its o r b i t a l  Agaev responded that, while "quite serious", 
this "question, obviously, is only about the volume in which such aid and support 
should be expressed", not whether it should be given at all, but Sheinis in his next 
article stressed the problem by suggesting that "new countries of socialist 
orientation" would emerge just in the "lower horizon" of the developing world, 
which is still "primarily a non-capitalist (and therefore significantly different) 
branch of the world capitalist f o r m a t i o n . " ^ ^ ^  His view predominated in a seminar 
on "The USSR and the Third World" held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry in late
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July 1988, where the head of the Middle East and North African Directorate, 
Vladimir Polyakov, began by remarking that the USSR had lost "both politically 
... and in the form of unjustified economic expenditures" because of the eclectic 
"concept of 'non-capitalist development'", which was "used for artificially linking 
together dissimilar processes which took place in the third world in the sixties and 
s e v e n t i e s . 3 After some speakers supported a call for reducing Soviet arms 
shipments to third world allies, recently expressed in the IMEMO journal by 
Andrei Kolosovsky, Kim Tsagolov, a Military Academy Professor, said "we need 
to thoroughly rethink the entire theoretical concept of socialist orientation without 
delay", and concluded by observing that: "Until we attain superiority over 
capitalism in the decisive sphere, material production, ... we can forecast in the 
group of socialist oriented countries and in the third world as a whole growing 
trends toward a capitalist model of d e v e l o p m e n t .  " 2 3 4
A broad settling of accounts with the eclectic view was undertaken by Yuri 
Aleksandrov and Vladimir Maksimenko, who suggested that "the most destructive 
thing for science is not the naive sloganeering dogmatism of the recent past, but a 
lack of understanding its epistemological roots." Due to "scholastic word-splitting 
about whether revolutionary democracy is a partial case of national democracy, 
whether one of them is a left wing of the other, whether one should identify 
socialist orientation and the non-capitalist path, and so on", the "essence of the 
problem" had been obscured: "can socialist orientation become an alternative to 
capitalism (and if it can, with precisely what conditions)?"^^ They carefully 
reviewed statements by Marx, Engels and Lenin which linked the possibility of 
by-passing capitalism in the Orient with the victory of socialism in the West, then 
explained Soviet illusions about 'non-capitalist development' as a consequence of 
"an uncritical surety in the swiftness of capitalism's general crisis under the 
influence of the loss of its colonial periphery", before endorsing Simoniya's 
definition of a 'socialist oriented' national democratic revolution as just "a 
revolutionary process of the emancipation of labour from all forms of 
pre-capitalist and colonial exploitation, solving the tasks of a bourgeois social 
revolution in conditions of the existence of two world systems." Repeating
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Levkovsky's argument about the objective limits of multistructurality, and 
Mirsky's point about the influence of the world capitalist economy, they 
concluded by criticising the "unconscious Eurocentrism" of those who viewed 
"state property in countries of socialist orientation as the highest type of property 
in general," in dogmatic opposition to Marx's view of socialism as "the liberation 
of labour, understood as a transition from an elemental division of labour and 
growth of productive forces to their cooperation and real, direct socialisation on a 
civil basis, eliminating alienation of the product of labour and power from the 
human being as a creator of social r e l a t i o n s . ”236
With this perspective, the debate about one power centre’s dependent allies 
was transcended by a more important discussion about the possibilities of 
socialism in a world still marked by a "growth of capitalism” as well as its 
decaying old forms.237 ul'ianovsky and Kaufman fulminated against their 
defeat, but were reduced to ad hominem attacks on Simoniya and Mirsky, plus a 
claim about economic obstacles to reversing ’non-capitalist development' that 
would have made Levkovsky smile from h e a v e n . 2 3 8  Their defence of "an idea 
formulated in our science already in the 1960s" was dismissed as a legacy of 
stagnation by one moderately conservative scholar, Yu. Ivanov. Dy The editors 
of Aziia Afrika i Segodnia declined to print Ul'ianovsky and Kaufman's reply to a 
letter of Simoniya's, which held Ul'ianovsky partly responsible for the tragedy of 
Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and exposed his "false modesty" in ascribing his 
"critical campaign" against Strany Vostoka to unnamed "Moscow scientific 
journals" (Simoniya added that Uli'anovsky had used "his official position" to 
prevent Simoniya replying to Ul'ianovsky's review article, which he thought had 
not given readers a chance to assess adequately the arguments of Strany  
Vostoka) .240 Kjm pr0ved more able than Ul'ianovsky to ride the wave of 
restructuring, protecting himself by emphasising that in considering 'socialist 
orientation' "one should not fall into e x t r e m e s " . 2 4 1  Simoniya resorted to the 
same rhetorical trick, but for a different purpose. In outlining a "Leninist 
conception of the transition to socialism in the countries of the Orient", he openly 
described Soviet society as still undergoing such a transition, and now criticised
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"bourgeois scholars and officials" (implicitly including Soviet marketeers like L. 
Popkova) who hoped that "in the course of restructuring our country will 
renounce s o c i a l i s m . "242 Simoniya's defence of ’socialist orientation' as an 
important topic for debate, which showed that his criticism of dependent allies 
had triumphed, was complemented by the arguments of Antonina Sterbalova, who 
disagreed with him about the prospects for Oriental capitalism, but was equally 
forthright in raising for consideration "three variants of reactionary or stagnant 
non-capitalist development." She pointed out that in the USSR during the 1920s 
"the concept of 'non-capitalist development' was directly identified with 
socialism", thus replacing the limits of censorship with the openness of logic.243
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involvement in the third world leading to a confrontation with the United States. A recent article by 
Paul Beilis, "The Non-Capitalist Road and Soviet Development Theory: a critique of some recent 
accounts", Journal o f Communist Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, September 1988, conveniently ignores 
Mirsky's endorsement of Simoniya against Ul'ianovsky, reflecting a desire to demonstrate at all 
costs what Beilis, p. 271, superciliously calls "the confusion that characterises Hough’s entire 
account o f Soviet views on the non-capitalist road". Because of an anachronistic distinction 
between 'permanentist' and 'stagist' views of 'non-capitalist development', which is not related to 
Soviet policy objectives, Beilis claims, p. 264, that Mirsky and Ul'ianovsky have consistently had 
"diametrically opposed conceptions" of'socialist orientation' and, pp. 271, 275-6, that Simoniya's 
view has not been widely endorsed. The first claim is belied by Andreasian's 1974 article, as well 
as Ul'ianovsky's attack on Mirsky for changing his mind, while the second is belied by Vasil'ev's 
1986 article, which Beilis, p. 281, cites, as well as the observation of the editors of Aziia i Afrika 
Segodnia, "Sotialisticheskaia orientatsiia: osmyslenie", p. 19, that the dominance in the past of a 
"dogmatic approach to the theory of non-capitalist development" had "inevitably led to the fact that 
our action in the international arena was not always carefully balanced and thoughtful." Beilis' own 
'confusion' is shown by his claim, pp. 269-70, that Simoniya's view is "located firmly within the 
stagist paradigm", the chief representative of which is Ul'ianovsky.
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Chapter 4: The Prospects for Capitalism in the Third World
Abstract-theoretical models of a developing society were constructed in the '60s and 70s 
either by a method of the generalisation of direct observations, which drew close to the 
level of empirical generalisation (as, for example, the conception of multistructurality), 
or by a hypothetico-deductive method, starting from pre-given 'idealised' (mentally 
purified, or speculative) model-images and principles of a real process (the conception of 
dependent development), or by a combination of both these logical methods (the conception 
of transitionality). But all these approaches were too partial or, on the contrary, too general 
and a priori, in order to secure the necessary unity of empirical observations and theoretical 
constructions.
(Igor Sledzevsky, reviewing N.A. Simoniya and L.I. Reisner eds, Evoliutsiia vostochnykh 
obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo, Narody Azii i Afriki, 1987, no.2, p. 160.)
Evaluating the survivability of capitalism as a social formation has always 
been a topical task for Soviet scholars and officials, but new aspects of this 
question have arisen during the history of the USSR. In the mid and late 1920s 
debate focused on the prospects for ’capitalist stabilisation’ in Western Europe 
and the United States. Bukharin argued forcefully that capitalism was more 
’organised' than before the First World War, suggesting ”it is by no means out of 
the question that in certain countries ... the productive forces of capitalism will 
grow with extraordinary rapidity." ^  The alternative view, developed principally 
by Varga and adopted by Stalin, saw capitalism as increasingly "cramped in the 
framework of the present markets", with its 'stabilisation' becoming "more and 
more rotten and u n s t a b l e As Richard Day has demonstrated, this view was 
based theoretically on Rosa Luxemburg's idea that capitalist economic crises are 
caused by a shortage of external markets, rather than by growing 
disproportionalities of production within a business cycle, as Marx and Lenin had 
a r g u e d .  ^ Whereas the 'classics' foresaw several increasingly serious crises of 
capitalism, Stalin asserted at the 15th CPSU (B) Congress in December 1927 that 
"the general and fundamental crisis of capitalism ... is becoming deeper and is 
shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism".^ Stalin's only 
brilliance was in the realm of organisational politics, not theory, as his 
differences with Trotsky and Bukharin showed. Like most dogmas, the 'general 
crisis of capitalism' originated as a clever but superficial exaggeration of events. 
While completely barren as a source of insight into the survivability of world 
capitalism, it helped stabilise Stalinism, by justifying breakneck industrialisation
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and forced collectivisation. Having removed Bukharin from the party leadership, 
Stalin told the 16th CPSU (B) Congress in late June 1930 that the 'third period’ of 
wars, revolutions and economic collapse had finally arrived for the capitalist 
world, which would not be saved by any amount of ’’venomous hissing about the 
necessity of punishing ’that country’ that dares to develop its economy when crisis 
is reigning all around.
With Stalin's consolidation of supreme authority in the early 1930s, Soviet 
discussion of the West largely degenerated into inane statements about 
capitalism's inevitable demise, and crude justifications for the Comintern's 
opportunist policies. The last substantial scholarly work on the subject, by 
Evgeny Preobrazhensky, was quickly dismissed in late 1931 as "Trotskyist 
contraband", with one reviewer asserting that his theory of the monopolistic 
business cycle contained a "social-fascist essence’’.  ^ Such crass commentary 
contributed to the Comintern’s disastrous strategy in Germany, where the Nazis 
were considered a ’lesser evil’ than the Social Democrats, since the latter were 
seen as representing the only possible bourgeois solution to the economic crisis, 
in the form of 'organised capitalism'7 This tragic episode showed clearly the 
level of ignorance to which Soviet political economy had swiftly sunk. Only 
Varga and a few colleagues continued to publish serious assessments of the 
prospects for capitalist recovery. Ironically, after prevaricating during the 
1930s, Varga ended the decade by suggesting, like Keynes, that the capitalist state 
could alleviate the 'problem of markets' through investment in non-productive 
employment such as armament construction. ^  After the war, Varga emphasised 
the positive implications of his new theory of 'organised capitalism', arguing that 
planning economic reconstruction had become a central political question in 
Western Europe.^ But Stalin, in the context of an intensifying Cold War and his 
need to renew strict ideological control, rejected this perspective as ’revisionist’. 
In 1952 he asserted that capitalism’s ’problem of markets' had worsened because 
it had lost control over Eastern Europe and China; capitalism's 'general crisis' 
had now reached its 'second stage', in which, he proudly claimed, "their 
industries will be operating more and more below capacity."^ In substance, this 
view simply repeated the old orthodoxy of twenty years before, which Varga had
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then supported. Evaluations of capitalism remained subordinate to ideological 
justifications of the supposedly superior character of Soviet society. Neither 
'planning* nor ’progress' could be said to exist in any form in the capitalist West 
or the developing world, since these features were officially required to serve as 
marks distinguishing the USSR and its allies from the 'non-socialist world'. 1 1
In the mid and late 1950s differences reappeared amongst Soviet scholars 
about the nature of the business cycle in developed capitalist countries, but the 
overall perspective regarding capitalism’s longstanding 'general crisis' was not 
r e v i s e d .  Indeed, at a meeting of loyal communists in 1960 it was announced 
that the 'third stage' of this prolonged crisis had already begun, though all 
concerned recognised that "new links of the imperialist chain have still not 
f a l l e n . "  13 This proclamation of another 'deepening' of capitalism's 'general 
crisis’ resembled Stalin's edicts on the subject in concentrating on the apparent 
success of the USSR rather than the contradictions of contemporary commodity 
production. 14 But, whereas Stalin's supporters in the 1930s could point to the 
Great Depression as evidence of capitalism’s collapse, the next generation of 
Soviet propagandists could only suggest that the fall of the colonial system would 
lead to a further "intensification of the problem of markets for capitalism."^ 
This idea was hardly new, having been argued by Stalin and Varga in the mid 
1920s debate about appropriate Comintern strategy toward the Chinese 
revolution. 16 Since it was disproven in practice then, its repetition three and a 
half decades later only testifies to the destruction of Soviet theory in the interim
i n
and the USSR's continuing need for some anti-capitalist legitimation.17 In the 
early Khrushchev period, the fact of capitalist 'stabilisation' in the heartlands of 
Europe was downplayed by focusing instead on the crisis of colonialism, a change 
of perspective which reflected the Soviet search for new allies in the South. 
Many Soviet scholars retained Varga's 1925 view that "it appears as if the fate of 
world capitalism is going to be decided in Asia", because they saw the world 
capitalist economy as a consequence, not a cause, of the colonial division of the 
w orld . 18 The struggle for economic independence and the development of heavy 
industry in countries like India and Indonesia was viewed as "the strongest strike 
[yet] on the whole capitalist system of the world economy." 1^ Since it was
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considered "impossible to suggest" that Western monopolies might assist the
industrialisation of underdeveloped countries, the prospects for capitalist
9 0development in the third world seemed slight. u Even scholars who would 
subsequently become champions of the market, like Nikolai Shmelev, argued at 
this time that "the development of the state sector facilitates the creation of a 
many-sided industrial complex, which is necessary for the resolution of the basic 
national-economic problems of backward countries."^
By the mid 1960s, many Soviet scholars had discarded their previous
assumption that capitalism would be crippled by its loss of colonies as wishful
thinking. As Hough has shown, from 1963 onwards a number of intelligent
scholars argued that Western investment now facilitated rather than prevented
economic development in third world countries, and that nationalisation or a
disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry would produce economic problems
rather than achieve i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^  Optimism about the general relevance of the
state-directed, ’administrative’ form of industrialisation undertaken by the USSR
soon gave way to a recognition of the great variety of economic strategies
appropriate to particular national c o n d i t i o n s . Vladimir Kollontai even
suggested in 1964 that the term ’underdeveloped countries’ was no longer valid,
because it obscured the "unevenness in both political and economic development"
9 4which characterised different groups of countries in the third world. This 
suggestion was rejected then by both Viktor Rymalov and Ul’ianovsky, who 
argued that all the countries concerned were still backward in world terms and 
still "really have common regularities of d e v e l o p m e n t . " ^  Thus began a long 
debate about whether the third world still existed as a common group of 
countries, or whether it had been ’differentiated’ into several qualitatively distinct 
groups.
A key question which now arose was the extent of capitalist development that 
the metropolitan powers could foster in their former colonies. The first speaker 
at a major conference in 1965 argued that:
One should not underestimate tendencies of capitalist development in countries
of the ’third world’, which exist together with tendencies of the non-capitalist
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path of development. Imperialism is still strong enough to support these 
[capitalist] tendencies from outside. ... Contemporary neocolonialism cannot 
but strive for the development of capitalism by a path of reform from above. 
This matter concerns not only the economic interests of imperialism. The 
metropoles, as experience shows, can economically exist without colonies.... 
But capitalism as a whole, as a world system, cannot maintain itself without 
attempts to retain its supremacy over the ’third world'. And the imperialists 
understand this very well. For them this is a question of the extended 
reproduction of capitalist relations. This is a question not only of 
economics but also of p o l i t i c s . ^ ^
The extent of this change in the nature of imperialism was subject to different
evaluations. Tiagunenko saw Western 'aid' as merely the export of capital in a
new guise, while Lev Stepanov (who also supported the theory of ’unequivalent
exchange’ between third world countries and developed capitalist states)
considered it a new, political phenomenon which arose because of the challenge to
97capitalism presented by cheap Soviet aid. 1 But no Soviet scholar was yet able to 
assess the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the periphery. This had to 
await the development of a new theoretical debate about the historical situation of 
the third world, which began to unfold in Soviet oriental studies from the late 
1960s.
Soviet scholarly debate about the third world has been more fruitful in the 
past two decades than Soviet discussion of the West. Whereas discussion about 
changes in Western capitalism had to proceed through the tortuous path of 
providing new meaning to the old concept of 'state-monopoly capitalism', debate 
about the prospects for capitalist development in the third world began with 
attempts to establish new conceptions of the common features uniting
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post-colonial societies on the periphery of world capitalism. 0 Since the 
established orthodoxy about capitalism's need for colonies had been fully 
undermined by events, the ensuing debate here was quite open and substantial. A 
new Soviet theory about the evolution of the third world was clearly required, 
and a number of younger scholars were eager to elaborate it in a comprehensive 
rather than a piecemeal way. Reflecting the still enthusiastic spirit of many 
Soviet intellectuals at this time, Lukin polemicised in 1969 against those who had 
adopted a "technocratic" approach to the problems of development, and called
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attention to the "advantages of a really scientific, theoretical, Marxist method of 
analysis over a pragmatic m e t h o d . " ^  But resuscitating of the former method 
was more easily suggested than achieved, particularly when the increasing 
conservatism of the Brezhnev years encouraged some scholars, such as Lukin, to 
adapt their concerns little by little to the dominant Machiavellian tradition of 
Soviet p o l i t i c s . 3 0  By the mid 1970s, the two leading institutes had affirmed 
different explanations of the third world's continuing backwardness, but neither 
the concept of 'multistructurality' (developed at IVAN) nor that of 'dependent 
development' (fostered at IMEMO) adequately answered the question of the 
prospects for a capitalist transformation of the periphery. While the 
differentiation of post-colonial societies into a variety of sub-groups then led 
some Soviet scholars to reject the possibility of a comprehensive theoretical 
approach in favour of an empiricist one, increasing emphasis on the peculiarities 
of capitalist development in the third world also became a feature of Soviet 
theoretical discussion from the late 1970s. Finally, the promise of a broader 
approach, espoused but not realised in the late 1960s, began to be fulfilled in the 
early 1980s, when some major works interpreting 'peripheral capitalism' in 
world-historical terms provided the focus for a new level of scholarly debate.
Sources of Backwardness and Economic Independence
In Soviet terms, the key problem facing post-colonial societies has been how to 
overcome backwardness and achieve some significant economic independence. 1 
Different Soviet conceptions of the 'commonality' of developing countries as a 
group of states apart from the 'two world systems’ have constituted competing 
interpretations of the meaning of backwardness in the contemporary world. The 
primary issue of debate has been whether the main source of third world 
backwardness lies in the ’multistructural’ domestic economies of developing 
countries, i.e. the existence of several contradictory structures of production 
within these countries, or in their 'dependent' position in the world capitalist 
economy. According to the latter view, overcoming backwardness and achieving 
economic independence are possible only by escaping from the confines of
1 84
capitalist exploitation along a ’non-capitalist path'. To the contrary, supporters of 
the former view argue that significant economic independence is attainable for 
less developed countries within the world capitalist economy, provided that they 
restructure their economies and make use of modem productive forces. These 
opposing positions, which crystallised in the early 1970s, have clearly divergent 
implications for Soviet foreign policy, but their significance as theoretical 
reference points extends beyond the narrow world of diplomacy. Soviet debate 
about the prospects for a capitalist transformation of the third world has raised 
broader questions, such as the role of the state in economic development and the 
different historical trajectories of Europe and the Orient. Indeed, the generally 
higher quality of Soviet writing about peripheral capitalism than about 'socialist 
orientation’ is partly a consequence of the impossibility of limiting discussion of 
the former subject merely to what satisfies the current interests of the USSR.
During the 1960s, Soviet scholars classified developing countries principally 
in terms of "their activity in the anti-imperialist struggle", even when considering
19this not simply as a reaction against economic dependence and poverty. 
Toward the end of the decade debate focused on the implications of what 
Stepanov termed "indications of an 'ascending movement' of capitalism in the 
third world."33 Two scholars from IVAN, Aleksandrov and Simoniya, criticised 
their counterparts at IMEMO for arguing in an "emotional" way that 
independence from imperialism was attainable only on the 'non-capitalist path'. 
They claimed that countries like India, which was achieving "serious successes" in 
"resolving the problem of economic self-sufficiency", were just as independent 
economically from the West as Egypt, Burma or Syria, and hence just as reliable 
in the future as loose but stable Soviet allies.^^ Significantly, both these views 
were incorporated in Tiul'panov's 1969 textbook, and in Ul'ianovsky's book 
published in 1972.^5 This juxtaposition of conflicting opinions confirms Stephen 
Clarkson's comment that Soviet discussion of the third world constituted "a 
school without a theory ... leading in divergent directions" at once.^6 But this 
situation did not last. Even with the "repeated transfer of particular countries 
from one path to the other" which Tiul'panov noted, his eclectic combination of 
three tendencies of development (increasing dependence upon imperialism;
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accelerated growth of national capitalism; and the 'non-capitalist path’) was soon 
regarded by leading Soviet scholars as in a d eq u a te .^
Tiul'panov's emphasis on a "vicious circle" of third world dependence and
economic backwardness, which could be broken only by a "weakening of the
position of the imperialist states on the world arena", was elaborated by scholars
at IM E M O  in their concept of 'dependent d e v e lo p m e n t ' .^  Against this view,
some economists like Shmelev and Sheinis focused, together with Simoniya, on
Tiul'panov's observation that "the prevailing tendency in the economic
development of the liberated countries remains a movement along the capitalist
path and the establishment of the capitalist mode of p r o d u c t io n ." ^  They
assumed that, precisely because of the third world's backwardness compared to
the West, the main task for the former was "of necessity to catch-up" with the
latter, and suggested that some developing countries were already closer in their
"level of development" to some developed capitalist countries than to other parts
of the third world. Both these views were rejected by Levkovsky and his
supporters at IVAN, who developed Tiul'panov's general proposition that
"movement from an existing multistructural economy toward socialism and
toward capitalism has in many respects a series of analogical manifestations, and
proceeds through the same intermediate points." Levkovsky was more cautious
than Tiul'panov in asserting the "objectively anti-imperialist" nature of the state
sector throughout the third world, but he agreed that with this progressive
foundation even foreign capital could serve as "one of the means for overcoming
economic backwardness and d e p e n d e n c e ." ^  This proposition was accepted by
those who focused on the rise of capitalism in the periphery, but not by exponents
of dependency theory. While Levkovsky was sceptical about the prospects for
capitalist leaps forward out of third world backwardness, he supported
Tiul'panov's general conclusion about the importance of "market criteria in all
sectors, including the state economy", and thus opposed the dominant IMEMO
49view more than the marginal liberal view outlined by Simoniya and Sheinis.
In the early 1970s, the theories of multistructurality and dependent 
development competed to fill a large conceptual gap in concerning the specific
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features of the third world. This task was urgent, because a mass of empirical 
material had been collected by the mid 1960s, but the abstract categories essential 
for analysing this data were noticeably l a c k i n g . 4 3  As Landa pointed out in 1971, 
it was not possible to deduce such categories from the "general regularities of 
world development", or from conditions "existing in the countries of developed 
capitalism." Phenomena typical of the third world, such as the persistence of 
"traditional forms of relations between people" and the "particular complexity of 
the influence of economics upon politics", needed to be understood in their own 
context, so as to "allow one to correctly evaluate the prospects for social progress 
in the O r i e n t . in other words, a 'middle-level' or 'regional' theory of the 
third world was required. This need was stated directly in the second paragraph 
of IMEMO's 1974 book on the developing countries, which, reviewing the extent 
of recent changes in the third world, noted the "necessity of a more profound 
analysis of these changes in a period when new processes have more or less 
'established themselves' and the tendencies of further social development have 
been defined more d i s t i n c t l y .  " 4 5  The clearer and apparently stable nature of 
common features of development in post-colonial societies at this time was a 
significant factor in the emergence of competing Soviet theories of the third 
world. As Igor Sledzevsky has reported in retrospect, these theories "began to 
form in a period of the undebatable predominance of features of similarity and 
kinship in the sphere of reproduction and development amongst peripheral 
societies of world capitalism over features of their differentiation, when 
centripetal processes were clearly stronger than centrifugal p r o c e s s e s . " 4 6  This 
circumstance contributed to a certain resistance of the theories of 
multistructurality and dependent development to conceptual revision, once they 
had taken shape.
The idea of multistructurality as the key to understanding the peculiarities of 
the third world did not arise in a social vacuum. Significantly, the first extensive 
conceptualisation of the third world as multistructural was made by a scholar 
from Poland, the country of the Soviet bloc with the most heterogeneous 
socio-economic structure. Jerzy Kleer suggested that out of eight economic 
structures existing in the third world only two were capitalist (one national and
187
one foreign), and claimed that only in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were these 
structures likely to subjugate petty-commodity and other pre-capitalist structures 
to the extent necessary for expanded reproduction in the form of the capitalist 
mode of production. He thought that elsewhere a multistructural economy would 
remain for a long time "one of the basic objective obstacles on the path of a quick 
transition of third world countries to industrial civilisation", and concluded that 
as a whole these countries formed an "intermediate system" in the modem world, 
characterised by a "strengthening of elements of neutralism" and efforts to 
"maintain a mixed type of e c o n o m y . Reviewing the Polish edition of Kleer's 
book, Mirsky questioned whether neutralism necessarily resulted from a 
multistructural economy, but noted that countries on the 'non-capitalist path' 
faced the same difficulties of overcoming backwardness as other parts of the third 
world.48 The implication of this, that multistructurality could not be overcome 
by political force, would have been clear to those Soviet scholars who in the mid 
1960s were showing a "growing interest" in the question of historical transition 
periods between socio-economic f o r m a t i o n s . ^ ^  Maksimenko has pointed out that 
"the conception of the developing countries' multistructurality, being elaborated 
in the numerous works of A.I. Levkovsky, arose in the course of the wide 
academic discussions of 1964-1968, including the discussions about pre-capitalist 
formations and about the 'asiatic mode of p r o d u c t i o n ' . T h e  basis of 
Levkovsky's theory of multistructurality, which in many respects resembled the 
conception outlined by Kleer, was the idea that post-colonial societies were in a 
"transitional state", which Levkovsky termed "an inter-formational stage of social 
development."51 By defining the key feature of the third world as "persistent 
multistructurality", Levkovsky emphasised both the long duration and complexity 
of a "transitional society", and contributed to a regeneration of serious historical 
theorising within the Soviet intelligentsia, pioneered in the 1960s by anti-Stalinist 
scholars like Gefter and G u r e v i c h . 5 2
The concept of multistructurality appealed particularly to scholars interested in 
classifying the variety of domestic economic relations existing in the third world. 
This topic was sufficiently new in Soviet oriental studies for Levkovsky to 
suggest a key change of terminology. He pointed out that the current term for
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the former colonies -- the 'developing countries' -- was taken from the West and 
failed to distinguish this part of the globe according to the same criterion 
(relations of production) that distinguished the 'two world systems’. He argued 
that classifying regimes according to their productive forces would not disclose 
their class nature, and remarked that in terms of economic growth the former 
colonies were "still very slowly developing countries." Once the existence of 
several contradictory economic structures in the third world was recognised, 
another, albeit more complex and transitory 'world system' emerged: "states are 
divided, if we apply a single criterion, into capitalist, socialist and 
m u l t i s t r u c t u r a l . " 5 3  This general classification was used in the 1974 IVAN 
collective work, particularly in its first section on problems of socio-economic 
development, although when speaking outside his institute Levkovsky reverted to 
using the term ’developing countries’, despite having argued that it was merely a 
"variant" of the inadmissible division of the world into 'rich' and 'poor' s t a t e s .
Whereas Kleer had seen local capitalism in developing countries as a single 
structure, Levkovsky emphasised the "fragmentation of capitalism" into 
competing economic, and hence political, structures as the principal peculiarity of 
third world multistructurality.^^ The conservative, retarding effect of merchant 
capital during colonialism was widely recognised, but Levkovsky focused on a 
"differentiation of the bourgeoisie" within multistructural countries after the 
attainment of political independence.^ He particularly stressed the importance 
of the petty bourgeoisie, which he viewed as possessing "in the overwhelming 
majority of countries an enormous potential for development", capable of leading 
a class coalition against the national bourgeoisie as well as against foreign capital. 
While noting that the "concentration of production and capital" in the developed 
capitalist structure of the third world was often "very high", he argued that only 
a small proportion of the population worked in these "capitalist 'skyscrapers'", 
which still depended to a significant degree on surrounding, backward structures 
of production.^ in Levkovsky's view, this national capitalist structure (which he 
termed "developed capitalist enterprise") had strengthened its position in the 
post-colonial period, but it remained too weak to overcome multistructurality and 
transform itself into a capitalist mode of production. In the countryside there
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was little prospect of petty proprietors growing into capitalist farmers, while in 
the cities modem industry was concentrated in the state sector and flanked by a 
multitude of small traders and '’pre-industrial" enterprises.^ Moreover, the 
"state-capitalist structure", which formed the basis of third world countries' 
struggle for economic independence, tended to be used by competing private 
capitalist interests against each other, particularly by the petty bourgeoisie to 
restrict developed capitalist enterprise.^^ Here, in the struggle "within the 
bourgeoisie" over the variants of capitalist development, Levkovsky discerned 
"the boundaries of capitalism in the transitional society of the 'third world’". He 
suggested that the state-capitalist structure was like the proverbial genie which, 
once enlivened as an instrument for other structures, would seek an "independent 
existence for itself' at the expense of local (as well as foreign) developed 
capitalist enterprise.60 He concluded that "the paradox of the socio-economic 
development of a multistructural economy consists in the fact that it itself, in 
particular under the influence of the specific development of capitalism, 
inevitably raises, especially in moments of social crises, the problem of the 
earnest restraining or even liquidation of a certain capitalist structure."61
One key implication of the concept of multistructurality was to downplay the 
significance of proclaimed foreign policy orientation in classifying third world 
countries. Levkovsky pointed out that there was no simple way for 
multistructural countries to achieve economic self-sufficiency, since their 
backwardness resulted principally from contradictory domestic structures of 
production, which could not be integrated into a system of expanded reproduction 
by decree. He argued that, in order to survive in the short-term, even the most 
radical regimes would be forced to pursue a flexible and careful policy in 
relation to foreign and national capitalist e n t e r p r i s e . 6 2  To stress this, Levkovsky 
quoted Lenin's suggestion that, compared to pre-capitalist relations of production, 
capitalist enterprise was an advancement which should be controlled but could not 
be e l i m i n a t e d . 6 3  The international significance of this point was noted in a 
review article on the 1974 IVAN collective work, which formulated "one of the 
central ideas of the whole work" as follows:
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Liberation from exploitation and onesided dependence, and economic and 
social progress in the countries of the Orient may be attained not by the path 
of a rupture of their ties with the world capitalist economy, but by a consistent 
and flexible strategy aimed at changing the character of these relations.1^
This assessment of the crucial importance of the international division of labour 
for each and every country was expressed most clearly in the chapters of the 
IVAN work written by Simoniya. While reaching broadly similar conclusions 
about economic independence to Levkovsky, Simoniya did not accept his theses 
about ’persistent multistructurality' and the limited prospects for capitalism in the 
third world. As the introduction to the work proudly explained, since "even 
within the authors' collective there is no full agreement about some essential 
questions (for example, about the character of multistructurality ... )", it was 
thought better to "retain in the book the existing points of view", rather than 
subject them to "editorial ’levelling’, which would have meant either their loss 
from the text or the ’imposition’ of the opinion of some upon o t h e r s . " ^
Simoniya distinguished between pursuing an "independent economic policy", 
which politically annulled a situation of imperialist "economic discrimination" 
(neravnopravie), and achieving "economic self-sufficiency", which defined a state 
that, by means of accelerated economic growth and increased labour productivity, 
had overcome an objective "economic inequality" (neravenstvo) formed during a 
previous historical epoch.^6 He suggested that, while for "the majority" of third 
world countries, of both orientations, there had "opened a real possibility already 
now to pursue an independent economic policy, using it as a mighty lever for 
attaining economic self-sufficiency", if such a policy ignored "objective 
regularities of economic development" (as in Indonesia in 1957-1963) it would 
result in "a general disorganisation of the national e c o n o m y . He stressed that 
attaining economic self-sufficiency, in contrast to simply pursuing an independent 
economic policy, "demands a very prolonged historical period" and "the 
participation of economically underdeveloped countries in the international 
division of labour, in particular with highly-developed capitalist c o u n t r i e s " .  8 
His conclusion that the "process of the internationalisation of the world economy" 
was "irresistible" no doubt reflected a reading of Soviet history, since he 
emphasised that the general demands of economic self-sufficiency were similar
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for all countries, though realisable in different forms.69 As Hough has noted, 
Simoniya was particularly concerned to dispel the illusion that 'socialist 
orientation' constituted a short-cut to economic development for third world 
c o u n t r i e s . 7 0  in this respect, Simoniya's view was similar to Levkovsky's in 
bothering to address the "contradictoriness" of post-colonial socio-economic 
structures.^* But, whereas Levkovsky viewed 'persistent multistructurality' as 
the main obstacle to economic growth, Simoniya saw this obstacle as an
unavoidable "period of internal socio-political stabilisation and national
79consolidation."' ^  Pointing to the potential benefits of ’"reverse order' economic 
modernisation" for countries on the capitalist path, Simoniya suggested that, 
although now "quantitatively traditional structures still predominate in them", it 
is "entirely possible" that toward the end of the century they will "overcome their 
backwardness" and begin to attain economic self-sufficiency
The relative influence in 1974 of the different views of Simoniya and 
Levkovsky about the prospects for national capitalist development in the third 
world can be judged from the conclusion to the IVAN collective work, nominally 
written by Kim. While Levkovsky's classification of contradictory economic 
structures was not summarised, two key implications of his analysis — the 
"serious role" of the petty bourgeoisie and the "enormous significance" of class 
coalitions — were fully r e c o g n i s e d . 7 4  In contrast, Simoniya's two key categories
— an independent economic policy and economic self-sufficiency — were mixed 
up in an assessment implying that 'socialist orientation' remained, even with the 
"internationalisation" of economic life, the best "initiator" of the "struggle for the 
attainment of economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y " . 7 5  This formulation reflected the 
eclectic argument of the part of the work written by Li, who, partly upon the 
authority of Brutents, viewed capitalist development in the third world as largely 
dependent upon imperialist s u p p o r t . 7 6  Brutents was nominally a member of the 
authors' collective for the 1974 IVAN work, but expressed his view fully in his 
book about national liberation revolutions published in the same year. He 
stressed the "deformed character" of 'colonial capitalism' in the third world, 
which had "arisen as it were 'from above'," as a result of the expansion of 
imperialism, "not as a result of the normal development and consistent change of
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socio-economic forms, having their roots in the economic life of a given country, 
in local economic s t r u c t u r e s . " ^  He implicitly criticised one aspect of 
Levkovsky's theory by suggesting that "with the broadening of its economic 
functions the state sector has a tendency to step beyond the limits of state 
capitalism", but his rejection of Simoniya's view was more s u b s t a n t i a l . ^  
Brutents emphasised the weakness of the national bourgeoisie as one of the 
"unprecedented difficulties on the path of the development of capitalism" in the 
third world, and suggested that peripheral capitalism was undergoing a 
"narrowing of its social potential, especially as a factor of the creation of a 
national economy and the attainment of economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . " ^ ^  He claimed 
it was still correct to view capitalist development in the liberated countries as 
stimulated "largely and often primarily" by tendencies originating in the former 
metropoles, and said this "conditions the special, and to a significant degree 
dependent (and 'backward') character of capitalism" in the third world.^O
The idea that third world countries on the capitalist path were stuck in a 
continuing situation of 'dependent development' was the main thesis of the 1974 
IMEMO collective work on the developing countries. As Hough has noted, 
leading scholars at IMEMO up-dated the crude dependency theory prevalent 
during the Stalin period by borrowing ideas from the Latin American 
dependencia s c h o o l . Compared to Levkovsky's theory of multistructurality, 
the theory of dependent development elaborated at IMEMO was more orthodox 
in Soviet terms, and somewhat less original in terms of international debate about 
the character of third world capitalism. These features, together with the force 
of inter-institute rivalry, resulted in a paradoxical polarisation of Soviet debate in 
the mid 1970s between two views which stressed in different ways the limitations 
of peripheral capitalist development. Because of this common conclusion, which 
accorded with the view of Brutents, the difference of perspective between the 
proponents of 'multistructurality' and 'dependent development' may seem to have 
been of limited political significance. But the rhetoric of the 1974 IMEMO book 
suggests otherwise. Despite similar arguments about the "limited possibilities for 
a transformation of petty production into private capitalist elements," the 
IMEMO scholars clearly demarcated their own "global approach" from
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Levkovsky's "narrow-country approach", which, they asserted, could not disclose 
the 'general tendencies of evolution' of third world countries, and reduced 
"regional peculiarities to a 'lowest common denominator'" of social development 
such as m u l t i s t r u c t u r a l i t y . 8  2  From their 'global' vantage-point, 
multistructurality was a derivative phenomenon, not a key determinant of 
post-colonial development. The IMEMO scholars interpreted multistructurality 
"as a deformed reflection of the development of the world capitalist economy ..., 
as a result of the involvement of countries with backward socio-economic 
relations in the system of world-wide economic and political t i e s . " 8 3  They 
agreed with Levkovsky about the "growing role of the state" in organising a 
multistructural economy, but focused on the "leading role of modem structures 
outside the 'third world' itself', which Levkovsky considered only of limited 
significance for understanding why developing countries remained b a c k w a r d .  8 4
The concept of dependent development highlighted a historical conflict 
between the "organic" and "spontaneous" emergence of capitalism in Europe and 
the "partial, sporadic character" of capitalist development in the third w o r l d . 8 5  
The basic idea was that the success of the former in creating a world capitalist 
economy had established a 'vertical' limit upon the type of capitalism which could 
now emerge in the rest of the w o r l d . 8 ^  While countries of the third world were 
'horizontally' at different levels of economic development, they all remained 
backward compared to countries of state-monopoly capitalism, with "qualitatively 
different social structures" and substantially less developed productive f o r c e s . 8 ^  
Relations between these two parts of the world capitalist system were 
"characterised by asymmetry" to such an extent that "the dependent countries 
receive the most important impulses of their development from outside; in the 
final analysis, changes in the productive, economic, social and superstructural 
spheres of these countries are conditioned by corresponding changes in the 
development of the metropole." The IMEMO scholars noted that the terms 
'metropole' and 'periphery' were "relative" rather than precise, but proceeded to 
use them n e v e r t h e l e s s . 88 This terminology implied that no basic changes had 
occurred in the economic structures of the third world since the fall of 
colonialism, other than a deepening of the economic dependence of countries on
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the capitalist path upon imperialism, as a result of the increasing gap in levels of 
production between these groups of c o u n t r i e s . ^9 Indeed, the IMEMO scholars 
asserted that, given technological development in the West, even industrialisation 
in third world countries now "does not in itself lead to a weakening of relations 
of dependence. Only the forms of these relations change."90 According to 
IMEMO’s 'global' viewpoint, third world backwardness was a consequence of 
these relations of dependence, and as such "a natural product of the basic 
tendencies of the capitalist system".91 Dependent development had "retarded the 
development of the productive forces in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America", leading to an "inversion" of the material and social elements of the 
productive forces, with demand growing much faster than slowly changing 
systems of work.92 While leading IMEMO scholars like Tiagunenko noted an 
"increasing economic differentiation" occurring amongst developing countries, 
they thought that "even the most advanced of these countries will, in all 
probability, be characterised in the year 2000 as underdeveloped."7J
In contrast to the approaches of Levkovsky and Simoniya, the IMEMO view 
logically reinforced the "superstructural" distinction between third world 
countries developing on the capitalist and 'non-capitalist' paths.9 4 
Notwithstanding different 'horizontal' levels and structures of development in the 
third world, the IMEMO scholars asserted that "in the final analysis all this 
variety of situations amount to two basic tendencies of development:" dependent 
for countries remaining within the world capitalist system, and independent for 
states of 'socialist orientation'.95 Thus, IMEMO’s 'global' viewpoint subsumed 
the tendency of national capitalist development in the third world noted by 
Tiul’panov beneath his generalisation of dependence. Peripheral capitalism could 
expand in a state of dependent development, but only in backward forms. It 
would therefore remain a crisis-ridden type of society, continually engendering 
revolutionary protests in search of an anti-capitalist alternative.^ The IMEMO 
scholars concluded that in the third world "the capitalism having prospects to 
develop ... is primarily dependent, deformed, parasitical, and 
speculative-bureaucratic".97 Labelling this variant of post-colonial society "state 
capitalism", they used this term in a quite different sense from Levkovsky, to
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refer to regimes which ’’easily collude with neocolonialism and fully provide for 
foreign e x p l o i t e r s . " ^  They considered a ’’cardinal contradiction” of dependent 
development to be that economic growth, which creates "potential possibilities for 
greater economic self-sufficiency,” is "connected with the maintenance and 
widening of a variety of contacts with foreign state and monopoly capital", thus 
reproducing the dependence of third world countries upon i m p e r i a l i s m . ^  Such 
"dependent capitalist development" was most evident in Latin America, and the 
IMEMO scholars claimed it was "incomestible, that Latin America shows to 
Afro-Asian societies definite elements of their future" (they regarded India, 
which was Levkovsky's prototype for the third world, as "an exception rather 
than a r u l e " ) .  100 basic point about this future, according to the IMEMO 
book, was that "in current conditions the growth of national private capital does 
not reduce, but on the contrary increases its dependence" upon imperialism. 101 
The implication of this point for Soviet foreign policy was clear: even the most 
’horizontally’ developed states on the capitalist path such as Brazil would remain 
’vertically’ dependent upon Western capitalism for their economic development, 
and so (unlike anti-capitalist movements in these countries) could not become 
stable allies of the USSR in its geopolitical struggle with this system.
The main difference between the concepts of multistructurality and dependent 
development concerned the relative importance of internal and external factors in 
determining social change in the third world. A related difference concerned the 
time-scale of such change, particularly the likelihood of anti-imperialism 
’growing-over’ into anti-capitalism in the foreseeable future. Levkovsky's theory 
of multistructurality focused on domestic factors of development, and his 
definition of post-colonial societies as transitional in an epochal sense emphasised 
the long-term character of progressive change in the third world. In contrast, the 
'global' viewpoint adopted at IMEMO highlighted external sources of change, and 
implied optimism about the prospects for anti-capitalist movements forcing 
concessions from imperialism in the short term. This difference of perspective is 
most evident in an article by Vladimir Krylov, the main Soviet initiator of the 
concept of dependent development, published in Voprosy filosofii in 1976.102 
After repeating the 1974 IMEMO book's criticism of Levkovsky for ignoring the
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question of the leading economic structure in the third world, Krylov proposed 
his own answer. Ironically, he also suggested that there was no leading structure 
within a particular developing country, but his reason was that "all the local 
structures ... present themselves as a dependent, subordinated complex of 
structures and as such cannot determine the formational type of a s o c i e t y . ”  103 
According to Krylov, this complex (and hence the ”main lines of the development 
of the whole 'third world"') is "formed by economic structures ruling elsewhere, 
by the correlation of their forces and the forms of their c o n f r o n t a t i o n . "104 He 
distinguished between "the development of a society under the influence of 
capitalism from without (or a capitalist orientation in the development of 
peripheral societies)... and the development in this society of a properly capitalist 
s t r u c t u r e " .  105 He argued that the "basic contradiction of 'dependent capitalist 
development'" consists in its lack of a solid domestic base, and stated the 
implications of this quite clearly:
The deciding factor here becomes, so to speak, the 'external aspect' of 
multistructurality, and precisely the heterogeneity of socio-historical orders 
in the most developed countries. The struggle of world systems henceforth 
determines the basic strategic paths of development of 'third world' countries, 
and new forms of peaceful competition in conditions of the relaxation of 
international tensions create possibilities earlier unforeseen for the evolution 
of backward countries in the direction of progress. °
While Krylov, unlike Ul'ianovsky, did not criticise Levkovsky for 
underestimating capitalist development in the third world, his immediate 
recommendation for Soviet policy was similarly optimistic and a d v e n t u r o u s .  107
Although IMEMO's 'global' view about the nature of peripheral capitalism 
was the most influential in Moscow in the mid 1970s, some scholars expressed 
doubts about it. When introducing a discussion in Leningrad, Tiul'panov 
remarked prophetically that "the IMEMO monograph somewhat underestimates 
the possibilities which imperialism still possesses [for fostering capitalist 
development] in a series of countries of the 'third world', despite the profound
i  n o
contradictions and enormous opposition which it meets here."100 The main 
direct criticism of the concept of dependent development came from scholars at 
IVAN, firstly in a review article by Kiva. He explicitly criticised the IMEMO
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book's basic assumption "that any development on the path of capitalism is 
dependent development" by pointing again to countries like India, "which are 
proceeding on the capitalist path but at the same time pursue an independent 
foreign policy c o u r s e " .  109 K j v a  argued that the existence of "economic and 
scientific-technical backwardness" in the developing countries is not itself an 
indication of their continuing dependence upon imperialism, since in this case 
Portugal, Spain and Ireland would have to be considered countries of "dependent 
development" as well. Moreover, writing when the energy crisis was affecting 
the capitalist world after the oil price rise of 1973-1974, he pointed to the 
"reciprocal dependence of the countries of developed capitalism on the supply of 
raw materials from the developing countries."!10 In this context, Kiva claimed 
that:
the aspiration toward full independence immanently exists in every liberated
country irrespective of its social orientation, and the struggle for its attainment
(of course, with different degrees of consistency) is led by a wide bloc of
socio-political forces, from the proletariat to the national (including the large)
bourgeoisie. In the current conditions of the correlation of forces in the world
i i i
this struggle has big chances of success.111
This view was also optimistic, but about the prospects for national capitalism 
rather than the chances of radical change. In response to IMEMO's proposition 
about the growing dependence upon imperialism of developing countries on the 
capitalist path, Kiva identified "two tendencies" in struggle: on the one side, 
liberated countries' efforts to strengthen their political sovereignty, and, on the 
other, imperialist endeavours to undermine this by exploiting their "sharp need 
for capital and modem technique". He was sure that "the first tendency 
dominates: there is occurring a weakening of the dependence of 'third world' 
countries on the leading capitalist countries, and on world capitalism as a 
w h o l e . " !  12 por Soviet diplomacy, this meant that serious objective prospects 
existed for the USSR to improve substantially its relations with some countries on 
the capitalist path.
The issue of whether particular countries on the capitalist path could become 
loose but stable Soviet allies depended ultimately on the nature of their capitalist
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development. If third world capitalism had strong domestic roots, then a new 
layer of 'inter-capitalist contradictions' would naturally develop. Kiva disagreed 
strongly with the IMEMO view that expansion of the state structure in developing 
countries signified a "crisis of 'peripheral capitalism' and the decay of private 
property", with a weak local capitalism requiring imperialist support in order to 
s u r v i v e . ^  He disputed the implication of this, that everything depends upon the 
political forces holding state power, since, the IMEMO book claimed, in the 
chaotic situation of the third world such power "appropriates for itself an 
incomparably greater independence than was the case in the countries of the 
classical path of the development of capitalism".! 1  ^ Speaking about countries of 
capitalist orientation, Kiva suggested that private capital would use the state to 
establish its own dominance — "as this occurred in Japan" -- and concluded that 
"before us there is not a unique phenomenon, not a special variant of 
socio-economic development, but one and the same capitalism, well-known in the 
West, the East or in any other region of the w orld ." ! 1  ^ This view about the 
"natural-historical process of capitalist evolution in the countries of the Orient" 
was argued most forcefully by Simoniya, whose book Strany Vostoka presented 
in embryonic terms an alternative to the theories of multistructurality and 
dependent de v e l o pme nt . S i mo n i y a  did not at this time rebut the latter theory 
(since the IMEMO volume was published only when his book was in press), and 
was careful not to criticise Levkovsky by name, in the manner in which he 
dissected the views of Tiul'panov and others.! ^  Nonetheless, by questioning the 
"adherence of many orientalists to a one-sidedly modernised, or its 
mirror-opposite traditionalised, scheme" for understanding the contemporary 
third world, Simoniya implied that existing Soviet approaches to studying
I I O
post-colonial societies were methodologically inadequate.1 ° The "illogicality" of 
the modernist (IMEMO) scheme consisted in applying the categories of a 
developed capitalist society to backward countries, and hence failing to notice that 
the weakness of the bourgeoisie as a class in the third world was "a natural not a 
specific" p h e n o m e n o n .!  19 Meanwhile, Levkovsky's "traditionalist approach" 
ignored the effects of colonialism by falsely considering '"remnants' of 
traditional social structures" as the moving forces of contemporary, post-colonial 
s o c i e t i e s . ! 20 Neither scheme abstracted the "essence" of third world
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development, which Simoniya viewed as first a colonial "synthesis of traditional 
and contemporary elements" and then the subsequent "processes of the 
modification of this synthesis ... into one or other modem forms".121
Simoniya distinguished three phases of colonialism, and argued that the "main 
change" of the last phase "consists in the formation of a national capitalist 
s t r u c t u r e . "122 He claimed this structure negates the "colonial character of the 
synthesis" established with the expansion of Western industrial capital during the 
second phase, and suggested that after independence the consolidation of local 
capitalism becomes the "leading tendency" determining the evolution of 
multistructurality in most third world countries. *23 His essential point was to 
define post-colonial societies as undergoing an "early-capitalist evolution" similar 
to that which occurred in Europe before the industrial r e v o l u t i o n .  124 Whereas 
Levkovsky's view implied that developing countries would remain predominantly 
pre-capitalist for a long time, and IMEMO's that they were already as capitalist as 
they could become, Simoniya suggested that much of the third world was on the 
threshold of independent capitalist development. 125 Methodologically, he 
criticised the "conception of an absolute opposition of the Orient to the West, 
denying the fact of the capitalist evolution of the former" just because substantial 
"non-economic compulsion" in developing countries did not correspond to an 
"organic, integral model of a capitalist society". Pointing out that, as Marx had 
emphasised, establishment of the capitalist mode of production in Europe was due 
in no small measure to non-economic compulsion, he concluded that the 
specificity of the third world "should be found in the peculiarities and variability 
of the establishment of capitalism, not in a more or less full negation of this very 
p rocess."  126  Simoniya suggested that "ignoring the real tendency of capitalist 
development in the countries of the Orient" had been facilitated by "the 
circumstance that the germs and first shoots of local capitalism quite often appear 
in old traditional forms"; he implicitly criticised Levkovsky for seeing 
small-scale capitalist enterprise as an independent structure of production rather 
than an element of either the private or state capitalist s t r u c t u r e s . ! 27 He also 
criticised Cheshkov’s idea that local capitalism in the third world was a 
"dependent" product of modem state-monopoly capitalism, arguing instead that it
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had derived "from the backward, 'black-hundreds—octoberist' form of 
metropolitan capital" dominant during the era of colonialism. 128 Simoniya 
thought such backward forms of capital (which, he agreed, could not transform 
the social structures of colonial countries) had been superceded by modem 
national and international forms of capital which could re-make the traditional 
structures of the third world in their own image. *29
The Uneven Growth of National Capitalism
Ironically, during the second half of the 1970s the concepts of 
multistructurality and dependent development had to adapt to an "unforeseen" 
change in the character of the third world — strengthening processes of 
socio-economic differentiation amongst post-colonial societies, particularly those 
oriented toward capitalism.130 The phenomena which came in the West to be 
called "the end of the third world" were noticed quite early by some leading 
Soviet o r i e n t a l i s t s . l ^ l  As Sledzevsky has pointed out, Soviet theories about the 
commonality of the third world had "hardly arisen" when they "confronted the 
problem of the further maintenance of their object as something integral." 132 At 
a conference in March 1975 Simoniya
emphasised that it is incorrect to speak about some 'united Orient.' Of course, 
all countries of the Orient as a whole lag socio-economically from developed 
capitalist countries of the West. But their commonality ends with this. The 
internal social structure of the countries of the Orient is distinguished by 
significant multiformity, so that it is a question not about specifics in the 
limits of homogeneous structures, but about fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s .  1 3 3
Simoniya suggested that insufficient attention had been given to "Bonapartist 
forms of rule", which endeavoured simultaneously "to resolve tasks, in their 
essence relating to different historical epochs". 134 His general comments implied 
that the dominant Soviet conceptions of dependent development and 
multistructurality needed re-defining, but this was easier said than done. 
Sledzevsky has shown that the various attempts by Soviet scholars to perfect these 
conceptions led to logical contradictions, particularly concerning the problem of
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whether 'peripheral capitalism' could develop in different forms. 135 He has also 
suggested that increasing differentiation amongst third world states "created the 
objective conditions for the manifestation of an empirical typology of developing 
countries", worked out by scholars of an ’anti-theoretical' persuasion who 
considered a "quantitative analysis of the degree of commonality and 
differentiation of these states" as the key to understanding the prospects for 
capitalist development in them. 136 the next two sections will endeavour to chart 
the emergence of what Sledzevsky has called a "crisis of the theory of the 
developing world", first by reviewing the continuing Soviet debate about 
economic independence, and second by looking at the discussion of state 
capitalism in the third w o r l d .  137
Both the political influence and theoretical weakness of the concept of 
dependent development derived from its simplicity, resembling in a more 
sophisticated form the original dogma of capitalism's steadily worsening 'general 
crisis'. A view which had empirical accuracy for particular countries at the time
— such as Argentina and Chile — was generalised to define the situation of all 
third world countries. This method would have convinced many senior Soviet 
foreign policy officials, who, as a result of the practice of 'stability of cadres', 
were naturally averse to more novel ideas like the implications of 
multistructurality or Simoniya's concept of a historically changing synthesis. 
Tiagunenko firmly maintained the authority of IMEMO's 'global approach' in his 
last work, rejecting "opinions in which the commonality of the developing 
countries' problems is questioned" as examples of "the danger of an absolutisation 
of specific features of separate countries and regions." He asserted that the basic 
dilemma for third world leaders remained: "either a development of capitalism 
with the attraction of foreign capital in every possible way, and consequently 
increasing dependence upon imperialism, or an active struggle for economic 
independence against the force of imperialism in the economy, which means 
against capitalism." But, in an afterword to this posthumously published book, 
his colleagues questioned whether this "differentiation of developing countries in 
relation to the two world systems" was still more important than "an increasing 
divergence of developing countries within the capitalist economic system." 138
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While the theory of dependent development held sway in official circles at least 
until the end of the 1970s, amongst the scholarly community, and particularly at 
IMEMO, it was increasingly on the defensive.
Already in 1973 Pavel Khvoinik, an economist at IMEMO, had presented 
figures to show ’’convincingly" that the demand from imperialist countries for 
third world resources had reduced during the past decade and would continue to 
do so. 139 Sheinis claimed in 1974 that this "strategic” change in the character of 
neocolonialism had created new prospects for peripheral capitalist development, 
but the issue was so controversial that he relied on the authority of Avakov 
(Tiagunenko’s deputy at IMEMO) to assert that ’’the very model of backwardness 
and dependence is changing” for countries on the capitalist path. 1^0 Avakov's 
position was in fact more orthodox, as he made clear in his book published in 
1976. Responding to Khvoinik, he argued that a quantitative "reduction in the 
scale of exchange [of resources] does not necessarily entail a weakening of 
dependence or a lessening of the interest" of imperialism in exploiting the 
developing countries, because acquiring a lesser quantity of resources from the 
third world after independence could be a "much more complex and hence no less 
important" matter for the West than colonial exploitation had been . 1^1 Avakov 
re-affirmed that "strict limits" existed for peripheral capitalist development, and 
strongly re-asserted the main IMEMO thesis that "dependent development 
determined underdevelopment" from "outside", as a "direct, natural result of the 
establishment of world capitalism". 142 The strict tone of these remarks suggests 
that Avakov was promptly rebuffing critics of the IMEMO book like Kiva,143 
but he made some noteworthy concessions to the liberal IVAN view. He rejected 
autarky as a basis for attaining "scientific-technical self-sufficiency" and hence 
economic independence, and was lukewarm about the prospects of the 
'non-capitalist p a t h ' .  144 He even exposed the inconsistency between the 1974 
IMEMO book's economic and political analyses, by stating that a "dependent type 
of development" is "peculiar to all developing countries irrespective of 
socio-political o r i e n t a t i o n " .  145 After suggesting that the OPEC price rise 
reflected only a "temporary tendency", not a basis for escaping from dependent 
development, he concluded by suggesting that the issue of the relative strength of
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Kiva's ’two tendencies' "demands special investigations for countries and groups 
of countries", i.e. less of a 'global approach’ than was usual at I M E M O .  1^6
One such investigation of relations between African countries and the EEC, 
by Khristos Fundulis and Emel’ian Popov, argued extensively against the policy 
recommendations implicit in the concept of dependent development. As well as 
emphasising the "now widely recognised" point that foreign capital and aid "plays 
a positive role" in the economic development of the third world, they claimed 
that the past decade had seen a "transformation of the established system of 
neocolonial supremacy", as a result of "processes weakening the dominant role of 
the USA in the capitalist w o r l d . I n  an editorial footnote, Leonid Goncharov 
acknowledged that the section of the book concerning economic independence, 
written by Popov, was "published in the form of a discussion", meaning that his 
"polemic with other economists" was c o n t r o v e r s i a l . W h i l e  Popov strongly 
attacked 'egalitarian' strategies of development like the conception of ’basic 
needs', his critique of the orthodox IMEMO view was not limited to its autarkic 
economic implications.1^9 He disputed the basic thesis of the 1974 IMEMO book 
by repeatedly defining the current relationship between developed capitalist states 
and the third world as growing "economic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " .  150 pjjs vjews 
largely coincided with those of Simoniya, although intriugingly he did not refer 
to the latter’s work, even when calling for a "terminological delimitation" 
regarding economic s e l f - s u f f ic ie n c y .1 5 1  Labelling IMEMO’s "radical" 
alternative to 'dependent development' as "not realistic", Popov re-defined the 
choice as fundamentally economic rather than political:
either rely for big support on one's own forces, on a great integration of 
society and economy, and then for a long time slow your economic progress 
and without reason complicate the resolution of social problems, or obtain, 
by using external resources on a more independent and non-discriminatory 
basis, the goal of economic growth - while only minimally admissible because 
of its painfulness, this then opens possibilities for a gradual subsequent 
raising of the living standard of the labouring masses. 152
Emphasising economic growth as an "important internal pre-requisite for the 
implementation of an independent political course", Popov considered that a 
"gigantic leap" toward greater economic self-sufficiency had been achieved by
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many third world countries in recent years. 153 He argued that a strengthening of 
national sovereignty is "characteristic now not only for countries of socialist 
orientation, but also for a whole series of states which are still firmly integrated 
in the world capitalist .economy and actively encourage in themselves the 
development of a capitalist s t r u c t u r e . " ! 54 And he added a very optimistic 
prediction about the West’s acceptance of detente and limitation of its former 
policy of "direct diktat" toward the third world, implying that the USSR should 
relax its own policy and endeavour to compete in economic rather than military
terms. 155
This expectation proved hopelessly wrong in the short-term, but deteriorating 
East-West relations in the late 1970s did not prevent increasing criticism of the 
concept of dependent development amongst Soviet scholars. Sheinis emerged as 
the most important critic of the orthodox IMEMO view, particularly after his 
move to that institute in 1975, where he joined forces with already existing 
sceptics such as Khvoinik, Andreasian, Georgy Skorov and Anatoli Elfianov.l56 
Developing the concept of 'medium-developed capitalism', Sheinis endeavoured 
to synthesise the 'internal' and 'external' approaches of the major 1974 works 
produced by IVAN and IMEMO.157 He considered the concept of 
multistructurality correct "as a starting point for research" on the developing 
countries, but thought that "external factors" like the importance of foreign 
capital needed more attention. 158 Having described the orthodox IMEMO 
approach as "more fruitful" in this respect, he proceeded to develop an 
interpretaton which reversed its basic postulates about third world 
development. 159 Whereas Krylov and Maidanik thought Latin America showed 
the inevitably dependent and deformed nature of peripheral capitalism, Sheinis 
argued that local "capitalism here appears as one, and not several structures", so 
that it has a "system-forming role" and constitutes the "ruling mode of 
production". 160 He defined countries of 'medium-developed capitalism' like 
Mexico as no longer multistructural, and, transposing Kleer's terminology, 
described them as an "intermediate group" between the "highly-developed 
capitalist states" and the "basic mass of the 'third worldV'l^l Sheinis agreed 
with the IMEMO book and Levkovsky that the state structure tended to expand in
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order to integrate a multistructural economy, but he viewed this as both 
temporary and characterised by "reactionary potential".162 He quoted Marx's 
famous statement about more industrially developed countries showing the future 
of less developed pnes to suggest the significance of 'medium-developed 
capitalism', which he considered to be in most cases dominated already by 
"monopolistic capital on national ground".163 Sheinis recognised that 
'medium-developed capitalist' countries were not repeating the "stage" of 
"classical capitalism", but instead constituted a "part of the system of 
contemporary state-monopoly capitalism."164 j^ s ¿ata showing basic 
socio-economic similarities between Latin America and Southern Europe were 
meant to prove that independent development within this system was still possible, 
i.e. that a 'vertical' limit upon the character of peripheral capitalism did not
exist. 165
Sheinis presented a sophisticated system of criteria for classifying developing 
countries at the same time as he disputed the orthodox IMEMO view about 
dependent development. Sledzevsky has called Sheinis an empiricist, but this 
seems to be an incorrect (or at least onesided) e v a l u a t i o n .  166 While relying on 
quantitative categories of analysis such as gross national product, Sheinis noted 
that statistics about foreign trade and capital movement "in themselves do not give 
rise to propositions about the character of dependence of one or other 
c o u n t r y . "  167 Such figures need to be interpreted in the light of definitions, 
which form a crucial part of any debate. Sheinis directed most of his criticism 
against two assumptions contained in the orthodox IMEMO viewpoint: that 
involvement in the world capitalist economy is an indication of a third world 
country's dependence upon imperialism, and that overcoming backwardness or 
underdevelopment effectively means 'catching up' with the advanced capitalist 
c o u n t r i e s .  168 He argued that 'catching up' (i.e. economic growth) remained a 
necessary goal for all developing countries, although "even in the most 
favourable cases (with high tempos of socio-economic growth and low 
demographic growth) a convergence of the level of economic development with 
the most developed capitalist countries is in the historically foreseeable prospect 
most improbable, and for the majority of medium-developed countries practically
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e x c l u d e d . "  169 g ut  ^ implicitly criticising Tiagunenko’s 1973 statement, Sheinis 
disputed the view that a continuing and even widening gap between 
highly-developed capitalist and quickly-developing third world countries means 
that the latter arp not successfully overcoming backwardness. He suggested 
that "the politico-economic categories of economic dependence, interdependence 
and self-sufficiency need a definite re-thinking", and, having previously 
supported Simoniya's distinction between an independent economic policy and 
economic self-sufficiency, he now applauded the concept of "asymmetrical 
dependence" (introduced by Primakov to define the ’special place' of some 
developing countries in the world capitalist economy) as "a significant step 
forward in comparison with abstract oppositions of dependence-independence or 
the thesis about onesided dependence . "She ini s  concluded that the "top level" 
of the third world comprised "countries, the economic dependence of which 
already has not so total a character as before". ^ 2
The prevalence of the idea of dependent development amongst Soviet foreign 
policy officials in the mid to late 1970s is clear from the fact that Simoniya chose 
to question its basic methodological assumptions openly in a pointed article 
published in early 1979. He began by repeating a point made by Reisner, that the 
1974 IMEMO book's quantitative correlation of comparative backwardness and 
increasing dependence was "simply mistaken in the socio-economic sense", 
because it ignored the qualitative fact that some countries on the capitalist path 
were "restructuring existing economic structures and creating fundamentally new 
productive f o r c e s . " A c c o r d i n g  to Simoniya, the "decay of old production 
relations of the colonial type" and the onset of industrialisation in some 
developing countries meant that "qualitative, essential changes of dependence" 
itself had occurred, not merely changes in its f o r m s . He argued that these 
changes had to be understood dialectically:
economic self-sufficiency grows up inside relations of economic dependence 
and at a definite stage of its maturity breaks through (in some places, though 
at present only to a small degree, it has already begun to break through) 
these relations of dependence.
Simoniya suggested that agricultural backwardness in many developing countries
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was Ma manifestation of the objective regularities of a growing capitalism, its 
unevenness and stress on industrialisation."1^6 He pointed out that "periodic 
slumps and crises are in general natural not only for dying but also developing 
capitalism",, and mocked a "persistent aspiration" on the part of some Soviet 
scholars to mistake "every conjunctural slump" as signifying "the fall of 
capitalism in the liberated countries". 177 By classifying developing countries 
into several groups, Simoniya emphasised the "extreme unevenness" of 
socio-economic and political development in the third world, particularly "in the 
limits of capitalist orientation itself’.178 He stressed that "the problem consists 
not in the fact that countries of capitalist orientation cannot but confront serious 
economic difficulties (here there is no place for doubt) but in the fact that these 
difficulties are not always and not everywhere critical or insurmountable in 
current conditions. It is precisely this circumstance which appears decisive in 
evaluating the prospects of their socio-economic development."179 Implicitly, he 
claimed that the orthodox IMEMO view was outdated, since it did not help work 
out which countries on the capitalist path would become economically 
self-sufficient enough to be potentially stable allies of the USSR in its struggle 
with imperialism. In a published discussion at this time Simoniya singled out 
India as such as prototype, because of its "greater stability of national capitalism" 
and the "lesser dependence of its fate on such a prop as foreign capital is for Iran 
or still remains for Indonesia." 180
While the idea of dependent development lost ground in IMEMO during the 
late 1970s, it maintained adherents amongst some scholars located elsewhere. 
Krylov, who moved to the conservative Institute of Africa, conceded that the task 
facing developing countries was "not a struggle for economic autarky", but still 
defended the orthodox view against the implications of multistructurality and new 
ideas about "'statocratic’ and other structures."! 81 The greatest range of opinion 
was expressed in IVAN, where Levkovsky's view (which had never been as 
dominant there as the idea of dependent development had been in IMEMO) 
received qualified support from most scholars but criticism from others. Support 
for the importance of multistructurality came from Nikolai Dlin, who presented 
an empirical typology of most countries on the capitalist path, and Elena
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Arefeva, who focused on the significance of foreign economic relations for a 
’’capitalist transformation of multistructural structures” in countries like India
i o9
and Iran.  ^ This qualification, about the need to focus specifically on the 
’’transformation of multistructurality” rather than on its general persistence, was 
accepted by Levkovsky in the introduction to the second edition of IVAN's 
volumes on the Orient, and reflected the influence of Shirokov’s argument about 
the formation of a ’’dual economy” in countries developing on the capitalist
path.
Shirokov considered that political independence had transformed the 
developing countries ’’into an autonomous part of the world capitalist economy”, 
in which the internal dynamics of multistructurality largely determine a 
particular country's path of development. Like Levkovsky, he thought the 
’’integrating potential” of the "local capitalist structure” had not been strong 
enough to prevent a "disintegration of inter-structural ties" after the downfall of 
colonialism. This had enabled "intermediate structures, above all the 
petty-commodity structure", to grow up in isolation, without becoming a source 
of capitalist accumulation as in Western Europe. But Shirokov claimed that this 
"strengthening of disintegrating processes" only persisted in very backward 
countries like Nepal, where "there occurs not an overcoming of 
multistructurality, but its extension." He argued that in countries like India, 
where the national bourgeoisie had come to power, a "re-establishment of 
inter-structural ties" had been achieved by relying "on a strong state capitalism", 
as well as "on the broad support of the world capitalist system". This process had 
"significantly accelerated the development of capitalism", leading to "a marked 
decomposition" of traditional economic structures, but had not involved most of 
the population in capitalist production, because of the capital-intensive nature of 
modem technology. Consequently, here "the comparatively quick dissolution and 
elimination of multistructurality" results in a "dual" economy, composed of a 
modem sector integrating "the different forms of a capitalist economy", and an 
independent traditional sector in which "an enormous mass of lumpens, paupers 
and partially or temporarily unemployed are concentrated." Shirokov suggested 
that while multistructurality might be reproduced in the foreseeable future in
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countries like Thailand and Malaysia, which could afford to use "extensive 
methods" of economic development because of their natural resources, this would 
be not the "stagnant retention of multistructurality" characteristic of Nepal, but 
rather "only a moment in the course of the mastering by capitalism of the 
economy as a whole." He concluded that the consolidation of a dual economy 
"will occur all the more clearly" with "the growth of population and the 
exhaustion of relatively accessible natural resources" in third world countries 
undergoing capitalist development. ^
Whereas Shirokov thought IMEMO's version of dependency theory unworthy 
of serious consideration, Anatoli Dinkevich, another senior economist at IVAN, 
presented an account of the "crisis of capitalism in the developing countries" 
which was very similar to the orthodox IMEMO view. He considered the 
socio-economic differentiation of countries on the capitalist path as a reason for 
rejecting Levkovsky's view about peripheral capitalism entirely. Like Simoniya, 
Dinkevich defined most of the third world as already part of the capitalist 
formation, not as still ’transitional'. But he emphasised the "increasing gap in the 
levels of economic development of the industrial capitalist states and the liberated 
countries", and argued that "immature" national capitalism in the third world was 
incapable of using the possibilities opened up by the 'scientific-technical 
r e v o l u t i o n ' .  while Dinkevich qualified this by claiming only that peripheral 
capitalism was "not able to secure the liquidation of backwardness and economic 
modernisation for all developing countries", and by noting an "insufficient 
maturity of the subjective factor of revolution as a whole in the countries of the 
'third world'", his view was implicitly the object of Slavnyi's comprehensive 
theoretical critique of dependency t h e o r y .  Yet scepticism about this 
ostentatiously 'global' approach did not necessarily impel belief in the 
'natural-historical process' of capitalist development suggested by Simoniya. 
Reisner, who was Slavnyi's supervisor and IVAN's leading liberal economist, 
implicitly criticised Krylov for seeing only the external "results", not the internal 
"causes" of technical backwardness in the third world, and Levkovsky for giving 
traditional factors an "absolute significance", but he remained sceptical in the late 
1970s about whether the capitalist mode of production could become dominant
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throughout the third world. ^
An attempt to integrate the ideas of dependent development, multistructurality
, and transitional period into a unified conception was made in the late 1970s by
Yashkin, but his view gained little support, highlighting the fragmentation of
Soviet opinion about third world development at this time. Yashkin considered
the link connecting these partial ideas to be an "inevitably" growing role of the
state as the integrating force in post-colonial societies.^ 8  He distinguished
between "two big groups" of developing countries: those already "forming a
peripheral branch" of one or other 'world system', and those representing a
"non-formational branch of the world economic system". The latter group was
larger, comprising countries experiencing "a frequent change in the orientation
of development", because of their "lack of a dominant mode of production" and
the greater importance in them of superstructural and external factors. *^9
Yashkin's main claim was that in "the majority" of third world countries
"capitalism has still not attained a formational [i.e. systemic] stage of maturity",
since it is split into "lower branches" tied to pre-capitalist structures and "higher
branches" tied to foreign monopoly capital. *90 He asserted that even for
countries on the capitalist path a transition to independent development and a
transformation of multistructurality pre-supposed the "growth and strengthening
of the state structure ... which leads in essence to the undermining of capitalism as
a system".^91 criticised Simoniya for reducing this "crisis of the capitalist
formation" in the liberated countries "to a crisis only of one of its particular
stages (early capitalism) or particular forms (dependent capitalism)", but his own
view that the state structure now headed the "hierarchy" of multistructurality in
1
most of the third world was rejected as "naive" even by Dinkevich.1 yjC In a 
review article on Soviet conceptions of the Orient Nikolai Illarionov singled out 
Yashkin's arguments for special criticism. Claiming that countries of the 
'periphery' belonged by virtue of the direction of their historical development to 
one or other formation, Illarionov supported Simoniya's view that the more 
developed countries of the Orient were systemically capitalist even before the 
capitalist mode of production had fully established itself in them.1 y j
The beginning of the end for the conception of dependent development came 
in 1979, when two key officials dismissed it as an inadequate interpretation of 
capitalism in the third world. Since Brutents had held that interpretation five 
years before, his new view about the importance of distinguishing between 
"dependent” and ’’national” capitalism in the liberated countries was quite 
significant. He suggested that ’’for a significant number of developing countries it 
will soon be necessary to speak not about absolute, but about relative 
backwardness in an economic sense”, and stated the implication of this clearly:
One cannot deny the possibility of a transition from dependent to national 
capitalist development. The widespread idea that, with a certain swoop of 
fatalness, dependence will in all cases inevitably become deeper and 
deeper seems to be not entirely true. ^
While conservatives like Kim still asserted the "permanent dependence upon 
world capitalism and transnational corporations" of national capitalism in the 
third world, Brutents' point was reinforced by Primakov in his keynote address 
to a major conference in February 1979, when he said there was a "need for 
specifying the character of dependence, which should be considered not 
universally, but at different lev e ls ." ^  ^  m  authoritative article published the 
following year Primakov explicitly criticised the "outdated" concept of dependent 
development for leading "to a certain underestimation of the role of internal 
forces, which in a series of cases were considered only as agents of external 
forces", and "an underestimation of the new conditions of the development of 
capitalism and its growing unevenness in different liberated countries". He said 
that while "one-sided dependence on the capitalist centre" still characterised many 
developing countries, "two-sided dependence" or "asymmetrical interdependence" 
now characterised the more self-sufficient third world countries, some of whom 
could even "draw near to the level of 'usual' interdependence [between developed 
capitalist countries] without leaving the world capitalist e c o n o m y . " H e  also 
criticised Levkovsky's 'inter-formational' definition of multistructurality, 
endorsed the 'multicriterial approach' to studying the third world developed by 
Sheinis, and called for further research into "the peculiarities of the development 
of capitalism in the liberated c o u n t r i e s " .  While asserting that the 
"differentiation of developing countries in economic relations" did not signify a
21 1
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"liquidation of the basic qualitative characteristics peculiar to the community of 
liberated states”, Primakov relied on "objective” anti-imperialism as the key such 
characteristic, in an ahistorical manner similar to Tiul'panov, the originator of 
the 'multicriterial approach'. This attempt to reach an acceptable compromise 
was more authoritative and eclectic than Yashkin's solution, but hardly more 
successful. When reviewing Primakov’s subsequent book, Sheinis and El'ianov 
asked politely whether the third world is now "a community or a conglomerate?”, 
while Sledzevsky later directly charged Primakov with "denying the formational 
commonality of the developing countries".
The Problem of State Capitalism Unresolved
The theoretical problems of Soviet oriental studies during the 'years of
stagnation' may be highlighted by fo.cusing on the discussion of state capitalism,
which was sometimes lengthy but seldom profound. Clarkson has suggested that
"the central concept for the Soviet view of the state in the third world is state
capitalism, a concept re-furbished for application to the ex-colonies during the
post-stalinist re-evaluation of development theory.”200 js more accurate to say
that state capitalism has been the main unresolved problem of Soviet development
debates, since there has not been one common concept but rather a number of
901competing concepts, which have often been vague. 1 The enormity of the 
problem of state capitalism for understanding third world development is perhaps 
why much Soviet discussion of it has been muddled. Cheshkov has recently 
reasserted the view, attributed to Lenin, of the "nature of state capitalism as a 
general 'station' on the path of movement both toward capitalism and toward 
socialism”, and noted the rarity in Soviet oriental studies of a "fundamentally 
theoretical analysis of the basic element of a [developing] society, precisely that 
which is called, depending on the position or point of view, the state-sector, the 
state-structure, or s t a t e - p r o p e r t y . " 2 0 2  This lack of development in most Soviet 
views about state capitalism has occurred in spite of one particularly intensive 
discussion published at the end of the 1970s.
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As a result of "the persistent and almost universal growth of the state sector 
in the 1960s, and in particular the mighty wave of nationalisation which swept 
through in the beginning of the 1970s," any "last doubts" that Soviet scholars had 
about the long-term significance of ’state capitalism' in the third world were 
discarded by the mid 1970s.^03 ^wo conferences on this topic were held in 
1972, the larger of which involved nearly fifty speakers. Levkovsky, who gave 
the main report, was criticised by several speakers for suggesting that "the state 
sector is in the majority of 'third world' countries first of all the state-capitalist 
structure", which comprises "not one, but several structures, forming successive 
phases of the development of state capitalism", from regimes dominated by the 
national bourgeoisie, through those "where political power is in the hands of the 
petty bourgeoisie and the direction of development has not been finally 
determined", to countries of 'socialist orientation'.^04 Answering criticism that 
this characterisation of state capitalism was too broad, Levkovsky conceded in a 
concluding speech that "one should not identify all forms of state intervention in 
economic life with state capitalism", but defended his view by "enumerating a 
series of questions, about which a common opinion was not a t t a i n e d . "^05 j^is 
discord was emphasised by in an article the following April by Mirsky, who 
noted that 'state capitalism' had become a
very wide and flexible term, which may be understood differently, depending 
upon which word - state or capitalism - is stressed. It has happened that the 
term 'state capitalism' designates both a state-sector and a state-structure, and 
simply everything that is not included in the concepts of 'capitalism' and 
'socialism' in a pure sense. One may ask: how correct is it to equate 
state-sectors in such countries as Iran and Iraq, Algeria and Afghanistan, 
Indonesia,Ethiopia and Israel - only on the basis that the state in all these 
countries ever more actively intervenes in the economy - and unite them 
all under the word 'state capitalism'? It is easy to note that with such a 
wide usage this term already designates and explains little.206
Mirsky agreed with Levkovsky that the "state-sector" was "only a form", the
content of which depended on the "class character of political power", but said his
view about state capitalism existing in countries of 'socialist orientation' was
907"theoretically impossible" and conceptually "absurd". ' Yet, remarking that "in 
practice, of course, everything is more complex", Mirsky presented an account
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of the possible "conservative" evolution of countries like Egypt toward a system 
"founded upon state capitalist elements", which "probably, will not be essentially 
different from that system, the establishment of which we now observe in the 
countries of so-called capitalist orientation".^08 thought the inconsistent 
political character of "national democracy" gives rise to a situation where "in 
many countries ’traditional' private-enterprise capitalism is limited, but there 
flourishes capitalism of a recent type -- state c a p i t a l i s m .  "^09
Mirsky's article implied that Soviet theoretical discussion was lagging behind
events, a point reinforced in a review article by Rozaliev and in the relevant
chapter of the 1974 IMEMO book, evidently written by Cheshkov. Rozaliev said
that, regarding the "potential prospects of state capitalism" in the third world,
"many problems have still not been studied, and some general questions have still
not been raised." While supporting Levkovsky against Ul’ianovsky on the need
for caution about the chances of 'socialist orientation’, he emphasized that "state
capitalism is above all capitalism, with all the consequences flowing from this",
and thus agreed with Simoniya about the potential for capitalist development in 
910the Orient. w This basic weakness of Levkovsky’s view was noted by the 
Leningrad scholars in their review of the 1974 IVAN work. They thought it 
strange to "express great doubts about the capacity of capitalism to transform the 
’third world' and become a system-forming structure", and simultaneously 
"consider the state structure only as collective bourgeois property." Instead, they 
suggested that "more accurate here would have been the term 'state structure'", 
which Cheshkov had introduced in order to eliminate "the uncertainties and 
contradictions arising from the application of the concept 'state capitalism' to the 
specific material of the 'third world’. ^
Cheshkov began by claiming that the 'leading role of the state-sector' was now 
apparent not just in countries on the 'non-capitalist path’, but in "the whole 
complex of developing countries," a view accepted by Levkovsky but not by 
Simoniya.212 Cheshkov then suggested that it was "logically incorrect" to reduce 
this matter to a "strengthening of the superstructure's influence on the base", 
which anyway would not explain the "obvious fact, that in contemporary
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conditions the state becomes a direct participant in basic relations.” He argued 
that if the increasing role of the state in economic life was considered as 
"something qualitatively (historically) new", i.e. not "just a peculiarity of a 
purely quantitative order", then it had to be "analysed starting from the unity of 
superstructural and basic relations", in terms of a 'single mechanism’ of the type 
characteristic of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism. This meant "that the 
formulation of the question about the 'leading role’ [of the state] is correct in a 
scientific sense only when it is connected with the category 'structure' 
(understood as a unity of productive forces and production r e l a t i o n s ) . 3 
Cheshkov considered that "the idea of the leading, system-forming role of the 
state-structure has still not found a sufficiently clear and comprehensive 
substantiation", because hitherto research had focused on "relations existing 
outside the state-structure itself', and the main method of argument had been 
negative, incorrectly deducing the state-structure's leading role from the 
"incapacity of all remaining structures to assume such a role"#214 pje arguecj 
that, on Levkovsky's view, the "progressive and anti-imperialist character" of 
state capitalism in the third world must either be "limited only to the political 
sphere" (i.e. be subjective, not objective as Tiul’panov had claimed) or "represent 
a quality of the same order as, say, the anti-monopolist actions of groups of the 
middle bourgeoisie." In both cases, "the growing-over of anti-imperialism into 
anti-capitalism cannot have a basis in the objective nature of the state sector."^^ 
Hence, according to Cheshkov, Levkovsky had to either follow Simoniya and 
return to "the traditional explanation" of anti-imperialism as showing "the 
progressive potential of the 'national bourgeoisie’" with the rise of capitalism in 
the periphery, or, if he doubted this potential, adopt IMEMO's thesis about 
dependent development and explain "the anti-imperialism of new ruling groups" 
by reference to the 'non-capitalist' potential of their state property, rather than as 
a by-product of their previous careers as individual members of the 'petty
bourgeoisie'.^^
Although Levkovsky was fully occupied responding to Ul'ianovsky's attack, 
and was subsequently ill, it is not accidental that neither he nor Landa, his main 
associate, responded to Cheshkov's critique of the definition of state property in
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the third world as both 'leading' and state ca p ita listic  Cheshkov's attempt to 
establish the "common points in the historical function of state-structures in all 
developing countries" was promptly questioned in Kiva's review article, but with 
arguments taken from Simoniya, not L e v k o v s k y . ^ 1 8  ^ e second edition of 
IVAN's volumes entitled The Foreign Orient and Our Time, Levkovsky’s 
position that "in a multistructural economy the state sector is nothing but state 
capitalist" was merely repeated, as two reviewers from IMEMO noted with 
chagrin:
The position contained in the first edition is reproduced in the new work 
without any changes, and the opinions defended by others in a series of 
scientific publications are ignored. It is possible to dispute these opinions, 
but it hardly does to avoid them to one sideS 19
Levkovsky's introversion about this matter was not unique; indeed, one of these 
reviewers, Oksana Ul'rikh, previously dismissed Cheshkov’s reconceptualisation 
in a footnote, relying on an uneasy combination of Levkovsky, Tiul'panov and 
T i a g u n e n k o . 2 2 0  But Levkovsky’s silence was a significant indication that the 
main debate about third world capitalism now occurred between liberals like 
Simoniya, Popov and Sheinis, who thought the national bourgeoisie was up and 
running, and 'left-radicals' like Maidanik and Cheshkov who, paradoxically 
together with conservatives like Kim and Dinkevich, thought it was only limping 
along with help from outside. Many observers had not made up their minds, 
whether because, like Mirsky, they were not yet convinced that local capital in the 
periphery could profit from independence, or because, like Shirokov, they 
doubted its ability to do more than a lopsided walk, or simply because they 
thought all these possibilities could exist at once. The fact that the Soviet 
textbook about the state sector in developing countries was written from the last 
'viewpoint' only reflected the increasing gap between the advanced scholars and 
their backward academic e n v i r o n m e n t a l
The one exceptional discussion of state capitalism was a round-table review of 
a book on Kuomintang China by Meliksetov, Cheshkov's strongest supporter. 
The thread of this discussion was the role of the ’bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ in 
either accelerating or holding back peripheral capitalist development. This term
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had been used in a rather loose, descriptive manner since the mid 1960s to refer
to corrupt administrators in various third world countries, but Meliksetov's book
included the first extensive, theoretical discussion of its application to a particular
group.222 j^e defined the Kuomintang elite in power as a bureaucratic
bourgeoisie, since it was based on nationalised state property and hence
economically opposed (as a 'primary' corporate owner) to the weak private
bourgeoisie, while remaining "a social community of a capitalist type" because
the state sector which it created "bears a state-capitalist character", with the same
"type of production relations — capitalist" as private enterprise, but a "different
path of evolution". Meliksetov labelled Kuomintang China as an original variety
of "state capitalism without the political supremacy of the bourgeoisie." He
argued that "the evolution of the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan" demonstrated
the long-term viability of this form of 'bureaucratic capital', since "despite the
really boisterous development of private enterprise, thanks to which the economic
face of this Chinese province has significantly changed, the genuine 'master' of
economics and politics remains as before the Kuomintang elite, the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie, who are not yet preparing to renounce their dominant position and
not yet merging with the rest of the bourgeoisie." From this analysis, which he
suggested might apply to Turkey and Mexico at around the same time and "many
countries of the 'third world'" since the 1950s, Meliksetov concluded that the
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was an independent group whose "social function does
not amount, as might have been suggested previously, only to preparing the
991conditions for the supremacy of a 'normal' bourgeoisie."^^
The most important difference of opinion in the discussion of Meliksetov's 
book occurred between Cheshkov and Simoniya. Cheshkov did not doubt 
Meliksetov's account of the development of bureaucratic capital in Kuomintang 
China, but questioned the logic of his analysis when used "for the interpretation 
of contemporary material" in the third world. Cheshkov's first point was to 
highlight the inconsistency in Meliksetov's definition of the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie. This group was "in essence not a bourgeoisie", because it 
personified state-property as a primary community opposed to private enterprise; 
but in so far as this property appeared as bureaucratic capital then "the
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bureaucratic bourgeoisie, being the personification of capital, is a genuine 
bourgeoisie", albeit of a strange sort.
In this case, apparently, the reference to the party-bureaucratic elite as a
non-bourgeoisie may mean only an aspect of its existence as a secondary,
derivative social community (a ruling elite, or, according to the author's
definition, a new ruling layer). However, the simultaneous recognition of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the economic plane as a bourgeoisie and in the
socio-political plane as not a bourgeoisie is not provided for in the conception
of A.V. Meliksetov and, moreover, is impossible, since he insists on the
994primacy of this [non-bourgeois] social establishment. ^
Cheshkov argued that "the cause of this contradiction should be found not in the 
thesis that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is a personifier of state- property, but in 
that state-property is expressed through the concept of 'bureaucratic capital'. In 
other words, the root of this contradiction lies in the identification of the concept 
'(state-) property of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie' with its specific historical 
form, expressed by the category '(bureaucratic) capital'", in the case of 
Kuomintang China.^25 suggested that, while particular social factors might 
account for the capitalist nature of the Kuomintang economic administration, "if 
we want to go beyond the specific situation to broader conclusions, we must raise 
the question of the significance of bureaucratic capital's own dynamic in the 
course of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . " ^ ^ ^  Judging from Meliksetov's evidence, Cheshkov 
claimed that logically "we must come to the conclusion that bureaucratic capital 
not only does not generate private capital in its development, but, on the 
contrary, subjugates or even eliminates such. If this is true, then the application 
of the concept 'capital' to characterise state property of the considered type seems 
still more doubtful." He then argued that to identify a society dominated by the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie as a form of state capitalism is "still less meaningful", 
since whereas the concept 'bureaucratic capital' might refer to "one or other 
lower form of capital", the concept 'state capital' "in essence characterises the 
means and resources which the state sector disposes of." Here Meliksetov had 
relied on a widely-held but unproven assumption "that the movement of state 
resources occurs according to the laws of the movement of capital." Cheshkov 
said that "this point of view ... has until now not been convincingly corroborated 
by any specific research", and concluded that Meliksetov's ambiguity about the
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historical function of different forms of capital was apparent in his reference at 
one point to 'bureaucratic a c c u m u l a t i o n ' . ^ ^
While Cheshkov criticised the inadequacies of Meliksetov's definition of the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, he thought it "more profound than the approach of 
those who see in bureaucratic capital only parasitical forms of personal (and 
illegal!) enrichment (N.A. Simoniya, M. A n d r e e v ) . " 2 2 8  Simoniya thought 
Cheshkov correct in exposing Meliksetov's inconsistency, but considered the 
source of the problem as an "insufficiently justified excessive broadening of the 
limits of the categories 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' and 'bureaucratic capital"'. 
Simoniya argued that the chief characteristic of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was 
neither the personification of state property, nor simple corruption as a means of 
personal enrichment, but the massive and systematic use by senior bureaucrats of 
nominally state resources as private capital. His resolution of Meliksetov's 
contradiction was historical rather than logical, defining a profit-seeking 
bureaucratic elite as "a fraction of the bourgeoisie" differing "from other 
entrepreneurial layers according to the specific features of its g e n e s i s " . 2 2 9  His 
main point was that bureaucratic capital constituted an alternative path of 
peripheral capitalist development in countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia and 
Pakistan, "where private enterprise capitalism did not strengthen itself 
sufficiently widely and deeply on a nation-wide scale, and where the bourgeoisie 
as a class is not able to directly subjugate to itself the state as a whole and the 
bureaucratic estate in p a r t i c u l a r . " 2 3 0  Whereas Cheshkov doubted the capitalist 
potential of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', Simoniya considered it unambiguously 
as a "system-forming factor of capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . ' ^ !  According to 
Simoniya, bureaucratic capital could perform this historical function "in 
conditions of the absence of developed state-property (Thailand)... leading in the 
final analysis to the formation of monopoly and, in prospect, state-monopoly 
capitalism." In such cases the growing state sector has "not simply a 
state-capitalist, but a bureaucratic state-capitalist character". Simoniya argued 
that, whereas in India capitalism had developed with private enterprise as the 
leading economic structure, now in many third world countries "the following 
chain of transformation is more probable: bureaucratic capital bureaucratic
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state-capitalism -> bureaucratic state-monopoly capitalism”, so that "bureaucratic 
state-capitalism fills up the Tiistorical gap' between the phases of early and late 
dying capitalism” in backward countries. Moreover, Simoniya thought this was 
not capitalism's only trick in the third world, since he considered that in Iran and 
Mexico one could already observe "elements of state-monopoly capitalism, the 
formation of which has occurred not through the phase of the establishment of 
bureaucratic capital, but by another p a t h . "232
The principal issue of debate between Simoniya and Cheshkov concerned the 
character of monopoly tendencies in developing countries. Simoniya thought that 
variants of a "specific (not only according to its genesis, but according to several 
important features) state-monopoly capitalism" were forming because of 
objective economic and subjective political factors in many capitalist countries of 
the Orient. He argued that capitalism as a formation was historically broader 
than the 'classical model' of private enterprise, pointing out that "Germany, Italy 
and Japan already gave examples of the significant scope of direct state 
intervention in processes of monopolisation and the establishment of 
state-monopoly c a p i t a l i s m . " 2 3 3  implicitly, Simoniya suggested that bureaucratic 
capitalist monopolies in the third world would function, like state monopolies in 
the West, as a sizeable historical reserve for the slowly but surely dying capitalist 
f o r m a t i o n . 2 3 4  contrast, Cheshkov thought there was an "essential difference" 
between the historical paths of the West and the Orient, particularly concerning 
"the interrelation of the processes of statisation and monopolisation, and hence 
private and state monopolies."
If in the West state monopolies were engendered by the logic of development 
of private monopolies ... then in the developing world bureaucratic capital 
arose in conditions when statisation preceded the creation of national private 
monopolies. The development of the latter was a result of the growth of 
'their' state monopolies, which from immature, formal, non-economic 
structures became mature economic relations. Of course, the course of this 
process depended upon and was corrected by the role of foreign private 
monopolies, but, in any case, at the current stage the development of local 
private monopolies is determined to a significant degree by the development 
of state monopolies (Brazil, Iran). This reverse in comparison with the West 
genotype of ties between private and state monopolies determines, in our 
view, the specific features of the forms of state-monopoly capitalism arising
here, to a still greater degree than the dependent character of these f o r m s . 2 3 5
Cheshkov interpreted these forms of monopolisation in the periphery as a ’’more 
complex" case of that 'negation of capitalism in the limits of capitalism' noted 
first by Marx and then by Lenin. Cheshkov’s immediate conclusion seemed 
similar to Shirokov’s view of state capitalism as a key element of a 'dual' 
economy, since he regarded the Chinese material as showing "that even the most 
radical variants of development in themselves cannot be alternatives to 
bureaucratic capital... [but instead are] forms of the establishment of democratic 
and anti-imperialist varieties of bureaucratic c a p i t a l .  "236 Cheshkov limited 
the concept of bureaucratic capital to "the economic relations of that state-sector 
which is based on transitional forms of labour and, correspondingly, the 
production and appropriation of surplus product at the juncture of pre-industrial 
relations and relations of an industrial t y p e . "237 gy  stressing the reverse order 
of monopolisation in the Orient, he implied that the backward (if not dependent) 
forms of capitalist development in the third world were increasingly unable to 
cope with the demands of modem industrial production, let alone with the 'ideal 
productive forces' which Krylov saw on the horizon. Hence, rather than a 
historical reserve of the capitalist formation, local state monopolies which did not 
operate according to the laws of capitalist production were symptoms of the 
progressive decay of capitalism as a world system. °
An intermediate position between the views of Cheshkov and Simoniya was 
presented by Mirsky and Sheinis, who argued that in the third world there now 
"occurs the establishment of state-capitalism of a new type, distinct from 
historically known f o r m s . "239 They identified this
original system as bourgeois, capita list,... [but] at the same time it is not a 
classical bourgeois system and not even of the same mould as the society of 
contemporary state-monopoly capitalism, since the correlation here of state 
and private property is different, private capital, as a rule, has not acquired 
significant positions, and the laws of the market (in any case, the internal 
market) do not determine economic development. The reproduction of 
collective social capital and the social groups personifying it is implemented 
with such modifications that sometimes doubt arises about whether it is 
correct to name this system capitalist (even with essential qualifications -
state, statocratic).240
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Looking at the example of Brazil, Mirsky and Sheinis suggested that, "in the 
socio-political sphere", a backward bourgeoisie "without experience" might 
prefer "to live 'under the shade' of a harsh authoritarian regime, getting in return 
a guarantee against a workers', democratic, left movement". They also claimed 
that "in the economic development of Latin American countries two imposing 
forces stand out: the state sector and the multinational corporations, but not 
national private-enterprise capitalism."241 They then raised some very 
important questions about the most probable policy of imperialism toward 
backward countries where "capitalism in its more or less well-known, 'Western' 
or 'Japanese', forms does not seem a sufficiently realistic prospect", evenhandedly 
presenting first the view that multinational corporations must "undermine here 
the regulating role of the state and state-sector", and then the opposite view that 
"the state in developing countries is for the monopolies a much more reliable, 
stable and promising contractor and partner than the private sector." While 
noting that such questions "may today only be raised" not answered, they were 
sceptical about Simoniya's claim that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in the third 
world could serve as an alternative driver of capitalist development. Conceding 
the possibility of its national capitalist dynamic, they doubted that it could really 
reach a point comparable to Western monopolies: "Even allowing that state 
property and funds operating in the command of the state function as a special 
form of capital (though this may occasion doubt), it is necessary to recognise that 
the disposer of this capital, according to its genesis, mode of reproduction, social 
functions and many other parameters, essentially distinguishes itself not only 
from the traditional figure of the bourgeois, but also from the state-monopolistic 
elite of developed capitalist c o u n t r i e s . " 2 4 2
Rather than inspiring a higher level of debate, this remarkable discussion was 
followed by a 'retreat from an answer' amongst Soviet scholars to the question of 
the socio-economic content of state capitalism. This retreat is clearly noticeable 
in a one-volume IVAN work produced under Primakov's editorship and 
Shirokov's influence at the turn of the 1980s. The introduction states that 
modem economic structures in Asia and Africa are "above all state capitalism and 
national capitalism", and mentions some negative phenomena associated with the
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former in both states of ’socialist orientation' and countries on the capitalist 
941path. 1 But in the whole book there are only a few isolated paragraphs about
state capitalism, considering it in superstructural terms as an economic policy, not
as a structure of production relations. The role of state capitalism is reduced to
"establishing socio-political stability", "mitigating the contradictions of ’dualist*
development" by "regulating" the growth of the national capitalist structure,
which, being limited to the demographically smaller ’modem' sector of the
economy, leads to "ruptures in the mechanism of reproduction" and a "growth of
economic and social disproportions in the whole process of development".^44
This conception of state capitalism as "a policy of compromise between the
interests of all groups of the bourgeoisie" was similar to Levkovsky’s view of the
"changing social content of the state capitalist structure", though Shirokov
supported Simoniya regarding the historically limited prospects of ’socialist
orientation’, and hence implicitly turned Cheshkov’s criticism of Levkovsky (for
reducing the progressive character of state-capitalism to anti-monopolist politics)
into an empirical statement about the broad objective limits of social change in
the third world.^45 jn Shirokov's opinion, the most important domestic changes
in the developing countries occur within the bounds of various forms of state
capitalist "compromise", not from one 'formational' plane to a n o t h e r . 2 4 6  These
forms may range from a relatively orderly "regulation of the economic process"
as in India, to a revolutionary upheaval as in Iran, which is "an example of the
extreme intensification of disproportions of social development".^47 This view
remains vulnerable to Mirsky’s point about a broadened concept explaining less.
Such appears to have been the main concern of Sheinis, who, reviewing
Shirokov's book about Oriental industrialisation, argued that "the specifically
capitalist character of the economic and social antagonisms which, apparently, are
94.8contained in the state-sector remains questionable."z, ° This is certainly 
Cheshkov's opinion, since in 1983 he repeated almost word for word a statement 
from the 1974 IMEMO book that, while the "technical-economic" aspects of the 
state-sector in the developing countries have been studied extensively by Soviet 
scholars, its socio-economic nature has not.^49
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A New Liberal Orthodoxy about Oriental Capitalism
By the end of the Brezhnev period, the significance for Soviet foreign policy
of differences amongst capitalist developing countries was widely recognised.
Soviet interest in doing business with national bourgeoisies in the post-colonial
world was not new, but had grown as the limited scope of 'socialist orientation'
became more evident. A 1983 textbook on The Foreign Policy o f Developing
C ountries  considered it "very important to follow up the combination of
anti-imperialist and pro-capitalist tendencies in the foreign policy of a number of
developing countries." India was highlighted as an "ally" of the USSR despite
being "connected with world capital by many economic threads"; on Simoniya's
authority, this resulted from the greater "degree of development of national
capitalism" in India, compared to other Asian and African countries on the 
9 SOcapitalist p a t h . M i r s k y ,  in the key chapter of this book, distinguished several 
types of capitalist developing countries according to foreign policy: 1) regimes 
like South Korea and Pinochet's Chile, whose alliance with the United States is a 
"decisive condition" maintaining their power; 2) 'sub-imperialist' powers like 
Brazil, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser degree Indonesia, who can pursue "an 
independent course" despite their common strategic interests with imperialism; 3) 
generally pro-Western countries like the Philippines, Nigeria and Argentina, who 
avoid "a clear position in disputes between the great powers", but not in regional 
conflicts; 4) India, "the clearest example of genuine non-alignment"; and 5) 
countries with no consistent foreign policy, because of domestic instability 
(Bangladesh) or disputes with neighbours (small countries of Tropical Africa). 
Mirsky claimed the second type of policy "essentially differs" from the first type, 
perhaps implying that the USSR could encourage these 'power centres' to become 
more independent of the West, closer to the 'ideal type' of capitalist developing 
country approximated by IndiaS^l Lukin made this point more directly, by 
defining India as a 'power centre' whose consistently independent foreign policy 
and stable "cooperation" with the USSR is based on "the coinciding interests of 
both states in a whole series of a r e a s .  "252 His Machiavellian advice, that the 
USSR should outdo the West in devoting "selective attention to large developing 
powers", was not fully supported by other liberals like Sheinis and El'ianov, who
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warned that ’’’sub-imperialist' tendencies in the developing world appear at all 
levels of development", particularly where a strong state with an undeveloped 
civil society has accumulated the material resources and armaments necessary to 
satisfy its "own ambitions ... in relation to weaker n e i g h b o u r s . ”253 Would the 
"spontaneous ... growth of capitalism" in the third world produce more cases of 
'genuine non-alignment' like India, or merely "a growth of conflict situations” 
that could "grow-over into global” d i s a s t e r s ? 2 5 4
Opening a discussion in the early 1980s on "The Prospects for Capitalism in 
the Developing World”, Mirsky noted that first the West and then the USSR had 
mistakenly expected the third world to develop in a straightforward direction. 
Events had shown things were "not so simple”, and the resulting "complex, 
undefined situation has, naturally, engendered debates and discussions in our 
scientific midst."255 Mirsky summarised two main views about "whether 
capitalism can become a 'system-forming factor’ in the developing countries." 
One view doubted this, stressing the incapacity of capitalist development to 
involve most of the population in modem production; "the inevitably growing 
role of the state"; and "the unproductive, and often simply parasitical character of 
the national bourgeoisie". Another view thought such factors would not stop the 
establishment of a specific, non-European form of the capitalist mode of 
production in Asia and A f r i c a . 2 5 6  Even without the presence of Shirokov, at 
least nine of the fourteen speakers supported his conclusion, based on the former 
view, that "the spreading of capitalism onto new territories not so much 
strengthens it as a socio-economic system, but rather intensifies its internal 
contradictions, weakening its very s t a b i l i t y . " 2 5 7  Reisner stressed a "barely 
surmountable investment barrier on the path of class formation of a capitalist 
type", while Yashkin argued that "without a relative growth of the proletariat 
amongst the working population, a broadening of capitalist relations is 
u n t h i n k a b l e . " 2 5 8  The "structurally different" character of peripheral capitalism 
from past and present Western capitalism was emphasised by Maidanik and 
Cheshkov, who saw the "growth of capitalist relations" in the third world only in 
"deviant forms", reflecting a situation in which "capitalism has lost its absolute 
c h a r a c t e r " . 2 5 9  Kollontai and Medovoi thought "the formation of capitalism in
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the developing countries” was still obstructed by multistructurality, as did 
Pokataeva, who claimed that ”in the formation of the capitalist structure here the 
essential role is played by foreign capital, particularly international 
m o n o p o l i e s . ”260 Sterbalova and Ostrovitianov argued that only ”with difficulty, 
painfully” can one perceive capitalism in Oriental societies dominated by ”a 
special variety of state monopoly, which has rested on a fusion of power and state 
ownership with the absence of any developed bourgeois private p r o p e r t y . ”261 
Only four speakers clearly expressed the second view, and two of these, Sheinis 
and Leonid Fridman, disagreed with Simoniya's idea, entertained also by Mirsky, 
that ”a few groups” of developing countries could leap forward to state-monopoly 
capitalism, "by-passing the cycle of the flourishing of ’free' private 
enterprise.”Z,D^  Concluding the discussion, Mirsky warned of ”the danger of an 
identification of capitalism with that manifestation of it ... in the history of
Western E u r o p e . ”263
One noticeable feature of Soviet debate about peripheral capitalism in the 
1980s has been a polarisation of opinion within IVAN and IMEMO more so than 
between them. The IVAN book edited by Primakov presented two dominant 
ideas beneath the slogan that capitalism had entered "into an epoch of chronic and 
deepening c r i s i s " . 264 First, while noting that most third world countries in the 
1970s had experienced "quite a broad growth of capitalism from below", it 
considered this limited to the 'modem' sector, and argued that, without "a 
fundamental breaking up of former, traditional, pre-capitalist relations in all 
spheres of social life", the conditions did not exist "for the development of 
productive forces in the scope and degree which the capitalist mode of production 
n e e d s . ”265 While Shirokov viewed India as a country "which has already 
attained or is approaching medium-developed capitalism," he claimed that the 
'duality' now present in its national economy "inevitably grows according to the 
growth of the capitalist structure itself, and above all according to the growth in 
its limits of a modem system of productive f o r c e s . "266 Second, this pessimism 
about the domestic maturity of the national bourgeoisie was accompanied by a 
view of its external position within "a new structure of 'centre' — 'periphery' 
relations" which repeated the old IMEMO argument that the developing
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countries' increasing "role in the world economy has been accompanied not by a 
liquidation of dependence upon imperialism, but by changes in its character and 
forms."267 Dinkevich claimed that growing trans-national investment in the 
third world not only stimulates the development of local capitalism, but 
"strengthens the dependence", especially technological, of these countries upon 
world capitalism; he thought the economic interests of new "sub-imperialist 
centres" would remain "closely tied with imperialism" and hence could not be a 
foundation for a more independent foreign p o l i c y . 2 6 8  opposition to these 
views, and to a statement which counterposed India’s "independent national 
development" to the generally "conservative character" of "authoritarian power" 
in other countries on the capitalist path, Simoniya in his chapter of this book 
distinguished between two broad types of capitalist development in authoritarian 
third world countries. He contrasted the instability and greater dependence upon 
imperialism of elements of "reactionary-bureaucratic state-monopoly capitalism", 
emerging in such backward monarchies as the Shah’s Iran and Saudi Arabia, to 
the relative stability and lesser dependence of nationalist "bureaucratic state 
capitalism" in "neo-Bonapartist dictatorships" like Thailand and I n d o n e s i a . 2 6 9  
This analysis of different types of Oriental capitalism did not fit easily with either 
Shirokov’s general characterisation of a chronically 'dualist' economy or 
Dinkevich's rendition of dependency theory.
While Simoniya edited the most influential book published under the banner 
of IVAN during the 1980s, the comparable book at IMEMO was edited by 
She inis, who tried to combine a largely quantitative analysis of economic growth 
in the developing world with a fundamentally qualitative approach to social 
progress. This strange combination derived from his basic assumption that the 
main measures of humanity are the enrichment of needs and the broadening of 
choices for the masses. In defining the development of productive forces as only 
a prerequisite for, not a criterion of, social progress, Sheinis started from the 
presuppositions "that economic growth may not in any society be a goal in itself, 
[but] the size of the product entering the sphere of personal and social demand ... 
most adequately expresses the possibilities and effectiveness of a given economic 
s y s t e m . "2^0 He attempted to provide "a complex analysis of economic and social
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processes in the developing countries," considered not as a homogeneous group 
but as "a motley conglomerate of countries" at different levels of
development. 271
Sheinis disputed simultaneously the major Western, third world and Stalinist 
orthodoxies about development. In opposition to the usual bourgeois view that 
the task for backward countries was simply to ’catch-up' with the developed 
West, Sheinis argued that this focus on tempos of growth was "a phantom", 
because most developing countries had inevitably established "an essentially 
different variant of economic growth" from that of classical c a p i t a l i s m . 2 7 2  ^  
opposition to nationalist reactions which reject modem civilisation as superfluous 
to 'basic needs', Sheinis insisted on the universality of human development, 
claiming that the unprecedented problems of the third world cannot be solved on 
a piecemeal scale, "outside the basic course of contemporary technical progress 
and the forms of social organisation dictated by it."273 And against the 
pretentious voluntarism of state-directed ’great leaps forward', he emphasised the 
destructive consequences of authoritarian control over economic, political and 
cultural life by new leaders fluent principally in "anti-imperialist 
d e c l a r a t i o n s " . 2 7 4  He ridiculed the view that the developing world's huge 
problems could quickly be solved by nationalisation, and stated directly that 
"definite elements of positive social development ... have been observed in 
countries of capitalist orientation, even those with a clearly expressed dependent 
path of d e v e l o p m e n t . " 2 7 5 while conservative scholars like S.A. Bessonov 
celebrated a hyprocritical declaration by President Marcos that classical 
capitalism (with its cynical exploitation of labour and enormous profits) was not 
good enough for the Philippines, Sheinis investigated the actual development of 
capitalist production in the periphery and considered its implications for 
established views of the third w o r l d . 2 7 6
In order to disprove finally the "canonised dogmas" of dependency theory, 
Sheinis constructed a typology of the levels of economic development of all third 
world c o u n t r i e s . 277 por this, his basic assumption was that the scope and 
character of economic dependence was determined by "the degree of
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backwardness of the productive forces,” which could roughly be measured in 
terms of per capita GNP.278 He divided the developing world into seven groups, 
the top three forming an ’’upper echelon”, the middle two an ’’intermediate 
echelon”, and the bottom two a "lower e c h e l o n " . ^79 Sheinis argued that the 
capitalist mode of production was already established in his first group, the 
mostly Latin American countries of ’medium developed capitalism’, which were 
closely connected with the world capitalist economy and had managed to 
"reproduce, although in a strongly modified form, the experience of 
cultural-historical development of European p e o p l e s . " 2 8 0  He claimed that, 
"strictly speaking", these countries formed an "intermediate" area of the world 
capitalist economy, together with "the backward periphery of Western Europe" 
and the oil-rich developing countries, which constituted his second group.281 
Noting that the second group was historically very backward, Sheinis suggested 
that "forms of modem socio-economic life, such as a capitalist organisation of the 
economy, are quickly penetrating here", developing productive forces quicker 
than in the rest of the third world and leading to the formation of "new power 
centres in the world capitalist economy" 282 j^ s gr0Up comprised tiny 
states with a highly-productive export sector. Sheinis bothered with them in 
order to illustrate the diversity of the third world, and to emphasise that 
economic growth for small countries results from being "deeply enmeshed in the 
international division of labour". He claimed that the prospects for poor small 
states, including many countries of 'socialist orientation', improving their 
economic position will depend upon whether they can develop "similar variants
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n .  " 2 8 3
Sheinis stressed the decreasing commonality of the third world in two ways. 
First, he claimed that the two main groups of the upper echelon possessed more 
"general-economic and industrial potential", and faced less serious social 
problems, than poorer countries without deep-rooted or dynamic capitalist 
d e v e l o p m e n t .  Second, as well as dividing the remaining countries
horizontally into different groups, he argued that the intermediate echelon was 
tending to split apart, with some countries likely to move forward into a higher 
group while others lagged behind. Significantly, the "verticals" which Sheinis
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noted, uniting countries at different levels with similar prospects of economic 
development, focused on capitalist oriented countries that encouraged much 
foreign investment. In his fourth group he highlighted South Korea and Taiwan 
as moving toward ’medium developed capitalism', characterised in Asia by 
Singapore and Hong Kong not India, while in his fifth group he suggested that 
this type of development was occurring at a lower level in Thailand and the 
P h i l i p p i n e s . 2 8 5  Sheinis included states of 'socialist orientation’ in his rankings, 
but devoted little specific attention to them in terms of economic growth, which 
he correlated largely with local capitalist development. As well as demonstrating 
that many developing countries were not locked into a vicious circle of 
dependence and backwardness, his typology apparently provided a rough measure 
of the degree to which multistructurality still characterised the third world. Only 
his seventh group of poorest countries, together with the least developed 
countries in his fifth group, were not marked by a strong growth of national 
capitalism. While Sheinis placed his sixth group, comprising three "very 
populous countries with a low income level" (India, Pakistan and Indonesia) in 
the lower echelon on the basis of per capita GNP, he admitted the "provisionality 
of such an association", since in terms of "a series of essential relations" these 
countries "stand Tiigher’ than many other countries of not only the lower, but 
possibly also the intermediate echelon".^^^ Sheinis argued extensively that most 
developing countries had established an effective mechanism of expanded 
reproduction, which operated autonomously from business cycles in developed 
capitalist states and was increasingly less fractured into contemporary and 
traditional structures of p r o d u c t i o n . ^ ^ ^  recognised that these countries still 
faced big structural economic problems, particularly the disproportion between 
relatively high-value industrial production and relatively small industrial 
employment which Shirokov had stressed, but tended to suggest that the economic 
constraints of multistructurality were now markedly less significant than legacies 
of the past in the socio-cultural sphere.^^Z
The response from a variety of Soviet scholars to Sheinis' analysis was 
positive, particularly concerning the question of peripheral capitalist 
development. Several participants in a review discussion compared the 1983
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IMEMO book edited by Sheinis and El'ianov favourably with its 1974
O Q Q
predecessor.  ^ Like Evgeny Rashkovsky, Khoros congratulated the authors for 
making "no small step forward in comparison with the preceding conceptions of 
'multistructurality' and 'dependent development'," by showing convincingly that 
"the problems of the developing countries cannot be reduced only to 
backwardness and d e p e n d e n c e .  " 2 9 0  Reisner agreed that the economic section of 
the book had demonstrated the autonomy of national capitalist development in the 
periphery from business cycles in the centre, although he doubted whether the 
authors' subsequent criticism of Krylov for a "hypertrophied accent on 
dependence" was correct in counterposing internal to external f a c t o r s . 2 9 1  L.S. 
Miksha of Moscow State University thought the argument of the economic 
section, particularly the chapter on economic crises, confirmed his "conclusion 
about the capitalist transformation of a multistructural e c o n o m y . " 2 9 2  a.E . 
Granovsky of IVAN similarly endorsed the book's "systematic macro-economic 
analysis", particularly its thesis about the formation of mechanism of 
reproduction in many developing countries "which has been able in the course of 
a prolonged period to support tempos of economic growth at a level higher than 
in the developed part of the world capitalist e c o n o m y " .  9 3  He also criticised 
some confusion in the book resulting from the authors' "contradictory" and 
unsuccessful "attempt to consider type of economic development, not speaking yet 
about social development, as a function of level of development". Granovsky 
suggested that sometimes Sheinis and his colleagues had tended to reduce different 
types of socio-economic development to different levels as measured in aggregate 
statistics. He argued that, despite this, their actual analysis "convincingly shows 
that the qualitative differentiation of the developing countries according to type 
of development is much deeper than that according to per capita GNP, so that the 
developing countries are not simply situated at chronologically different steps of 
a single process of development, but largely proceed on qualitatively different 
paths of structural d e v e l o p m e n t . " 2 9 4  This criticism, while questioning the 
adequacy of a typology constructed largely on a quantitative basis, added strength 
to Sheinis' overall point — that third world countries have less in common than 
the name implies.
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Another point of supportive qualification was made on a broader scale by 
A.M. Petrov of IVAN, who doubted the meaning of comparisons by Sheinis of 
levels of economic growth between contemporary developing countries and 
Western Europe a century ago. Petrov suggested that Sheinis had falsely 
abstracted in his economic analysis from the different historical contexts of 
capitalist development in the third world and in 19th century Europe, allowing 
the reader to interpret his figures about comparative growth rates as evidence for 
reviving the ’catching up’ viewpoint. However, Petrov noted that Sheinis had 
subjected this perspective to a ’’ruthless critique” toward the end of the book, 
showing ’’the existence of a completely special model of capitalism” in the
9QC
liberated w o r l d . M a k s i m e n k o  likewise considered this conclusion about a 
structural "dissimilari ty of the capitalist ’East’ to the capitalist ’West"’ as 
’’extraordinarily important”, although he thought that the specific place of 
post-colonial societies in global history had not been sufficiently established in the 
second half of the book on social development. He criticised the authors for 
’’uncritically” repeating the widespread thesis about a growing role of the state in 
developing countries, without adequately considering the state as "a strategically 
important sphere of a fierce social struggle for dominant positions in the power 
bloc."296
This absence from the book of a specifically political analysis was reflected in
some ambiguity about the problem of state capitalism. In his macro-economic
analysis, Sheinis suggested that the leading structure in most developing countries
9Q7was national capitalism, either in a private or state form. ' But m his historical 
overview of social structures in the third world he endorsed Cheshkov’s opinion 
that the state sector, even in countries of capitalist orientation, is not reducible to 
the state capitalist structure, and generally emphasised the large social obstacles 
facing peripheral capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 9 8  Surprisingly, in their conclusion 
Sheinis and El’ianov downplayed somewhat the significance of economic 
differentiation, and expressed a view remarkably similar to that of Shirokov. 
They stressed the economic disintegration of third world economies, and 
remarked that:
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the capitalist... restructuring of backward multistructural social structures, 
their adaption to completely different, incomparably higher ... forms of social 
life is exceptionally complex. Therefore, it would be an illusion to suggest that 
serious economic and social disproportions may be fully (or even largely) 
overcome already in the life of current generations. In the developing world 
there exist - and, apparently, will exist for a long time yet - completely 
different systems: die criterion of economic and social efficiency of one of 
these is the relation of income to expended resources, and of the other, the 
absolute magnitude of the product produced and productive employment.^99
Earlier, Sheinis suggested that, considered historically rather than synchronically, 
post-colonial societies are "hybrids", which "it is hardly reasonable" to identify as 
bourgeois or socialist. Like Cheshkov, he thought their specificity as 
"transitional multistructural structures consists in being as it were simultaneously 
situated at all stages" of human progress, combining legacies of early class 
societies with elements of an advanced structure of demand, derived from 
European capitalist development and socialist aspirations to overcome class 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . 300 While criticising the theories of multistructurality and 
dependent development as "rigid a priori schemes", Sheinis did not, through 
either his empirical, macro-economic analysis or his general discussion of social 
backwardness, provide an alternative to existing theories of the third world, and 
consequently he reproduced the now dominant 'dualist' view in a less rigid 
form. 1 As Sledzevsky observed, "strictly speaking" Sheinis himself proceeded, 
like anyone else, "not from the facts, not from the specific features of real 
development, but from a preliminary logical break-down of the subject — a 
break-down, it is necessary to say, based not only on categories, but on taking the 
problems of social development only in one, earlier selected logical field (in the 
plane of an earlier established combination of the factors of d e v e l o p m e n t ) . " ^ ^  
By focusing on quantitative and qualitative aspects of development largely 
ignored by other Soviet scholars, Sheinis managed to produce "more questions 
than answers", but not a theory of capitalist development in the p e r i p h e r y . 3 0 3
In a review article Simoniya criticised Sheinis for not fully overcoming the 
"deeply pessimistic conception" of 'dependent development', despite disagreeing 
with Krylov and, as Slavnyi pointed out, with D i n k e v i c h . 3 0 4  Simoniya endorsed 
the economic analysis of Sheinis and his colleagues, but suggested that the
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simplicities of dependency theory could only be overcome by a qualitative 
explanation of differentiation amongst developing countries, not by She inis' 
quantitative typology.^OS Simoniya strongly criticised the concept of 'medium 
developed capitalism', which Sheinis used to associate the economically most 
developed third world countries with the least developed countries of Western 
Europe. Understood qualitatively as the middle or mature phase of the capitalist 
formation, Simoniya argued that "the term 'medium level of capitalism' is 
suitable only for the 'primary model' of capitalism, that is for a small group of 
countries of the West, and relates only to their historical past." He claimed that 
in backward countries, where elements of competitive and monopoly capitalism 
are superimposed through the state on the process of early capitalist development, 
it is "senseless to speak of 'medium developed capitalism', the more so because 
this first phase in the absolute majority of developing states carries a symbiotic 
character, that is, here there are present essential structural elements of preceding 
formational structures, and also a colonial synthesis, left over from the recent 
past."306 Simoniya suggested that, by failing to distinguish between economic 
growth and economic development, Sheinis had tried to evaluate peripheral 
capitalism according to measures suitable only for classical capitalism.^ 07 
Consequently, despite his intentions and because of his inadequate methodology, 
Sheinis had not fully transcended the 'catching up' perspective.
Simoniya argued that the only sense in which leading third world countries 
resembled backward countries of Europe was in terms of the common features of 
delayed capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . structural similarities between 
'secondary' capitalism in Russia and Japan and 'tertiary' capitalism in most 
developing countries had been noted by Khoros, but he initially viewed the latter 
through dependency theory.^09 Simoniya's theory of Oriental capitalist 
development was meant to supercede this supposedly 'global' perspective, as well 
as the more down to earth generalisations of 'multistructurality' and 'dualism' put 
forward by Levkovsky and Shirokov.^lO The basic problem addressed by 
Simoniya was how to evaluate the "formational maturity" of capitalism in the 
developing states.^  ^ He assumed, like Sheinis, that such an evaluation must 
refer to previous capitalist development, but argued that only the 'secondary'
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capitalism typical of Eastern Europe was structurally similar to, and hence an 
appropriate measure for, the extremely unnatural or "synthesised” capitalism 
developing in most of the third world.^l^
Simoniya began his theory by constructing a 'classical' scheme of the natural 
emergence of capitalism from a decaying feudalism, the essential structures of 
which were overthrown in a successful bourgeois revolution. He claimed that 
this "endogeneous" form of capitalist development, characterised by "a consistent 
transition from one phase to another", occurred only in countries of 'primary' 
capitalism, principally England and France.^13 Only in these countries did an 
organic synthesis of traditional and modem elements during the first, 
'Bonapartist' phase of capitalist development lead to the second, 'bourgeois 
democratic' phase, in which capitalism existed in a mature form, before 
beginning to negate itself in its third phase through the emergence of private and 
state m onopolies'^  In contrast, 'secondary' capitalist development in countries 
like Germany, Italy and Russia arose in a deformed way, under the influence of 
an absolutist state trying to maintain its feudal structure and compete 
internationally with the ’Bonapartist' or even 'bourgeois democratic' states of 
’primary' capitalism.^^ Simoniya suggested that the first phase of ’secondary’ 
capitalist development was characterised by "a complex synthesis, or symbiosis, 
of absolutist and Bonapartist state organisations", which reflected the "unfinished" 
nature of the bourgeois social r e v o l u t i o n . ^  16 mixture of feudal and
capitalist structures did not produce a mature capitalist society, characterised by 
an organic civil society and so cyclical but not structural crises.^l^ Instead, 
countries of ’secondary' capitalism leapt from the first to the third phase of 
capitalist development, experiencing great social tensions as a result. Monopolies 
here emerged quickly "from above", but were socially weaker than in countries 
of 'primary' c a p i t a l i s m . 3 1 8  Simoniya argued that 'secondary' capitalism's key 
feature is that "all its phases have a transitional character", i.e. are formed from 
a synthesis of structures from different socio-economic form ations'^
Simoniya viewed such a continually changing 'complex synthesis' of opposing 
traditional and modem structures as typical, in more diverse forms, of the
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'tertiary' capitalism developing in most post-colonial societies. The 
distinguishing feature of 'tertiary' capitalism is its genesis out of a 'colonial 
synthesis', i.e. "as a result not of intra-state evolution, but of inter-state conflict 
and the forced orientation of the mode of production in a bourgeois direction by 
capitalist elements of foreign o r i g i n .  " ^ 2 0  Simoniya identified two related points 
in which 'tertiary' capitalism is significantly more 'synthetic' than the structurally 
similar 'secondary' variety. First, "the contemporary bourgeois states in 
countries of the Orient (irrespective of their concrete form) appeared not from 
heaven, but all the same from above — either as a result of political national 
liberation revolutions, or thanks to a deal of the former metropole with the elite 
of the dominant c l a s s e s . " ^ 2 1  Simoniya suggested that these new states found 
themselves after independence "on the completely inadequate base of a 
compounded real society, which if it contained isolated, primarily potential, 
elements of a modem, bourgeois, civil society, then in the majority of cases they 
were insufficient for securing the stability, firmness and effective activity of a 
genuinely contemporary s t a t e .  2 2  Second, the emerging national capitalist 
structure in this largely pre-bourgeois society was contradicted by two traditional 
elements (the 'colonial synthesis' and archaic, pre-colonial structures) not one, as 
in countries of 'secondary' c a p i t a l i s m .  3 2 3  Facing such opposition, the new 
national state in countries of 'tertiary' capitalism had to synthesize or integrate 
these traditional elements while introducing modem elements of civil society 
"largely from above".324 simoniya argued that this task could only be fulfilled 
by one or another form of 'Bonapartist' state, which uses "crude methods and 
forms of centralisation" and "a large proportion of traditional authoritarianism" 
in conducting "a policy of social (bourgeois) m o d e r n i s a t i o n .  " 3 2 5  He claimed that 
"in the first phase of social development in the countries of the Orient this 
centralisation acquires with objective inevitability the character of 
authoritarianism (sometimes open, sometimes masked in different forms of 
p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n i s m ) . " 3 2 6  ^  a discussion with Sheinis, Simoniya suggested that 
there is no alternative in the third world to a 'stalactite' form of capitalist 
development, although he added that within this type there is "an enormous 
diversity of concrete-historical models, conditioned in particular by different
097
correlations in them of the elements of democracy and r e a c t i o n . 7
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Simoniya grouped capitalist developing countries according to their "level of 
formational development", as manifested in the character of their post-colonial 
synthesis of conflicting social structures, particularly the capacity of the national 
capitalist structure to play "a leading role in relation to the remaining components 
of the social s t r u c t u r e " . 3 2 8  contrast to Sheinis, he considered Saudi Arabia to 
be at a qualitatively lower level of development than India, because it was 
characterised by only a "formal synthesis", in which traditionalists borrowed 
some fruits of modern civilisation in order to strengthen an original 
"neocolonialist absolutist state o r g a n i s a t i o n " . 3 2 9  simoniya viewed India as one of 
the most advanced bourgeois states in the developing world, with an essential 
synthesis observable "practically at all levels and in all spheres of life", 
particularly in the remarkably stable "authoritarian parliamentary" form of state 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 3 3 0  He explained this largely in terms of the "comparatively high 
level of maturity of the national capitalist structure", which enabled the national 
bourgeoisie to maintain its supremacy with relative ease and flexibly work out 
reformist solutions to social crises.331 Simoniya argued that as a rule crises of 
social structures in the developing world are more profound "at very early stages 
of capitalist modernisation", particularly in cases of exceptionally accelerated 
development such as Iran under the S h a h . 3 3 2  He thought an Iranian-type 
revolution from below unlikely in "neo-Bonapartist regimes" like Indonesia, 
where traditional structures are more integrated into the process of national 
capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 3 3  He viewed such regimes as Thailand, Egypt, and even 
Pakistan under military rule as "characterised by a relatively high level of 
political stability", based on the development of a bureaucratic state-capitalist 
economic structure; in the Philippines, where this foundation is weaker and "a 
crisis of social structures is objectively inevitable", he thought "a resolution of it 
by reformist means seems entirely p o s s i b l e . " 3  3 4  While asserting that 
state-monopoly tendencies would arise in a variety of third world countries, 
Simoniya argued that their effects would differ according to the level of capitalist 
development attained. Particularly in India, but also in Thailand, the resulting 
social tensions would not threaten the existing political system, while such 
capitalist development would tend to strengthen these countries' economic 
independence from i m p e r i a l i s m . 3 3 5  But in countries with a weaker post-colonial
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synthesis, a social crisis could result in representatives of traditional structures 
coming to power and pursuing a "very high level" of a very low form of 
"'anti-imperialist independence' (remember, for example, Iran 1980-1982)." 
Like Sheinis, Simoniya thought that such "reactionary anti-imperialism" was not
w o r t h  s u p p o r t i n g . 3 3 6
Simoniya’s approach to the phenomena of Oriental capitalism was widely 
endorsed by other Soviet scholars as a big step forward, although several 
participants in a review discussion criticised his theory for some r i g i d i t y . 3 3 7  
A.S. Agadzhanian of IVAN characterised Simoniya's idea of a continually 
changing synthesis as "an answer to the more radical and ... more pessimistic 
theoretical tendencies characteristic of the 1970s [in] the conceptions of 
'dependent development' and ' d u a l i s m ' .  " 3  3  8 j^ e  same point was made by 
Aleksandrov, who regarded Simoniya’s focus on the "integrating character" of 
post-colonial states as "an important step forward in the development of a general 
methodology for studying ... the developing countries" in a non-Eurocentric 
w a y . Significantly, the most complete endorsement of Simoniya's 
interpretation of Oriental capitalism came from Mirsky, who was one of the main 
contributors to the 1974 IMEMO book. He agreed with Simoniya's central thesis 
that a 'Bonapartist' state organisation was necessary for countries of 'tertiary' 
capitalism after independence, saying it "allows one to draw a very strict, logical, 
convincing picture of the post-colonial development of Asia and the Near East, to 
give an answer to many questions which until now remained u n c l e a r . " 3 4 0  
Mirsky agreed with Simoniya's characterisation of 'secondary' capitalism as 
lacking a mature phase, but considered his thesis about a decline of bourgeois 
democracy in the central countries of state-monopoly capitalism as "very 
d e b a t a b l e " . 3 4 1  Sheinis also doubted this point of Simoniya's 'classical' scheme, 
and together with Khoros criticised both Simoniya's "broadened rendering of the 
concept 'Bonapartism' into a spirit of authoritarianism in general," and his 
classification of Germany as a country of 'secondary' rather than 'primary' 
c a p i t a l i s m . 3 4 2  However, they fully supported Simoniya's serious 
comparative-historical approach to the prospects for capitalism in the third 
world, in opposition to the "widespread routine approach" of ignoring or paying
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lip-service to theories about formational development.343 Sheinis endorsed 
Reisner's view that the backwardness of Oriental societies in the modem era 
resulted partly "because of their distance from the West", and suggested that 
Simoniya's general ’synthesis’ conception of history contained "elements of a new 
scientific paradigm, the need for which is felt quite sharply."344
This idea was spelt out by Slavnyi, who credited Simoniya with overcoming 
an "invisible barrier" to understanding "the essence of social processes in the 
Orient." Slavnyi argued that this barrier consisted of an a priori generalisation 
of the "regionally limited experience" of countries of ’primary’ capitalism into 
"the essence of a universal process" of capitalist development. He suggested that 
Simoniya had clarified the limits of this generalisation in relation to Oriental 
capitalism, by "emphasising the irrelevance of the classical model for countries 
which have embodied the secondary and tertiary m o d e l s " . He considered the 
main innovation of Simoniya's theory to be an "affirmation of the special 
significance of civilising factors in social evolution", particularly the emergence 
of civil society as an integrating prerequisite for capitalism. From this, Slavnyi 
concluded that "the development of capitalism in the liberated countries was not 
provided for precisely by civilising, and not by economic or any other 
prerequisites", and agreed with Simoniya that developing countries like India, 
rather than Saudi Arabia, had established a "synthesised" civilisation that 
potentially "creates the conditions for a transition to bourgeois civilisation."346 
Slavnyi also viewed Simoniya's theory as an alternative to the "technocratic 
approach" of "the supporters of the conception of 'dualism'".^47 ^ e  latter
saw capitalist development in India as limited to a technologically advanced but 
socially narrow modem sector of the society, Slavnyi argued that this was not 
necessarily so. He suggested that capitalist production could develop in third 
world countries using labour-intensive technology, which is more profitable here 
than in developed capitalist countries because of the existence of huge masses of 
cheap labour. He noted that such a "synthesis" had emerged first "in the sphere 
of production organised by the trans-national corporations," leading to "a 
strengthening of dependence on the centres of the world capitalist economy." But 
he argued that this non-classical "technological mode of production" would
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spread via the "enormous mass of small producers", broadening the social base of 
Oriental c a p i t a l i s m . 3 4 8  Slavnyi even suggested that Simoniya's approach was "so 
new" that he had not fully transcended the technocratic perspective himself, when 
defining India as advanced in third world terms because of its "highly-developed 
technology", rather than owing to the proportion of its population involved in
capitalist relations. 49
The shift in the terms of Soviet debate about capitalism about in the third 
world was noted by Levkovsky in one of his last articles, about a "new stage" in 
the formation of the national bourgeoisie. He dismissed even moderate 
dependency theorists for understating "the significance and weight of the 
bourgeoisie" in the periphery, which had increased in the last two decades when 
"a growth of capitalism from below strengthened sharply". Levkovsky noted the 
"strengthening of local monopolies" in countries like India that Simoniya had 
highlighted, and agreed with him on the capitalist potential of merchant capital, 
suggesting that "lower shoots of capitalism have managed to come up, so to say, 
from under the asphalt of large and middle business, owing to the fact that this 
'asphalt' does not cover the whole economy, is strewn with cracks and is not 
always stable, especially p o l i t i c a l l y . "350 Conceding that "the degree of 
disintegration" of a multistructural economy had been "exaggerated and even 
absolutised", Levkovsky noted a growing "tendency toward the involvement in 
the general process of reproduction of an ever greater number of social 
segments", and "a tendency toward the consolidation, intertwining and even 
partial coalescence" of the three upper kinds of capitalism (the private-capitalist 
structure, state capitalism and foreign monopolies). He still stressed the 
"transitional state" of the national bourgeoisie as a class which could not exist 
economically "without contacts with the state sector and foreign capital", or 
politically "without cooperation with other social forces", but he now considered 
its potential in quite similar terms to S i m o n i y a . Landa contributed to this 
coalescence of views by arguing that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the Orient is 
historically "transitional", constituting "a stage in the formation and development 
of such an 'old' community as the private-enterprise b o u r g e o i s i e . " 3 5 2
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In an article in late 1986, Sheinis tried to deal with any ’’survivals" of the old 
orthodoxy about special 'boundaries' or 'limits' for capitalism in the developing 
c o u n t r i e s . H e  argued that, despite the economic downturn in the early 1980s, 
the development of capitalist production in the third world had not stopped, and 
had already attained an "irreversible" position, preventing a return to "enclave 
capitalism".354 Disputing Shirokov's 'dualist' view, he thought the widespread 
"growth of 'lower' capitalism, not only in the cities but also in the countryside", 
showed that the "spontaneous-market mechanism" remained, as Shmelev had 
insisted, a powerful, 'system-forming' factor of capitalist development.355 
Sheinis criticised Simoniya's view that original forms of state-monopoly 
capitalism were already appearing in some developing countries, but his main 
argument was with those who considered any anti-Western reaction in the third 
world as 'progressive':
If such movements attain success, then they shatter not capitalism (for they have 
no realistic socio-economic alternative, and the inertia of commodity-capitalist 
relations earlier set in motion has its effect), but those attainments of real social 
progress which accompany it. Iranian society is paying a significantly dearer 
price for the 'islamic revolution' than for the bourgeois modernisation of 
the Shah.356
Sheinis implied that dependency theory had failed the Iranian test, a point 
directed against conservative officials like Nikolai Petrov, who viewed the whole 
third world as still "subjugated" by and rebelling against "the imperialist policy 
of diktat and exploitation", and also the left-radical group in IMEMO headed by 
Maidanik, who stuck to the "position that on the path of capitalist development the 
dominant tendency is a continual reproduction not only of the relations 'dominion 
- dependence', but also a situation of ’high-development - backwardness' and, as a 
rule, the disintegrated nature of d e v e l o p m e n t . "357 Maidanik considered that a 
"dependent economy" is not "doomed to stagnation", or prevented from 
industrialising, but thought "the possibilities of capitalist development in the states 
of Asia and Africa are organically tied to the retention and deepening of these 
countries' cooperation with state-monopoly capitalism of the imperialist centres." 
He claimed that without these ties capitalism could not become the leading 
structure in the periphery, and the local bourgeoisie could not become the
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dominant class.358 ^  Maidanik's book, the section on the Iranian revolution saw 
it as "a most serious strike on the 'model' of dependent capitalist development", 
praising the Khomeini regime’s "undebatable anti-imperialism and 
anti-Americanism" even after its brutal repression of leftists "already in
' j c q
1979-1980". Jy Another view was presented by Simoniya, who not only 
criticised loyal communists for siding with Khomeini, but provided an 
explanation of the latter’s victory in terms more profound than the role of an 
unfortunate subjective factor.^^O Significantly, Mirsky applauded Simoniya for 
seeing that capitalism would still develop in anti-Western Iran, at a time "when 
the specificity of the Islamic regime had aroused in many of our scholars 
illusions, engendered by the mass, liberating character of the revolution, and by 
the authorities' peculiar tactics, their anti-capitalist r h e t o r i c .
The new liberal orthodoxy about oriental capitalist development has become 
significantly more influential amongst Soviet scholars as a result of the relaxation 
of censorship following the January 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central 
Committee. Even as this liberalisation began, a cogent article by Mirsky, who 
noted that any denunciation of a particular view as "heresy" would mean that "the 
opportunities for scientific research are in general closed", summarised 
Simoniya's argument that the initially weak position of the national bourgeoisie in 
post-colonial societies was both "natural" and temporary. Mirsky stressed that 
objective and subjective "contradictions" between 'neo-Bonapartist' dictatorships 
and private bourgeoisies were "secondary", because the former forces, including 
the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' which administers the state sector, "historically act 
in the interests of the bourgeoisie" by securing stable conditions for "capitalist 
development as a process".^62 y^e necessity of this process as a condition of 
progress for backward countries was soon argued in a controversial article by 
Sheinis, who attempted to demonstrate the short-sightedness of old political 
thinking, which had been "falling off a conveyer" with "onesided and at times 
simply primitive interpretations of complex problems," based on "dogmatic 
prejudices" that obstruct the development of theory.^63
Sheinis used the new atmosphere of openness to state frankly some points
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"implicitly already existing in a number of scientific publications.” First, he 
asserted that the "existing gap between North and South" resulted not principally 
from the effect of colonialism on the latter, but from the historical maturation in 
the former of dynamic "economic and social mechanisms of development". He 
linked "the genuine tragedy of the 'third world’" with the legacy of pre-capitalist 
structures rather than the consequences of capitalist development, claiming that 
"the essence" of
backwardness consists not in the type of capitalism which began to penetrate 
here already during colonialism, but in the type of social milieu where it acts 
and which it has not managed in the majority of developing countries until 
now to reconstruct in its own shape and image, owing to causes rooted not so 
much in the immanent contradictions of capitalism as in the characteristics 
of this very milieu.364
Second, Sheinis argued that "the prospects for a resolution of many economic and 
even social problems" in the third world are "tied with a capitalist transformation 
of the economy, which is gathering tempo and spreading wide and deep, although 
it often takes on unusual, 'non-classical' forms." He outlined a necessary 
"economic mechanism" for overcoming backwardness which emphasised the 
"flexibility" of state regulation, an expansion of market relations, a modernisation 
of traditional structures, and paying for not expelling the "advantages" of foreign 
e n t e r p r i s e . Third, Sheinis counterposed the "quite harsh demands" of this 
mechanism to the inefficient, short-term stability of economic independence. 
Noting that there must be a trade-off between these choices, he now turned 
Maidanik's admission that dependence does not mean stagnation around, by 
claiming that a focus only on independence does result in "a deepening of 
backwardness and an atrophy of the mechanisms of development."366 At a 
conference of young scholars in April 1987, Sheinis asserted that "a country's 
capacity to adapt to the demands of the world capitalist economy largely 
determines the successes and pace of its development."367 The following month, 
at a conference of established scholars, he called for a rejection of "frozen 
stereotypes" about the socio-economic development of the third world, arguing 
that changes in the world capitalist economy must "modify the category of 
economic independence as a basic priority for the developing countries."368 jn
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his article he attacked the ’general crisis of capitalism' as such a stereotype, 
remarking that ”a crisis, i.e. an extreme aggravation, an inflaming of all social 
contradictions, which is prolonged for tens of years -- this is a nonsense, a
devaluation of the concept.”369
Sheinis explicitly rejected the old assumption that the priority of Soviet policy 
must be "to broaden as much as possible an ’anti-imperialist front”', saying this 
had led "politically to a union with anti-democratic, anti-progressive and simply 
irresponsible forces”, subordinating research to "a pre-given, simplified, purely 
dichotomous vision of today's very complex and heterogeneous world. He 
emphasised that "democracy is not only an instrument," but "an inalienable 
element of social progress" with "an invariable core — social initiative and 
autonomy 'from below', the self-organisation of citizens possessing a certain 
freedom of choice.” He proposed a more relaxed and open policy toward the 
West. Given "the sensitivity of social opinion in the West to the USSR’s policy 
toward conflicts" in the third world, it was necessary to "actively form a zone of 
the coinciding interests of East and West in the South", keeping the inevitable 
"periodic aggravations" of conflict here "within the limits of civilised social 
conduct." He claimed that "in the North there are influential forces who are 
interested in increasing the level of economic development of the South, resolving 
the most urgent social problems there, and reducing the potential for 
conflict."3 d  Recognising that he might be accused of "wishful-thinking, not 
considering today's political realities”, Sheinis argued that:
overcoming the inertia of established approaches may not spread in some 
spheres and avoid others. Conservatism and extraordinary caution in some 
areas of politics, ideology and science may seriously weaken the effectiveness 
of restructuring which unfolds in other directions. 1 ^
Such boldness raised the ire of Agaev, who thought Sheinis had gone beyond the 
pale by questioning the absolute priority of the broadest possible 'anti-imperialist 
front'. Asserting that Sheinis had re-written the party line by emphasising the 
interdependence of states in the modem world rather than their opposing natures, 
Agaev taunted him with having succumbed to 'the convergence hypothesis', but to 
little avail, since the official line had shifted noticeably in this direction and, in
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any case, the legitimacy of what Sheinis called "an uncompromising 
counterposition of different points of view in the course of scientific discussion" 
was now e s t a b l i s h e d . 3 7 3  xhe same issue of the journal carrying Agaev's riposte 
included an article by Yuri Shishkov, IMEMO's leading liberal economist, who 
asserted that "the economy of the Soviet Union and the economy of the developed 
capitalist countries, with all the differences in their material-technical base, are 
founded upon one and the same technological mode of production.”374 
Western orientation is supported now by Primakov, and by German Diligensky, 
the new chief editor of the IMEMO journal, who gave "moral support" to Sheinis 
and El'ianov during the 'years of stagnation' and recently called for an end to 
"the influence on theory of apologetic tendencies".375 ^he task he set of 
"re-thinking our scientific and political language" was performed with zest by 
Nikolai Karagodin, a contributor to the book by Sheinis and El'ianov, whose 
damning review of a conservative book about trans-national corporations in the 
third world appeared in June 1988 under the title: "Analysis or 
Myth-creation?"376 weeks later the new liberal orthodoxy was enshrined at a 
special conference in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where Shevardnadze noted a 
recent improvement in the level of scientific advice and stated clearly that: "The 
struggle of two opposing systems is not the most determining tendency of the 
contemporary epoch."377
Sheinis claimed in early 1988 that, while "inertia" kept the "formerly 
prevailing" approach to peripheral capitalism alive, the issue "consists already not 
in whether there is on the path of capitalism in the developing countries an 
insurmountable boundary, a 'barrier of underdevelopment' and so on, but in what 
type of capitalism is being consolidated in the economy and society of these 
c o u n t r i e s " . 378 Accepting Simoniya's criticism of his quantitative typology, he 
now viewed the "comparative maturity" of capitalism in the third world 
qualitatively, depicting "upper", "middle" and "lower" "horizons" of countries at 
broadly similar levels of capitalist development which were quite different from 
his previous classification. The main change was that the oil-rich countries were 
placed in the middle horizon behind India, which together with Pakistan and 
Indonesia had been 'moved up' from the least developed group. This change
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reflected a more historical view of Oriental capitalism, but Sheinis criticised 
Simoniya for overestimating the chances of accelerated capitalist development in 
India, whose "comparatively stable and balanced variant of economic and social 
development" he thought "almost unique in the developing world". Placing 
Taiwan and South Korea in the upper horizon because of their "dynamic 
development", based on a "flexible economic mechanism, quite keenly reacting to 
shifts in world production and trade", he considered that the "key question" of 
whether Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines would follow this path "remains 
open."379 Yashkin had recognised the leading position of 'newly industrialising 
countries' in the "upper echelon" of the third world, but this change has been
ion
viewed differently. Urging "a rejection of excessive generalisations" about 
"the periphery of the world capitalist economy", B.F. Kliuchnikov criticised "the 
assertion about a crisis of the 'catching-up' model in relation to a group of 
developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region", arguing that the "geo-economics 
and geo-politics" of an "impulsive capitalist transformation of this region" made 
"doubtful" Shirokov's new thesis "about a reduction of the role of the liberated 
countries in the world capitalist economic system, and a weakening of the interest 
in them of the imperialist c e n t r e s . "381 Kollontai agreed "in general" with 
Shirokov, but claimed that "a series of states, and also separate branches of 
economic systems at a country level remain able to move up to the level of 
medium developed capitalism", if they create "a flexible and maneuverable 
economic m e c h a n i s m " . 3  8 2  This prospect was denied by Avakov and by 
Dinkevich, who criticised "an exaggeration of spontaneous-market relations" by 
scholars who make an "absolutisation" of export-oriented development, and S.A. 
Byliniak's view that "the debt problem and protectionism hardly leads to a 
catastrophe" for capitalist developing c o u n t r i e s . 3 8 3
The now dominant Soviet view that Oriental capitalism is still progressive has 
not emerged from a new synthetic theory of the developing world. Avakov in his 
authoritative overview of Soviet third world studies claimed that the specific 
features of 'peripheral capitalism' had not yet been properly analysed, and even 
remarked that Eurocentrism had left Soviet scholars "practically deprived of 
scientific tools adequately accounting for the specificity of the object of
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research."384 pjis evaluation suggests that the persuasiveness of the new 
liberalism derives more from undermining old conceptions than successfully 
establishing new ones. At a recent conference, Aleksandrov pointed out that the 
recent growth of third world capitalism "was not foreseen by the theoretical ideas 
of the 1960s and 1970s", but V.G. Rastiannikov and E.V. Kotova’s "model of 
Oriental capitalism" which stressed the absence of free competition was rejected 
by Granovsky and A.P. Kolontaev, who thought it "incorrect to identify a 
disruption of the value proportions of commodity production with a deformation 
of the mechanism of market relations. "3 85 The specificity of Oriental capitalism 
was stressed by Sledzevsky, who criticised Simoniya and Sheinis for still using an 
implicit concept of dependent or at least ’catching-up’ capitalist development. 3 86 
Sledzevsky welcomed Simoniya's historical approach, but claimed he had not 
successfully explained the reproduction in third world countries of contradictory 
social structures, i.e. not established that an essential capitalist synthesis had 
occurred, rather than just a formal "symbiosis of systemically different 
elem ents".387 Sledzevsky argued that Simoniya's "typology of state 
organisation" ('Bonapartism', bourgeois democracy, monopolism) was just an 
"ideal type" of 'primary' capitalist development, and hence not applicable even 
heuristically to developing countries that derive historically from "different 
phasal forms and mechanisms of development."388 Cheshkov made a similar 
point, claiming that the very idea of a 'nationally-organised capitalist synthesis' in 
the third world was contradictory. Concerning the evolution of a 'compounded 
society' after independence, Cheshkov suggested that "there is good reason to 
consider that a systemic diversity of structures excludes one-directional ... 
development", so a capitalist synthesis is not inevitable. While Simoniya had 
recognised this in stressing the crucial role of the post-colonial state, Cheshkov 
argued that this raised doubts about the "unconditionally 'capitalist' nature" of 
most developing countries. He also questioned the validity of Simoniya's 
'tertiary' model of capitalist development:
This model, peculiar to the developing countries, differs from the primary, 
as by the way from the secondary, model in the leading role of external 
factors. If it 'works' in the post-colonial period, then the question arises: 
how 'national' or 'synthesized' is the capitalism being established in the 
developing countries? It seems that before us there is rather some branch
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of world capitalism, or a variety derived from its centres, even though on 
an internal foundation. Consequently, it is necessary to choose between the 
model of 'nationally organised capitalism' and the tertiary model of 
capitalist formationality. The authors, apparently, are inclined to retain both, 
which creates a problem for the general theory of formations.389
Indeed, Simoniya more often contrasted post-colonial, 'tertiary' capitalism with 
'Europe', i.e. 'primary' capitalism, than with 'secondary' capitalism, showing a 
hidden identification of 'tertiary' and 'secondary' capitalism, which gives some 
substance to Sledzevsky's claim and to Avakov's apparently belated criticism of
Eurocentrism.390
In responding to the thesis of Sheinis and Simoniya that capitalism in the third 
world now has a 'logic of self-development', Sterbalova argued that the 
"traditional social milieu" (that "mysterious sphinx of the 'third world'") had 
adapted capitalism into "'hybrid' forms of production", characterised by "only 
the formal, not real subsumption of labour to a new mode of production, which 
may become a capitalist mode of production only in union with production 
relations, i.e. with bourgeois social relations, resting on developed bourgeois 
private property and being reproduced by a bourgeois civil society and a 
bourgeois state".^91 \yhiie calling for "further elaboration" of Brutents' old idea 
about 'revolutions of a new type', she relied mainly on Cheshkov's thesis that 
post-colonial societies have been constituted "as a conglomerate, determined by 
the struggle of two social 'principles' — private and collectivist — and developing 
in many equivalent directions".^92 cheshkov did not simply undermine the 
concepts of multistructurality and dependent development like Sheinis and 
Simoniya; he tried to incorporate their partial insights in a broader approach, 
constructed, as Sledzevsky pointed out, "not only on the level of empirical 
generalisations in the scope of the capitalist formation, but on the level of general 
formational t h e o r y . "393 Cheshkov suggested that the conception of third world 
dependence "has a place in explaining the origin of a developing society", as a 
historical product of capitalist disruption during colonialism, while 
multistructurality appears as the form of a society where "different modes of 
production have been placed on one another, but not one of them has been 
articulated and acquired formational fulfilment".394 ^  contrast to Simoniya's
249
theory of "capitalism as a world system", he argued that "the real growth of 
capitalism" has intensified its "internal contradictoriness", as an incomplete 
formation split by a double "dualism": the retention of non-capitalist forms in the 
East, through an unstable "symbiosis" rather than a progressive "synthesis", 
creates two types of social system in the modem world, not one. 5 Cheshkov’s 
view that "the great variety of a developing society across countries and regions, 
and also the heterogeneity of its component elements, does not allow one to mark 
out a single main path of its evolution", should benefit from the open 
consideration of countries like China as part of the third world, but it is doubtful 
whether his 'macro-formational approach' will succeed in "setting right the 
conceptual views now existing in Soviet science about the developing 
c o u n t r i e s . Despite his call not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, it is 
more likely that the important "culturological" study of Oriental civilisations will 
proceed "beyond the bounds of the theory of formations" entirely, not parallel
with it toward the "higher level of generalisation" characteristic of 'big
• 397 science. '
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Chapter 5: The Nature of Soviet Society Reconsidered
In a situation where old scientific conceptions have to a significant degree ceased 
’to work', utopia as one of the ways of 'stirring’ the imagination may enable the 
development and new orienting of scientific research.
(M.A. Cheshkov, "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza gosuklada: tip obshchestvennogo 
vosproizvodstva i sotsial'nyi nositel'", in L.I. Reisner ed., Ekonomika razvivaiushchikhsia 
stran: teorii i melody issledovaniia, Nauka, Moscow, 1979, p. 347.)
It is reasonable to presume that different Soviet views about the developing 
countries have domestic as well as foreign policy implications, particularly where 
these views interpret the dilemmas of third world development in world-historical 
terms. When considering the domestic implications of recent Soviet development 
debates, it is necessary to sort out different levels of political meaning. 
Generally, the decline of the ’non-capitalist path' must reflect badly on supporters 
of the status quo in the USSR, who previously linked the consolidation of their 
camp with "the successes of those developing countries which are rejecting the 
capitalist path of development." * This negative implication is objective and 
uncritical for conservative scholars, since it occurs in spite of their efforts to 
downplay the significance of setbacks abroad, and depends on an appreciation by 
others of broad similarities between the third world and the USSR.
This point has been highlighted by the liberals in their effort to institutionalise 
open scientific enquiry. Sheinis, in his article on new political thinking about 
questions of development, directly stated that studying "the genuine tragedy of the 
'third world”’ within "a broad comparison of the world-historical order might 
allow us to look in a new way at our own problems, although they stand in a 
fundamentally different context."^ Avakov included a similar statement in his 
less radical but more authoritative article. Before concluding that studies of the 
third world should "give a supplementary creative impulse to the development of 
Soviet social science", he noted that "an objective study of the developing world, 
of 'third world' society, may provide much material for elaborating the theory 
and practice of socialist restructuring, for enriching new social and 
politico-economic t h i n k i n g . S u c h  statements are attempts to legitimise and 
extend a genre of implicit, critical discussion of Soviet society that survived at the
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margins of Soviet academia during the 'years of stagnation'. In this discussion, an 
analysis of third world problems was meant to apply also, and often especially, to 
the USSR by a small group of Soviet scholars who conducted a subterranean 
debate "by proxy", in a broadly similar way to those who criticised the Stalinist 
system by extolling the general virtues of NEP.^ At this particularly esoteric 
level of meaning, direct points about the nature of Soviet society have been 
implied critically, by authors relying on their readers' intelligent discretion in 
order to communicate cryptically. While it is difficult to evaluate the political 
impact of such criticism, it is clear that a healthy diversity of unorthodox views 
has been expressed, some of which certainly venture far beyond mere "criticism 
from within the system .
It is much harder to define the main issues and trends of this subterranean 
debate than to evaluate the more open discussions about third world development. 
Implicit commentary on the problems and prospects of Soviet society has 
occurred in a quite unregulated way, like voices competing for a hearing in the 
dark, rather than identifiable speakers at a public forum. The fact that scholars 
participating in this deep discussion are not easily grouped into opposing 'teams' 
is useful as well as difficult for an outside interpreter, because, as Chernyak has 
argued, classifying Soviet scholars merely in terms of whose side they are on in a 
debate can create a "simplistic opposition" which overlooks the content of 
different conceptions and places professional routinists on a par with serious and 
original thinkers.^ Often the most meaningful differences of opinion occur 
amongst scholars who support each other as members of a reformist 'team'. A 
big problem for the interpreter is how to judge such differences in terms which 
would make sense for the scholars concerned. Chernyak has stressed that to 
understand the hidden turmoil of Soviet philosophy "an outside observer must 
have very well defined philosophic positions of his own."^ Understanding from 
the situation which Bakhtin has termed 'outsideness' necessarily involves a 
questioning of and by one's own conception of the topic being discussed. "One 
meaning discloses its depth when it has met and come into contact with another, 
strange meaning: between them there begins a kind of dialogue, which overcomes 
the seclusion and onesidedness of these meanings".^ To distinguish different
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voices in the dark, the interpreter must have some conception theoretically of 
what they could be saying. This initial approximation of the sense of a statement 
depends on evaluating it in general terms like radical, liberal and conservative, 
and is then refined by suggesting the shades of meaning which such labels cover in 
the particular situation. The amorphous but substantial nature of the subterranean 
debate about Soviet society resembles what Oakeshott called 'the conversation of 
mankind', in which what matters most is not that a clear answer is reached, but 
that important issues are raised.^
The distinguishing feature of clever and significant use of Aesopian language 
is a coherent theoretical orientation. Without some clarity about which questions 
are most important, a critic risks merely pointing out the obvious. If esoteric 
argument remains confined within a descriptive mode, conveying meaning only 
by referring to similar phenomena in another context, then its explanatory force 
will be severely limited because of the historical difference between the open and 
implied subjects of discussion. Sheinis and El’ianov have emphasised that the 
actual problems of the third world are "so unprecedented in terms of scope and 
character, that all attempts to describe, let alone resolve them 'by analogy’ are 
certainly doomed to f a i l u r e . " ^  The same point applies to 'bureaucratism' in the 
USSR, but this does not vitiate a mirror-like analysis of the 'braking 
mechanism'. 1 1 It is possible even descriptively to suggest the nature of a problem 
without adequately defining its specific features. Toward the end of the first of 
two articles entitled "Ideals or Interests?", Andrei Nuikin quoted, with clear 
analogical intent, some passages from a 1974 Soviet work on elites in the Orient 
about "the parasitical character of bureaucratic capital" in Indonesia, as part of a 
broad argument about the strength of bureaucratic opposition to restructuring in 
the USSR. 12 His remarks can be viewed as marking the shallow end of esoteric 
criticism, since they lack a critical theoretical dimension at a basic conceptual 
level, by just attributing bureaucratism to Parkinson's Law and likening it to 
r a d i a t i o n .  13 Towards the deep end are scholars like Cheshkov, who in a paper 
published in an appendix to the volumes quoted by Nuikin, endeavoured to 
theorise the possible nature of that which could not be mentioned empirically, 
knowing that this task was both safer (censors and editors are usually sure what
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things must not be said, but are easily lost in an unfamiliar maze of concepts) and 
more substantial than playing with colourful analogies.^ For the outside 
interpreter as well, the depths of theoretical argument are safer, since here there 
is less chance of mistakenly following Alice into a fantasy land in which "the 
words go the wrong way."
Reflections Upon the Transition to Socialism
Once upon a time a big but poor country managed to lift itself by its 
bootstraps through several historical stages to the threshold of a classless, ’radiant 
future’ all in the space of a few years, thanks largely to waves of popular 
enthusiasm inspired by an unmentionable man of steel. Such was the authoritative 
mythology of Soviet history until recently. In a very conspiratorial reading of 
history, Stalin asserted that the main obstacles to building Russian socialism in one 
backward empire were personal, in the form of the so-called 'Bukharin-Trotsky 
Gang of Spies, Wreckers and Traitors to the C o u n t r y ' . ^  The most arrogant 
assertion in the Short Course is a simple proclamation that "the Soviet people 
approved the annihilation of the Bukharin-Trotsky gang and passed on to next 
b u s i n e s s . "  17 While the next and last agenda-item in this fantasy-history was to 
ensure "in an organised way" that "90,000,000 persons, in their unanimous vote, 
confirmed the victory of Socialism in the USSR",!^ in the memory of many 
Soviet people the 'next business' was the mass terror which became known as 
'Yezhovshchina' or simply 'the year 1937'. ^  This gulf between official and 
private stories of the past is one reason for the recent claim by Afanas'ev that 
"there is not, perhaps, in the world a country with so falsified a history as 
o u r s . "20 He argued that those responsible for this were not professional 
historians, let alone the Soviet people as a whole, but rather those bosses 
("Trapeznikov and his assistants") who conducted "pogroms" against original 
sch o larsh ip s Afanas'ev identified the main feature of Stalinist historiography as 
its "monopoly" on interpretation, thus echoing Igor Kliamkin's forceful complaint 
that: "Here [in the study of Soviet history] until now everything is monological in 
the most primitive sense. The voices of the participants are not listened to. Besides
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the victors, all are deprived of a word."^^ But whereas Kliamkin himself 
rejected a full dialogue with those opponents of Stalin who doubted the possibility 
of genuine socialism in one country, Afanas’ev managed somewhat later to 
express frankly the view of "very many" who "do not consider the society we 
have created as socialist, even in a ’deformed1 s e n s e . One of these many is 
She inis, who in a round table discussion in 1983 pointed out that:
a socialist society cannot be constructed on a primitive material base, in 
international isolation and on the basis of ascending toward the patriarchal 
character of collectivism. If there exists an alternative, opposing both a 
movement toward socialism and capitalist modernisation, then evidently 
this alternative is not development but stagnation, not the resolution 
but the forcing together of problem s.^
From this viewpoint, the transition toward socialism is not a textbook topic but a 
contemporary imperative, necessary in order to prevent "the collapse of this, our 
last historical attempt to find a way out of a terrible d e a d - e n d .  "25
The three main victims of Trapeznikov mentioned by Afanas’ev (Tamovsky,
Volobuev and Gefter) all endeavoured to reconsider the established, linear
version of Soviet history by drawing comparisons with other countries and
periods.26 Tamovsky emphasised the complexity of the social conflicts which led
to the Bolshevik revolution, and was the first Soviet scholar to point out the
structural similarities between capitalist industrialisation in pre-revolutionary
97Russia and contemporary developing countries. ' Volobuev also presented a 
complex account of 1917, arguing against the common view "that history is 
fatally pre-determined, i.e. that everything could have happened only as it did"; 
he reminded his readers that Lenin "was a decisive opponent of the idea about a 
’programmed character’ of one-line-only development, and about the 
pre-determination of the victory of a socialist revolution in our c o u n t r y . 8 
While both these authors drew attention to the objective importance of 
’multistructurality’, the most profound exponent of this concept was Gefter. In 
1969 he edited a book on the historiography of revolutions that has been called a 
"manifesto of legal Marxism" in the modem USSR, then during the ’years of 
stagnation’ he contributed to the underground socialist journal P oiski, before
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recently returning to the liberalised legal arena of debate with some profound 
comments in an interview entitled "Stalin Died Y e s t e r d a y . . . " . ^
In 1972 Gefter suggested that "the problem of the wholeness of the Russian 
historical process," which had received only a formal solution since the mid 
1930s, was best conceptualised in terms of "the changing of one kind of 
multistructurality into another. "30 He noted that "it would be naive to find an 
answer in a definition," and cautioned against viewing multistructurality in a 
static, descriptive way as just the existence of 'many structures'. He focused on 
"the interpenetration and conflict of different socio-economic forms," which "in 
specific societies differs, sometimes very essentially, from ... the sequence of the 
change of formations in a world-wide process."31 He emphasised that a period of 
transition involves both the possibility of progressive change and the danger of a 
reactionary, 'hybrid' development, in which "the old is able to assimilate the new, 
to turn it into a source for itself."32 While Gefter used these categories to 
explain the backward and uneven development of capitalism in pre-revolutionary 
Russia, they are evidently applicable to the Soviet period. Indeed, he began by 
noting the lively contemporary interest in the question of multistructurality, and 
had previously referred to the '"multistructural' social transformations begun by 
O c t o b e r . a  cryptic sentence of Gefter's subsequently quoted by Sheinis 
encapsulates the critical import of his view: "It is a paradox of history: the 
onesided, accelerated growth of a new formation 'returns' it again and again to 
the stage of genesis."3^ The gap between this conception and the orthodox 
assertion that multistructurality was quickly overcome by the beginning of the
1C
Second Five Year Plan would have been clear to many Soviet readers. At least, 
Gefter's critical meaning is now so clear that I.K. Pantin, the chief editor of
Rabochii Klass, concluded a recent discussion about the 'braking mechanism' by
'1/1
repeating this sentence without reference, as if everyone knew the source.
While Gefter was dismissed from his senior academic post soon after his paper 
on multistructurality appeared in Sverdlovsk, later that year Levkovsky published
' i n
in Moscow his two most significant articles on the same theme. 1 In these 
discussions of state capitalism in the 'third world', Levkovsky presented an
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original version of the orthodox Trotskyist idea that in a backward country the 
transition to socialism degenerates into a bureaucrat's p a r a d i s e . He based his 
view on Lenin's analysis of multistructurality in post-revolutionary Russia, a fact 
which shows the narrowness of Kliamkin’s claim that there was "not one case" 
where the publication under Khrushchev of stenographic reports including 
Trotsky's speeches "turned the reader into a T r o t s k y i s t . " ^  The key word for 
understanding Levkovsky's view is "the prerequisites for preparing the 
construction of s o c i a l i s m . " ^  Unlike Stalin and his followers, Levkovsky 
assumed that socialism could not be built anywhere just by nationalising private 
property. He saw "development in a socialist direction" for backward countries 
as a long-term process, stressing "the enormous complexity and contradictoriness 
of the first steps toward socialism in a contemporary multistructural society".^  
He distinguished fundamentally between such a society and a developed capitalist 
society, in which the productive forces have matured enough for socialism and the 
proletariat has the potential to become a class ruling for itself throughout the 
s o c i e t y . ^^ Interpreting Levkovsky's view as Trotskyist depends upon 
understanding post-revolutionary Russia as the former not the latter type of 
society, an understanding based firmly on Lenin’s post-1917 analysis, the only 
theoretical source referred to by Levkovsky, and supported by both Gefter's 
interpretation of Russian backwardness and Reisner's statement that Soviet Russia 
in the 1920s "must be considered as an economically backward, underdeveloped 
and developing s t a t e . A short paragraph contrasting "the historical paths of 
creating of a socialist structure" in Russia and in a multistructural society of the 
'third world’ seems to contradict this understanding, but this can be interpreted as 
a defence clause inserted by Levkovsky to answer any accusation of heresy from 
the thought p o liced  Indeed, it must be so interpreted if Levkovsky’s argument 
is not to be rendered theoretically incoherent. Suggesting the need for such a 
clause is not fanciful, since Ul'ianovsky in attacking Levkovsky did make such an 
accusation, albeit without being fully aware of the evidence for it.^5
Levkovsky began his critical discussion by raising the "cardinal question" of 
the extent of "disjunction" between "processes of the statocratisation of the means 
of production (or economy) and processes of the development of s o c i a l i s m " . 1^
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He answered this question ~ which the 'United Opposition' had posed in 1926 — 
by considering the objects and subjects of statocratisation (ogosudarstvlenie) in 
undeveloped, multistructural societies.47 Levkovsky claimed it was "impossible" 
to say that the productive forces of such societies were ready for socialism, stating 
frankly that "private ownership of handicraft and small-capitalist enterprises 
cannot be replaced by state ownership with a benefit for economic 
development. "48 He argued that if such statocratisation nevertheless occurred, 
this was because it served the interests of a rising "bureaucratic elite", which 
"becomes a negative force, obstructing progressive changes" threatening "its own 
special, monopoly position in administration."49 Levkovsky emphasised that the 
political character of the forces holding state power "is in real life the key to 
economic restructuring and the evolution of the state sector i t s e l f . T h i s  topical 
statement implied a liberal reconsideration of the classic Stalinist slogan 'politics 
in command', focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of the politics in 
question. As Simoniya was soon to argue in a commentary on one of Lenin's 
phrases, "politics expresses economics in a concentrated way, but not any practical 
politics, only a correct one."51
Levkovsky defined the state sector in a backward, multistructural society as 
"state capitalist", the term which Grigory Zinoviev had used in 1925 to 
characterise the degenerating nature of nationalised industry in the USSR.^2 
Levkovsky likened this emergent state capitalist structure to a genie which the rest 
of society "can hardly succeed to put back in the bottle," because it provides a 
base for "an influential stratum of the economic, bureaucratic-technocratic and 
administrative elite" that has made "contacts with the new strata and people who 
have risen to power."^^ Abstracting from specific 'details', Levkovsky focused 
on "an irresistible tendency toward the numerical growth" of this elite, which he 
considered wasteful:
it is obvious that a swelling of the state-economic administrative apparatus, 
not conditioned by the objective needs of a multistructural country, is, so to 
speak, still another confirmation of 'Parkinson's Law'. Such a malignant 
growth, negative in itself, is by its parasitism doubly detrimental for an 
economically underdeveloped society: limited state resources begin to be 
'eaten away' to an often significant degree by the administrative apparatus.^4
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A similar point has been made by the leading Western Trotskyist Ernest Mandel, 
who claims that ’’the massive swelling of officials, controllers and 
state-apparatuses in the USSR devours about 30% of the national i n c o m e . " ^  
While Levkovsky saw the political victory of the Soviet bureaucracy as more 
inevitable than Mandel did, he shared the latter’s long-term optimism about the 
’’planned foundation” of a bureaucratically administered e c o n o m y . ^ ^  He assumed 
that the replacement of the bourgeoisie by a ruling bureaucracy rather than by the 
proletariat was "another indication of the social transitionality of a multistructural 
society and state capitalism", not a feature of a new system of exploitation. 
Levkovsky’s answer to the basic question of whether statocratisation presages 
socialism was ultimately a qualified yes. He claimed that the state capitalist 
structure tends "to become an ever more important 'incubator' of the 
material-productive and class prerequisites for preparing the construction of 
socialism", and suggested that although initially, during the "quite prolonged 
period" of rule by a bureaucratic elite, this is only "a subsidiary and socially 
unrecognised process", in the end it must become a consciously regulated one.^7
Levkovsky's basic thesis, that the USSR is still in a transition period toward 
socialism, was argued more extensively by Simoniya in the first part of his 1975 
book. Simoniya referred directly to the early Soviet period through a detailed 
analysis of Lenin’s post-revolutionary remarks, and was able to hint about the 
subsequent evolution of the Soviet state by clarifying some important matters of 
historical methodology. First, he re-affirmed Marx’s distinction between "a 
social revolution as an epoch of social change (the implementation of socialism, its 
organising activity) and a political revolution as a partial moment of this social 
change (the political act of overthrowing the old power, the destruction of old 
r e l a t i o n s ) . 8 He criticised a Stalinist textbook for identifying the latter with the 
former as "all-powerful" and ignoring the fact that a successful political 
revolution "needs a preliminary preparation o f the basic conditions of a social 
r e v o l u t i o n .  ^ He rejected as voluntarist the view "that a socialist political 
revolution liquidates capitalist production relations and establishes socialist ones", 
arguing that, while juridical forms of property could be changed by decree, the 
extent of the socialisation of production could not.^0
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Second, Simoniya re-stated Lenin’s suggestion that backward Russia had to 
pass through "a more or less prolonged special historical transition period to 
socialism ", which was distinct from and prior to "a properly socialist transition 
period" toward communism.61 During this preliminary transition period the 
Soviet state had to create a new economic base with a similar level of socialisation 
of production to developed capitalist countries, by fostering the development of 
state capitalism as the "main link" of a "mixed transitional e c o n o m y " . 62 in this 
context, Simoniya noted that "one of the most important, decisive features of the 
revolutionary process in Russia ... consisted in the non-correspondence of 
political power — the dictatorship of the proletariat ~ to the character of the 
economic base." He posed three possible results of this situation:
1) the superstructure may hold out on the non-corresponding base, having 
adapted to it in order to guide its further development in a direction 
necessary for the superstructure itself;
2) the superstructure may hold out on the non-corresponding base, but at the 
price of such an adaption that signifies a degeneration of the superstructure 
itself and its reduction into correspondence with the base;
3) the superstructure may enter into a direct conflict with the base, 
attempting to 'abolish' it, and fall as a victim of its own foolishness.1^
Simoniya’s key claim was that "the first two variants entail the necessity of a 
transition period , in the course of which a correspondence is established between 
the superstructure and the b a s e . "64 in other words, even the degeneration of a 
socialist superstructure does not force a country off the path to socialism, 
although, as one critic of this position has remarked, this path may now have "a 
deep ditch in it. ”65 By highlighting 'Lenin's last struggle' and questioning 
'socialism in one country', Simoniya suggested that the Soviet state had 
degenerated, because of the "decisive role" of "objective, material conditions" in a 
backward c o u n t r y .66 But his scheme for understanding the course of a political 
revolution implied that a "recoil" could not destroy all the attainments of a 
preceding "leap f o r w a r d " . 67 Like Levkovsky, Simoniya considered "the 
character of the superstructure" as the key to "a successful realisation of the tasks 
of the transition period", yet seemed to think that even if the door stuck fast 
during a hammering, a new key could be found to open it.
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If ambiguity about the systemic legacy of Stalin's victory is the consequence of 
viewing the USSR as still transitional toward socialism, the premise of this view is 
"that the only possible alternative to capitalism, both in theory and in practice (at 
least under the historical conditions of modernity) is socialism".1^  Otherwise, the 
fact that "the bureaucracy has its own (sufficiently clearly recognised) interests, in 
the defence and development of which it comes forth very energetically and 
effectively", would suggest something like a black hole, not a hiatus of maturing 
prerequisites.^ Assuming that non-capitalism means movement toward socialism 
downplays the negative role of the bureaucratic elite, which the thesis about 
Soviet society's pre-socialist character apparently highlights. Afanas'ev has 
suggested that those interested in rescuing Stalinism can admit that Stalin 
"discredited the idea of socialism", because this distracts attention from "the 
essence of the problem", which is: "to what extent was Stalin the creator and at 
the same time the product of the system which consolidated itself during his 
period in power"?71 A variant of the transitionality thesis can even have a 
conservative meaning, if it asserts that genuine socialism will 'mature' as the 
existing structure is freed from ' d i s t o r t i o n s ' . ^  But the theory of an extended 
transition period advanced in the 1970s by Levkovsky and Simoniya criticised 
Stalinism, which then traded under the slogan 'real socialism'. This criticism was 
liberal rather than radical in defining the prospects for change, suggesting that a 
future reform from above which allowed "different forms of the state capitalist 
structure" to operate could still regenerate movement toward socialism, in spite of 
the conservative reaction at the time.^^ Yet affirming the need for another NEP 
begs the question of the effect on Soviet society of two generations of rule by a 
bureaucratic elite. At one point Simoniya questioned the logic of those seeing in 
China "the prolonged existence of a military-bureaucratic superstructure over a 
socialist base alien to it."^^ This could be read as a criticism of Stalinism, but 
only by exposing an inconsistency in applying his theory of a transition to 
socialism to the modem USSR. If an advanced superstructure has been reduced to 
the level of a backward base, then a new and inherently backward system must be 
the result. While such a system may exist within a broad epoch of social change 
(an 'inter-formational period' in the widest sense) this does not imply, as 
Simoniya argued, that it is itself transitional toward socialism.
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At first glance the arguments of Butenko, who expounded the idea of 
’developed socialism' and attacked the view that a socialist society is inherently 
transitional, appear opposed to those of Levkovsky and S i m o n i y a . 7 5  in fact they 
are fairly similar, the main difference being that Butenko focused more on 
systemic obstacles to socialism in the USSR, even while nominally referring to 
"the consolidation of socialist democracy" and "the development of socialist 
production" in Brezhnev's R u s s i a . 7 6  Butenko's main form of argument during 
the 1970s was to expose the gap between the "essential features of socialism" and 
"very widespread" phenomena in Soviet society like "slackness, alcoholism" and 
social injustice.77 He presented 'developed socialism' as an ideal, and assumed 
that in view of the increasingly acute "problems in food supply and medical 
service (the Soviet Union had come to lose its attainments in matters of infant 
mortality, life expectancy etc.) — it was clear that, despite official declarations, 
Soviet society then did not correspond to the objective criteria of constructing 
developed socialism."78 in opposition to "an empirical approach" which 
identified all aspects of Soviet society as components of "a socialist way of life", 
Butenko adopted "a theoretical approach" which viewed negative phenomena like 
"money-grubbing" as having "nothing in common with a really socialist way of 
life". Using as a motto "the well-known truth: 'not all that is real is rational”', he 
demonstrated how little existing Soviet society "corresponds to the nature of 
socialism, i.e. to those forms of life activity which are realised in the bounds of 
the principles of s o c i a l i s m . " 7 9
Butenko focused particularly on the crucial questions of economic inequality 
and the absence of democracy. Concerning the former, he began by noting that 
"often discontent is stirred up by the facts of a significant difference in the 
material position, in the living conditions ... of one or another group of 
t o i l e r s " . He then distinguished between two types of social injustice. One type 
comprised unequal rewards for unequal work capacities, i.e. the persistence of a 
'bourgeois right' which Marx thought inevitable until the achievement of 
communist abundance. Another type, which Butenko pointed to as provoking 
"special dissatisfaction", consisted of "sharp differences in the standard of living 
and way of life which are not conditioned by essential differences in the
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contribution of labour." In this case, citizens benefiting from either speculation 
or an official position "live in luxury, have their own personal swimming pools, 
dachas, two or three cars, etc."^
Naturally, such a situation stirs up regular resentment not only from those
toilers whose material means only allow them to make ends meet, but also
from every conscientious worker, whose daily strenuous toil, creating social
wealth, cannot provide for them the material conditions of life which are
89undeservedly enjoyed by the aforementioned figures.
Searching for "the sources of such injustice", Butenko cautioned against the view 
of "some toilers", who "consider that all this is a natural outgrowth of material 
stimuli for labour, a consequence of distribution according to the quantity and 
quality of labour, a regular result of maintaining commodity-money relations in
• 0-3
society". He argued that any premature attempt to eliminate such relations 
could only "undermine the very basis of the development of socialism, close the 
path to a really just equalisation of living standards and the perfection of a 
socialist way of l i f e ." 8 4
Butenko implied that the second type of injustice derived from the hierarchical 
nature of a command economy, since it occurs "when an official position is used 
for personal interests, which in reality just contradicts all the norms of 
s o c i a l i s m . " ^ 5  While calling for an end to such "distortions in realising socialism" 
~ "so that the way of life of all toilers may become socialist" — Butenko 
recognised that these cases of "the most flagrant violation of socialist principles" 
resulted not simply from moral weakness, but from "the specific situation of one 
individual or a n o t h e r . " ^  There was clearly a well-entrenched, "definite and 
stable interest" behind this injustice, which in the short-term tended to be 
strengthened, not threatened, by artificially reducing inequality in rewards 
between differently qualified w o r k e r s . After ironically citing a speech of 
Brezhnev's about the need to criminalise bribery, Butenko described the most 
serious, systemic consequence of a regime of privilege hypocritically taking that 
"very dangerous, pseudo-revolutionary path of levelling":
This path would have led inevitably to undermining the basic foundation of 
social progress — effective labour, since it would have deprived all toilers of
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a direct interest in the quantity and quality of their labour. Such a path would 
have undermined the stimulus for increasing the productive qualifications of 
workers, it would have led to stagnation and decline in the development of 
education and science, which would have had as its direct result a rejection of 
scientific-technical progress. Without all this [interested labour and scientific 
progress] it would have become simply impossible to have a further growth of 
social production, which is the main condition for raising the living standards 
of all toilers, the most important means for the elimination of existing 
injustices in the distribution of material goods, the decisive factor in the 
development and perfection of a socialist way of life. It is perfectly obvious 
that such a path contradicts the interests of socialism, the interests of all 
toilers.^
While this characterisation of general stagnation as anti-socialist evidently 
referred to phenomena typical of the USSR at the time, Butenko has recently 
stressed that, "when criticising the deformations and stagnation of the Brezhnevite 
1970s, it is impossible not to turn to their sources, to the Stalin years, when that 
mechanism which in the seventies became a braking mechanism was formed." He 
noted that the technical successes of the 1930s were "inseparable from the mass 
repressions" masked with "heartlessness, formalism and demagogy" which made 
the workers increasingly passive, and argued that, in spite of some different 
policies from Stalin, Brezhnev's power base remained "the Stalinist, 
nomenklaturist pyramid of administrative-bureaucratic authority" that had 
nothing to do with socialism, understood as "the political supremacy of the 
working class and its allies.
Butenko became widely known in the West for his contribution to a discussion 
in Voprosy filosofii in the early 1980s on contradictions in Soviet s o c i e t y .  
Before then, in the space of a few pages in his 1978 book entitled The Socialist 
Way of Life: problems and opinions, he presented a radical critique of the lack of 
democracy in the USSR. Reviewing two poles of "possible onesidedness" in 
resolving "the well-known contradiction between the necessity for a development 
of democracy and the necessity for a development of centralism", he said the 
experience of socialist development had "already shown" that favouring the latter 
leads to "the bureaucratisation of centralism", and overemphasising the former 
may supplement democracy with "elements of anarchy and disorganisation."^ 
Given Brezhnev's respect for what Lukin has called Stalin's policies of
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"all-pervading centralism" and "limitation of democracy", it is clear that 
Butenko's warning about a 'centralist deviation’ was much more serious than his 
concern about excess d e m o c r a c y . 92 He directly linked "the need for an 
uninterrupted growth of democracy" with "the successful development of a 
socialist economy" by claiming that the latter remains "impossible" without the 
former.93 After listing some general features typical of bureaucratic centralism, 
such as narrowing the role of representative institutions in favour of executive 
organs of power, and limiting the removability of the latter as the rights of the 
mass of toilers are reduced, he considered the consequences in productive and 
social activity if this "growing shortage of democracy" becomes "a stable 
tendency, a continual practice ".94 in production, "the division strengthens 
between rulers and ruled, between the administration and ordinary workers, and 
there arise elements of the alienation of the isolated worker from social 
production, as his everyday consciousness enters into a contradiction with social 
consciousness and his productive and social activity is r e d u c e d .  "95 This leads "to 
a lowering of collectivism and a growth of individualism, to a re-birth of such 
vulgar principles as 'that's no concern of mine', 'everyone for themselves', and to 
a strengthening of a consumerist approach to l i f e . "96 Since Butenko 
characterised such a mentality as "alien to the nature of socialism", it is worth 
noting that, according to the Polish economist Wlodzimierz Brus, "the spirit of 
acquisitiveness" amongst ordinary people in Stalinist society is greater even than 
in the West.97 in the sphere of social activity, Butenko identified bureaucratic 
centralism as leading to:
an undermining of the toilers' faith in the real character of the implemented 
democracy; their social activity acquires a formal character,... it is deprived 
of real content, and does not lead to a realisation of their goals; the discrepancy 
strengthens between word and deed, form and content, external activity and 
the internal emptiness of this a c t i v i t y . 9 8
While Butenko cited "the experience of China" as having confirmed "the truth, 
according to which 'the liberation of the toilers may be only their own 
undertaking'," and the principle "that 'democracy for the toilers' cannot be 
realised without the real participation in it of the toilers themselves", his words 
evidently meant much even if they remained only in R u s s i a n . 9 9
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In terms of political effect, the rhetorical strategy of directly calling the bluff 
of Soviet bosses' professed adherence to genuine socialist principles may be 
successful, particularly after the advent of glasnost' .100 However, during 
Andropov's time at the top, Butenko also presented a critical analysis of Soviet 
society in the form of a theoretical discussion about the prospects for a transition 
to socialism in backward countries with an undeveloped economy. 101 The fact 
that, in an account of Lenin's post-revolutionary idea of state capitalism, he 
referred to "the extreme economic backwardness of Russia," identifies his 
argument as similar in scope to the criticism made by Levkovsky and 
Simoniya.102 Butenko highlighted "a disproportion in the localisation of the 
objective and subjective prerequisites for the transition to socialism", which 
"conditions the fact that subjective aspirations toward socialism in countries with 
an undeveloped economy exceed the objective p o ssib ilities  o f their 
realisation." 103 He claimed that:
Such a situation results in the fact that not all countries with an undeveloped 
economy, having implemented a political revolution and broken with the 
supremacy of the exploiters, may successfully proceed in contemporary 
conditions to socialism. Precisely because of the absence of a series of objective 
conditions, the possibility of constructing socialism in separate countries, as 
historical experience shows, is not turned into a reality, a result which has 
been and still is manifested in breakdowns, backward movements, and in 
unforeseen forms of development. 104
That 'not all countries' may be read as meaning not any, because of the effect 
which objective limitations have had on subjective aspirations, is suggested by 
Butenko's open reference in 1988 to the USSR as "post-capitalist" rather than
socialist. 105
The main theme of Butenko’s 1983 book was the need for a careful resolution 
of "the contradiction between political power and the development of a 
multistructural economy" during the first stage of a 'reduced' transition to 
socialism. He focused on the dilemma of a post-revolutionary regime having to 
encourage economic growth through private enterprise, particularly in the 
countryside, without threatening its own political s t a b i l i t y .  106 in a clear 
reference to Stalin’s 'great change', Butenko noted that an intensification of this
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contradiction "gives rise to a 'temptation' to resolve it with administrative 
107m e a s u r e s . " H e  characterised this policy as the least successful historically of 
"three essentially differing conceptions of resolving the basic tasks of a transition 
to s o c i a l i s m . "  108 ^  t h j s  administrative solution, the masses are compelled "to 
sacrifice themselves in the name of the future," with the authorities repressing 
"not only the resistance of remnants of the exploiting classes, but all social forces 
not agreeing that sacrifices in the name of an accelerated transition to socialism 
and communism are necessary." 109 Proclamations of success notwithstanding, 
this policy proves so mistaken that it "may be fatal for the prospects of socialist 
construction."! 10 Butenko summarised a second, 'market socialist' policy, 
according to which it is necessary "to make space for the regulating activity of the 
law of value," for the reason that "since socialism grows out of a society based on 
private property, on private interest, it must borrow some of the economic laws 
and mechanisms peculiar to this previous level of development."!H He then 
counterposed a third policy, "in which the means do not contradict the ends", i.e. 
do not "lead to a deformation of socialist attainments." This policy aims for a 
"maximally balanced" but "fundamental" transformation of society, through a 
careful "broadening of planned control over the development of the economy", 
including "the gradual and voluntary co-operation of peasant households"; it 
"must at all stages, with different methods and in different forms, secure the 
union of the working class and the toiling peasantry, and consider the interests of 
other social g r o u p s . " W h i l e  Butenko emphasised the dangers of a 
"left-opportunist strategy, using military-bureaucratic methods for implantating 
'barracks communism"', his distinction between the second and third conceptions 
of a transition to socialism suggests that he is a radical rather than a liberal 
opponent of Stalinism.! 1^
As well as evaluating different strategies for resolving the dilemma which the 
Soviet regime faced during the 1920s, Butenko made some passing comments on 
the systemic consequences of the implementation of bureaucratic centralism by "a 
very broad administrative (or military-administrative) ap p a ra tu s ."P o litica lly , 
this leads "to the gradual separation of this apparatus from the toiling masses, to 
its transformation into an independent hierarchical pyramid, functioning
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according to its own laws, and confessing to a cult of p e r s o n a l i t y . " * ^  
Economically, this system can build factories and muster workers but it cannot 
’’create the economic elements of socialism in an economically undeveloped 
country”. Butenko argued that:
For this it is still necessary to attain such a mode of combining these workers 
with means of production acquired in other countries, so that there is trained 
and formed within them an 'energy of labour', an economic requirement for 
renewing and perfecting these means of production, and for increasing the 
culture of their labour. Otherwise, if a country, having entered on the path of 
socialism, cannot find the ways and modes of fermenting in itself this economic 
requirement for dynamic development, for a continual renewal of production, 
and cannot create the conditions for scientific-technical creativity, for a growth 
of productive initiative and culture, then after a number of years this 
technology, acquired abroad and progressive for its own time, grows old, 
and the country remains as backward economically as it was.*
Since Butenko measured the completion of the first stage of a transition to
socialism by "the destruction of stagnant forms of production", as well as by the
growing involvement of the toilers in administering the affairs of society, he
clearly viewed Stalinism as an 'incubator' only of bureaucrats, and so "an obstacle
on the path of creating the material-technical base of s o c i a l i s m . " * ^  T h i s  applied
particularly to agriculture, because "without the presence of a food fund one can
hardly speak in general about a real socialist p o l i c y . S t r e s s i n g  the
importance of improving agricultural productivity, Butenko argued that forced
collectivisation leads to "both the stagnation of collectivised production itself, in
the bounds of which neither the association of labour nor the weak application of
technique can compensate for a loss of interest in labour on the part of the basic
mass of producers, and a worsening of the economic position of the
p e a s a n t r y . " ^  He directly stated that the retention of backward collective farms
"has been determined at times more by political motives than by productive
expediency", a point made also by Yanov.^O Such a policy leads "not forward to
socialism, but, on the contrary, backwards, to the extremes of primitive
communism, from which traditional oriental despotism grew up, assisting the
191conservation of an extremely low level of productive forces. ^ 1 Butenko 
argued that socialist collectivism "is directed at the maintenance and development 
of every individuality entering into this collective," so that "the historical
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prerequisite of socialist social bonds is not a traditional patriarchal personal bond, 
although the former contains some elements of the latter, but 'personal 
independence, based on external dependence', i.e. again its prerequisite appears as 
a product of capitalist civilisation."122 ^  backward country lacking this 
prerequisite requires "necessary and essential aid" from socialist forces abroad if 
it is to avoid "either a progressive political degeneration, adapting with its own 
means to the economic conditions of the country, or gradual economic stagnation, 
also leading sooner or later to undermining the initial principles of political 
power, to a rejection of the proclaimed goals." 123 Butenko said that if, against 
Lenin’s advice, such forms of development are mistakenly identified as socialist, 
then this would "not only discredit socialism, but, especially, disorientate the 
masses, making it possible to inflict enormous losses on the cause of
socialism." 124
Butenko’s critical arguments are not difficult to understand, so they may have 
been influential amongst critical Soviet intellectuals. How influential is difficult 
to judge, but conservative attacks on Butenko and his involvement with the 
recently formed Moscow Tribune group (saying frankly that Gorbachev’s draft 
laws on political reorganisation are undemocratic and "will not suffice") suggest 
that he has attracted an audience. 125 One issue of interest to a radical readership 
during the ’years of stagnation’ must have been how to define a system which, for 
them at least, was evidently non-socialist and hardly transitional. The most 
widespread answer in these circles was perhaps that which used the term ’state 
capitalism’ in the pejorative sense common before 1921, denoting the last leg of 
private property, rather than a first step toward socialism in a backward 
c o u n t r y .  1 2 6  Amongst the leading scholars this view was argued principally by 
Sheinis, whose statement about an alternative of stagnation summed up Butenko's 
argument, and M i r s k y . 1 2 7  Sheinis first broached this subject in a paper prepared 
for a conference in Leningrad in October 1968, in which he discussed "a 
dangerous tendency of the social isolation of ruling groups, controlling the 
productive forces as their corporate p r o p e r t y . "  1 2 8  Noting that "progressive 
development depends in the greatest degree on the social nature of the state", he 
stressed that "the consolidation of a dominant exploitative class may occur on the
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basis not only of private-capitalist, but also corporate property, which state 
property becomes in a backward country, the majority of whose population has 
been removed from real participation in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . "129 Claiming that such 
property "in the conditions of the developing countries is, of course, not socialist, 
but state capitalist or, in the best case, transitional", he warned about a 
strengthening of "bureaucratic capital" in a regime where "the limitation of 
democracy by elite groups (allegedly in national interests) grows into a system of 
repressive measures constituting a form of their social p r o t e c t i o n . " 1 3 0  ^  1 9 7 1  y 
Sheinis called this regime "a specific form of state capitalism", but only "because 
of the absence of a more accurate and generally-understood equivalent." *31 He 
did not ignore the differences between this system and the West, arguing that "in 
contrast to a private ownership bourgeoisie, the links within the elite bear not a 
heterogeneous, but an organic character", in which "the economic situation of this 
or that group of the elite is determined largely by their position in the state 
administrative system ."!32 By stressing the key role of civil society in 
progressive social and political change, Sheinis has implied that Soviet 
'bureaucratic capitalism’ is inferior to its Western c o u n t e r p a r t . ! 33 His view is 
discussed in detail in the second part of this chapter.
Mirsky is probably the most significant Soviet scholar who participated in the 
subterranean debate. While a prominent commentator on third world events since 
the 1960s, he has made some pertinent observations about the general features of 
a 'swollen state' and 'spent society' in backward countries attempting to catch-up 
with late capitalism. 134 in 1973, after citing Marx on Oriental despotism and 
Engels on the prerogatives of sovereign power, Mirsky pointed out that 
"multistructurality ... created a favourable situation for the rise of a central 
executive a u t h o r i t y . "  135 He focused on "the upper strata of the 
administrative-governmental apparatus" which, "using the might of state power, 
have concentrated in their hands great economic strength, and placed under their 
control a significant part of the means of p r o d u c t i o n . "136 He disputed the 
accuracy of the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' as a name for such people, since 
they do not use these resources as capital, but "only have them at their disposal", 
and derive their income not from "the exploitation of wage labour, but thanks to
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their special, privileged position in the system of production relations." Yet, he 
said "in its way of life, and often in its world-view, this social layer gravitates 
toward the hierarchy of values peculiar to a capitalist society."^ 7  Concerning 
the basic interests of this group, Mirsky wrote:
On the one hand, the state sector is a nourishing environment (if not a feeding 
trough) for the ruling bureaucratic elite, who therefore are interested in its 
development and will fight against those forces (connected with elements of 
private-enterprise capitalism) who in their egoistic interests would like to 
weaken and limit the state sector. On the other hand, however, it is beyond 
doubt that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ in favourable circumstances would 
by no means reject the direct possession of enterprises, and would proceed 
to a coalescence with the private sector (without, of course, yielding the 
instruments of state from their hands). In other words, the possibility of a 
privatisation of enterprises, which are becoming 
the activity of the state sector, exists in principle.
Mirsky viewed factors obstructing the development of Western or Japanese-style
capitalism in most backward countries as "long-lasting, if not perennial."^ 9  But
he thought a "conservative tendency" in the aftermath of a revolution "may lead
to the supremacy of a special type of degenerated, 'thermidorean' authoritarian
elites, resting on bureaucratic castes and objectively facilitating the development
of capitalism, though in a specific, state-capitalist shell."*^0 Disputing
Levkovsky’s "absurd" view of such state capitalism as an engine of socialist
orientation, he argued that it is "opposed to socialism" and "fundamentally" no
different from the system being established in developing countries of capitalist 
141orientation. A
In his chapter on socio-political problems of the 1974 IMEMO book, Mirsky
noted some "causes of the weakness of a legal opposition" which apply to the
USSR as well as the third world. These included weak class differentiation, a
dominant ideology of anti-imperialist nationalism, control of the trade unions and
1 49monopoly of the media by the ruling party. ^ Mirsky characterised the 
relationship of the authorities with the masses in this system as dominated by 
"state paternalism". The ruling circles are concerned "not to awaken the initiative 
of the people", either for fear of revolution or because of a sincere belief that 
they know the people's needs best, while "the people have grown tired of slogans,
profitable as a result of 
138
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and promises; distrust toward words and speeches spreads; conversations about 
freedom and democracy are often treated with indifference. A government 
demonstrating the capacity to cope with inflation is more highly regarded by 
many than a government providing for free elections."*^3 Returning to this 
theme in January 1987, Mirsky observed that:
When new privileged strata appear for all to see, when there grows up a 
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', drawing into its 'magnetic field' the state and 
party apparatus, when high words about revolution, equality and social justice 
are made into hollow sounds, then disillusionment of the masses inevitably 
follows. The society is enveloped with distrust toward authority and its slogans, 
and social apathy spreads. 144
These comments concerned the failure of the 'first generation' of countries to take 
the 'non-capitalist path'. Mirsky claimed that embourgeoisement in the USSR had 
been suppressed, because firstly "there was practically no pernicious influence of 
capitalism 'from outside"’, and secondly "the dictatorship of the proletariat 
existed, in the society there had formed an anti-proprietorial, collectivist 
atmosphere (not to mention administrative 'anti-Nepmen' m e a s u r e s ) . "145 ft [s 
difficult to accept these affirmations as Mirsky's serious opinion about Soviet 
development under Stalin, since he defined a 'Soviet order' as one "awakening the 
independence of the masses" by conducting "a 'revolution from below', and not 
only 'from above'".146 Taking Mirsky at face value about continued proletarian 
power in the USSR would mean ignoring this distinction, and assuming his 
disagreement with Simoniya about the degeneration of Soviet power. In fact, 
Mirsky praised the "historicism, richness of associations and audacity of 
analogies" in Strany Vostoka, and demonstrated, in the discussion of Meliksetov's 
book, his own skill applying such a t t r i b u t e s .  1^7
Meliksetov is one of a group of reformist Soviet Sinologists who have sought 
to "sharpen the reader's appreciation of similarities" between the USSR and 
modem China while placing "trust primarily in historical literacy." A^ ° The key 
theoretical chapter of his book is clearly meant to provide a new overview of 
socio-economic development in Kuomintang China, understood essentially as "an 
energetic process of the monopolisation of large-scale property in the hands of a
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leadership quickly and in an elitist way isolating itself from society.”^ 9  while 
Meliksetov emphasised the specific historical conditions of this process, his 
analysis reverberates with one possible interpretation of Stalinism, evident by 
analogy in a characterisation of Chiang-Kai-Shek's changing role, taken from a 
French researcher:
He became an all-powerful dictator gradually. In the beginning he was a simple 
instrument, which Chinese capitalism wanted to use for implementing a plan of 
capitalist construction in China and for attracting the popular masses to this 
construction. Gradually he became popular with these masses and from an 
obedient instrument was turned into one of the masters, and then into the only 
master of the country — into a dictator. u
Meliksetov highlighted "the speed and intensity of the process of statocratisation 
of the economy, not having clear economic causes”, and sought an explanation in 
”the social self-determination of the Kuomintang ruling layer.” *51 He argued 
that ”the concentration of enormous property in the hands of the state changed the 
social being of this layer, placing an economic foundation under its independent 
existence, which had been conditioned above all by socio-political factors.”*52 
Assuming the 'bureaucratic capitalist' nature of their state property, Meliksetov 
defined them "as a collective exploiter, ... a collective capitalist.”*53 Their 
ideology was devoted to "justifying the policy of statocratisation of large-scale 
property,” using "traditional garments” in "ideological campaigns” aimed at 
"making sacred state power and, consequently, the 'chief of this state and his 
p r o g r a m m e . " ^54 Quoting an article on China by Lukin, Meliksetov noted that, 
while "the remoteness of these campaigns from the real needs of broad strata of 
the population made this work in the end unsuccessful", it still "led to the 
maintenance and deepening of an authoritarian socio-psychological climate, in 
which 'any form of institutionalisation of social disagreement was completely 
e x c l u d e d ' " .  155 He also quoted Lukin's 'ideology of development' article to 
support his view that nationalism was the main motivation of the Kuomintang 
elite, who wanted "to govern a really great state, and not simply grow rich at the 
expense of the state t r e a s u r y " . ! 5 6
The possibility of applying Meliksetov's analysis to the USSR is apparent in the
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last three contributions to the published discussion of his book. One reason why 
Cheshkov stressed the specific, and not the general, basis for Meliksetov’s 
definition of Kuomintang state property as capitalist was to dispute the accuracy 
of such an application. *57 a  broadly similar concern is implicit in Simoniya's 
response that the '’flexibility" of the concept 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is its "least 
attractive point". Simoniya argued at length that "the simple possession of the 
apparatus of state economic management by any socio-political group does not yet 
make it a bureaucratic bourgeoisie", but "only a bureaucratic elite"; he even 
re-invested "the (juridical) relations of property dominant in a society" with 
special significance in an effort to show that a ruling bureaucracy in charge of the
1 C O
means of production is not ipso facto a collective capitalist. ° These remarks 
were directed against the contribution of Mirsky and Sheinis, whose argument 
about "the establishment of state capitalism of a new type, distinct from 
historically known forms", referred not just to "Afro-Asian countries of capitalist 
development" (a name used "for want of a more adequate term") but also to 
Soviet-type societies. 159 The passage, quoted in chapter four, about a domestic 
reproduction of collective capital in this system outside the laws of the market 
suggests such a r e a d i n g .  160 Like Western exponents of this view, Mirsky and 
Sheinis defined "this original system" as capitalist because:
it is based on the alienation of the producer from the means of production and 
results of labour, on exploitation, on social inequality, on the production of 
surplus value, which is distributed between 'the collective capitalist' and private 
capitalists. It is capitalist also because it is included in the meta-system of the 
world capitalist economy and is subjugated to the basic logic of the latter's 
development. The reflection of all this in social psychology is a corresponding 
set of bourgeois value orientations, a proprietorial approach to life, and a 
dominant motive of personal success. On this ground there grow up 
bureaucratism, corruption and other negative social phenomena.
They argued that "this is not a derivative system, constituting an emanation of a 
dominant private-capitalist economy, but a self-contained structure striving to 
immortalise itself, arising initially as a superstructure over a multistructural 
economy, but subsequently penetrating all branches of socio-economic relations in 
the society." Growing "as an answer to the imperatives dictated by the 
development of world productive forces", this structure "creates some
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opportunities for an economic advance, a way out from backwardness (thanks to 
the primacy of the state sector in the economic structure), and the solution of a 
number of urgent national problems."162 Mirsky and Sheinis claimed that, 
comparing Kuomintang policy "with contemporary Chinese reality, one inevitably 
comes to the conclusion that in essentially different political and ideological 
forms, sharply conflicting with each other, there have been and still are 
manifested — however paradoxically ~ variants of resolving similar problems 
which are very close in their socio-economic nature.”163 Clearly, in their view 
the phenomenon of sharp conflicts shrouding basic similarities has characterised 
not just China, but the modem world system.
This sweeping generalisation of Meliksetov’s analysis was not the only 
analogical form of argument open to radical scholars wishing to expose the Soviet 
elite. The Chinese mirror was used more effectively by Ostrovitianov and 
Sterbalova to highlight "a degeneration of regimes, which earlier embarked on 
the non-capitalist path, in the direction of a modernised 'asiatic' mode of 
p r o d u c t i o n . "  1 6 4  The Sino-Soviet split was a godsend for critical socialists within 
the Soviet intelligentsia. It meant they could comment seriously on one case of a 
revolution defeated, openly stating such points of significance for Soviet history 
as: "the nature of the working class is alien to all kinds of despots, authoritarian 
regimes, and the deification of 'strong' personalities.”165 While agreeing with 
Levkovsky about the need in backward countries for ”a whole historical 
pre-socia list stage” of development, Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova disagreed 
fundamentally with him about the historical consequences of ”a transformation of 
executive power into a closed, self-developing organism, reproducing a swelling 
of administrative personnel as its main political s u p p o r t . ”166 ^  stark contrast to 
Levkovsky’s 'incubator' metaphor, they argued that a "reactionary degeneration 
of leading groups" results in the dominance of society by "bureaucratic castes," 
who "freeze democracy, halt the movement to a socialist goal ... and exploit the 
toilers in their name, resorting to both economic and non-economic methods of 
c o e r c i o n . " 1 6 7  Like Butenko, they thought such a regime can "only immortalise 
poverty, backwardness and the oppressed position of the people, lead the nation 
into the dead-ends and by-ways of history, plunge it into a state of uninterrupted
297
dissatisfaction and unrest." Consequently, "it is inevitable that there be a 
prolonged period of zig-zags, vacillations, coups at the top, and persistent and 
bitter struggle, which must in the end return society onto a path of movement 
toward the real socialist g o a l . "  168
It is significant that Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova restated this goal in classical 
Marxist terms as a society in which the state first changes its character and then 
"withers away", with "the personal leadership of revolutionary ruling groups 
being gradually replaced by more widespread democratic regimes."*69 They 
criticised some revolutionaries for "intolerance toward all other opinions", but 
did not regard the discrediting of "genuine socialist ideals" by "the theory and 
practice of new authoritarian regimes" as irreversible. ^ 0  Their optimism was 
based not on an assumption of transitionality, but on an understanding that the 
alternative posed by 'the classics' could never be fully blotted out, despite 
everything that has happened "under the name of s o c i a l i s m " . ^ !  They pointed 
out that Engels warned decisively against identifying as socialist the "'crying 
anachronism'" of a society in which "chauvinism, a return to national seclusion, 
and the galvanisation of old despotic methods of administration leads naturally to 
the loss of all progressive a t t a i n m e n t s . " ^ 7  Emphasising the scale of this 
phenomenon, they commented that:
Such historical precedents are all the more dangerous in that they have a 
tendency to be repeated. In separate national states there have formed at the top 
authoritarian elites who play upon the backward psychology of the people, 
consciously erode the proletariat, deliberately disunite the masses, incite upon 
each other different strata of toilers, and regenerate in a modernised form 
outdated, archaic institutions, using them for consolidating an unlimited 
despotism. A true revolution ends up in a situation when, according to the 
characterisation of Marx, in order that society would not have attained itself 
a new content, the state as it were returns itself to its most ancient form.
This process is masked, screened from the masses by a cascade of clanking 
socialist slogans, camoflauged by highly-strung, ecstatic 'revolutionary' rituals, 
which are called upon to cultivate in the people a mood of sacrifice and 
self-estrangement. In such a society empty talk inevitably becomes superior 
to social content, which ephemerally, fluctuatingly, slidingly, like mercury, 
is fully dependent upon continually changing external and internal political 
goals. 73
In a previous article Sterbalova suggested that the Mao Zedong group were trying
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Mto kill in the consciousness of the Chinese people the conception of socialism" by 
doing "everything possible, in order that society would accept the practice of 
present-day China for socialist development." She made the more serious object 
of her criticism clear by adding: "But history, as Marx said, repeats itself twice: 
the first time in the form of tragedy, and the other in the form of farce." Having 
described Mao and (by implication) his predecessor Stalin as creators of an 
"anti-utopia", she summed up the ideological role of this concoction in world 
history by concluding that defenders of 'state socialism' like "the Maoists would 
do well to remember a simple and obvious truth which is so clearly expressed in 
the well-known aphorism: you may fool some of the people all of the time, and all 
of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the 
time."174
Civil Society and the Need for Reform
Not all Soviet intellectuals hoping for change would have endorsed such
radical criticism of the Soviet elite. A defence of inequality presented by El'ianov
in 1976 outlines the probably more influential liberal alternative to economic
stagnation. Referring to radical articles by Sterbalova, Cheshkov and Sheinis,
El'ianov agreed that "the extraordinarily large salaries by local standards of the
upper branch of the state administration are, undoubtedly, an attribute of power
and a manifestation of the relative independence of the local ruling e l i t e . "  175
Noting an absence of "social and political forces able effectively to oppose the
greedy aspirations of the ruling clique," he claimed that "nevertheless it is hardly
possible to reduce everything to this", since "such a straightforward evaluation, in
our opinion, somewhat oversimplifies the essence of the matter."*76 Elianov
argued that "the developing countries sharply need a fundamental improvement of
the system of state administration." He viewed this as essential for securing
"proper leadership" of "the modernisation of the local economy," and considered
that better administration "demands a sharp rise in the qualifications of the
appropriate personnel, and consequently significantly higher payment for their 
1 77labour."11' He regarded some administrative sponging as inevitable "with the
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current state of socio-economic and political structures", but overall thought it 
correct "to speak about the growth of a professional and bureaucratic layer as a 
concomitant component of the economic and cultural progress of the developing 
countries, a component which according to its material level finds itself in the 
position of an elite".^ 8  This perspective on the necessary role of bureaucracy in 
development is basically Weberian, and so quite different from that of 
Levkovsky, who followed Lenin in regarding bureaucracy as first and foremost 
an obstacle to workers' control, and indeed a temporary obstacle which hatches 
the prerequisites for its own supersession. ^ 9  There are significant points of 
overlap between these alternative perspectives, particularly concerning criticism 
of statocratisation as resulting in what Erik Pletnev recently called "Soviet 
'monopolism'", but an important difference r e m a i n s .  jf Levkovsky implied 
that a socialist society is still a future possibility, most supporters of the law of 
value as an everlasting objective measure of efficiency regard the contemporary 
USSR as socialist, while implying that socialism is distinct from capitalism not 
according to its mode of production, but according to its pattern of distribution or 
political system, or simply its tragic history.181
There have been several spurts of liberalism in Russia in the past, but the 
current one is arguably the most substantial to date. As Hough has suggested, the 
eagerness of the intelligentsia "for a relaxation of the dictatorship and an opening 
to the West" has connected with, but also outstripped, the recognition by a new 
generation of leaders that change is necessary to overcome their country's 
increasing relative backwardness in the modem w o r l d .  This awareness of the 
need for reform was best expressed in the opening of Shmelev's famous article, 
"Advances and Debts": "The state of our economy satisfies nobody. Its two 
central, in-built defects — the monopoly of the producer in conditions of universal 
shortage, and the lack of interest of enterprises in scientific-technical progress — 
are probably clear to all." Shmelev said that no wise men know completely "what 
is to be done" to fix these defects, but offered for consideration a series of liberal 
solutions, including creating "a comparatively small reserve army of labour" (i.e. 
unemployment) as a means of "particularly economic" rather than administrative 
"compulsion".^83 The response to these proposals from around and above
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confirms the view that the commonality of perception between the intelligentsia 
and the new leaders is limited. While 9 out of 10 readers' letters supported 
Shmelev's solutions, Gorbachev in commenting on this article agreed with the 
diagnosis, but doubted the receptiveness of the patient, if not the effectiveness of 
the cure.
Both the strength and weakness of liberal economic reform in the USSR can 
be judged from the fact that, in broad outline, Shmelev had already presented the 
policy of 'cost-accounting socialism' in a book published in 1970.^5 this book 
he argued against the view that there are two appropriate 'models' of socialism, a 
highly-centralised and autarkic type of 'extensive' development suitable for 
backward countries and an optimally-balanced market mechanism of economic 
growth feasible only in a highly-developed country. ^ 6  He stressed his support 
for 'market socialism' even in an underdeveloped country by making the strange 
claim that in the USSR during the 1930s "the work of the majority of enterprises 
was based on principles of cost-accounting and the unprofitability of separate 
producers was never considered a norm ".*^ This is an extreme case of a Soviet 
economist legitimating the regulating role of the law of value by declaring that it 
already e x i s t s . S h m e l e v  likewise asserted that "in the nature of a socialist 
order there have not been and are not any objective regularities of development 
demanding a u t a r k y " . Y e t  his argument about the need for a "forcing of 
industrial exports" implied that a tendency 'to swim against the tide' of economic 
interdependence still existed, and it proved so strong in the Brezhnev years that 
by the mid 1980s the USSR was already exporting proportionately less machinery 
than a number of developing countries. The strength of Shmelev’s demand to 
replace a sellers' market with a buyers’ market, based on the "productive and 
financial independence of enterprises", is that it has long since attained the status 
of an economic axiom amongst the Soviet intelligentsia. The weakness is that 
it has been continually ignored by responsible officials who have found resorting 
to 'administrative methods' easier than 'cost-accounting', if not unavoidable. 
Toward the end of "Advances and Debts" Shmelev repeated, in direct and more 
colourful terms, a claim about "a shortage of qualified personnel" which he made 
in his 1970 book, when he had argued that simply increasing investment does not
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create "a productive economic mechanism of development.” On the contrary, ”an 
unjustifiably high rate of accumulation may lead to a negative effect because of 
the excessive social tension occasioned by concomitant administrative measures, 
the suppression of incentives to work, and the irrational allocation of the 
accumulation fund resulting from imperfections in the organisational structure of 
society and a shortage of trained p e r s o n n e l . ” a  k e y  problem for liberal 
economic reform is that the existing centralised economic system inculcates in its 
administrators a ”'god given’ right to command”, so that the original shortage of 
qualified personnel is reproduced.*^3
The main problem facing the development of liberalism in the USSR is that, in 
the short term, ’’everything depends upon the character of the leadership of 
society, upon whether or not it gives an opportunity for the manifestation of 
independence and variety in the thinking and conduct of the members of 
s o c i e t y . " T h i s  reliance of liberalism upon reform from above does not mean 
that the leadership’s options are unlimited. An argument for liberalism put 
forward by Popov in the late 1970s rested on a thesis about the "not very wide 
choice” facing a modernising state directing an "extraordinarily painful” process 
of ’development from a b o v e ’ . Popov defined this process as characteristic of 
all backward countries, in which there is "a significant gap between the might of 
the modernising pressure of the modem sector and the absorbent capacities of the 
traditional environment." He suggested that while the state had to satisfy "a need 
to accelerate economic development" within socially-acceptable limits, it would 
tend "to favour economic growth" at the expense of "traditionalism and stability", 
because of "the presence of available modem technique with its demonstration 
effect, and the already largely formed progressive orientation of the educated 
e l i t e " .  ^ 6  7^13 Westernising view assumes that backwardness in a competitive 
world ultimately makes some degree of liberalisation necessary, even while 
creating obstacles for its development. From a liberal viewpoint, the success of 
restructuring depends largely upon whether the imperatives for overcoming 
backwardness have a stronger impact on the leadership than structural legacies of 
the past. While Kliamkin has stressed that the absence in Russia of a suitable soil 
for parliamentary democracy "predetermined the failure of all past attempts at the
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liberalisation of the country,” he was still expectant about the prospects for the 
present reform from above. In a book review published in March 1985, he noted 
the topicality of considering those 19th Century Russian revolutionary democrats 
who placed their 'hopes in the top leaders', expecting them to create "more 
favourable conditions for the action of progressive forces".*^
A key concern of Soviet intellectuals since Gorbachev's attempted liberalisation 
began has been to find some guarantee that this reform from above will not prove 
fruitless because of a change at the top. One participant in a recent discussion 
about "factors of the irreversibility of restructuring” said in this respect:
It seems to me that the question must be put this way. For us - beginning with 
the 1930s and continuing in the following decades - the state crushed civil 
society under itself. In essence the interests of society, the interests of specific 
people and social groups were replaced and supplanted by bureaucratic 
interests. In my view, the most important problem is whether society can 
control the state, and the p a r t y ,  o
The concept of civil society, which "includes the whole complex of relations 
outside the limits of the political state", has recently regained the 'right of 
citizenship' in Soviet social science. One article notes that "without a society 
freely developing under the aegis of the state, the latter gradually degrades and 
loses its genuine meaning and p u rp ose. " 2 0 0  Another article suggests that a 
successful socialist revolution in a backward country leads to "an inversion of the 
functions of state and civil society", which can only be overcome by an 
"institutionalisation of the basic branches” of the l a t t e r . 2 0 1  The vagueness of 
these open references to civil society in the USSR supports the recent opinion of 
V.G. Gel'bras that Soviet social scientists are "in essence, only approaching a new 
reading of this conception, and a translation of its rich content into the language 
of specific policy." He pointed out that amongst the Soviet intelligentsia the 
concept of civil society "was revived by orientalists," who used it for "analysing a 
society that has still not become civil, does not have fully formed classes, and is 
undergoing a difficult period of transformation, characterised by the pressing 
together of systemically-different c o m p o n e n t s . "202 That the orientalists 
concerned did not just have the Orient in mind is suggested by Slavnyi in his
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review of Simoniya's conception of the key role of civilisational factors in a 
successful historical synthesis. Claiming "it is impossible to exaggerate the 
scientific and practical significance” of Simoniya's argument, Slavnyi defined its 
reference as "universal”, and cited Gorbachev's policy of "increasing the role of 
the human factor in all spheres of life" to point out that implications for 
understanding Soviet society were i n c l u d e d . 2 0 3
While "the conception of socialism as a civil society" has recently become a 
key piece of reformist rhetoric amongst the Soviet intelligentsia, its two main 
revivers, Simoniya and Sheinis, disagreed somewhat about the possibilities for 
establishing civil society in a backward, state-dominated c o u n t r y . 2 0 4  Simoniya 
based his view on a version of Gramsci’s comparison of the organic stability of 
civil society in developed capitalist countries with its embryonic condition in 
Eastern Europe, "in particular R u s s i a " . 2 0 5  Simoniya argued that "the process of 
the establishment of civil society and its interdependence with the official state" is 
"essentially different" in backward countries from what occurred in Western 
Europe. In the latter, "the formation of civil society was a prerequisite for the 
emergence of the modem bourgeois state", so that "the process of development 
passed in general and as a whole from below — from the economic base and social 
structure to the political s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . " 2 0 6  He claimed that a modernising state 
in a backward country would face an "objective need" to compensate for the 
absence of a "cementing civil life" by introducing "political life from above". But 
since "political life cannot replace the whole complex of manifestations of civil 
life and its cementing role," the modernising state would sooner or later have to 
allow the development of civil society in order to solve "problems of 
national-state integration".207 Summarising the experience of third world 
countries after independence, Simoniya wrote that:
the initiating, stimulating and directing role in the establishment of civil society 
has belonged to superstructural elements, above all to the elite strata of the 
state apparatus (the nucleus of a modem state). In other words, the process of 
the formation of civil society here began largely from above. And only with 
the strengthening and taking shape of civil society may it begin to exercise 
increasing pressure on the official state, compelling the latter to a further 
evolution (a process often accompanied by crises and revolutionary
situations).208
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In his review published in early 1987 Sheinis agreed with the difference between 
East and West, but commented that:
This thought demands clarification. The state, sooner in the sphere of its 
economic activity than in any other, may create and really creates - in contrast 
to European models - certain prerequisites for the formation of civil society, 
although it still often blocks this process quite consciously. But civil society as 
a complex of independent social organisations cannot be created from above, 
other than only as quasi-civil so c ie ty i^
He stressed that civil society has "not only socio-economic, but also socio-cultural
roots", which grew in Western Europe through a "prolonged cultural evolution"
spanning centuries and including many forms.210 He warned that "far-ranging
control from above obstructs the formation of an independent civil society and is
911fraught with catastrophes in the Kampuchean manner."^11 While considering the
market and hence private property as "the economic base of civil society", Sheinis
said "already the phenomenon of fascist dictatorships in Europe has graphically
shown the non-identity of bourgeois and civil society, the possibility of the
existence of capitalism with a 'frozen* civil society — in the rupture of social ties
peculiar to it, the desecration of institutions etc., it also showed that society may
919be reconstructed primarily on the basis of state bonds."'61 In view of his
previous arguments about the 'state capitalist' nature of Stalinism, he evidently
also regarded past Soviet experience as showing that a modernising state could not
913be relied upon to foster the development of civil society from above. J
Supporting change from above does not necessarily imply satisfaction with an 
authoritarian political system. Shmelev, who recently stated that "a revolution 
from above is by no means easier than a revolution from below", concluded a 
1977 paper on economic efficiency by saying that "the task of formulating a 
rational economic policy ... is closely connected with a renewal of the political 
structure and a development of democracy in all spheres of social life". ^  The 
nature of a 'revolution from above' was considered by Simoniya in his historical 
analysis of 'secondary' capitalism in Eastern Europe. His argument is evidently 
not meant to be transferred altogether for understanding Soviet history, but is 
topical in the light of Shmelev's open statement of a common formula for
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Gorbachev’s r e s t r u c t u r i n g . ^ ^  while the context of Simoniya's discussion is ’’the 
transition from an absolutist to a Bonapartist type of state organisation”, he noted 
that the complex character of this transition in countries of 'secondary' capitalism 
"could not but affect the whole subsequent social development of states of this 
group”.216 Khoros has suggested that, in terms of agrarian relations, the 
"despotic role of the state" and cultural integration, 'secondary' capitalism in 
Tsarist Russia was more backward even than in Japan; he concluded that "the 
objective problems and contradictions of the formational development of Russian 
society have long since made themselves known in the country constructing 
s o c i a l i s m . " ^ 7  jn 1975, when Simoniya viewed the USSR in a special transitional 
period composed of a reformist "synthesis of traditional and new elements" in 
which the former were dominant, he implied the need for a "new political 
revolution", but did not consider this as a 'revolution from above', except briefly 
and pessimistically with regard to some states of 'socialist orientation'.^^ By 
1984, when a new leadership was waiting in the wings, he claimed that "a correct 
evaluation of the phenomenon of a revolution from above is today exceptionally 
important". The fact that his analysis of this phenomenon was made before 
Gorbachev’s restructuring began makes it more interesting, since it is 
unencumbered by either illusions or the obvious sensitivity of the subject.^19
Simoniya criticised Agaev for equating a revolution from above with 
"ordinary reforms, implemented by traditional... ruling circles and not changing, 
in essence, either the character of social relations or the nature of superstructural 
institutions themselves." Simoniya argued that a revolution from above should 
not be viewed just as "an essential transformation of society" initiated by a 
"traditional ruling clique", but more deeply as a distorted "reflection" of an 
"incomplete political revolution from below".^20 criticised a Western 
scholar, Ellen Trimberger, for making the opposite mistake to Agaev, in equating 
a revolution from above with one from below by identifying the "real 
revolutionary potential" of the former with the internal nature of the state 
apparatus, rather than with objective forces pushing this conservative apparatus 
toward fundamental change. Simoniya thought the specific "contradictoriness" of 
"a revolution from above consists in the fact that the bureaucratic state apparatus,
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while conservative to the core, reactionary in its subjective aspirations and
counter-revolutionary in the methods which it uses to suppress progressive
political opposition, is compelled by external circumstances to accomplish a
'revolutionary programme' of social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s .  "221 While regarding this
phenomenon as "objectively progressive", he noted that "a revolution from above
is fundamentally different from a revolution from below, according to the
character of the forces participating in it (in particular the complete elimination
of the masses from transformative activity), the direct tactical goals, the form of
social tranformations and the specific results". He concluded that a revolution
from above is "a slow and half-hearted way of resolving urgent social
transformations," and is marked by "the prolonged maintenance of essential
elements" of the old social structure during "systemic renewal of the traditional
political s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " . 222 This characterisation applies to Gorbachev's
restructuring, although not without qualification to Stalin's 'great change', which
993has often been labelled a revolution from above. ^
Agaev recently responded to Simoniya by waving Krasin's flag to confirm the 
rectitude of his own approach to the phenomenon of 'revolutions from above', but 
the conservative nature of his view is clear from two articles published in late 
1987.224 ^  ^ e  first, Agaev defined Gorbachev's restructuring as a "previously 
unknown" but nevertheless "natural stage of the whole epoch of socialist social 
revolution". He cited Ligachev to affirm that the difference between Gorbachev 
and his predecessors is one of "degrees of radicalism, determined by the amount 
of tasks to be solved", and warned of a need to guard against "left-extremist 
pseudo-theories" which put forward the dangerous "thesis of 'a revolution in the
99c
revolution', affecting the very essence of political power. His second article, 
attacking Sheinis for having committed "a nihilistic turn in interpreting the tasks 
of new political thinking", was entitled "The Political Realities of the Developing 
World and Social D i a l e c t i c s ' ' ^ ^  While implying that Sheinis supported taking 
"the path of an artificial maintenance of the social status-quo" in the third world, 
Agaev himself took this path with respect to Soviet history, by defending the 
opinion that the strictest centralisation "was inevitable in a country that was far 
from the most developed economically and situated face to face with the capitalist
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w o r l d .  " 2 2 7  Agaev's main concern was that "the rejection of a class approach to 
reality" would mean wasting the USSR’s complimentary allies amongst 
"detachments of the international workers' m o v e m e n t " . 2 2 8  implicitly, he meant 
that these forces would be much less corrosive of existing 'political realities' in 
the USSR than the effects of an opening to the West. But these realities soon 
shifted of their own accord. Agaev supported his concluding claim about the need 
for all participants in scholarly discussions to observe "the basic demands of social 
dialectics" (i.e. no washing of dirty linen in public) by referring to Avakov’s 
article in the IMEMO j o u m a l . 2 2 9  Yet within six months this journal's new 
editor, Diligensky, accused proponents of a 'class' approach like Nina Andreeva 
of expressing "nostalgia for the time of the cult of personality", and professed 
astonishment at the "unpardonable cynicism" with which they attributed their 
'ideas' about internal enemies to Marx and Engels.230 Agaev is a more erudite 
and less celebrated cynic than Andreeva, but his use of the word dialectics has 
been no more than "a sophistic formula", at least concerning the nature of Soviet 
society.231 Fortunately for the "few readers" who Agaev thought might find his 
stance too cautious, in the next issue of Rabochii Klass Gefter re-affirmed the 
idea of "choice as a condition of l i f e . " 2 3 2
Without doubt the most unjustified of Agaev's claims against Sheinis was that 
his 'nihilistic turn' had led to "an essentially anti-historical concealment and 
smudging of the opposition between capitalism and socialism, as a result of which 
the necessity of a struggle for social progress is d e n i e d . " 2 3 3  Sheinis has devoted 
considerable attention to the problem of formulating some basic "criteria of social 
progress" in the modem w o r l d . 2 3 4  Historically, his main theme has been that 
socialism should not be identified with mere opposition to private capitalist 
monopolies of "another monopoly — the national state, as the most all-embracing 
organ of economic and political c o n t r o l . " 2 3 5 in ¿he paper referred to by 
El'ianov, Sheinis argued, on Lenin's authority, that the "decisive condition" 
determining movement of a society toward socialism is not "the degree of 
statocratisation of the national economy", but whether this economy is "really 
turned to benefit the whole p e o p l e . " 2 3 6  He suggested that "movement only in the 
first of these directions in the best case creates prerequisites for socialism,
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elements of transitional relations, and in the worst case may place under doubt the 
progressiveness of this movement in g e n e r a l .  " 2 3 7  Sheinis has repeatedly called 
attention to the "reactionary potential" of "hasty and excessive statocratisation of 
the economy", manifested in "the disorganisation of the economy and a 'recoil* in 
the socio-political field. "238 ^  1977 he wrote that:
The monopoly position of the state structure in the economy, which is often 
supplemented by a monopolisation of political power by new ruling groups, 
in specific social conditions contains not only the possibility of opposition to 
imperialism and local reactionary classes, and the possibility of a progressive 
restructuring of the national economy, but also those negative tendencies 
peculiar, as V.I. Lenin emphasised, to any monopoly: an aspiration toward 
stagnation and decay, onesidedness of technical progress, the fomenting of 
parasitical expenditure, anti-democratic tendencies in politics etc.239
Sheinis implied then that Soviet leaders showed "a tendency to undertake decisions 
prompted not by a serious analysis of objective processes, but by chance 
i m p u l s e s " . 2 4 0  Coincidentally or otherwise, these two criticisms were made with 
reference to the late Brezhnev years in speeches to the recent CPSU Conference 
by Arbatov and Primakov respectively. 1
Sheinis is not only significant as a precursor of some opinions about Stalinism 
now openly proclaimed by senior officials. More importantly, he has argued 
since 1968 that the "super-centralised economic and socio-political structures 
which were established in the USSR during the five years after the death of V.I. 
Lenin" can only be reformed in a comprehensive and "scientifically sound" way, 
not "by the method of 'trial and error'".242 most imp0rtant of all, he has
implicitly suggested that successful reform would involve the progressive 
development of private-enterprise capitalism in the USSR. This suggestion seems 
contradicted by the recent arguments of his colleague Shishkov, who has stressed 
the legitimacy of "socialist commodity production today and tomorrow", and by 
Sheinis’ own criticism of "our in-grained identification of capitalism as such with 
economic laws of modem production that are equally obligatory for capitalism 
and s o c i a l i s m . " 2 4 3  But such statements are best interpreted as necessary rhetorical 
attempts to cast doubt upon conservative verities, not as indications of a basic 
agreement between all liberals and Stalinists about the socialist nature of Soviet
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society. Even Afanas'ev has referred to the co-existence of "two systems — 
capitalism and socialism” during ”a whole historical epoch”, in order to argue that 
the existing systems ”must conduct a continual dialogue between themselves, adapt 
to each other, mutually-enrich each other and compete, not at the expense of, but 
for the good of the f u t u r e . ” 2 4 4  This basic thesis of 'new political thinking', that 
there must be 'an interdependent and largely integral world', was affirmed 
unambiguously by Sheinis in 1 9 7 8 .  Concluding a preliminary analysis of the 
criteria of social progress, he asserted that all countries are proceeding "by 
original, unrepeatable and not short paths to the formation of a single 
international community, the basic features and main values of which, according 
to our deep conviction, cannot but be u n i v e r s a l . ” 2 4 5  Sheinis recently argued that 
no country can afford not to follow "the vector of modem historical 
development” — based on an ecologically limited, industrial-scientific market 
economy with political democracy and a basic recognition of "the sovereignty of 
the individual in society" — if it is to avoid the 'alternative' of "degradation and in 
the end c o l l a p s e . " 2 4 6  His previous arguments about the class nature and historical 
prospects of Soviet society allow one to understand his present view as essentially 
social democratic, in the sense of considering social progress as a matter of 
'civilising capitalism', at least until "the very distant f u t u r e " . 2 4 7
The critical analysis of Stalinism presented by Sheinis in 1971 was quite 
radical. This probably reflected an identification with Menshevism or the 
Western new left, particularly the 'state capitalist' school of Trotskyism, although 
Sheinis was sure of the "pointless" nature of the opposition 'plan or market', 
arguing that "practice and theoretical considerations lead to the answer: both plan 
and market, in the state sector and outside it — and with this the general, most 
abstract posing of the question c o n c l u d e s . "248 However, Sheinis stressed that 
"here it is a question of a new form, growing on the soil of the objective 
socio-economic needs of backward countries and possessing a double kind of 
potential: development toward socialism (in as much as the world socialist system 
exists and the transition to socialism is realised on a world scale), or the 
development of a special type of state-capitalist system (in as much as the 
influence of world capitalism has not been overcome, and the internal conditions
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[for development toward socialism] are still extremely i m m a t u r e ) .  "249 Applying 
this alternative to the USSR at the turn of the 1930s clearly implies that the latter 
potentiality has been realised in modem Soviet society. Sheinis argued that "this 
form gives rise to a ruling class of a new type — an elite, which passes through a 
period of social formation, has no prototype in preceding history, and possesses 
specific socio-economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  "2^0 Significantly, he did not claim that 
this new form of society constituted "the ultimate development of capitalism”, but 
rather argued that its specific feature consists "in the fact that the formation of an 
original corporative-statist structure was not prepared for by a process of the 
concentration of production and capital, and by other spontaneous economic 
processes, as this occurred in the West."251
Sheinis listed five key characteristics of this new type of elite. First, and most 
important, are "the special interests peculiar to it, which oppose it to the other 
classes and strata of the national society." Sheinis suggested the selfishness of the 
Soviet elite with a very telling comparison:
In our literature it has been regularly emphasised that in the midst of the elite 
and around it there develops corruption, nepotism, and an aspiration toward 
personal enrichment, which show that its representatives do not devote 
themselves to concern for the common good, but hurry to grab a piece of 
everything devourable.... Demonstrative answers were given by some pupils 
of a boarding school in Mali: 'What is your goal in life?' - 'To finish learning, 
become a patron, have a white wife and a car of the latest model'. 'What is this 
socialism?' - 'It is when we drive out the colonisers and ourselves become the 
patrons.' The elite really strives for consumption on the level of the 'highest 
world standards'. The social prestige of activity in the state apparatus, even in 
its lowest branches, is much higher than in private enterprise, and the income 
is higher, more certain and more stable. Obviously, an important reserve of 
the accumulation fund for plans of development consists in limiting the 
revenue of these g r o u p s .  2
Sheinis was careful enough to add that "it would be a mistake to restrict research 
of the elite as a socio-economic phenomenon to the sphere of distribution and 
personal consumption, since its aspirations are by no means exhausted by villas 
and automobiles." He argued that "its interests are manifested in the most 
different spheres of production and social life", including "foreign policy 
aspirations not having any relation to real social needs" and "re-armament and
militarisation, which have undermined the national e c o n o m y .  " 2 5  3  He said "all 
these divergences in the interests of the national community and the ruling elite 
are immeasurably more dangerous than an excessive passion for personal 
e n r i c h m e n t . "254 ^QCOn^  Sheinis argued that the mechanism for checking the 
economic efficiency of this elite is "much more complex" than the rate of profit 
guiding "usual capitalist firms", since it "includes not only economic, but also 
political relations. The state may ruin the economy during a definite period and 
only after some time receive a more or less telling b l o w . " 2 5 5  Third, Sheinis 
noted that this new elite "has a pyramidal structure", in which "the influence, 
power and amount of personal consumption grows in geometric progression 
according to elevation from the base to the top". He also noted "the 
extraordinarily great role of a narrow group of chief political leaders, not having 
an equivalent in countries with a developed class structure", and remarked that 
"the properly ruling elite is numerically small: those who undertake the basic 
decisions, situated in 'a room with controls’, are few." But Sheinis argued that 
"this is no basis for concluding that the elite as a whole is not a class formation: 
indeed, in the imperialist countries the big bourgeoisie forms only part of a 
class." He claimed that the organic character of political power means that the 
elite as a whole realises "a right of corporate property on the most important part 
of national revenue and national wealth", with the economic position of groups in 
the elite dependent upon their political s t a n d i n g . 2 5 6  Fourth, Sheinis noted that 
"the elite has special modes of formation and reproduction: the decisive place 
belongs not to the institution of inheritance, but to education, service in the army, 
nepotism etc." Fifth, "the elite has special forms of relations with other social 
groups, including different kinds of non-economic c o e r c i o n . " 2 5 7
Sheinis contrasted the historical path of Stalinism with that of capitalist 
Europe, but viewed both as different structures "through which society moves 
toward socialism." He argued that, while "in the classical variant political power 
was a realisation of economic supremacy", "here politics takes precedence over 
economics, though this is not only a political process (because relations of 
property, as was the case for example in traditional old-oriental despotisms, are 
intertwined and merged with relations of political power), but the formation of a
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new socio-economic and political structure". Saying that "the contradictions 
contained here deserve the most intent attention", he described the main 
contradiction ("manifested in the course of recent decades") as that, while "only 
the state" could oversee progressive development, in conditions of "the inertia of 
large social classes, the weakness and smallness of the modem working class and 
other social groups engendered by the scientific-technical revolution, often the 
state falls into the hands of self-seeking forces, who are indifferent to common 
national interests." He suggested that "a tendency toward a certain isolation of the 
interests and social positions of the state elite group will probably operate so long 
as the basic classes of modem society have not developed, so long as historical 
development has not broken up ancient traditions of peculiar absenteeism and 
social indifference amongst large groups of the p o p u l a t i o n . " 2 5 8  Sheinis argued 
that progressive development requires "the formation of social counter-balances 
to the state apparatus, the formation of a mechanism subjugating the activity of 
the state to (or, at least, correlating it with) the interests of society," without 
which "catastrophic results" may occur. He called for "workers' control of the 
enterprises of the state sector," since "without this the plan-regulating activity of 
the state will always be subject to the danger of social deformation and economic 
inefficiency." Having said that "even a structure which undoubtedly contained in 
itself important elements of socialism maintains the internal potential for social 
degeneration", he concluded that "the really progressive alternative ... is in any 
case connected with a prolonged and difficult process of development of forms of 
social autonomy, formation of political democracy, social control over the 
activity of state organs at all levels, and the break-up of a social psychology 
containing elements of passivity and s e r v i l i t y . " 2 5 9
The question of whether the Stalinist system could be reformed, rather than 
just maintained with adaptions to the demands of modem production, would have 
been pondered by Sheinis during the long 'years of stagnation'. The answer he 
offered in the early 1980s through an analogical discussion of "Marx's model of 
Bonapartism" was rather pessimistic.260 jh ç  main reason for pessimism was the 
way a dictatorial regime had constrained the development of modem social 
classes. Summarising Marx's model, Sheinis commented that: "the spike of a
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Bonapartist dictatorship was directed at suppressing the independent political 
activity of the working class (this we remember well), at repressing, destroying 
and perverting the institutions of civil society, in as much as they existed 
independently from the state, and at depriving the democratic intelligentsia of an 
independent role (about this we are often inclined for some reason to f o r g e t ) . " 2 6 1  
Sheinis suggested implicitly that, while there are no ’’direct analogies" in history, 
the USSR during Stalin's rise to power contained a "specific refraction and 
hypertrophy" of five basic ingredients of B o n a p a r t i s m . 2 6 2  First, a mass of 
"de-classed elements" (who in Marx’s model formed the bulk of the sovereign’s 
"praetorian guard"). Second, a particularly backward peasantry. Third, a 
"motley conglomerate" of a bourgeoisie, which had grown out of a society 
characterised by "strict social stratification and non-economic divisions". Fourth, 
a working class still only a 'class in itself, "quantitatively small (especially its 
factory detachments)," receiving "some benefits which other social strata do not 
have, and situated sometimes under state patronage." And fifth, significantly 
weaker institutions of civil society than 19th Century France.^63 Having thus 
outlined the balance of class forces which (in Marx's words) allowed "a grotesque 
mediocrity to play a hero's part", ^64 sheinis characterised the result in terms of 
the following "important distinctive features" of the type of society concerned:
- a strong state, which has absorbed in itself several functions that in Europe 
civil society fulfilled;
- the weakness of economic and social counter-balances to the power of the 
state, which represents an aggregate not only of definite social, but also 
particular personal interests;
- a violent unification of different aspects of social and ideological life (often
in a religious form);
- significant economic inefficiency, and the wasting of limited resources on 
prestigious and other parasitical goals;
- the consolidation of social inequality on a new basis;
- a strengthening of rigidity, with a peculiar kind of ossification of a series of 
social structures, complicating progressive processes of social e v o l u t i o n . 2 6 5
Sheinis said "of course, this is only one of the tendencies of social development, 
but a tendency sufficiently real, which is rooted in the past and present of many 
countries of the East and fraught with serious shocks, that may extend beyond 
national-state boundaries." He remarked that "today it is difficult to judge the
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longevity of such structures, but they hardly seem a short-lived and localised 
historical episode like the Second empire in F r a n c e .  "266
Whether the West would prefer to do business with actually existing Stalinism, 
rather than risk the uncertainties of a liberal ’roll-back’, was perhaps the biggest 
unresolved issue for Soviet scholars during the stop-start detente of the 1970s. 
The comments of Mirsky and Sheinis about this matter provide the best example 
for understanding Kagarlitsky's point, that esoteric discussion of the USSR has 
taken place not just through Aesopian language, but through theoretical study of 
’’actual relations existing in other countries. The relevance to Soviet reality ... 
appears not in the garbling or mixing-up of some phenomena with others — that is 
done by the authors of official textbooks — not in any [special] sort of 
camouflage, but merely in the choice of m a t e r i a l . "267 After wondering whether 
growing "state regulation at the expense of the market" in the West "has its 
limits", Mirsky and Sheinis focused on a crucial "second question: what 
socio-economic system will contemporary capitalism in general and the 
multinational corporations in particular transplant, propagate and support in the 
developing c o u n t r i e s ? " 2 6 8  t wo contrasting answers which Mirsky and Sheinis 
reviewed could have appeared to insightful readers as opposing ’positions’ on the 
issue of Western policy toward the USSR, should the latter be forced 
economically to open its doors. The first position was optimistic from the point 
of view of Soviet intellectuals concerned about establishing some ’economic and 
social counter-balances to the power of the state':
In as much as the capitalist oriented developing countries will to a growing 
degree be guided by foreign capital, Western markets, Western sources for 
receiving financial means, equipment, food, 'know-how' etc., and in as much as 
imperialism remains imperialism and cannot but use these circumstances for 
imposing its model of social order, all this must lead to the consolidation of 
private-enterprise capitalism on the periphery of the world capitalist system, 
and undermine here the regulating role of the state and state s e c t o r .  "
Mirsky and Sheinis said "supporters of this point of view rest upon no small 
number of facts of contemporary reality", but added: "their opponents may enlist 
no fewer facts and no less weighty theoretical considerations.They assert that 
neocolonialism, striving organically to integrate the developing countries into a
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modified system of world economic ties, will endeavour in every way to 
encourage and 'feed up’, 'domesticate' state c a p i t a l i s m .  "270 ^  this view, Western 
monopolies have already shown that they prefer to do business with an 
authoritarian state, rather than "support an unstable, capricious and weak private 
sector, which is not able in the political plane to independently secure stability and 
a firm anti-revolutionary order." While "liberal circles in the West" have been 
"distressed" by the downfall of parliamentary experiments in the third world, 
their conservative "opponents reply that such a kind of democracy anyway had no 
strong roots here, could not have secured the stability necessary for economic 
growth and stable relations, restrained revolutionary forces and created a suitable 
investment climate." This second view was pessimistic, at least from the 
short-term perspective of Soviet liberalism: "Considering all this, influential 
imperialist circles are inclined toward state capitalist, bourgeois-bureaucratic, in 
particular military-despotic, regimes in the developing countries -- this, maybe, is 
for them the main chance to prevent a transition of these countries onto the path 
of socialism and to retain their control in the developing world".271 jf such 
regimes suit the West in the third world, then why not in the USSR as well, the 
hopes of dissidents and the morals of the 'free world' n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ? ^ ^  [ s  
significant that Mirsky and Sheinis took this 'position' seriously, in spite of 
optimistic predictions about the liberal prospects for detente made by Arbatov's 
institute and IMEMO's systems theorists at the t i m e . 2 7 3  This suggests concern 
that a selective opening to the West might exacerbate the "basic defect" of the 
structures of Stalinism, which "consists in their small capacity for further change, 
in an excessive regulatedness that leads society into a historical d e a d - e n d . "274
Despite doubting the internal and external possibilities for reform, Sheinis was 
not one of those who "had fallen into the depths of despair", mesmerised by the 
question: "How great is the inertia of prolonged s t a g n a t i o n ? "275 His 'criteria of 
social progress' may be read as an attempt to specify the necessary conditions for 
achieving a "broadening of the class base of the s t a t e " . 2 7 6  The basic requirement 
was a focus on the quality rather than quantity of social production. Sheinis 
directed his classification of development of the productive forces as only a 
prerequisite of social progress against those for whom nominally high tempos of
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economic growth had become "the object of an ecstatic cult”. He argued that,
while such tempos are ”most often attained with a low initial level in conditions of
a massive relocation of material resources and labour power from the countryside
to the towns”, economic development requires a continual adaptation to the
demands of ”that technological mode of production — industrial, and then
scientific-technical — which has formed (or is forming) in the more developed
c o u n t r i e s . ”277 T h i s  Western orientation was reflected in the criteria of progress
chosen by Sheinis: first, an unrestricted pattern of consumption able to stimulate
economic activity; second, increasingly productive labour, comparable in
discipline as well as solidarity to workers who have passed through ”the harsh
school of capitalism”; third, a social and international development of culture,
which "must not be closed in the narrow circle of an intellectual elite"; fourth, an
overcoming of social inequality which is "connected not so much with a reduction
of the intensity of inequality (it is sometimes even increased), as with the
transition from non-economic, personal forms of it, resting on direct violence or
tradition, to primarily economic and impersonal, anonymous forms"; and fifth,
greater personal freedom, "with the development of democratic control and a
variety of forms of social a u t o n o m y . "278 Sheinis supported his attack on
egalitarianism with a reference to Marx’s threefold scheme of the development of
social independence, implying that a society like the USSR based on the "total
dependence” of the individual is essentially p r e - c a p i t a l i s t . 2 7 9  while this attack
was endorsed enthusiastically in a review by Fridman in Novy Mir soon after "the
important principle of true social justice — equal pay for equal labour and
980unequal pay for unequal labour" had become an official slogan of reform, w not 
all Soviet intellectuals who favour private enterprise perceive a "direct 
counter-position of egalitarian aspirations and economic growth." Reisner had 
argued that "economic egalitarianism" is directed "against the selfish interests of 
elite groups amongst the ruling bureaucracy," and implies the need for "a 
democratisation of all spheres of social and political life and changes in the 
structure of p o w e r . " 2 8 1
Sheinis recently argued that the "main danger" to progressive change lies in 
widespread "inertia and conformism" providing opportunities for "conscious
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opponents of restructuring" amongst the "central economic bureaucracies" and 
"especially in the provinces" to "discredit reform i t s e l f . " 2 8 2  t h e  threat of 
reaction is inherent in a situation where "the state, as a rule, faintly submits to 
influence from social classes and strata of the national community standing 
’outside’ and ’below’ a hierarchical statist s t r u c t u r e . " ^ 3  in 1983, Sheinis said 
economic development can be "choked in a stagnant social environment", when an 
underdevelopment of "the ’human factor' of the productive forces" results from 
"breaches between economic modernisation and the conservatism of important, 
sometimes system-forming features of the socio-cultural o r d e r .  " 2 8 4  Thjs danger 
was emphasised by Slavnyi, who focused on the social process of 'planned 
anarchy', which Sheinis had shown as "engendered not so much by the 
incompetence of the [administrative] actors, i.e. by a shortage in their professional 
knowledge, as by their negative purposes regarding the economy and economic 
problems." 2 8 5  § i a v n y i  endeavoured "to listen to their anti-imperialist and 
anti-capitalist rhetoric, in order to understand the real meaning enclosed in
o  o/r
it "¿oo foun(i this in the way such rhetoric had "slowed socio-class 
development" by forming "communities consolidated on a traditionalist basis", 
which are "supported by redistributive solidarity and other social institutions 
allowing people to live independently of the extent of their labour contribution to 
economic a c t i v i t y . " 2 8 7  He suggested this state-centred "socio-cultural process", 
which Sheinis considered as a pre-capitalist social "integrator" based on "personal 
bonds" and "respect for authority", was now the main "generator of anti-capitalist 
and anti-market t e n d e n c i e s . " 2 8 8  By fostering "the accumulation of enormous 
social energy, directed in words against capitalism and in deed against modem 
society and the social forces connected with it (in particular against modem 
detachments of the working class)", a conservative state had tried to "block the 
free play of political forces, and violently press against each other atomised 
elements" of the population, so it could preserve its traditional structure 
irrespective of the social consequences of "its intervention in processes of
administering the e c o n o m y " . 2 8 9
In his 1983 book, Sheinis repeated his earlier observation that "the state may 
ruin the economy over a long time, ... but not feel an urgent need to correct its
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course, since 'checking' occurs through the socio-political sphere, in which it 
disposes of supplementary 'resources of survivability'", and through which 
"impulses are not only delayed, but often bring distorted i n f o r m a t i o n .  "290 But 
he now agreed with Cheshkov that such a "state economy" may "only with a great 
stretching of interpretations be characterised as state c a p i t a l i s m " . ^  1 This 
conclusion, that Soviet society has been neither capitalist nor socialist, is also 
implicit in comments made by Leonid Vasil'ev and by Mirsky about the prospects 
for a movement toward private ownership. Vasil'ev's main argument is that "in 
all the post-primeval history of humanity there are only two formations," a 
European one based on private property and a non-European one based on the 
coalescence of power and property in a state mode of production (which has been 
the most widespread historically, though Marx happened to call it the 'asiatic' 
m o d e ) . 292 This view suggests that mature Stalinism was a modem "variant" of 
the latter, which "regenerated" after a qualitative transformation of the old social 
order had failed because "the attributes of capitalism (the naked cash of 
private-ownership ties with a clear priority of the owner as such above the social 
corporation, and with the secondary nature of the state as a servant of the ruling 
class)" were "organically alien to this society from its very b e g i n n i n g . "293 
Vasil'ev argued that "the phenomenon of privatisation" has had virtually no 
chance of overcoming the state mode of production from within, but he implied 
that eventually this mode could not cope with "the character of modem 
production" developed by the capitalist mode, and pointed to present-day China as 
a test-case of what might happen in a state economy where "the role of private 
property is not only officially permitted, but encouraged".294
This last question was addressed by Mirsky, who thought Sheinis had been too 
hasty in agreeing with Cheshkov that a turn to capitalism is precluded by the 
continuing "relative independence of the s t a t e " . 2 9 5  Mirsky hypothesised that:
The special role of the state, which unconditionally will be retained in the future 
(I repeat, to me this seems undebatable), does not exclude the possibility of its 
'merging' with a private-enterprise bourgeoisie. The question is how to 
conceptualise such a merging. The 'big people' of the state and party apparatus, 
evidently, will not yield the levers of rule from their hands and turn into 
factory-owners, but what can stop them from in many ways becoming friendly
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with, and moreover becoming related to businessmen, nouveaux-riches, 
brokers, speculators, or even themselves running a business on the side?
The temptation of entrepreneurship is great, even with regard not to the 
productive sphere, but to trade, services etc. In any case this will be capitalism, 
albeit non-traditional, with the retention in the state's hands of the key 
branches of i n d u s t r y . 2 9 6
Mirsky noted that what is "most difficult of all to determine is the social nature of 
the ruling community." He depicted a basic conflict between a bourgeoisie which 
"sooner or later" feels the need for "one or another kind of representative 
system", and "a statist-bureaucratic elite striving to retain a monopoly of 
administering the state". He listed two possible "ways out" of this conflict: "either 
decisively put the bourgeoisie 'in its place', or proceed with it in a continual 
alliance." He noted that the first variant may only succeed with "the most 
energetic strike on the economic positions of the bourgeoisie, the aim being to 
deprive it of an independent base of existence"; "but this practically means the 
execution of a deep social revolution, which the ruling elite of capitalist oriented 
states organically cannot and does not want to begin." Mirsky considered that 
"the second variant amounts to virtual renunciation of the monopoly of power, to 
an agreement about sharing power with the bourgeoisie"; in this case, "to secure 
itself, to be insured, the statist elite will have to compensate for the loss of part of 
its political positions by a strengthening of its economic base, i.e., enter by one 
path or another into the sphere of private business, and to a certain degree 
precisely 'merge' with the bourgeoisie." Saying that "here we return to the 
question of the social nature of the ruling community," Mirsky suggested that now 
"this social nature may in general be characterised as 'pro-bourgeois' or 
'quasi-bourgeois', and it is reflected in the behaviour of the ruling groups at the 
decisive moment of choice, toward the forcing through of their own group 
statist-bureaucratic interests, despite ... a tendency toward dominion over society 
as a whole." He concluded that "social instinct most likely prompts the ruling 
community with the need to proceed to compromise with the private sector, and 
the result is a special, unknown in previous history state-capitalist model (and in 
the more developed countries, possibly, that variant of 'bureaucratic state 
monopoly capitalism' about which N . A .  Simoniya has w r i t t e n ) . "^97 The key to 
understanding the application of this argument to Soviet society is to recognise
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that the ruling community's social nature has changed since its formation under 
Stalin. Then, when it was not oriented toward capitalism, the first 'way out' was 
taken, and this led to a dead-end. Now the conflict is brewing again, still beneath 
the surface, but with at least the second exit more likely, in Mirsky's view. Yet if 
state capitalism is now seen not as Stalinism’s 'shell' but as its most comfortable 
shroud, what structure was created by those whom Grigory Vodolazov rebuked as 
"pirates”, proficient principally in constructing straight lines "in the form of a 
system of barbed-wire fences, places of detention, prisons, concentration camps, 
and so on”?298
The Contradictions of ’Statocracy'
Kagarlitsky has found an answer to this question in Cheshkov's concept of 
'statocracy' ('e t a k r a t i i a A theoretician of the radical youth movement which 
emerged after the 20th CPSU Congress, Cheshkov was imprisoned between 1957 
and 1963 for underground socialist activity, but returned to academic life from 
the mid 1960s, first at IVAN, under whose aegis his book on the peculiarities of 
the Vietnamese bourgeoisie was published in 1968, then at I M E M 0 . 2 9 9  He has 
made the most original contribution to the subterranean debate about the nature of 
Soviet society, attempting to understand 'the interpenetration and conflict of 
different socio-economic forms' which Gefter pointed to, and criticising 
conceptions based on analogies rather than analysis. At a recent round table, he 
argued that Vasil'ev's "thesis about the stability of the traditional phenomenon of 
'state-power—property' does not work well with a comparison of the 
post-revolutionary societies of China and, say, Russia." Cheshkov said that "in 
China, where the statist tradition is much more ancient than in Russia, 
'state-power—property' has been less prolonged (approximately two decades 
against seven), less stable (the 'cultural revolution', for which we have no 
analogue) and more capable of self-transformation (the success of the course of 
'four modernisations' for about a decade against the failure of reform attempts in 
Soviet society during three d e c a d e s ) . ”^ 0  Schematically, Cheshkov's concept of 
'statocracy', which he recently presented openly with no contraints of censorship,
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is the opposite of Vasil'ev's concept of a traditional state mode of production, 
since it refers to a qualitively new form of state property that has arisen in the 
20th century through "a process of the negative negation of capital, ... when 
capitalist and bourgeois structures do not simply exist together with non-capitalist 
and non-bourgeois structures, but cannot exist without them.'^Ol Since 
Cheshkov's theory of ’statocracy' has been the most original and is now the most 
topical feature of Soviet development debates, the rest of this chapter is devoted to 
evaluating it. After reviewing the themes which led Cheshkov to formulate his 
theory in 1974, the concept elaborated then will be considered in detail, before 
discussing those of his ideas in the late 1970s which have been incorporated into 
its new formulation.
The focus of Cheshkov's work is clear from a key conclusion about the 
prospects for Soviet society which he had worked out already by May 1968. 
Commenting on a book contrasting processes of social differentiation in 
developing countries with the formation of capitalism in Western Europe, he 
highlighted the role of a ruling group which ’’rests not on a system of private 
enterprise, but on its privileged position in the socio-political structure". He 
suggested that:
If one attempts briefly to define the features of the special (not traditional- 
capitalist) path of the formation of the social structure in the 'third world', 
then, in my view, they look like this: the transformation of the basic mass of 
producers into one or other variety of wage workers, with the separation of 
extremely small layers of exploiters. The basic antagonism here occurs 
between the mass of producers and the ruling stratum (the 'bureaucracy' or 
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'), which, concentrating economic and social 
functions in it hands and merging itself with the state apparatus, has a 
tendency to turn into a parasitical, extremely reactionary force.
This, so to speak, is the initial model. Its further development may, of course, 
be very diverse. However, it is almost incredible that such a structure might 
transform itself into a capitalist society. Most real are the following 
alternatives: either stagnation, which may last very long, and a flowering 
of corruption, or political changes opening a period of social reforms of the 
initial structure, with the possible prospect of its development in the 
direction of socialism. ^ 2
With hindsight this assessment seems remarkably prophetic, particularly since it 
was made before the invasion of Czechoslovakia finally dispelled the "illusions"
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engendered by Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation, which, according to Kagarlitsky's 
chronicle, "had prevented us from perceiving the main thing — the class nature of 
the r e g i m e . B u t  here the nature of the ruling group remains ambiguous (is 
its basis socio-political rather than economic, or both?) and the reasons for 
doubting the chances of delayed capitalist development are not spelt out.
In a short article in 1970, Cheshkov raised the problem of how to "define the 
class base of the political top echelon of society", the 'elite' which comprises 
"people occupying the highest positions in the state, military and ideological 
apparatus." A negative answer was clear, since the "top-most groups of society ... 
according to their social position undoubtedly cannot belong to the labouring 
classes and at the same time are not representatives of the bourgeois class, if only 
because of the absence of a corresponding socio-economic base in the form of 
capitalist production relations." While not ruling out the growth of a national 
bourgeoisie, Cheshkov stressed its essentially "deformed" nature as a result of 
economic backwardness. Without a strong bourgeoisie, he claimed that "power 
and ownership of the basic means of production form a single, undivided complex 
in the shape of the state", personified by an 'elite' that "differs from the basic 
historical types of dominant social groups." There was only an "external" 
similarity with the "closed, autarkic system" of the 'asiatic mode of production', 
since the contemporary 'elite' "appears as a link in the chain of complex 
international economic and political ties", and is "frequently more closely 
connected with the 'external world' than with its own nation", although it "has a 
basic internal support — the state." Cheshkov tentatively viewed the 'elite' as a 
"historically new, special type of social community", which in a contradictory 
way "fulfills as it were the role of a still not formed class." While insisting that 
this 'elite' was not merely a ’superstructural' phenomenon, he defined it as a 
surrogate class, and concluded by asserting that ultimately "the logic of social 
development inexorably leads it to become an integral part of the rising
classes."-^-
Cheshkov developed an analysis of this independent bureaucratic elite in 
response to existing Soviet theories of the transition of backward countries to
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socialism, particularly Levkovsky's view, but also Meliksetov's conception of 
'bureaucratic capital’, and Ostrovitianov and Sterbalova's idea of a resurgent 
'asiatic mode of production', all of which he criticised for having "reduced the 
historical specifics of the state-structure to one well-known socio-economic 
category or another." He suggested that these views were not entirely wrong, but 
had taken partial aspects of the state-structure for its "socio-economic essence", a 
point made in the West by Hillel Ticktin and Gyorgy M arkus.^5 Cheshkov’s 
criticism of Levkovsky referred both to the variety of state-structures in third 
world, which demanded "a differentiated approach" not a generalisation of state 
capitalism, and to "pre-socialist societies” like the USSR, in which "it would be 
mistaken to characterise the state-structure ... as state capitalist, on the basis of the 
fact that a socialist structure may not develop itself’, since "from the alternative 
'socialism or capitalism', 'a third perspective is not given', it does not follow that 
there is only possible an opposition 'socialist structure or state capitalist 
s t r u c t u r e '".^06 This debate with Levkovsky was the impulse for Cheshkov’s 
conceptualisation of the Soviet bureaucratic elite as ’’primary" rather than 
"secondary", i.e. not itself "derivative" from a ruling class.^7
Cheshkov initially used "the term ’new ruling groups’ (or ’dominant groups’)" 
to refer to this "new social establishment", which comprised functionaries 
"embodying state property in all its basic aspects (both economic and 
n o n - e c o n o m i c ) " . 3 0 8  He noted a "growing differentiation" of this "new social 
community" into ’functional’ groups of "administrators, ’technocrats’ (economic 
managers), politicians, ideologues and military men", arguing that "the wider and 
more diverse the state’s economic function becomes, the more the group of 
'technocrats’ (or economic managers) grows, and the greater role its activity 
acquires for the existence of all the ruling groups as a whole." He suggested that 
"the 'technocratic' group here includes, as a rule, the heads of economic 
departments and their basic subdivisions, the directors of different state 
organisations and social corporations, and the leaders of plan organs", whose 
"general mood" might be characterised as 'moderately conservative 
n a t i o n a l - s t a t i s m ' . 3 0 9  Claiming that "the growth of the 'technocratic' group has 
not at all led to the disappearance of a special layer of officials realising the
324
classical, coercive function of the state", he viewed this group as now "very
closely intertwined with the ’technocrats', so that, maybe, it is more correct to
speak about them as a united administrative-economic group."^^ While saying
that "the 'technocratic' ideology has become the ideology of other ruling groups,"
he still considered that, "because of 'the division of labour' between separate
ruling groups, emphasis on social development (sometimes even at the expense of
solving technical-economic tasks) is maintained to a greater degree by groups of
politicians and ideologues", despite "a definite decline in the influence of these
groups on the masses, by virtue of the fact that promises made by them after the
attainment of independence (or in a period of populist regimes) were not 
311realised . '0 1 1  Cheshkov regarded such phenomena as indications "of the
insufficient maturity of all these groups as a special social community." Claiming
that "their unity has been attained largely coercively", he suggested this absence of
organic unity had intensified with a "crisis of the new ruling groups", which
began approximately in the mid 1960s but had its roots "in the generally
immature, 'formal' character of state property ... and especially its dependent 
319character". 1Zi He then linked this crisis with a decline in social mobility:
The fact is that as a whole these groups have remained extremely narrow and 
have been reproduced from their own social sphere or one near to them. ... 
Such seclusion works in contradiction to the objective necessity for a 
broadening of the ranks of these groups, in connection both with a growth 
in the functions of the state sector, and with a growth of new middle strata.
As a result since the beginning of the '60s relations between the dominant 
groups and those strata of students, intelligentsia and office workers who 
might have calculated on entering their ranks have become s t r a i n e d . - ^
Thus in his first extensive analysis of the Soviet bureaucratic elite, published in 
the 1974 IMEMO book, Cheshkov implied that the reformist call for broadening 
the social basis of the regime, made by She inis in 1971, was at present 
unrealistic.^
Cheshkov introduced the concept 'statocracy' in a paper for a conference on 
"Society, Elite and Bureaucracy in the Developing Countries of the East", held at 
IVAN in June 1974.^15 Broadly, he used the concept 'statocracy' to define the 
social nature of new dominant groups in developing societies where the local
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bourgeoisie is historically weak. His "hypothesis” about ’statocracy' might apply 
to much of the modem, non-European world, although he specifically noted that 
"the most important features" disclosed by his "theoretical apparatus may in 
principle be fully expressed only in separate cases.”^ ^  This qualification did 
not allay "serious objections” from other conference participants, particularly 
Simoniya, who argued:
Cheshkov's scheme ignores one exceptionally important 'detail' of a specific 
historical character, which makes his abstract model of society vulnerable, 
namely: in such 'ideal' (from the point of view of his scheme) countries as 
Indonesia, Thailand and so on, the exploitation and appropriation by 
'statocracy' of its fruits is realised beyond the bounds of the state apparatus, 
in the sphere of private-capitalist and in general market relations. 1 '
While Cheshkov referred in passing to these countries and others like Mexico and 
India, they were clearly not the key cases at i s s u e . T h i s  raises the question of 
whether Kagarlitsky is right to argue that Cheshkov "did not attempt" in his study 
of 'statocracy' "to analyse Soviet reality under the guise of discussing the 'Third 
World'”, but rather, "using 'Third World' material, he constructed a model which
' l  1 Q
is applicable also to our understanding of Soviet society. No model can be 
constructed purely speculatively, without incorporating experience from one or 
another realm of human life. If Cheshkov was only thinking through third world 
material, then why should his theory of 'statocracy' be applied to Soviet society, 
as it has been by Kagarlitsky? That would mean that an analogy may provide the 
basis, not just the background, for an analysis, which Cheshkov has disputed. 
The answer is suggested by Kagarlitsky in a later passage that owes much to 
Gurevich: "this research is objective, and precisely because of its objectivity it can 
lead us to some fundamental conclusions of present-day importance."^ ^ 0 
Objectivity was achieved by Cheshkov through a dialectic of societal comparison, 
methodologically similar to Gurevich's historical dialogue of cultures, derived 
from B a k h t i n . ^21 His analysis of the contradictions of 'statocracy' was a 
hypothesis about features of "the leading role of state property" which exist as yet 
"only in prospect" for the third world, but which have been realised more fully in 
Soviet type s o c i e t i e s . ^ 2  ¡ f  this 'prototype' had not existed, the prospect itself 
would be less present in the modem world, and in that case a theorist like
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Cheshkov would most likely not have been able to construct a model of 
'statocracy* as one possible scenario for the third world.
In the first half of his paper, Cheshkov argued that the idea of the bureaucracy 
as a 'secondary* group representing those controlling the means of production 
"clearly needs a definite correction" for a situation where top officials "rest not 
only on the state and political apparatus, but directly personify state property and 
guide the activity of an independent state sector." He rejected characterisations of 
these officials as a 'bureaucratic* or 'state' bourgeoisie, because such ideas were 
''thought up by means of an analogy" (and hence an identification) with classical 
capitalism, not through an analysis of the specific features of these officials, such 
as:
a) the ruling groups (especially administrators, i.e. the highest bureaucrats and 
officials) are reproduced to a very significant degree from 'their own' sphere;
b) there is an increasing commonality of features (age, education, experience) 
and exchange of functions between different ruling groups (bureaucrats as 
politicians, party leaders as bureaucrats etc.);
c) a political-ideological platform (national-statism) common for these groups 
is being worked out, based on a recognition of the leading role of the state 
sector ... in the development of a technical-economic base and in pursuing 
definite social reforms affecting the interests of wide strata of the toilers;
d) these ruling groups have formed certain layers of mass support (party 
activists, the 'rural bureaucracy').^ 3
Cheshkov said all this demonstrated "a tendency toward a certain consolidation of
the ruling (political-administrative) groups, a growth of self-consciousness and a
strengthening at the expense of other strata." He pointed out the unusual
character of the "increasing ties" (both personal and 'organisational') between
these ruling groups and a growing bourgeoisie. In contrast to capitalism, here the
"hereditary assignment (transfer to son) of a career as entrepreneur is less likely,
the 'larger' the entrepreneur", since "the biggest bourgeois is formed not apart
394from, but in close connection with the ruling political-administrative groups.
He argued that in such circumstances the ruling community cannot be understood 
"as 'representing' the interests of a growing bourgeoisie", and claimed that "the 
concept bureaucracy is hardly applicable to this community, since it theoretically 
presupposes that division of property and state, base and superstructure
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characteristic for classical c a p i t a l i s m . "^25 Before proceeding to analyse this 
"historically new variety of a dominant class — 'statocracy'", Cheshkov suggested 
that Lenin, in his analysis of 'Octoberist' capitalism and the dominant classes of 
Tsarist Russia at the turn of the century, had faced a similar problem of 
conceptualising "a special type of dominant class, which is based on the unity of 
basic and superstructural phenomena. Noting the development of a bourgeoisie 
and the growing influence of its upper parts on this class, V.I. Lenin emphasised 
in a polemic with the 'liquidators' that the former dominant class does not 
disintegrate but is preserved, although it changes."-^ Cheshkov used this quote 
to widen the reader's horizon so as to include the key referent of 'statocracy'. 
While the various views of state capitalism that he initially rejected did refer only 
to the third world, that was not his main concern, as is clear from his penultimate 
footnote, which criticised "the identification of 'statocracy' and a bourgeoisie that 
is characteristic for left-extremist theories in particular, and the conception of 
state capitalism of the Trotskyists e s p e c ia lly .^7 jf the initial impulse for 
Cheshkov's theory was to resolve Levkovsky's ambiguity, its main motivation was 
to better the strident critique of Stalinism expressed by S h e i n i s . ^ 8
Given this task of rebutting the view of Soviet society as state capitalist, it is 
not surprising that Cheshkov latched on to Krylov's idea of "a qualitatively new 
system of productive forces", constituted by 'ideal' (principally scientific) rather 
than material (industrial) processes, and leading to "the transformation of 
collective (state) forms of property into a leading position in relation to individual 
f o r m s " . ^ 9  This "axiom" enabled him to maintain faith in the existence of "a 
decaying capitalist tendency" worldwide, and retain what Kagarlitsky has termed 
a "neo-Communist" view of the transition to socialism, rather than adopt the 
sanguine or social democratic outlooks on modernity developed by Vasil'ev and 
Sheinis.-^O But if Cheshkov believed that Krylov had seen the future, he still 
criticised him for not properly understanding the present, in dismissing as an 
"illusion" the view that non-capitalist administrators could be the "source of a 
'new class’".^31 j^e argued, against Krylov, that the performance by 
administrators of some "social functions does not in the least negate the fact of the 
development of state property on the basis of the appropriation of the direct
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producers’ labour." He claimed that "the leading role of state property conditions 
the fact that 'statocracy' is formed in the system of social reproduction as a 
primary social community, that is, a community whose relations with the direct 
producers concerning the creation (and appropriation) of the surplus product are 
determinant in the given s o c i e t y .  That 'statocracy' "occupies such a place in 
the system of social production which allows it to appropriate others' labour, that 
is be a proprietor", was considered by Cheshkov as the paramount fact, which 
required recognition whether one conceived the content of state property "as a 
transitional phase of social development, a new mode of production or just a 
special phase in the development of contemporary capitalism on its periphery". 
He clearly supported the second of these conceptions, arguing for "the thesis about 
'statocracy' as a special ~  for the 'third world' — variety of a dominant class and 
ruling social community, exploitative in its nature and based at the same time on 
historically new, primarily state forms of appropriation, and acquiring class 
characteristics according to its m a t u r a t i o n .  "33 3 Yet Krylov's axiom could not be 
embraced without conditions, the principal one being an assumption that any 'new 
class' based on a post-capitalist system of productive forces must be more 
progressive than the bourgeoisie. If this is true then 'statocracy' and its 'new 
mode of production' must become a global phenomenon, not remain an outgrowth 
of 'third world' backwardness. Cheshkov published this conclusion only in 1979, 
which is presumably why Levkovsky disputed it only in the following year, but its 
germs appeared earlier.^34
Cheshkov's central argument about the contradictory historical dynamic of 
'statocracy' included five points. First, "in 'statocracy' the place of the basic 
element is occupied by political-administrative layers (who might conditionally be 
called the 'elite')". The bureaucracy forms "a direct component part of the basic 
dominant community", but capitalists are only a "derivative" group in the society. 
Second, the key question about 'statocracy' is whether or not its existence 
"excludes the formation of the bourgeoisie as a basic class", not as a subsidiary 
group. Third, the answer to this question will differ in particular societies, but 
the determining factor is whether new productive forces are developed on a 
"relatively independent" basis, or old productive forces are imported in a
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dependent manner and at a 'lower' level from the citadels of world capital. A 
transformation of the bourgeoisie into a basic class is always possible, "since 
'statocracy' is based on exploitative property", but "this possibility is real only in 
the 'dependent' variant of state property", when "the bourgeoisie, having become 
a basic class in the limits of the country, remains a 'derivative' class in the system 
of social communities of the world capitalist system", and a historical product of 
' s t a t o c r a c y ' . Fourth, while this dependent variant or tendency of 'statocracy' 
is "more widespread", the other, independent tendency is "theoretically more 
interesting", because "it is more 'pure' and so from it one may understand 
deviations (more massive than the 'ideal'), while from deviations it is difficult to 
derive the norm." This independent "transformation of 'statocracy' into a 
primary community" becomes difficult to reverse when it has "built up a system 
of productive forces corresponding to it". With the "continual reproduction of a 
unity of superstructural and basic relations", state property changes "from its 
formal or immature condition ... to a stage of maturity", and this "signifies a 
transition from an immature to a class-shaped statocracy." Here "the bureaucracy 
is transformed basically from a 'representative' of the bourgeoisie into only a 
professional-special part of the basic class (an 'elite')." Since "the possibility of 
such a transition is embedded in the nature of state property", it occurs "with the 
retention (and not withering away) of purely-superstructural relations, and their 
gradual filling up with 'economic' content (for example, tax as an expression 
initially of secondary, and later of primary production relations)." While "the 
formation of 'statocracy'" begins with "the fulfilment by it of definite social 
functions", these are directly contradicted by its separation from society as a 
united ruling g r o u p . 3 3 6
Fifth, "according to the character of the interrelations between the 'elite' and 
the bourgeoisie one may note two different variants of the formation of 
'statocracy'." In the dependent variant, "the 'elite' leaves for the bourgeoisie its 
basic (historically speaking) sphere — material production", and "'statocracy' as a 
whole appears more formal", i.e. not an organic change of the class structure. In 
the independent variant "the elite either wholly or partially (in the basic branches) 
subjugates material production and ousts the bourgeoisie into the sphere of
330
exchange." 'Statocracy' here is "more mature", and the social transformation 
caused by its consolidation is far greater, since an "integration" of the ’elite’ by 
ensuring "its unity with the state apparatus" is "an initial, and not a final point for 
the evolution of this social e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  " 3  3 7  Cheshkov's abstract account of 
these two tendencies (which may have been the source of Mirsky's two ’variants') 
was heavily influenced by Krylov's theory of dependent development, and by his 
axiom of state-controlled production as a form of the f u t u r e . 3 3 8  Cheshkov 
claimed that the extent of an "’ideal’ transformation of statocratic revenue" (i.e. 
progress in developing new productive forces) "is determined in the first place by 
how much it has separated itself — as an independent form of surplus product — 
from monopoly and state-monopoly profit (in the first place foreign capital)." 
Without this independence, "statocratic revenue remains — and even becomes all 
the more (absolutely) ~  a product of surplus pre-industrial labour", and as such 
does not "cease to be a simple deduction from the means of existence" realised 
through "a lowering of the standard of living e t c . "339 ft was to question this 
comfortable assumption that non-capitalism means progress that Sheinis insisted, 
against Simoniya, on the need "to speak about two types of economic 
independence", one based on developing productivity but another based on an 
"autarkic" isolation which "dooms an economy to stagnation", so that it "cannot 
resolve the tasks of social p r o g r e s s . " 3 4 0  ironically, in positing state-monopolies 
as "higher" than capitalism, so that any return to the latter would be a reversal 
analogous to the 'second serfdom', Cheshkov reached a similar overall conclusion 
to Simoniya, while basing himself on the theory of dependent development of 
which Simoniya has been the most trenchant o p p o n e n t . 3 4 1
Before proceeding to discuss the independent variant of 'statocracy' in more 
detail, Cheshkov noted that "it is impossible to exclude the variant of 'mature' 
'statocracy' in connection with a tendency toward dependent development".342 
The 'deviation' of an independent (because ’mature’) ’statocracy’ from the 
progressive ’norm' would signify precisely that autarkic failure which Sheinis 
urged his colleagues not to forget. Cheshkov's subsequent analysis of the 
historical character of the 'elite' forming the key element of 'statocracy' makes 
most sense in terms of this degenerate assimilation of the new by the old, in which
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bourgeois elements have not been superseded but merely reduced by the power of 
the state to the marginal position of small-scale merchant c a p i t a l . ^ 4 3  He focused 
particularly on the unusual difficulty which the 'elite' has in transforming itself 
into a basic class. In a situation of 'all power to the state', the 
political-administrative 'elite' might appear to be able easily to dominate the 
society, but Cheshkov pointed out its weakness as a group whose "wholeness" is 
initially "formal" and "immature". In other words, this 'elite' has been cobbled 
together "from a conglomerate of political, bureaucratic etc. 'secondary' 
communities" and lacks a substantial social base. Cheshkov argued that at this 
first stage the necessary unity of this 'elite' is secured either by the authority of 
leaders of the liberation struggle, "or by methods of force." He said "the latter 
signifies that in the capacity of the integrating group in this period of immaturity 
of the 'elite' there most probably emerges the military", and then wrote:
Their role at this stage is already distinct from the period of the liberation 
revolution and, in particular, the strengthening of their union with the 
administrators (economic managers) shows that the 'elite' enters a phase of 
maturation (Indonesia after 1965), clearly displaying with this its exploitative 
features. ^44
This reference to Indonesia is more enigmatic than the pieces quoted by Nuikin, 
but arguably more to the point. Since Cheshkov is here discussing the 
development of an independent, i.e. anti-monopolist, variety of 'statocracy' 
(whether progressive or deformed) he logically cannot be referring to Suharto's 
policy orientation but to something else, like his methods. Since even Nuikin has 
now publicly disowned Stalin as a communist after 1929, it is quite possible that 
the 'neo-Communist' Cheshkov was making an empirical link between what have 
been the two most massive slaughters of communists to date, namely the purges in 
the USSR from the mid-1930s (which Stalin described as a 'civil war inside the 
party') and the butchering of the Indonesian Communist Party 'after 1965'.345 if 
so, Cheshkov's skill as a scholar is such that he was able to make this powerful 
condemnation of Stalinism at precisely the time of the Soviet elite's "clampdown 
on overtly critical scholarship that took place between 1972 and 1974."346
Cheshkov noted "an original 'exchange' of functions within the reproduction
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of the 'elite' and 'statocracy' as a whole", and contrasted the structure of this 
ruling group with a 'normal' capitalist elite that comprises "relatively stable 
groups narrowly-specialised according to their functions". He said "another 
peculiarity" of the former 'elite' "is that its wholeness is reproduced not so much 
through formal channels and institutions (parties, parliament), as through 
informal ones (social organisations), and, in particular, through the personal ties 
of i n d i v i d u a l s . "347 He suggested: "Evidently, the instability of group functions, 
the integrating role of the military, and the primarily informal and personal 
character of interrelationships between members of the 'elite' — these look like 
features of the transition of 'statocracy' into the phase of its maturation, a 
transition extremely painful and casting into crisis not only the 'elite' itself, but 
the dominant 'statocracy' as a w h o l e . "348 After defining the ideology of top 
officials as "national-statocratism", Cheshkov argued that the "maturation of 
'statocracy'" is shown not in its greater dominance over society, but in "definite 
symptoms of the phenomena of a 'crisis of the leaders', especially noticeable since 
the mid-60s". He listed the following "changes" or "basic features" as 
characteristic of "the process of the formation of 'statocracy' for approximately 
the past two decades", i.e. since about 1953:
a) in substance 'statocracy' has formed as a social community dependent on 
world capitalism;
b) ruling political-administrative groups and private-ownership layers in 
’the provinces' have quickly developed, intensifying the contradiction of 
'statocracy' as a country-wide social community between the 'basic' and 
'derivative' elements in its structure;
c) the influence and role of the technocratic group has grown, and the tendency 
of it toward a merger with 'the bureaucracy', and in a number of countries 
toward a closer union with the military, has been marked; the ideology of 
technocracy has been transformed into the ideology of 'statocracy' as a whole;
d) the influence of politicians (especially those connected with traditions of the 
national liberation movement) has declined as a factor securing the relative 
unity of 'statocracy';
e) the class essence of the ideology of early 'statocracy' (different conceptions 
of 'development', 'national socialisms', a 'mixed economy' etc.) has been 
manifested more clearly, which has led to a weakening of the influence
of 'statocracy' (especially its 'elite') on the masses;
f) by virtue of the high degree of self-reproduction of different groups of 
the 'elite', and the relative limitedness of admission into them 'from below' 
and even from the modem middle layers, there has gradually grown a social 
'isolation' of the 'elite' from these strata, part of whom are moving over into
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opposition to the dominant coalition;
g) the position has strengthened of private-ownership layers, who have 
to subjugate to themselves the ruling political-administrative groups of 
'statocracy’ in 'the provinces’; the contradiction between these groups and the 
bourgeoisie often acquires the form of conflicts between centre and 
p e r ip h e r y .3 4 9
Cheshkov argued that this crisis of the maturation of 'statocracy' is best 
understood as "an expression of a struggle of two tendencies in its midst — 
dependent and independent." He added that "concretely, the content of the 'crisis 
of the leaders' consists in the fact that 'statocracy', being formed as a relatively 
integral dominant social-class community, finds itself now at a cross-roads and 
stands before the problem of a choice between two pretenders to the role of the 
basic element in its structure: 'elite' or bourgeoisie." This suggests that the 
independent tendency of 'statocracy' is in a historical blind-alley if it has to 
'catch-up' with capitalism, which is precisely the conclusion that Mirsky presented 
a decade or so l a t e r .  ^  50
Cheshkov largely ignored relations between 'statocracy' and its workforce, but 
characterised the basic position very briefly as follows: "The level of productive 
forces of the 'third world', on the basis of which this crisis unfolds, and the 
maturity of the 'bearers' of revolution here is such that one should speak in 
substance about a crisis of grow th . Therefore at this stage the 'crisis of the 
leaders' is an element of a general (or objective), but not a direct revolutionary
TCI
s i t u a t i o n . " T h i s  implies that the independent variety of 'statocracy' has 
established its own system of productive forces, but not managed to develop it 
adequately in competition with world capitalism. This is why its long-run 
tendency is toward dependence upon the capitalist 'world system', without itself 
necessarily becoming a component part of this system. Cheshkov's suggestion that 
the maturity or qualitative growth of the working class is one reason for 
slackening economic growth in a 'statocratic' society remains enigmatic, but it 
makes his view complementary to the theory of Soviet society developed by 
Ticktin, who has argued that the Stalinist elite formed through a forced 
mobilisation of the absolute surplus product, but subsequently has not managed to 
extract a sizeable relative surplus product by developing labour productivity, so
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that its social room for manoeuvre is historically s h r i n k i n g . 352 Cheshkov made 
precisely this point in contrasting with capitalism the "special nature of conflict, 
peculiar to this variety of a dominant force," characterised by "the combination 
within its bounds of a class community and the state." He cited Engels' thought 
that a "division" or "separation" of the state from the ruling economic group 
"evidently strengthens the position of the dominant class in the plane of its 
long-term interests", and then wrote:
As an opposite, one might suggest that their [ruling group and state] unification 
in the bounds of one social community, while strengthening its present, current 
interests at the same time potentially weakens the 'strategic' position already 
because its field of manoeuvre is sharply reduced. Having the opportunity to 
quickly and relatively easily resolve current conflicts (using repression, and 
social reforms), ’statocracy' finds itself less capable of solving fundamental 
contradictions. This is why here small, partial conflicts are especially pregnant 
with quick escalation into a deep antagonism. Conflict does not display itself, 
but accumulates, so to speak, and this strengthens the possibility of a way out 
beyond the limits of this dominant class.353
By stressing the pragmatism of authoritarian regimes like Brezhnev's, both in 
pursuing "a policy of social reformism" at home and in balancing a variety of 
short-term interests abroad, Cheshkov implied that latent contradictions might 
have to pile up for a long time before overwhelming the holders of p o w e r . 3 5 4  
He also said the "world energy crisis", i.e. the big rise in income from oil 
exports, had "given a new impulse to the strengthening of state-property as the 
socio-economic basis of an independent 'statocracy'", providing more time for 
this dominant group to strengthen its "acquisition of social-class qualities>» 355
The political conclusions which Cheshkov drew for "the attitude of left forces 
to 'statocracy'" highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis presented in 
his 1974 paper. The first two conclusions were quite clear and had been 
convincingly demonstrated:
a) 'statocracy' is (more accurately - has become) in its essence a dominant 
social-class force, and not simply a leading, ruling etc. 'superstructural' group;
b) though 'statocracy' in its historical function is analogical to the contemporary 
bourgeoisie, it is yet distinct from the latter in its socio-economic nature. ^
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Cheshkov's third and fourth political conclusions were speculative if not assumed 
a priori, and closer to the view of Simoniya or Levkovsky than to that of Sheinis 
or Butenko. Thirdly, he claimed that 'statocracy' "represents exploitative 
relations of an order higher than capitalist ones", in which the "basic divide" 
occurs between independent and dependent variants (constituted around the 'elite' 
and bourgeoisie); this was simply a hypothetical deduction from Krylov's axiom 
which ignored the fact that bourgeois elements keep growing back. Finally, he 
suggested that "with a consideration of the basic contradiction in 'statocracy' 
[between the social functions it performs and its maturing class essence], definite 
groups in its midst might become more or less active allies of 
progressive-democratic left forces and even strategically more important 
temporary allies than the 'national' bourgeoisie."^57 ^  similar claim has been 
made by Kagarlitsky with reference to the Khrushchev years, but both he and 
Cheshkov are very vague about these possible allies within 'statocracy' for the
I C O
left. ° This basic limitation of Cheshkov's analysis derives from his leaving 
aside statocracy's relations with its workforce, so that although he claimed its 
numerical strength was no less than a bourgeoisie or aristocracy, he never 
specified the fractions within it, other than the tendencies of dominant 'elite' (with 
its circulating functionaries) and repressed or resurgent bourgeoisie. While 
raising the possibility of a 'way out' beyond 'statocracy', Cheshkov had no 
illusions about this eventuating soon. He said that, as well as enabling one "to 
polemicise with some apologetic conceptions ('polyarchy' and the like) advanced 
by bourgeois politologists as alternatives to 'oligarchy' ... the concept 'statocracy' 
may be useful in polemic with ultra-leftist authors, who usually identify a crisis of 
the dominant class with a crisis of its definite historical form ('oligarchy') and on 
this basis incorrectly evaluate the 'crisis of the leaders’, this important element of
a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n . " ^ ^ ^
During the late 1970s Cheshkov developed his theory in two different 
directions, both significantly more restricted by censorship than this relatively 
open conference paper. First, he elaborated the concept of a "statocratic type of 
production", as a "hypothesis about the state-structure in its interrelations with 
ideal productive forces". In a consciously speculative generalisation of Krylov's
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axiom, which he described as an exercise "even not in logical futurology, but in a 
futurology of the imagination" in the utopian spirit of Wright Mills, Cheshkov 
explicitly considered statocracy "from the angle of its universal, not its particular 
features", presenting a "purely logical analysis" of "the highest form of 
production relations based on exploitation", without mentioning any "peculiarities 
of historical d e v e l o p m e n t .  "360 To justify this sketch of an "intellectualised" 
post-industrial society, Cheshkov quoted Marx saying "there is no need to use ... a 
blotch of an extraordinary character as a means for the elimination of theoretical 
difficulties", which meant that the history of ’post-capitalism’ should not dull 
attempts to imagine its future. Cheshkov claimed to have left "the extremely 
complex problem of the correlation of early and mature features of the statocratic 
type of production outside the sphere of analysis at its current stage", but he could 
no more avoid this issue than one can consider the future outside the context of 
the present. Indeed, he now polemicised with "left-radicalist critics" who 
"absolutise the early stages of the process of the historical formation of the 
statocratic type of production and cannot perceive its mature s t a t e . "3 6 1  
Kagarlitsky has taken some of the statements here to refer to features of Soviet 
society (in particular, a form of distribution in which "wages, in essence, are no 
longer a price for the commodity labour power, but i n c o m e " ) . 3 62 This 
interpretation is correct only in isolation insofar as partial aspects of this ’model’ 
are present, since the USSR is hardly a post-industrial society. Cheshkov was 
principally making the very controversial claim that some apparently backward 
aspects of the present, like "political relations of dominion — submission" between 
statocracy and the workforce based on "direct" personal dependence, could 
perhaps be viewed not as necessarily pre-capitalist, but as "lower forms" of a 
personal yet "indirect (managerial and cultural-psychological) mechanism of 
appropriation and alienation" which would exist in a 'post-industrial' system of 
production where "the basic object of property is a non-material element — 
s c i e n c e . "36^ This original standing of Marx on his head did not convince Sheinis, 
who stressed the progressive significance of an "anonymous" civil society partly 
in response to Cheshkov's h y p o t h e s i s . 364-
Second, in the context of a comprehensive review of Western theories about
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"the ’holders of power' in the developing countries", Cheshkov raised some 
problems for adequately understanding "ruling and dominant groups" uniting 
state power and power of ownership in their hands. According to Cheshkov, the 
two main faults of such theories were: 1) a tendency of neo-colonialist and 
nationalist authors to reduce the economic base of the dominant group to "one or 
another variety of personal income, realised through the state apparatus"; and 2) 
a tendency of left-radicalist authors to define the dominant group as one or 
another kind of bourgeoisie, without showing that the state sector which it 
controls is capitalist.3 65 The unresolved issue in both cases remained the nature 
of the "relations between ruling and dominant groups and the labouring classes". 
Cheshkov suggested that the concept of "personal relations", considered "as an 
antipode of the concept material relations", might be useful in determining "the 
correlation here of the processes of the appropriation of labour and the alienation 
of personality " in the "bonds of dominion-subordination" between the dominant 
group and the masses. He added that, in terms of political economy, these are 
relations of "a special kind, when class nature exists, so to speak, functionally but 
not substantially, or, in other words, these relations, while being class relations, 
are not relations between classes." In terms of understanding Soviet society, 
Cheshkov's main message was that the conception of state capitalism, which 
assumed the 'holders of power' to be a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', had "lost its 
force", since it could explain neither "the collective nature of this phenomenon" 
nor the historical "causes of its definite dynamism."366 His distinction between 
"two types of relations of dominion—submission: those resigned on the basis of 
personal supremacy and dependence, and relations of force resulting simply from 
economic functions" seems to have persuaded Sheinis that a society based on the 
former cannot be understood as capitalist, since that would obscure the key 
question: "will the current variety of forms of personal dependence of the 
producer be gradually discarded and turned into economic relations of 
dominion—subordination? Or will these relations of personal dependence not only 
be maintained, but be reproduced in new forms?"367 ^  1983, while still 
foreseeing a "world transitional epoch" (i.e. a post-capitalist future), Cheshkov 
focused on "processes of the deformation and degeneration of potentially socialist 
forms", where "the internal relations" of the "pre-dominant" state structure "rest
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largely on non-economic force, on a variety of forms of personal submission and 
dependence adapted to contemporary conditions.” He distinguished this system 
from both capitalist and pre-capitalist structures:
Dominion and submission here embody not simply non-economic force and 
the alienation of the surplus product, created by the producer in the process 
of more or less independent economic activity, as this occurred, say, with 
feudalism, but are realised in the form of personal dependence in the sphere 
of production. The boundaries in which the surplus product is extracted are 
widely extended.
He noted that this apparent extension of exploitation was hardly effective, since it 
was ”accompanied by the conservation of a low level of social production, as the 
ramified system of non-economic force inevitably blocks the development of the 
'human factor' of the productive forces.” Where this system "acquires final 
forms”, people will have "to pay colossal social and material costs” for the 
privilege of being led historically "into a blind-alley".^68
In 1986 Cheshkov renewed his discussion of 'statocracy', rather obscurely in 
an article about its "unusual" autonomy from other social forces, and with more 
clarity in a chapter on the formation of struggling classes in a non-European 
developing s o c i e t y .  ^69 ¡n ^ is  chapter he defined class holistically as "an 
aggregate of material and ideal relations", formed actively "in the three main 
spheres of social relations — the socio-economic, the social and the political". He 
said the basic antagonism in a developing society occurs between "two macro-class 
formations", comprising diverse socio-economic groups of proprietors and 
labourers, which struggle socially and politically to constitute themselves as, 
respectively, a united "ruling community" and a "popular bloc". He noted that the 
process through which these basic "conglomerates" of exploiters and exploited 
become classes 'for themselves' is complex, particularly where:
By virtue of the unification of power and property in a united mechanism, 
part of the proprietors occupy a specific intermediate position in the society. 
Being in the socio-economic plane an integral part of the macro-class of 
proprietors, they find themselves in the social plane between the two 
conglomerates; with the interaction of socio-political forces, especially in 
such situations as a struggle against dictatorial regimes and the like, these 
proprietorial groups may become part of the 'popular b l o c ' . ^ O
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Cheshkov suggested that "privileged layers" of the labouring conglomerate, like 
"the union bureaucracy, the elite of peasant organisations, part of the office 
workers etc.", tend to join with part of the proprietorial conglomerate ("different 
groups of the highest office workers, specialists") as "supporters of a reformist 
strategy of development." But he thought the "nucleus" of the labouring 
conglomerate could potentially oppose itself "to property in the capacity of the 
universal representative of labour," and so "has a positive-revolutionary 
character." Stressing the "key role" of the state as "that axis, around which the 
proprietors are consolidated and display their antagonistic interaction with the 
labourers", he argued that "monopolisation of power" by statocracy (the unified 
ruling groups) and "suppression by the state of even weak elements of civil 
society" had "engendered a deep crisis in the relations between these groups and 
all other classes and strata, the society as a whole. The situation appears 
paradoxical: having attained the peak of their might, having become almost the 
absolute holders of power (amongst the local pretenders) these groups have found 
themselves in the face of the deepest crisis".^71
Cheshkov found the causes of this crisis "in the peculiarities of the ruling 
groups' monopoly of power," in which the state has been transformed "from a 
public institution into a corporate organisation, based on the unification of 
political and economic power" — "i.e. a kind of private monopoly." Here "power 
itself has been turned into a means alienating the will, and often the 
national-cultural identity of society, into a force standing against society." 
Disenfranchised "private-ownership classes" (the 'middle class') have not managed 
"to 'abolish' the leading role of the groups in power in the dominant community", 
"because these groups have possessed comparatively more unity and, more 
importantly, a greater capacity to express the most general interests of the 
proprietors and exploiters." Yet, while "the 'popular classes' have still not been 
able to overthrow the dominant classes", statocracy's "oligarchic type of power" 
had been significantly undermined by the pressure of both these forces opposing 
it, creating "a tendency toward a certain decentralisation of power and its 
deconcentration, toward increasing the number of political subjects and the 
introduction of elements of pluralism into authoritarian political systems".
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Cheshkov said this "process of the liberalisation of authoritarian regimes 
benefited society as a whole, but ... strengthened most of all the position of the 
macro-class of proprietors", since "the crisis of power had not become a crisis of 
the dominant classes." But he thought "the crisis of the leaders is today clearly 
not finished", and concluded by distinguishing "three basic modes (directions) of 
the resolution of this crisis: a redistribution of power within the ruling groups, 
the establishment of coalition relations between these groups and political forces 
directly expressing the specific interests of private-ownership classes, and 
revolution." The first mode occurred "where the forces of civil society were 
most passive", and "strengthened the influence of technocrat-managers and groups 
of administrators close to them". The second mode required "the working out of 
a long-term strategy", which was only possible (and also doubtful) because of "the 
very concentration of all levers of economic and political pressure in the hands of 
statocracy, which led the system of power into a crisis." Cheshkov implied that 
this direction might also be averted by the third mode’s emergence in the form of 
a 'popular bloc':
There, where the groups in power have at times felt a growing danger from 
the side of such a movement, their strategy has been marked by a tendency 
toward social compromise. However, liberalism in relation to other fractions 
of the ruling classes has more than once been combined with the strengthening 
of a tendency of political authoritarianism in relation to the lower orders. In 
different situations the effectiveness of such a strategy has turned out to be 
different. But it already to a decisive degree has depended on the intensity 
and purposefulness of the reaction it has met from the popular masses. '
This characterisation of a third 'way out' beyond statocracy supports Simoniya's 
point that the success of a 'revolution from above' in restructuring a conservative 
society depends principally upon how well it can distortedly 'reflect', and thereby 
exhaust, the potential of a revolution from below.373
Cheshkov clarified the scope of his theory of statocracy in an open article in 
late 1988, which began by claiming that even Soviet critics of Stalinism had 
considered "the problem of bureaucracy" only (whether "implicitly or explicitly, 
negatively or positively") in terms of "the Weberian theory of bureaucracy as a 
social agent of a special type of organisation, administration and power.’'374 He
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said this theory did not address the problem of ’the bureaucracy' as a "practical 
owner" of nationalised means of production, and suggested his "broader concept 
of 'statocracy"' provided a way of considering the processes engendering a new 
type of ruling group, without positing the universal role of an 'apparatus' or 
reducing this historical question to the problem of defining who comprises 'the 
b u r e a u c r a c y '.375 pje stressed that the growth of statocracy during the 20th 
century was based on "worldwide processes", such as the formation of scientific 
productive forces, the concentration of social production on both national and 
international levels, the militarisation and especially the statocratisation of modem 
economies and societies. If bureaucratic organisation accompanied classical 
capitalism, Cheshkov argued that "the genetic foundations of statocracy are 
formed in processes of the negation of capital", in which state property becomes 
'universal private property' "in all contemporary societies". He distinguished two 
main forms in which "the state negates capitalist property", a "negative" (for 
capital) growth of the state sector "within the bounds" of the capitalist mode of 
production, and a "converted-positive" form arising with the degeneration of a 
political attempt to move beyond capitalism toward socialism. He classified 
Western societies as cases of the former, "partial" kind of statocracy, and Soviet 
societies as cases of the latter, "absolute statocracy". While emphasising that "the 
formation of both kinds of statocracy occurred in their most tight and direct 
mutual-opposition", he suggested that, whereas in the 1970s the "crisis in the 
world capitalist economy led to a crisis of statocracy in the societies of state 
monopoly capitalism, at the same time in the developing world and in Soviet 
society it consolidated its position." He implied that, while the crisis of statocracy 
in the West had been temporarily resolved through a redistribution of power "in 
favour of private-enterprise strata", in the East a transformation from a lower to 
a higher sub-type of absolute statocracy had only begun.376
Leaving the "dualist" form of 'third world' statocracy aside, Cheshkov focused 
on the Soviet case of absolute statocracy, based on strict determination of 
economic relations by volitional relations of production "assuming the form of 
relations of dominion/submission." He distinguished "two sub-types" of absolute 
statocracy, according to whether economic relations "have their own logic" and "a
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degree of autonomy”, or whether they "function only as an economic expression 
of volitional relations". He called the former "a market or NEP variety", and the 
latter a "barracks-communist variety", saying that, while "both these sorts may 
transform each other", the market variety is clearly the "higher" form, 
characterised by the presence of other forms of property than state property and 
the introduction of "elements of competition" in the political s p h e r e . ^ 7 7  
Characterising Stalinism as the key 'case' of barracks-communism, as a 
"completely politicised statocracy, extending relations of dominion/submission to 
the personal dependence of the producer", Cheshkov suggested that while "not 
inevitable" it was the most probable transformation of Russian society given the 
internal and external circumstances of the early 1920s. He said it had fulfilled the 
"historical tasks" of creating "a material foundation of modem society" and 
surviving in a capitalist world, but had "exhausted its possibilities" since it "could 
not adapt to the conditions of the world scientific-technical revolution." He 
argued that:
functioning in the 1960s and 1970s in a form cleansed from the cult of 
personality, i.e. as a pure barracks-communist statocracy, it deprived the 
producer of his labouring function, established a planned anarchy of the 
economy, divided state property along departmental lines, and made alienation 
total. In short, in conditions of a 'pure' (cultless) barracks-communism the 
society lost the capacity for self-development, which allows one to consider 
the barracks-communist sub-type of absolute statocracy (and especially its 
Stalinist case) not as a transitional form, but as a dead-end branch of an
'in  Q
interrupted (since the end of the 1920s) transition period. 70
Cheshkov suggested that this dead-end was expressed most "in the absence of 
forces capable of adequately transforming this society", which resulted from "the 
predominance of relations of dominion/submission over economic relations" of 
production. While dismissing identifications of Soviet society as a variety of 
socialism as "in essence an echo of the ideology of Stalinism", he said that some 
potential for "a return to the initial stage of a transition period" existed, and 
might be realised through a transformation of the barracks-communist variety of 
absolute statocracy into the market variety, "on the basis of what Marx called the 
positive acquisition of private property and especially through a development of 
the world market and modem productive f o r c e s " . ^79
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Cheshkov's view of Soviet society is more compatible with Butenko's 
assessment than with either Simoniya's view of a 'Bonapartist' transition toward 
socialism or El'ianov's liberal view of the necessary function of bureaucratic 
administration in social development. According to Cheshkov, both these views 
are inadequate not normatively but historically, in not explaining why their 
prescriptions for change have been systemically obstructed in the past, why the 
transition to socialism has stayed on the horizon and the economic sense of reform 
has remained abstract. In other words, change has been prevented not just by 
'bureaucratic distortions' but by statocratic interests. Considering the prospect of 
reform, Cheshkov commented that "in 'defence'" of "a really 
professional-administrative bureaucracy" one "must say that it still now does not 
exist", adding that "we should not forget that the general conditions of industrial 
production, dictating the alienation of the producer and statocratisation as a form 
of the socialisation of production, will facilitate a regeneration of the phenomenon 
of statocracy, although in new, higher f o r m s .  80 This question of statocracy's 
historical prospects is the main point of difference between Cheshkov and Sheinis. 
Cheshkov's idea that statocracy, by replacing the proletariat as the main 
"antagonist of the bourgeoisie", has become "the most substantial social agent of 
our epoch" is questioned by Sheinis' stress on the importance of civil society in 
modernity, while Sheinis' perspective of civilising capitalism is relativised by 
Cheshkov's claim that Westernisation is not the only highway to progress. OA 
This has also been a 'unity of opposites', since neither view would have developed 
without the other.
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Conclusions
By developing inter-formational links and transitional structures embodying a historical 
synthesis, humanity as a generic community receives the chance to overcome the blocked 
socio-economic and political relations of the old social structure, which have outlived 
themselves on a world-historical scale, and maintain with this the most valuable 
accumulation of the preceding formation, necessary for further movement forward.
It is no accident therefore that precisely at the most critical turning-points of the history 
of humanity, when the drama of social conflicts and international collisions attains its 
culmination — precisely then with growing force there appears a tendency toward a 
historical synthesis, toward an integration of old and new, toward a widening of the area 
and a raising of the level and intensity of intellectual-spiritual exchange, toward an abrupt 
growth in the social mobility of the population of countries, regions and the whole world.
(Lev Reisner, in N.A. Simoniya and L.I. Reisner eds, Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: 
sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo, Nauka, Moscow, 1984, p. 28.)
This thesis has investigated debates amongst Soviet scholars since the mid 
1960s about three broad problems of development: first, the significance of 
'non-capitalist development' in the third world for Soviet foreign policy; second, 
the question of whether peripheral capitalism can overcome the backwardness of 
developing countries; and third, the nature and deficiencies of the development of 
modem Soviet society. These debates have been read in the light of previous 
studies of comparable discussions amongst the Soviet intelligentsia, and in terms 
of scepticism toward the literal claims of 'Marxism-Leninism'. A lot of 
arguments about specific aspects of these problems of development have been 
evaluated, showing the tenor of Soviet discussion over time about the serious 
issues raised by leading scholars. It is now worthwhile to return to the level of 
general Western discussion about Soviet politics, and suggest some answers from 
the present analysis to current questions.
A direct answer can be given to the question: "how open is 'openness'?" * The 
dramatic transformation in opportunities for Soviet scholars to express critical 
ideas is shown clearly by chapter five, especially in the case of Cheshkov. After 
moving from enforced purgatory to the gates of paradise in the 1960s, he was 
able in the 1970s to present a radical critique of Soviet society, but only in an 
obscure form which few could understand. If, as Nuikin's article suggests, the 
scope of Cheshkov's theory of 'statocracy' was still unclear in early 1988, that 
cloudiness has now vanished. Not only is the sun shining, but many mirrors of
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criticism are at work. Glasnost' was granted and extended from above mainly 
because many below demanded it. When Sheinis recently observed that Mwhat has 
already been said and written has become an indestructible fact of today's (and 
tomorrow's, however events have turned out) social consciousness", he meant that 
the doors of dialogue cannot be shut again, since the winds of change are too 
strong. While the new political atmosphere has been more refreshing than the 
forecasts predicted, because staleness had been the norm for so long, the main 
point is that those doors were creeping open for a long time before glasnost '. 
Henceforth, even a strong arm will probably only be able to moderate the gust of 
public controversy, not reduce it to an occasional breeze of dissent.
A deeper question concerns the prerequisites for the emergence of what Yuri 
Levada has recently called "real pluralism", based on an institutionalisation of 
different points of view.^ Such pluralism would mean the end of an official 
perceptual screen. Certain ideas would still predominate in guiding policy, but as 
a result of open argument rather than legitimate manipulation of acceptable 
evidence. In these terms, the evolution of scholarly debate about peripheral 
capitalism charted in chapter four confirms Aleksandr Bovin's assessment that, 
after the liberal epoch of the 1960s, the "strengthening of a conservative mood in 
the highest echelons of the Soviet leadership held back, but did not stop the 
process of c h a n g e . P r o g r e s s  in this debate occurred principally in the early 
1970s, when Soviet social science was suffering a reactionary backlash, and in the 
early 1980s, before the beginning of a reform from above engendered new hopes. 
An important difference between these two periods is that, whereas the initial 
exchange of opinions tended to polarise around the dominant 'positions' of IVAN 
and IMEMO, a new level of debate was reached a decade or so later largely 
because of a differentiation of theoretical opinion within these institutes. This 
change has been consummated with Simoniya's recent appointment as IMEMO's 
deputy director overseeing research on the developing world, where one of his 
tasks will be to encourage scholars to take up the challenge of general theory 
presented in Cheshkov's critical review article.^ The fact that Sheinis has been 
Cheshkov's main responsible editor in the past shows that leading liberal Soviet
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academics have placed a high value on pluralism of ideas, encouraging those 
colleagues with whom they have had significant disagreements. Of course, this 
does not mean that top policy officials possess a similar degree of respect, but the 
presence of a culture of tolerance within the USSR's leading foreign affairs 
institute indicates the potential basis for an openly pluralist rather than monist 
Soviet world view. Avakov's 1987 advice that "genuine scientific ambition 
consists not in trying to inflict blows and defeat on an opponent, ... but in ... not 
being afraid to doubt the truthfulness of one’s own conclusions" differed 
markedly from his sharp defence of the 'dependent development' view a dozen 
years before, and might even be read, pace Agaev, as a call for pluralism .^
The material examined in this thesis sheds some light on the conceptual change 
represented by 'new political thinking'. While the persistence of the orthodox 
view of 'socialist orientation' considered in chapter three confirmed the hierarchy 
of the Brezhnev regime's basic objectives toward the third world posited in 
chapter two, some key assumptions of Ponomarev's world view have been 
overturned by the new liberal orthodoxy reviewed in the last section of chapter 
four. There is evidence of a paradigm shift in Soviet perceptions of the third 
world, i.e. that a new conceptual framework has arisen because of the 
abandonment of old assumptions in order to make up for opportunities lost during 
a 'normal' period of muddling through. The phenomenon of 'reactionary 
anti-imperialism’ was not accounted for by the old Soviet leadership, which 
considered the developing countries largely as an arena for pressurising the West. 
The context of this phenomenon as a response to the growth of capitalism in the 
third world suggests that the new leadership cannot simply adjust its tactical goals, 
giving more attention to non-aligned capitalist developing countries and being less 
profligate with support for isolated states of ’socialist orientation', without 
re-assessing its general approach of competing for influence against the centres of 
world capitalism. If local sources of backwardness in the third world engender 
nationalist ambitions that threaten global security while wasting resources for 
development, then international help from outside powers rather than one-eyed 
rivalry is a pressing imperative. Gorbachev’s 27th CPSU Congress speech still
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referred to the '’ruthless exploitation" of developing countries by imperialism, but 
noted the prospects for "new capitalist 'power centres'" and called for a "moral 
and political isolation of American imperialism" in order to strengthen global 
interdependence not undermine capitalism. He said that "continuity in foreign 
policy has nothing in common with a simple repetition of what has taken place, 
especially in approaches to problems that have amassed", called for "special 
exactness in evaluations of our own possibilities, self-control and supreme 
responsibility in undertaking decisions", and placed the need for "firmness in 
maintaining principles and positions" and "tactical flexibility" within an overall 
"determination not toward confrontation, but toward dialogue and mutual 
understanding."7
This reformation of Soviet foreign policy from above raises the question of 
how much conceptual change has occurred, or can occur within the limits set by 
the 'leading role' of the CPSU. The analysis in this thesis does not support 
Breslauer's conclusion that a "normative commitment to 'anti-imperialism' ... 
inhibits fundamental learning about the prospects for achieving denial [i.e. 
anti-Western] goals among third world nationalist regimes."^ Such a commitment 
did dominate Soviet political discourse during the Brezhnev years, but it has not 
held firm since then. The fact that Sheinis' perspective about the scope of change 
required in Soviet foreign policy was broadly accepted in the Foreign Ministry 
within a year after his article on 'new political thinking' appeared testifies to 
rapid progress not inhibition of fundamental learning.^ The main topic of a 
recent discussion amongst leading scholars was the possibility that contemporary 
capitalism could exist without exploiting the developing countries. Simoniya 
argued that conditions were forming which would make "militarism and the 
direct exploitation of other peoples not only unprofitable from the point of view 
of the fundamental interests of the world capitalist system, but also threatening to 
its existence". He stressed the influence of peace-loving forces in the West, and 
claimed that for leading third world countries "the attainment of economic 
independence with a simultaneous integration in the bounds of the international 
division of labour will mean the end of neocolonialism." Sheinis spelt out the
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implication of this by suggesting that, if the nature of the West was re-thought 
under the pressure of events in the 1960s as 'imperialism without colonies', "now 
the time has come to take the following step" and recognise that "'imperialism' in 
that sense in which it was understood in Marxist literature at the beginning of the 
century (and as it has been interpreted until now in the works of epigones) is not 
at all the defining characteristic of capitalism at the close of the 20th c e n t u r y . " ^  
Clearly, if imperialism no longer characterises the West then a basic Soviet 
commitment to support 'anti-imperialism' in the third world is a thing of the past. 
The suggestion by Hough and Valkenier that a Soviet perspective of global 
interdependence implies the end of a bifurcated view of the international order 
has been confirmed. ^
The process of extensive change in the dominant Soviet view of the third 
world has been 'cumulative' rather than 'cyclical'. This is shown clearly by the 
debate about 'socialist orientation'. Criticism by leading scholars of existing 
Soviet policy had to build up for a long time before it became influential in 
official circles. The initial rejection of Simoniya's critique by Brutents shows that 
post-Khrushchev disillusionment amongst Soviet officials about the prospects of 
radical anti-Western regimes in the third world was minor. ^  Optimism about 
dependent allies on the part of Ul'ianovsky and his supporters in the early and 
mid 1970s was nothing new. What was new was the reconsideration undertaken 
at this time by a key figure in the debate, Mirsky, who appreciated the 
significance of state capitalist development in Egypt soon after Simoniya. His 
warnings were ignored by senior officials in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
partly because the orthodox view was affirmed by a lot of lesser scholars who 
were content to think at the level of propaganda rather than analysis. But this did 
not signify an absence of conceptual change, since at this time it became widely 
recognised that 'socialist orientation' was a realistic prospect only for more 
backward third world countries, and even there depended upon political will 
rather than economic forces. The gradual exposure of contradictions in the 
dominant eclectic view of 'non-capitalist development' throughout the Brezhnev 
years contributed to the speed with which it was discarded under the new
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leadership, and led to growing interest in a serious analysis of problems 
complicating socialist development in backward countries.^  While both 
Maidanik's left-radical rejection of the ’leading role' of loyal communist or 
nationalist parties and the links made by Simoniya and Sterbalova between the 
failure of 'socialist orientation' and Stalinism were conceived many years before, 
the influence of these ideas would have increased recently because of the obvious 
falsity of the old orthodoxy. Maidanik's standing amongst the foreign policy 
establishment is now marginal because of his adherence to dependency theory, but 
his criticism of Primakov for not noting that "the historical role of the subjective 
factor of revolution" in a developing society is "to neutralise objective factors of 
blocking and stagnation" had interesting domestic i m p l i c a t i o n s . ^  The lack of 
substance in Ul'ianovsky's view about 'non-capitalist development' meant that 
heretical views accumulated in the 'years of stagnation' even amongst leading 
scholars who retained faith in capitalism's 'general crisis'.
A new Soviet orthodoxy about the third world has emerged not only because 
of the progress of scholarly debates, but also because of the new leadership's 
relaxation of control over political discourse. The legitimacy of an open 
exchange of opinions about controversial issues of foreign policy has compensated 
substantially for the continuing absence of a comprehensive synthetic theory of 
the developing world. While Simoniya's theory of Oriental capitalism has formed 
the basis for the new liberal orthodoxy, it has not transformed the alternative 
approach presented by Cheshkov, so that these competing views exist in an 
unstable symbiosis rather than an evolving synthesis. This situation does not 
contain the possibility of a return to the old orthodoxy, because Cheshkov's 
revision of old dogmas has been more radical than Simoniya's, and his method has 
been at least as Marxist. While sceptical about the progress of peripheral 
capitalism, Cheshkov is clearly not a supporter of barracks-communism in the 
third world. His main criticism of the new liberal orthodoxy's reduction of 
developing countries' conflict with the West "to inter-capitalist contradictions" is 
that it ignores the "global problems of today's world", by assuming that major 
progressive development is still possible within the capitalist formation if third
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world countries follow the European path. He argues that "the historical time for 
a formational type of development has been exhausted", partly because the 
growing role of mental productive forces has led to "a relativisation of the 
primacy of material production and material mechanisms of determination in 
processes of social evolution", and partly because "the coexistence of world 
systems ... does not amount to a temporary situation of 'transition' from one 
formational epoch to another", since "a consecutive change of formations in the 
context of the military-cosmic revolution already may be not only a mode of the 
development, yet also a mode of the existence of humanity; it can become a path 
to the annihilation of h u m a n i t y . " ^  i n  short, human development is not a matter 
of catching-up but of looking out. Cheshkov's view fits Gorbachev’s earnest 
rhetoric of global disarmament almost as much as Simoniya’s does. If a real 
"pluralisation of social structures" occurs in the USSR,*7 and capitalist 
contradictions do intensify some time in the next few years, then Cheshkov's 
radical utopia of a way out beyond statocracy might become most influential in 
Moscow and elsewhere. Only if reform in the USSR is halted from above, and if 
Simoniya's optimism about the growth in the West of "pacifist, 'ecological' and 
other democratic forces" is misplaced, will a return to what She inis called a 
primitive Soviet world view be likely. ^
This interpretation of the actual and potential scope of 'new political thinking' 
is based on an extensive reading of the main works by leading Soviet development 
theorists over the past twenty years. The quantity and quality of dialogue possible 
between an outside interpreter and the arguments contained in these works shows 
that, although the influence on Soviet policy of the brightest scholars was minimal 
during the 'years of stagnation', the horizon of their concerns was not. As Hough 
has suggested, they were preparing for major political changes, without knowing 
the year when a new era would begin. ^  While the form of the material 
evaluated in this thesis confirms the initial methodological point that Soviet 
scholars have been restricted politically in expressing their ideas, an important 
qualification should be noted. In general, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, 
the meaning of arguments put forward by leading scholars was not obfuscated by
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a need to concede to tradition on some points in order to advance other 
controversial opinions. In other words, the necessary concessions made in order 
to get works through the censorship did not affect the logic of the arguments 
advanced. Given an appreciation of the contexts of debate, the main difficulty 
was not the ritual silence with which sensitive issues were apparently swept under 
the carpet, but rather the complexity and broad scope of scholarly disputes about 
such issues. This conclusion is not surprising, in terms of both the existence of 
substantial debate during the 'years of stagnation' and the open expression of 
different opinions in the fresh air of glasnost'. If the dead atmosphere of 
tradition had been so strong as to inhibit the systematic interrelation of parts and 
wholes required by logical thought, then the content of implicit debate would have 
been less significant, as was largely the case under Stalin, and the public polemics 
allowed by the new leadership would have been limited by many illusions, as 
largely occurred under Khrushchev. The discursive structure of recent Soviet 
development debates confirms the general hypothesis argued in chapter two of a 
progressive dissolution of ideological censorship in the USSR since Stalin.
Debates amongst leading Soviet scholars about problems of development have 
been significant not only in changing the dominant Soviet view of the third world, 
but also in affecting what Kagarlitsky has termed the "cultural-political process" 
of Soviet s o c i e t y . 20 The main conclusion in this respect is that, while 
conservative officials succeeded in stabilising the Stalinist system for a decade and 
a half from 1968, most leading liberal and radical critics of this system continued 
to argue for change. If some scholars like Lukin narrowed the scope of their 
criticism, others like Sheinis maintained a dialogue of broad dispute with the 
holders of power right up until the arrival of glasnost', and even to some degree 
thereafter. Socially, while the Brezhnev regime isolated itself from the demands 
and hopes of much of the Soviet intelligentsia, many leading scholars occupied 
themselves with the long task of creating a majority consensus about the need for 
radical reform. They did this largely by trying to understand the obstacles to 
change theoretically, since from their perspective empirical facts about the 
declining quality of Soviet life were as obvious as they were unmentionable. The
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main difference between the internal Soviet critiques of actually existing Stalinism 
considered in chapter five and many Western accounts of the Brezhnev regime 
concerns the source of what Slavnyi called 'enormous social energy directed in 
words against capitalism and in deed against modem society'. All participants in 
the subterranean debate about Soviet society agreed with Lukin's point that poor 
'socialism' derived not from mistakes by well-meaning leaders, but, as Levkovsky 
stressed, from the political character of the bureaucratic forces holding state 
power. None suggested that the main obstacle to change was an ideological 
attachment on the part of high officials to a theory of 'Leninism' based on "the 
primacy of politics over e c o n o m ic s" .^  Mirsky's scenario about 'the temptation 
of entrepreneurship' for a 'statist elite' assumed as a matter of course that 
adequate economic compensation would satisfy the holders of power if it proved 
impossible to compete with a growing bourgeoisie. The reading of Soviet 
development debates in this thesis suggests that official ideology has lagged far 
behind academic theories because of the dead weight of bureaucratic politics, not
that official policies have been hamstrung by any theoretical precepts of an
99uncompromising ideology.
This interpretation implies that if substantial changes in the political 
composition of the Soviet elite occur, then the official ideology might be able to 
catch-up and incorporate a number of key intellectual themes. Broadly speaking, 
such a political liberalisation has been Gorbachev's main achievement to date, but 
comparing the subterranean debate about Soviet society with the current Party 
line shows that some themes remain outside the official perceptual screen. A 
recent speech by Aleksandr Yakovlev stressed the need for a rich "tradition of 
intellectuality", and claimed that, in terms of a transition from the "authoritarian 
past" to a democratic future, 1988 "was a turning-point not only for the epoch of 
restructuring, but for the whole of [Soviet] history." While assuming the socialist 
nature of Soviet society, he said "an ideology of myth-creation" had supported the 
elimination from decision-making of "millions of communists", but warned of a 
"real danger" that failure to understand the difficulty of reform could "undermine 
restructuring with whining and whittling, drown it in petty d e b a t e s .
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Certainly, the task of replacing an old dogma which said 'everything is 
wonderful' is much more difficult than merely loosening it. From the viewpoint 
of a reformist leadership, nothing could be simpler rhetorically than proclaiming 
'the end of ideology’, if only it was not necessary to elaborate a new historical 
synthesis in place of the echoes of Stalinism. What Cheshkov called "the 
transformation of a consciousness of restructuring into an ideology of renewal 
having a really scientific basis" cannot be controlled, or even directed, from 
above, because, as Rashkovsky has pointed out, "truth is internally inspired and 
dynamic", so that attempts to monopolise it lead only to the hollow inertia of dead 
f o r m u l a s . If the voices of civil society are allowed and encouraged to speak, 
they will set their own agendas for change, and evaluate themselves which debates 
are pithy and which are trifling. While force of circumstances can lead the elite 
strata of the state apparatus to foster elements of pluralism, only the strengthening 
of dialogue from below can, as Simoniya suggested, compel the official state to a 
further evolution.
The 'dangerous tendency of the social isolation of ruling groups' which 
Sheinis highlighted at the end of the 1960s was paralleled by a foreclosing of 
foreign horizons for all but the privileged few. Conversely, the new liberal era 
of reform from above has seen official Soviet offers of dialogue with the outside 
world, in the first place with the West, which are at least as substantial as calls for 
mental renewal at home. This is partly a reaction to the relative cost of the 'years 
of stagnation', when the USSR marked time while some developing countries 
continued to catch-up with the West economically. The constraints of Soviet 
backwardness led one scholar to suggest recently that, even with a successful 
economic reform, the USSR would lack the "cruel" advantages of capitalism, so 
that "an excessive enthusiasism for Western technology will consolidate our 
position as a catching-up, dependent, 'developing' country."^ Genuine progress 
for the USSR cannot be obtained through technocratic means, but through 
cooperative appropriation of what Pantin called "the highest results of common 
human development."26 As Levada recently suggested, the USSR's "full and 
stable 'return'" to the 'highway' of world progress is connected "with the starting
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up of a fundamental dialogue between cultures and socio-political traditions", the 
language of which "may be only common v a lu e s ."27 The broadest conclusion of 
this thesis is that such cross-cultural discussion about common global problems is 
quite possible and necessary, but not inevitable, since conservative forces on both 
sides are not interested in a "depolarisation" of ’power centres' in the modem 
world.28 in other words, differences of opinion expressing the interests of social 
institutions and groups are not determined by state boundaries. Only by talking 
about broadly similar obstacles to development will it be possible to substantiate 
"the universality of common human values, resting on which we might in a 
non-relativist way recreate human h i s t o r y . ' ™
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